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This dissertation focuses in the phenomenon of partner violence in Mexico.  It 
examines the causes of partner violence at multiple levels of analysis.  At the micro level 
it examines characteristics of individual victims, the family and the relationship.  At the 
macro level the focus is on the legal and social structures that define domestic violence 
and the State’s response.  Throughout the analysis, the State plays a central role as the set 
of institutional arrangements that define the rules of the game and that determine the 
possibilities for change and the potential roles and effectiveness of key players including 
the feminist movement. 
Throughout the analysis I examine the confluence of forces that influence the 
State’s attempts to reduce individual women’s risk of partner violence through its 
legislative, judicial and police powers in a historically defined situation characterized by 
pervasive structural patriarchy.  A major objective is to asses the influence of the 
pervasive patriarchy in the system on individual women’s risk of partner violence.  The 
approach adopted in this dissertation is based on the assumption that patriarchy is a social 
system that permeates social institutions and that becomes internalized and part of the 
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normative everyday reality that structures individual’s interpretations and motivations.  
This research demonstrates that, on average, the structural gender inequality between 
Mexican men and women is high.  This inequality is revealed through qualitative and 
quantitative analyses that demonstrate empirically the influence of the patriarchal system 
both on individual experiences of partner violence, and on the State’s response. 
Adopting a feminist post-structuralist approach to the analysis of the State’s role, 
the research reveals inconsistencies between the discourses and practices of the Mexican 
State regarding partner violence.  By analyzing administrative family violence legislation, 
I determine whether the Mexican State has in fact made substantively meaningful 
attempts to challenge patriarchy and to end violence against women in the family realm.  
The family violence legislation has two often inherently contradictory purposes.  On the 
one hand the objective is to protect the family as a core social institution.  The second, 
which is often in conflict with the first objective, is to protect women from abuse by their 
partners.  This dissertation demonstrates that these conflicting objectives and the 
embededness of patriarchy throughout the social help explain why certain branches of the 
Mexican State tend to strengthen patriarchy and reify women’s subordinate position in 
the family.  The way in which the State interprets and implements family violence 
legislation reveals the inability and/or unwillingness of the State to protect women’s 
rights and highlights the patriarchal assumptions pervading the State’s actions.   
Finally, this research looks at feminist and women’s movements and NGOs to 
determine whether they have been effective in influencing the State to adopt measures to 
guarantee women a life free of violence. I looked not only for their influence on the 
legislative level, but also surveyed the role they continue to play in implementing anti-
violence laws.   
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
“The legal right of a man to beat his wife is no longer explicitly 
recognized in most western countries but the legacy of the patriarchy 
continues to generate the conditions and relationships that lead to a 
husband’s use of force against his wife. Patriarchal domination through 
force is still supported by a moral order which reinforces the marital 
hierarchy and makes it very difficult for a woman to struggle against 
this, and other forms of domination and control, because her struggle is 
construed as wrong, immoral, and a violation of the respect and loyalty 
a wife is supposed to give to her husband. Despite this, women do 
continue struggle against their husbands’ specific oppression as well as 
against the ‘morality’ that forces a woman to remain silent or to seek 
fault in herself for her husband’s violence. Women struggle against all 
odds –against cultural ideals that still require a woman to submit to 
almost any form of treatment that her husband considers appropriate 
and against the policies and responses of various social agencies which 
often demonstrate direct or indirect support for the husband’s authority 
and his use of violence”. Dobash and Dobash (1979:ix) Violence 
against Wives, A Case against the Patriarchy. 
 
 
The “hogar”, or hearth and home, is no sanctuary for many women in today’s 
world.  The home is one of the most dangerous places for Mexican women (Díaz-
Olavarrieta and Sotelo 1996).  In 2003, approximately 40 percent of Mexican women 
were the victims of some type of abuse by their partners (INEGI and INMUJERES 
2004).  This research addresses an important and at the same time little understood 
phenomenon, violence against women perpetrated by their romantic partner in Mexico.  
While a great deal of attention has been paid to the individual and situational factors that 
influence the phenomenon, the roles of social structure, the State and the impact of 
legislation and public policies on the prevalence and severity of partner violence has been 
largely neglected.  The current study addresses those shortcomings by focusing on the 
interconnections between social structure, the State and individual-level factors as 
determinants of the risk of domestic violence in a highly patriarchal social and cultural 
context.   
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The ingrained and pervasive nature of patriarchy in Mexico is revealed by the fact 
that 8.5 percent of Mexican women believe that their husbands have the right to use 
physical force to discipline them when they do not fulfill their obligations.  Similarly, 11 
percent believes that wives have an obligation to have sex with their husbands even if 
they do not want to (ENDIREH 2003).  Violence against women has existed in Mexico in 
different manifestations since the pre-Hispanic era (Alonso 1997; Finkler 1997; Suárez 
Escobar 1999).  The arrival of the Spaniards did little more than strengthen and reaffirm 
the already existing patriarchal social structure by adding cultural scripts that reinforced 
women’s subordination (Suárez Escobar 1999).  The right of a man to beat his wife is no 
longer explicitly recognized in Mexican legislation since it was outlawed in the 1871’s 
criminal code (Alonso 1997).  In Mexico wife beating is not considered a natural aspect 
of male-female relations, nor is it treated in law as a husband’s or mates prerogative.  
Indeed, violence against women is rejected both in the private and public spheres and 
aggressors are stigmatized (Agoff, Rajsbaum, and Herrera 2006; Finkler 1997:1153).  Yet 
the phenomenon persists at surprisingly high rates. 
In order to address the problem of domestic violence, in 1996 the Federal District 
Legislative Assembly enacted the first administrative family violence law in Mexico.  
Soon afterwards, administrative family violence laws were approved in other states in 
Mexico.  These were motivated by both international forces and local internal pressures 
from civil society, the women’s movement, and as a result of a political legitimacy crisis.  
These forces acted together to further the approval of family violence laws.  
The objective of administrative family legislation was to reduce the prevalence of 
partner violence by providing assistance to victims and promoting family violence 
prevention programs and policies.  However, the role of the State was not 
straightforward.  An examination of the passage and implementation of administrative 
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family violence legislation reveals the following paradox that will be examined 
throughout this dissertation: the laws have a dual purpose, on the one hand to protect and 
affirm the sanctity of the family, and on the other the protection of family members from 
the threat of family violence.   
Based on the proposition that patriarchy is a social system that permeates 
institutions and that becomes internalized in individuals, my dissertation addresses 
several specific questions.  One of the most central is, what is the role of the State in 
implementation of laws?  A second is, what are the implications of the inherent paradox 
in the objectives of protecting the sanctity of the family while intervening to protect its 
members from violence?  A third question relates to the type of protection women receive 
from the State under the administrative family violence laws.  A fourth question asks 
whether State-promoted measures intended to protect women from partner violence are 
patriarchy-free. A fifth question addresses the level of patriarchy in Mexico.  A sixth 
question asks if the level of patriarchy is similar in all states of Mexico.  Finally, a 
seventh question asks how patriarchy affects individual experiences of partner violence.  
Although these questions are posed separately, they will be answered in many parts of the 
dissertation, often simultaneously.   
Social problems are complex and need to be studied within their multiple levels of 
complexity.  As a consequence, this research examines the causes of partner violence at 
multiple levels of analysis; from the individual victim, the family and the relationship at 
the most microscopic level, to the larger legal and social structures at the most macro, 
taking into consideration role of the State, an entity that has the potentiality of changing 
both the social structure and the individuals.  
The study of partner violence is complex since violence is very often 
bidirectional. In this research I only focus in violence perpetrated by men against women, 
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since men exert violence based on a system that attributes them social prerogatives on 
women.  This system is patriarchy. As men are the ones benefited from this system the 
nature of the violence perpetrated by women is of another nature, and it is not based on 
their privileged position in society.  
 
1.1-   SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
When domestic violence became the subject of scientific research in the early 70s, 
its definition was restricted to physical violence (see for example Gelles and Straus 1979; 
Yllo 1988).  As time passed, the definition of violence was expanded to any act that is 
harmful to the victim, including physical attacks, threatened physical attacks, 
psychological or emotional abuse, sexual assaults or threatened sexual assaults, and 
neglectful behavior (Gelles 2000).  Today there are many conceptions of those acts that 
constitute domestic violence and the scholar community has not reached a consensus 
regarding “how broad or narrow the definition of violence should be, or as to how to 
define the specific components of any definition (e.g., violence, neglect, rape, or 
psychological abuse)”  (Gelles 2000:786).  The Declaration on Violence Against Women 
(1993, Art. 1), defines violence against women as “any act of gender-based violence that 
results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to 
women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, 
whether occurring in public or in private life”, regardless if it occurs.  When these acts 
are perpetrated by a romantic partner, the act is labeled partner violence or domestic 
violence.   
The problem of partner violence is complex because its causes and its 
consequences reach beyond the individual and the family.  At the individual level, 
research based on diverse western and non-western samples agrees that victims of partner 
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abuse experience personal loses beyond damage to their physical and mental health 
(Castro, Peek-Asa, and Ruiz 2003; García-Moreno 1999; Goodman, Koss, and Russo 
1993; Heise and García-Moreno 2002; Valdez-Santiago and Juárez 1998), such as lower 
earnings compared to non abused (Morrison and Orlando 1999). 
At the family level, violence in one family relationship is related to violence in 
other family relationships (Straus and Smith 1990).  The children of abused women are 
more likely, than those of women who have not been abused to be victims of violence, to 
act violently against their intimate partners and their children (Egeland 1993; Kalmuss 
1984; Larraín Heiremans 1994; National Research Council 1996; Straus, Gelles, and 
Steinmetz 1980; Straus and Smith 1990).  Domestic violence teaches children that 
violence is an appropriate way of resolve disagreements, which increases the likelihood 
of engaging in violence outside the home (Morrison and Orlando 1999) and ultimately 
lead to adult criminal behavior (see review by Hackler 1991). 
Finally, partner violence has a socioeconomic impact on society that includes 
expenditures on the criminal justice system, shelters, social and medical services, as well 
as impacts on the country’s economic development (Buvinic, Morrison, and Shifter 
1999).  The expenses in the health system of Mexico associated with family violence are 
approximately 1.5% of the GDP, or approximately 92,292 million pesos per year (Oficina 
del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas 2003).  In sum, partner violence is a 
problem that has broad implications for the individual, for families and for society in 
general and the problem requires a better understanding of its causes and consequences, 
its intergenerational transmission, its impact on other spheres of social life, as well as the 
role of the State in dealing with partner violence. 
Until the last two decades most of the research about domestic violence was 
centered in North-America and a few Western countries (Jewkes 2002).  For the most 
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part, research on domestic violence is dominated by English-language publications and 
researchers in other countries tend to rely on the extensive literature on violence in the 
U.S. to motivate and frame their analyses (see Krahe, Bieneck, and Moller 2005; Krane 
1996).  Only recently have researchers begun to test propositions and theories based on 
studies from developed countries in developing nations.  Interestingly, this new research 
focused on other societies and cultures has largely corroborated Gelles and Cornell’s 
(1983) tentative conclusion about the existence of country variations in rates of violence 
and other factors, including culture, that are related to family violence.  This new 
comparative research, even given its limitations and limited representativeness (García-
Moreno 1999; Torres-Falcón 2001), suggests that we cannot assume that the same factors 
that explain violence in the United States and Western Europe operate in the same way in 
other societies.  Factors other than the individual and situational characteristics of the 
individual, the family and the relationship might influence partner violence.  Among 
those we find structural level variables such as the level of structural gender equality, and 
the State. 
Despite the fact that the World Bank has labeled Latin America as one of the most 
violent regions of the world (Buvinic, Morrison, and Shifter 1999), very little is known 
about the structural contexts, prevalence and factors associated to partner violence in this 
region, largely because of  the lack of nationally representative studies in many countries 
(Heise and García-Moreno 2002; Watts and Zimmerman 2002).  This analysis of partner 
violence in Mexico extends our current knowledge about partner violence in several 
ways.  First, it contributes to better understanding the phenomenon in a developing 
country.  Second, since Mexico is often stereotyped as Machista (Díaz-Olavarrieta and 
Sotelo 1996) and because of the fact that Mexican men are stereotypically seen as violent 
machos (Alonso 1997), Mexico represents an excellent case study for analyzing the role 
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of social structure and culture in the phenomenon of partner violence.  Third, in light of 
Mexico’s recent democratization process, the analysis of Mexico can shred some light 
about how the State deals with women’s rights, and more specifically with partner 
violence, in a context of democratization.  And fourth, theoretically, by using the case of 
Mexico, this research extends previous approaches by developing a theoretical bridge 
between the micro family violence approach (mostly focused in the individual) and a 
macro feminist perspective (mainly centered in the patriarchal nature of the social 
structure and the analysis of the state).  This dissertation reconciles these two standpoints, 
so that rather than considering them as competing perspectives, treats them as 
complementary approaches that deal with different aspects of the same problem. 
 
1.2-  FEMINIST APPROACH TO WOMEN, FAMILY, PATRIARCHY AND 
VIOLENCE  
With few exceptions, women have been historically subordinated to men.  Yet, 
there is no agreement in the literature concerning the nature of patriarchy or masculine 
domination as a cultural and social phenomenon (see in example Bourdieu 1998; Segal 
1993).  Patriarchy, which defines the position of women in society as subordinate to men, 
has been historically supported and reinforced by legal, political, economic and 
ideological structures, including the religious system (Dobash and Dobash 1979; 
Moghadam 2004).  These structures directly or indirectly maintain and reinforce the 
ideology and reality of men’s authority over women and foster the acceptance of men’s 
use of physical force against women.  
The patriarchal society is one in which power is held by male heads of households 
in all realms public and private.  In the private realm, the patriarch (male) enjoys power 
over all junior males, females and children. In the public sphere the power is shared and 
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negotiated among patriarchs.  In the household women might influence indirectly that 
who occupies the power (male), but it never happens in the public sphere (Mann 1986).  
In order for the Western State to emerge as the dominant institution of power in society, 
it had to control the large feudal households, which hold political and economic power.  
The State deliberately increased the power of the husband and father in the family, 
strengthening patriarchy, as a way of creating loyalties and reinforcing hierarchy, both 
within the family and in the society giving a central position to the State in society 
(Dobash and Dobash 1979).  The development of patriarchy within the family was 
instrumental for the State in assuring that the same patterns of obedience and hierarchy in 
the family would be reproduced in social life.  Therefore, the nuclear family became a 
basic social cell and the basis of the State.  Foucault (1965) argued that the family was 
the foundation of patriarchal society, and that other social institutions replicated the 
family model.   
The family is perhaps the only societal institution that is conceptualized as 
essential and natural.  Feminist discourse has criticized the nuclear family as the 
fundamental source of gender inequality and the primary locus of women’s oppression.  
The family is one of the most patriarchal institutions in society (Dobash and Dobash 
1977).  In order to assure subordination the patriarch has the prerogative of using force; 
such as the State has it in the Weberian conceptualization of the State (1965).  The family 
does not only maintains, but also validates men’s use of violence against women (Bograd 
1988).  Although other forms of male violence against women are shaped by patriarchy 
as well, a man’s right to dominate is nearly sacrosanct within the family (Dobash and 
Dobash 1977; 1988).  
The structured inequality in the family, which frees men from child care, creates a 
male consciousness that makes boys want to differentiate than women and to treat them 
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as subordinate.  Because men monopolize the positions of power and authority in the 
society, these desires to distance themselves from women and not to be like them are 
institutionalized in discriminatory policies and practices (Williams 1993).  Thus it is 
through the family where the patriarchy is maintained and reproduced through the 
socialization of patriarchal norms and values that are transferred from one generation to 
the next.  The core aspect of this theory is that the private patriarchal structure of the 
family is reproduced in the public sphere, thus reproducing and reinforcing the inequality 
between men and women.  As the data attest, the family is not only the most patriarchal 
institution, but also the site in which more violence against women occur. 
1.2.a-  Feminist Approaches on Patriarchy and Violence  
Patriarchy is a system in which men invariably oppress women.  It is conformed 
by “a set of social relations which has a material base and in which there are hierarchical 
relations between men, and solidarity among them, which enable them to control women” 
(Hartmann 1976:138).  Different men exercise varying degrees of power and control, and 
“women collaborate and resist in different ways” (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994:3).  The use 
of physical violence against women is a consequence of patriarchy and it is not only a 
way in which women are controlled and oppressed, but it is “one of the most brutal and 
explicit expressions of patriarchal domination” (Dobash and Dobash 1979:iv).  Even one 
incident of abuse, even if it is moderate, serves the purpose of reminding a woman that 
the man has ultimate control, and that this control cannot be questioned (Calveiro 1999). 
Feminism cannot be regarded as a homogenous group.  Three main factions have 
been identified (Jaggar 1983; Mooney 2000).  Liberal feminists argue that patriarchy, is 
the overriding cause and explanation of violence against women.  Liberal feminists are 
also called equal rights or reform feminists and they believe that that the structural 
inequality between men and women generates a culture in which violence against women 
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is tolerated (Dobash and Dobash 1979; Fox 1988).  Liberal feminists usually work toward 
achieving civil and political equality, or political reforms that will improve women’s 
status in society in the context of the existing social order.  The rationale behind is that as 
the status of female as a group becomes more similar to that of men in a certain society, 
women’s situation of subordination and domination will change (Dobash and Dobash 
1992).   
The second group, socialist feminists, believes that women’s situation is 
influenced by the socio-economic context, which has to change in order for women to be 
able to improve their situation.  The concept of patriarchy was a late comer in feminist 
Marxism, which in its early stages was mainly centered in the domestic labor debate (see 
review by Mooney 2000).  It was not until later that the concept of patriarchy entered in 
the discussion of why women had a subordinate status in society.  For some, patriarchy 
and capitalism were two different systems of oppression (Hartmann 1976), while for 
others there were two interlocking systems that contributed to women’s oppression 
(Young 1981).  For Marxist feminists the improvement of women’s situation and the 
eradication of violence will be associated with changes in the economic realm –
capitalism- and in the ideological level -conventional family structure. 
Finally, the third group within feminism, radical feminism, believes that male 
oppression of women (patriarchy) is the most fundamental form of domination and it 
predates capitalism.  For the majority of radical feminists patriarchal domination is 
associated with “the male appropriation of women’s sexuality and bodies and acts of 
violence (Mooney 2000:87); therefore, sexuality is central in their analysis of women’s 
subordination (MacKinnon 1979; 1989).  They claim that men control women using 
female’s sexuality; the threat or fear of violence function as control mechanisms.  Male 
violence against women has the function of maintaining male’s supremacy and female 
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inferiority (Bograd 1988).  For radical feminism, the family and the institution of 
heterosexuality which is derived upon the conventional family are key in understanding 
patriarchy and women’s subordination (Radford and Stanko 1991). 
 
1.2.b-  Unveiling Patriarchy: How Does the Patriarchal System Work? 
Dobash and Dobash (1977; 1979) examined with detail how the patriarchal 
system works in their ground breaking work, Violence Against Women, a Case Against 
Patriarchy.  Embracing a liberal feminist perspective, their work illustrates the 
functioning and perpetuation of the societal patriarchal system.  They theorize patriarchy 
as being composed of two elements, structure and ideology.  The structural aspect of the 
patriarchy becomes manifest in the nature of the hierarchical organization of social 
institutions and social relations.  Social institutions and social relations determine that 
some individuals will occupy positions of leadership and power, while others will be 
relegated to secondary positions.  Access to these positions is not based on individual’s 
achievement, instead, ascribed status or institutionalized forms of privilege allow certain 
individuals to reach these privileged positions.  
The institutional nature of the hierarchical structure determines which groups will 
lead (men) and which groups will follow (women).  This patriarchal structure also allows 
those who are in privileged positions to select who will inherit those positions, thus, 
perpetuating their advantage.  Patriarchy is maintained and reinforced by assuring that 
women have no legitimate means of changing or managing the institutions that define 
and maintain their subordination: “Confining women in the home, banning them from 
meaningful positions outside the family, and excluding them from the bench and the 
pulpit is to deny them the means of bringing about change in their status” (Dobash and 
Dobash 1979:43). 
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The second aspect of patriarchy, the ideological, is related to the acceptance of the 
inequality between men and women.  In some cultures women are socialized to accept 
physical and emotional punishment as their husbands’ prerogative (Heise, Pintaguy, and 
Germain 1994; Levinson 1989).  The patriarchal ideology serves as a legitimate base and 
a way to reinforce the acceptance of the structural patriarchy.  The ideological component 
assures that complains and attempts to transform the patriarchal system will be seen as 
deviant and immoral.  In this way, the socialization into an acceptance of the patriarchal 
hierarchical order allows these inequalities to persist over time and to remain 
unquestioned and unchallenged.   
The patriarchal structure implies a hierarchy in which women are at the bottom of 
legal, political, economic and ideological structures.  That women are not in the higher 
ranks of the social structures only perpetuates their formal inequality and it makes 
challenging the patriarchal ideology almost impossible.  In other words, because women 
do not have the same access as men to influential positions in social institutions, it is 
impossible to change the societal ideology that places women in a subordinated position.  
At the same time, this ideology prevents women from reaching powerful positions in the 
social structure.  Therefore, ideology and social structure feed on themselves and 
contribute to the inequality between genders. Without women in the ruling spheres, their 
subordination is guaranteed and the patriarchal ideology remains unchallenged.  
In sum, according to liberal feminism, the societal systematic organization of 
male supremacy and female subordination and consequently violence, can be eroded on 
the one hand by women achieving positions valued in society and previously reserved to 
men.  On the other, this process has to be accompanied with an ideological change.  
Nevertheless it remains unclear whether ideological changes will carry structural changes 
or the other way around, or the both have to occur simultaneously.   
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1.3-  THEORETICAL MODEL OF THE RESEARCH:  STRUCTURATION 
THEORY, THE STATE AND LINKS BETWEEN MICRO AND MACRO 
PERSPECTIVES FOR ANALYZING PARTNER VIOLENCE 
Individuals are members of society and are embedded in a particular social 
structure.  There are several definitions of social structure.  From one perspective social 
structure has been conceptualized as the set of relatively stable patterns of relationship 
among different entities or groups that compose the society.  From another perspective 
the term has also been used to refer to the embedded institutions or norms that shape the 
actions of social agents.  From both perspectives, social structure underlies and defines 
important social systems including the political system, the class system, the legal 
system, or the patriarchal system.  Society can be interpreted as a bounded system 
(Giddens 1984).  According to Giddens, a “social systems exist only in so far as forms of 
social conduct are reproduced chronically across time and space” Giddens (1984: xxi). 
Giddens’ (1984) theory of structuration suggests that social structure, which 
consists of  traditions, institutions, moral codes, and established ways of doing things, 
exists as a result of the mutually reinforcing actions of structures and individual agency.  
It is through the continuous repetition of the acts of individuals that structure is 
reproduced.1  “In structuration theory, ‘structure’ refers to the rules and resources 
recursively implicated in social reproduction.  Institutionalized features of social systems 
have structural properties in the sense that relationships are stabilized across time and 
space” (Giddens 1984: xxxi).  Social structure is not monolithic.  It can be changed when 
individuals act differently, either because previous acts are ignored, replaced or 
reproduced differently.  Giddens emphasizes the duality of structure and agency, while 
claiming that the two cannot be conceived apart from one another.  Therefore, Giddens 
                                                 
1 Giddens (1984) defines social structure as the “institutionalized features of society which stretch across 
time and space, which involve the dual aspects of reflexive human actions and of their continuity over and 
above the individuals involved in any one instant”. 
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argues, structures are linked to individuals since it is through individuals’ repetition that 
the structure is created, but structures do not completely determine individuals’ behavior.  
Instead, structures are a set of rules and resources upon which actors draw, and which in 
the aggregate they reproduce. 
The theory of structuration is very appropriate for explaining how the patriarchal 
system in Mexico is produced and reproduced, as well as both maintained and challenged 
by individuals and the State.  Patriarchy is a social system in which men invariably 
oppress women.  It is constituted by a set of social relations which have a material basis 
which generates solidarity among men that enables them to control women (Hartmann 
1976).  Patriarchy is embedded in social relations.  Patriarchal ideology is manifested in a 
“normalization” and acceptance of gender inequality in several spheres of social life.  
Nobody questions, for example, that on average women’s salaries are lower than those of 
men, that women are often forced to quit their job after having a baby; that women are 
expected to perform unpaid domestic chores, or that men have the right of controlling the 
behavior of their female partners.  All of these internalized beliefs contribute to 
patriarchy and its perception as legitimate.  
In the case of partner violence the repetition the behavior at the individual level 
over time and space results in the behavior coming to be regarded as something normal.  
Domestic violence lies at the core of the patriarchal system, leading some scholars to 
argue that domestic violence is the most brutal and explicit form of domination under 
patriarchy (Dobash and Dobash 1979; Radford and Stanko 1991).  Of course, it is 
possible that such a situation can change if individuals alter the ways in which they 
interpret gender and family relations and the behaviors and gender relations they view as 
legitimate and morally correct.  Through the establishment of new non-patriarchic 
practices it is possible that basic social structures can change.  In elaborating this 
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possibility it is important to remember the role of the State, which exists as part of social 
structure but also can be seen as a key actor that operates between other components of 
social structure and individuals.  In perhaps one of the most influential definitions of the 
State, Weber (1965), defines it as an organization that has a monopoly of the legitimate 
use of physical force within a given territory.  The State is potentially able to influence 
both the society/group of individuals and the social structure, because through laws and 
the use of force, the State has the potential for changing how individuals act.  Therefore 
the State can be seen as operating between society/social structure and the individual.  
By adopting a post-structuralist feminist perspective of the State, I consider the 
democratic State both as an arena in which tensions that originate in society are 
manifested and negotiated, and as an agent that has the potential for changing that same 
social structure, thereby altering gender relations through the use of force.  In Figure 1.1, 
I represent graphically these complex relationships, central in the development of this 
dissertation.  In the upper part of the figure we find the patriarchal system, that is, 
patriarchal social structure and ideology.  I place the individual at the bottom.  The 
double-headed arrows that connect the patriarchal system to the individual represent the 
duality described by Giddens as part of his structuration theory.   
In the middle of Figure 1, I place the State.  As argued by the post-structuralist 
feminist theory of the State, the State is plural, composed by a differentiated set of 
institutions, agencies, and discourses that are influenced by civil society and social 
movements in specific historical, social and political contexts (Waylen 1998).  The 
legislation, policies and actions that the State adopts relative to women’s issues must be 
understood in conjunction with the ideologies of elite State actors (Bourque 1989).  For 
that reason the plurality of the State is depicted as the three branches lines that connect 
each branch.  There are also arrows that connect civil society/NGOs, social movements 
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Figure 1.1:  Theoretical Model of the Study:  The State and Links between the Micro and 
Micro Perspectives for Analyzing Partner Violence 
 
 
movements and women’s movement to with the branches of the State.  As we will see in 
chapter five, NGOs, social movements and the feminist movement are regarded as 
representing the same thing in Mexico (Lamas, Martínez, Tarrés, and Tuñón 1995).  
Through their own movements women have the potential of influencing the State, the 
individual and the social structure (Dobash and Dobash 1988).  Finally, in Figure 1 we 
find a line that connects the State with the patriarchal social structure, this line reflects the 
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influence of the patriarchal system on the individuals that compose the State, again 
reflecting the pluralism within the State.  
1.4 -  DATA AND METHODS 
In order to investigate the role of the various actors I employ a mixed-methods 
approach.  Such an approach provides the opportunity for a far more comprehensive 
examination than is possible using a single data source or methodological approach 
(Creswell 2003).  Next I describe the sources of data and methodologies used both in the 
qualitative and quantitative part of this dissertation. 
 
1.4.a-  The Quantitative Analysis 
In the quantitative part of this dissertation I use two sources of data.  The first one 
is a national representative survey, the National Survey on Household Relationship 
Dynamics (Encuesta Nacional sobre la Dinámica de las Relaciones en los Hogares, 
ENDIREH).  The second one is a database that I created with socioeconomic, political, 
economic, legal and demographic state-level variables.   
The National Survey on Household Relationship Dynamics was conducted in 
2003 by the Mexican National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Informatics 
(INEGI).  The ENDIREH is a national representative sample of women of 15 years and 
older who at the moment of the interview were either married or cohabiting with a male 
partner.  The ENDIREH has also representative samples for eleven of the thirty-two 
states or entidades federativas that compose Mexico: Baja California, Coahuila, Chiapas, 
Chihuahua, Hidalgo, Michoacán, Nuevo León, Quintana Roo, Sonora, Yucatán and 
Zacatecas.  The government of these states financed the surveys in their territory in order 
to assure its state-level representativeness.  All ENDIREH’s interviewers were females 
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and received extensive interviewer training.  The interviewer administered the totality of 
the ENDIREH in Mexico.  Respondents were guaranteed anonymity and confidentiality.   
The ENDIREH collected extensive information about different forms of partner 
violence, decision sharing and gender roles in Mexican households from October 20 to 
November 14, 2003 (see INEGI and INMUJERES 2004 for more details), and serves as 
the source of information for estimates of rates of violence, as well a individual-level 
information about individual’s personal history and situational, and exosystem variables.  
As we will see in Chapter 4, exosystem variables are defined as formal and informal 
social structures that impinge on the immediate settings in which a person is found and 
influence or delimit the individual’s range of action, such as unemployment or 
socioeconomic status (Heise 1998).   
The second quantitative data set was created by the researcher.  It contains state-
level information concerning sociodemographic, political, legal, economic and 
educational variables.  Some of the variables included in this database measure the 
gender gap in the above mentioned spheres of social life.  These variables are used in 
Chapter 2 to construct the patriarchy measures (Sugarman and Straus 1988; Yllo 1984).  
Some other variables are not gender related and measure general features of the state such 
as religion, population density, level of human development measured by the United 
Nations’ Human Development Index (United Nations Development Program 1995), 
urbanization, migration, indigenous population, homicides, or distribution of wealth 
among others.  These variables will be used as controls in the third chapter.  These 
variables and its sources are described with detail in the quantitative part of my 
dissertation –Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.  
In the quantitative part, I use binary analyses, factor analyses and correlations, in 
order to create a measure of structural patriarchy or gender equality: Gender Equality 
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Index in Mexican States (GEIMS), which is developed in Chapter 2.  I also use 
multinomial logistic regressions to assess the individual-level correlates associated with 
the experience of the different types of violence: physical, psychological-emotional, 
sexual and economic-patrimonial.  Finally, I use logistic hierarchical lineal models to 
evaluate the influence of patriarchal social structure (structural level of gender equality) 
on individual-level partner violence (Chapter 3).   
 
1.4.b-  The Qualitative Analysis 
In the qualitative analysis of my dissertation I use several techniques: in-depth 
interviews, content analysis, and historical analysis.  The qualitative analyses focus on 
administrative family violence legislation.  As opposed to family violence provisions in 
the civil and criminal codes, the administrative legislation involves the three branches of 
the State more comprehensively.  Administrative family violence legislation has a dual 
purpose: the protection of actual or potential victims of violence and the support and 
reaffirmation of the family as a core social institution.  The focus on administrative law 
allows me to assess the extent to which this dual objective is achieved.  This objective 
would have been impossible through an examination of the civil and criminal codes, 
since these laws are focused strictly on individual behavior and enforcement.  Moreover, 
administrative laws also offer an excellent opportunity for studying the development of 
public policies related to family violence at the state level, and for examining how partner 




1.4.b.i-  In-depth Interviews 
Most of the qualitative part of my dissertation consists of a series of semi-
structured in-depth interviews with both men and women in professional positions in 
which they deal with the phenomenon of partner violence.  This sample includes judges, 
state congressional representatives, members of the Women’s Institute, directors of 
public agencies that provide services to victims of family violence, the actual providers of 
services, scholars, directors of domestic violence shelters, members of state commissions 
of human rights, police chiefs, doctors, and others.  I conducted 89 in-depth open-ended 
interviews with these key informants from whom I gained insights into how domestic 
violence is conceptualized by key actors, the role of the agencies as well as the official 
stance and actions of the institutions and organizations that they belong to,  I also 
collected information on related to their evaluations of the effectiveness of their 
organization/institution in addressing the problem, as well as their perception concerning 
other agencies, institutions and organizations (see Appendix 1 for details about the 
interview protocol).  
The objective of the qualitative component of the research was to illuminate 
findings from the quantitative component.  For this reason I conducted interviews with 
members of the three branches of the State, members of NGOs and the feminist 
movement and scholars with expertise in the area of violence against women and partner 
violence.  My assumption was that key civil society informants, representatives of NGOs 
and scholars would not be pressured to offer the official State version or politically 
correct information related to domestic violence and the response of government 
agencies.  Members of civil society and NGOs have played an important role in defining 
domestic violence and have pressured the State to take measures to prevent domestic 
violence and provide assistance to its victims.  For that reason their opinions and 
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perceptions are crucial for understanding the role of the State.  The research was 
approved by the Institutional Review Board of the University of Texas at Austin 
(Protocol # 2005-04-0030). 
 
1.4.b.ii-  Selection of Cases and Informants 
In the qualitative part of my research I adopt a grounded theory approach.  
Grounded theory is an inductive approach to the study of social life that attempts to 
generate a theory from the constant comparing of unfolding observations (Babbie 2005; 
Creswell 1998).  I adopted this approach because the objective of the qualitative research 
was to analyze the role of the State in protecting women from partner violence based on 
the analysis of the administrative family violence legislation enacted by the states.  The 
selection of the cases of study (states), and individuals interviewed in each state was 
purposive.  I used my own judgment as to who could provide the whole range of 
viewpoints concerning the passage and enactment of laws, as well as their enforcement.  I 
employed a quota sampling scheme to select key State informants.  The objective was to 
make sure that the sample included informants from the three branches of the state –
executive, legislative and judiciary power, as well as from NGOs.  
The five states in which I conducted detailed fieldwork include Chihuahua, 
Federal District, Guanajuato, Jalisco and Morelos.  These states were selected in order to 
ensure diversity in several important state characteristics potentially associated with the 
role of the State in protecting women’s rights.  These variables were: the level of 
structural gender equality measured by the GEIMS, the strength of the women’s 
movement measured by the percentage of NGOs devoted to women’s issues, and the 
percentage of NGOs involved in activities intended to address violence against women.  
Another key variable for the selection was the manner in which domestic violence 
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legislation was enacted, either as the result of pressures from below (bottom-up) or a top-
down path.  I also wanted to include one state where no administrative family violence 
legislation had been approved, and assure variation among the political parties governing 
each of the states.  Table 1.1 shows the general characteristics of the States in which I 
conducted extensive fieldwork.  The population from Chihuahua, Federal District, Jalisco 
and Morelos comprise 24% of the population of Mexico.   
The results of the qualitative analysis cannot be generalized to all states in 
Mexico.  They are intended to illustrate patterns, processes and common categories 
across states.  Chihuahua was selected because it was one of the four states at the time 
that I conducted the field research had not approved an administrative family violence 
law.  This state is exceptional given that Chihuahua has been the focus of international 
attention as a result of the murders of women in Ciudad Juarez (Ensalaco 2006; Fregoso 
2006).  As I found in my own research, many cases of female homicides are in reality 
cases of domestic violence.  The Federal District was selected because it was the first 
state in which an administrative family violence law was enacted, and the Federal District 
is often taken as a model by many other states given the long-lasting political centralism 
as a result of seventy years of PRI dominance.  Guanajuato is of special relevance in that 
it is the first state in which the family violence legislation approved in 1999 was annulled 
and a new administrative law was enacted.  The experience of Jalisco is unique since it is 
the only case in which an administrative family violence law was approved as the result 
of a popular initiative.  Finally, the case of Morelos represents a case in which the 
approval of the legislation followed a clear top-down model with no specific events that 
fostered its enactment. 
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Chihuahua 3,241,444 29 11 0.89 0.34 45.3 ---  PRI 12,767 3.4 
Federal District 8,720,916 219 40 2.51 0.46 72.4 Bottom-up 1996 PRD 23,916 1.5 
Guanajuato 4,893,812 22 4 0.45 0.08 41.2 Top-down 2000 PAN 3,348 0.2 
Jalisco 6,752,113 24 2 0.36 0.03 41.2 Bottom-up 2003 PAN 9,240 0.7 
Morelos 1,612,899 14 3 0.87 0.19 45.4 Top-down 1999 PAN 8,231 1.8 
            





In terms of the characteristics of the informants, I sought to interview key 
informants from the three branches of the state, and members of NGOs, the feminist and 
women’s movement, and scholars.  Table 1.2 shows the number of people interviewed in 
each state and its adscription to each category.  The number of interviews in each state 
ranges from 15 in Chihuahua to 21 in Morelos.  I identified people in all five states one 
month before arriving and sent them a letter in which I explained my research project and 
asked if they would participate (see Annex 2 for a model letter).  I sent an average of 40 
letters to potential informants in each state with the objective of interviewing key 
informants in the same category in each state.  I wanted to obtain information from such 
informants as family or civil judges, directors of agencies providing assistance to women, 
members of the state women’s institute, the state commission of human rights, NGOs and 
so on.  Once that I arrived in each state, I contacted key informants by phone to again 
explain the goal of my research and to inform them of the importance of their 
collaboration as key informants for my study.   
 
Table 1.2: Characteristics of the Key Informants by State 







Legislative Executive Judiciary    
Chihuahua 2 7 1 5 0 15 
Federal District 3 5 0 7 1 16 
Guanajuato 2 6 1 7 1 17 
Jalisco 3 7 4 5 1 20 
Morelos 4 7 4 5 1 21 
       
Total 14 32 10 29 4 89 
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As a result of cultural differences it took me a while to have access to the key 
informants in the first state where I conducted my research, the Federal District.  Rather 
quickly I realized that I should give all the information about my research and 
sponsorship by the University of Texas at Austin to the secretaries and assistants of the 
people that I intended to interview.  These individuals act as gatekeepers for their 
employers and exercise a great deal of discretion in deciding whether or not the issue 
requires the attention of the person one might wish to see.   
On the interview day, I would handle the key informant documentation about the 
study, and all personal information and contact information, in that document the 
informant was told that his information would be kept confidential.  Although the 
interviews were conducted in a journalistic style, some of the people that I interviewed 
mentioned that they were giving the information based on their experiences and that they 
did not have any problem in having their name released.  Others requested their name not 
to be disclosed or that part of the information would be anonymous.  In some cases I use 
the name of the person, in others I employ a pseudonym and/or provide provided 
situational and contextual information about the area of expertise of the key informant.  
In some states the data-collection process was more complicated than in others.  
For example in Chihuahua the fieldwork was very complicated and that is the reason why 
the number of interviews is smaller than in other states.  The political context of Juarez 
and the fact that Chihuahua has been the object both of national and international 
attention due to the murder of young women in Ciudad Juarez and Chihuahua, made 
access to key informants from the government and judiciary power difficult and often 
impossible.  In Chihuahua access to members of civil society organizations and 
representatives of the feminist movement was also difficult.  After ten days contacting 
key informants in Chihuahua I had succeeded in conducting only one interview.  In order 
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to increase my chances of finding informants I participated in a demonstration organized 
by the feminist movement and NGOs commemorating the International Women’s Day.  
After marching with them I had the chance of meeting prominent feminists and leaders of 
NGOs in Chihuahua.  Some offered to participate on the spot and others agreed after 
several phone calls. The fieldwork went much more smoothly in the states of Jalisco, 
Morelos and Guanajuato.  It was a little more complicated in the Federal District, where 
people were more reluctant to talk to me.  As shown in Table 1.2, I conducted 15 
interviews in Chihuahua, 16 in the Federal District, 17 in Guanajuato, 20 in Jalisco and 
21 in Morelos.   
In the analysis of the in depth interviews I followed a three step procedure.  First, 
I analyzed the interviews state by state in a general manner in order to determine whether 
differences among them were immediately obvious.  By doing this, I attempted to assess 
whether or not specific issues such as the manner in which domestic violence legislation 
was enacted, the party in government or the level of patriarchy could be associated with 
potential variation across states.  Second, I analyzed information from similar key 
informants across states in order to identify similarities and differences in the 
conceptualization of the phenomenon of partner violence, their of behaviors relative to 
women victims of partner violence, and their personal opinions and attitudes towards 
domestic violence and the State’s response.  In this part of the analysis I sought to find 
different discourses and conceptualizations associated with the position that the key 
informant occupies within the structure of the State, or his/her membership to an NGO.  
Finally, I analyzed the data taking into consideration the gender of the informants.  I 
could not perform this type of analysis by state because only 13 percent of the key 
informants were males (12 out of 89), and they belonged primarily to the judiciary branch 
or were responsible of coordinating legal assistance services in agencies that provide 
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services to victims of family violence.  The fact that men constitute such as small 
percentage of all interviewees reflects the feminization of the positions within the 
legislative and executive branches of the State dealing with the issue of family violence, 
and the women’s and feminist movements.  
I had all the interviews transcribed and I applied the codes manually.  I 
constructed categories and groups of information following each of the groups to which 
the key informants belong to.  I differentiated then between information about the 
institution that they belong to, and information about other institutions or agencies that 
they had contact with. I constructed categories of meaning and I coded each interview 
accordingly.  This method implied to going back and forth to the text in order to create 
meaningful categories that emerged from the interviews.  In addition to the content 
analysis of the interviews, I used the interviews to complete the historical analysis in 
Chapter 6, where I examine the process and the rationale under which the family violence 
legislation was enacted.  
1.4.b.iii-  Content Analysis 
For the analysis of the contents of the legislation in Chapter 6, I performed a 
content analysis of the administrative family legislation.  I read all the state-level 
administrative legislation concerning family violence, and I attempted to find 
commonalities and differences.  The identification of the commonalities and differences 
was partially informed by the interviews with key informants.  I identified then the main 
characteristics of the legislation that based on the interviews with key informants could 
be associated with the protection of victims of partner violence.  Then, I used quantitative 
analytical techniques for analyzing information gathered with the content analysis (see 
Marshall and Rossman 2006 for further details). 
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1.5-  STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
This dissertation is organized in two parts.  In the first part I present my 
quantitative analysis resulting from the analysis of the ENDIREH 2003.  This part 
consists of two chapters.  Chapter two is methodological, and Chapter 3 is analytical.  In 
Chapter 2 I develop a measure of the structural component of patriarchy.  I accomplish 
that objective by creating a composite index: the Gender Equality Index in Mexican 
States (GEIMS) for assessing the level of gender equality across the 32 Mexican states.  
After reviewing conceptual and methodological issues related to previous measures of 
structural inequality I detail the logic and methodology involved in the construction of a 
composite and multidimensional measure of gender equality, at the social structural or 
macrosystem level, in Mexico.  The GEIMS measures the level of gender equality in 
different spheres of social life: economic, educational, political and legal.  This chapter 
has been published as an article in Social Indicators Research (Frias 2007), and has 
already been validated and used for analyzing the relationship between patriarchy and the 
heterogeneous distribution of partner violence in Mexico (Frias 2008). 
In Chapter 3, I analyze the influence of the patriarchal social structure on the 
individual.  This chapter reconciles the two traditionally divorced sociological 
approaches in the analysis of partner violence: family violence and feminism.  I use 
logistic multi-level models to examine the influence of structural factors, especially the 
level of gender equality, on the prevalence of diverse types of violence against women in 
Mexico, and how the level of structural gender equality interacts with individual-level 
and situational characteristics of women.  The findings of this chapter suggest that, after 
controlling for other structural variables the structural level of gender equality is 
negatively associated with state-level average prevalence of physical and economic 
violence.  Moreover, the results indicate that the level of gender equality mediates the 
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effect of individual-level characteristics such as employment, share of decision making 
and non-traditional gender roles for certain types of partner violence.  Chapter 3 
highlights the relevance of taking into consideration the context in which individuals are 
embedded in social research.  
The second part of my dissertation consists of the results of the qualitative 
approach.  Chapter 4 reviews previous literature about the state, women’s movements and 
civil society.  In this chapter I examine feminists’ theories of the State and I theoretically 
justify the use of the feminist post-structuralist theory of the State throughout the 
remaining chapter of this third part.  Post-structuralists argue that the State has no 
inherent position or set of interests relative to gender and that it can either be a 
controlling or enabling, depending on specific historical circumstances.  Moreover, the 
State is conceived as both an agent and an arena in which the battles for women’s rights 
take place.  This conceptualization is key because it will guide both Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6.  In the second part of Chapter 4, I trace the evolution of the feminist 
movement in Mexico, and I explain the historical and political circumstances that might 
account for its evolution.  Next, I review the relationship between the women’s 
movement and the State, and how the feminist movement and feminist NGOs put the 
issue of violence against women in the public agenda.  
Chapter 5 examines the ways in which in response to internal events and 
international pressures the State’s actions relative to domestic violence has evolved.  This 
chapter is based on two theoretical perspectives, post-structuralist theory and theories of 
legislative diffusion.  I use these two theoretical approaches to identify three patterns of 
passage of legislation based on the relationship between the women’s movement and the 
legislative branch of the State.  These patterns are (1) collaborative efforts between the 
women’s movement and the State (Federal District); (2) bottom-up activist efforts 
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(Jalisco), and; (3) top-down introduction of legislation that only later sought the citizenry 
legitimacy and support of the women’s movement (Guanajuato and Morelos).   
Chapter 6 examines the contents of the administrative legislation concerning 
family violence.  In Chapter 5, I described how the women’s movement conceptualized 
the administrative laws as a tool for protecting women from domestic violence, but in 
Chapter 6 I analyze the contradiction within the family violence legislation: protection of 
individuals within the family, and family promotion.  I identify several aspects of the 
legislation that introduce the possibility of promoting violence as a result of the 
contradictory and often incompatible conflicting objectives I mentioned earlier of 
protecting women while reaffirming the sanctity of the family.  In reality, the State places 
a greater emphasis on preserving the family than on protecting the rights of women.  
In the last qualitative analytical chapter, Chapter 7, combining the feminist post-
structuralist approaches to the analysis of the State and theories of gendered 
organizations, I analyze contradictions and inconsistencies among branches of the State, I 
discuss the issue of structure and agency in the State, and I review perceived gender 
differences within each branch of the State.  I analyze each branch separately (legislative, 
executive and judiciary).  In the case of the executive I focus on three key actors such as 
the Governor, police bodies, and agencies that provide services to victims of partner 
violence.  In the analysis of each of the branches I do two things, first, I describe how that 
agency, ministry, or level of government deals with the issue of domestic violence.  
Secondarily, I analyze how the members of other branches of government and civil 
society assess the role and the degree of success of each branch of government charged 
with dealing with some aspect of domestic violence, as well as how the gender of key 
actors affects the general response toward victims of domestic violence.  In the last part 
of Chapter 7, I examine the strategies employed by individuals empowered to deal with 
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women’s rights to make sure that, moving away from the family perspective, women 
victims of family violence are protected.  
Finally, in Chapter 8, I present the conclusions of this dissertation emphasizing 
the main findings and its theoretical contribution to the analysis of the phenomenon of 
partner violence.  I also examine the policy implications; highlight the limitations and 
paths for future research.  
This dissertation can be read in two different ways, as a whole document or as a 
collection of separate articles or chapters, each of which can be read independently.  Each 
chapter has an introduction and conclusions, as well as a presentation of the theoretical 
perspectives that informs the chapter.  All the chapters and parts of this dissertation are 
tied together in this introductory chapter and in the conclusion.  Before proceeding, I 
must differentiate between State with capital S and state with a lower-case s.  While the 
State refers to the abstract political institution, the lower-case state refers to each of the 
32 entidades federativas or political units that compose the Mexican Federation.  
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CHAPTER 2:  MEASURING STRUCTURAL GENDER EQUALITY 
IN MEXICO: A STATE LEVEL ANALYSIS 
Social phenomena such crime, single motherhood, divorce, unemployment, 
partner violence, fertility and other manifestations of complex social processes are rarely 
uniformly distributed spatially, but rather reflect an ecological distribution in which areas 
of higher or lower population concentration correlate with other factors such as ethnic 
composition, cultural characteristics, the level of gender inequality, legal structures, 
social history, local labor markets, and much more.  Mexico is no exception.  Suicide, 
fertility, abortion, partner violence, poverty, educational attainment and industrialization 
are, among other social phenomena, unevenly distributed throughout the country, again 
reflecting local and state-related factors (Fuentes and Montes 2004; Híjar-Medina, 
Rascón, Blanco, and López 1996; Singh and Sedgh 1997).  Whether or not gender 
inequality follows this pattern of ecological heterogeneity presents a critical research 
question that has to date received little theoretical or empirical attention.  The importance 
of assessing the level of gender equality among Mexican states is of theoretical and 
practical relevance for understanding potential sources of regional differences regarding 
many social phenomena.  
The current study has broader implications for future research.  Much of the 
research that deals with gender-related social phenomena recognizes that at the societal 
level norms and discourses related to gender roles and equality influence individual-level 
behaviors.  In the ecological model developed by Heise (1998) this societal context is 
labeled the “macrosystem”.  Scholars have labeled the structurally based differences in 
attainment between men and women in the aggregate or macrosystem as gender 
inequality or patriarchy (Sugarman and Straus 1988; Titterington 2006; Yllo and Straus 
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1990).  The macrosystem sources of gender inequality directly affect both aggregate rates 
of violence and an individual woman’s risk of becoming the victim of partner violence 
(Dobash and Dobash 1979; Smith 1990; Straus 1994; Yllo and Straus 1990).  It also 
influences her risk of suffering health problems, especially those related to sexual health 
including AIDS (Lawson 1999), of experiencing poverty, unemployment and unhealthy 
employment conditions (Rice 2001), homicides (Baron and Straus 1988; DeWees and 
Parker 2003; Titterington 2006; Vieraitis and Williams 2002), rape and sexual violence 
(Austin and Kim 2000; Yodanis 2004), and more. 
The main goal of this chapter is to assess the level of gender equality across the 
32 Mexican states.2  After reviewing conceptual and methodological issues related to 
previous measures of structural inequality I detail the logic and methodology involved in 
the construction of a composite and multidimensional measure of gender equality, at the 
social structural or macrosystem, level in Mexico: GEIMS (Gender Equality Index in 
Mexican States).  The methodology can be also used to construct gender equality indexes 
in other Latin American countries.  The contribution of this measure is to extend previous 
research which has for the most part focused on individual level correlates of abuse to 
incorporate the structural manifestations of patriarchy (Castro and Ríquer 2003; 2004).  
The basic motivation for developing a measure focused on the macro societal level 
derives from the proposition that ignoring that structural determinants of gender 
inequality represent a potentially serious methodological fallacy in which the 
misattribution of structural determinants to the individual level is likely.   
This argument is presented in six sections.  The first section discusses the concept 
of gender inequality and reviews previous measurement attempts.  The second part 
                                                 
2 Mexico is composed by 31 states and a Federal District. The term that is referred to each of these units is 
entidad federative (federal entities). For homogeneity purposes I will call “state” to each of 32 political 
divisions of Mexico. 
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argues for the need for a gender equality index in Mexico and the methodology used in its 
development.  Next, for each of the dimensions of the index, I present a theoretical 
justification of the variables included, followed by the calculation of the composite index.  
The fourth part covers the methodology for estimating the multi-dimensional index, the 
Gender Equality Index in Mexican States (GEIMS) and provides an overall assessment of 
the level of gender equality across Mexican states. The fifth part explores the 
geographical distribution of gender equality.  Finally, the last part includes the 
discussion, and highlights the potential uses and limitations of the index.  
 
2.1-  GENDER INEQUALITY AND ITS MEASUREMENT 
Gender inequality is “the departure from parity in the representation of women 
and men in key dimensions of social life” (Young, Fort, and Danner 1994:57).  Although 
there is no consensus concerning the key dimensions of gender inequality, most scholars 
agree that it is a multi-dimensional concept composed by several spheres: economic, 
educational, political, legal, health and family systems (Dijkstra 2002; Harvey, Blakely, 
and Tepperman 1990; Sugarman and Straus 1988; Yllo 1980; Young, Fort, and Danner 
1994).  For present purposes, gender inequality can be conceived of as a system that 
justifies and perpetuates the domination of women by men in all areas of private and 
public life (Stacey 1997).  This structural system of domination has existed throughout 
history and has been labeled patriarchy (see Dobash and Dobash 1979; Segal 1993).  The 
most important conceptual point is that gender inequality is grounded in and is 
maintained by patriarchal structures and ideologies.  
Most of the published research that deals with aspects of gender inequality tends 
to focus on a single dimension of gender inequality and employs either a single measure 
operationalizations of the construct (see review by Bradley and Khor 1993) or a set of 
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variables that tap such social dimensions as educational status, employment, poverty or 
political participation (Brewer and Smith 1995; DeWees and Parker 2003; Vieraitis and 
Williams 2002; Young, Fort, and Danner 1994).  Few attempts have been made to 
develop a measure for assessing gender inequality in different spheres simultaneously.   
Kersti Yllo (1980; 1984) was the first scholar who created an index for measuring 
gender equality across U.S. states, the Status of Women Index (SWI).  The SWI is a 
composite measure designed to assess the status of women as a group compared to status 
of men as a group based on four dimensions, economic, educational, political and legal.  
The economic dimension is operationalized as five indicators, the educational and the 
political by four each, and the legal by thirteen.  All indicators within each dimension 
were standardized and added together.  The final SWI was the result of averaging the four 
individual dimension scores.  The SWI has been used to examine the relationship 
between regional differences in partner abuse and gender inequality (Yllo 1980; 1984; 
Yllo and Straus 1984; 1990).  The SWI’s methodology has been recently used by 
Yodanis (2004) to create reduced versions of political, educational and economic 
measures of women’s status.  
The Gender Equality Index (GEI) by Sugarman and Straus (1988) was inspired in 
the SWI (Yllo 1980; 1984).  As the SWI, the GEI aims to “measure the attainments of 
women relative to men” in the United States (p. 233).  Attainment is defined as the 
“extent to which members of a particular gender have achieved such society valued 
statuses” (p. 230) in different realms: economic resources, legal rights or positions of 
political power.  In contrast with the SWI, the GEI excludes the educational sphere, 
increases the number of variables in each of the sub-spheres and uses a more 
sophisticated methodology.  The GEI was an average of the three sub-dimensions.  After 
standardized, each variable had to meet two criteria for its inclusion in each dimension: 
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first, the correlation between the indicator and the sub-index (after adjusting for the fact 
that the indicator is part of the index) should be equal or greater than .30.  Second, an 
increase in the alpha coefficient for index reliability should result when the indicator is 
deleted.  The GEI and some of the economic, political and legal subindexes have been 
used to examine the relationship between gender equality and other state-level 
phenomenon such as partner violence (Straus 1994), homicide (Baron and Straus 1988) 
or the extension of legislative advances (Berger, Neuman, and Searles 1991).  The 1988’s 
GEI was updated by Di Noia (2002), and it s content and methodology and has been used 
for constructing indexes of gender inequality at the sub-state level (Titterington 2006). 
Harvey, Blakely, and Tepperman (1990) constructed an index of gender equality 
based on the Consumer Price Index for Canada.  It is composed of seven variables that 
reflect women’s gains in the economic and educational spheres.  Instead of conducting an 
analysis of internal reliability for identifying the variables to be included in the model, as 
the GEI, uses factor analysis for this same purpose.  The final index is computed by 
calculating the average of the six variables that met the methodological threshold.  Its 
longitudinal perspective makes it appropriate for assessing gender equality changes over 
time.  
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) developed in 1995 the 
Gender-related Development Index (GDI) and the Gender Empowerment Measure 
(GEM) with the objective of examining the relationship between gender inequality and 
economic growth (UNDP 1995).  The GDI assesses the relative well-being of women in a 
particular society using three variables: adjusted income, education and health.  The 
GEM assesses women’s empowerment measured as women’s share of public-valued 
positions: professional and managerial occupations, representation in national 
parliaments, participation in the labor force and share of national income.  Both indexes 
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consist of summed averages of the indicators.  However, these indexes are not perfect 
since they “can capture only what is measurable and therefore do not cover other 
important dimensions of gender inequality” (UNDP 1995:72).  
Dijkstra (2002) summarizes the criticisms to the GDI and GEM and proposes an 
alternative index, the Standardized Index of Gender Inequality (SIGE). This is an 
unweighted relative measure of gender inequality composed by five variables measuring 
gender inequality in the educational, health, economic and political spheres, some of 
which were previously used for the GDI and GEM.  After the standardization of the 
variables, the SIGE is computed by calculating their arithmetical mean.  Similarly, Austin 
and Kim (2000) also calculated an index by calculating the arithmetic mean of four 
variables measuring inequality in the educational, economic and political spheres.  
 
2.2.-  NEED AND METHODOLOGY BEHIND THE GEIMS 
Mexico is among the most unequal countries in Latin America with important 
cross-state and regional differences in terms of education, poverty, development, 
distribution of basic services, and health (Fuentes and Montes 2004).  These disparities 
call upon the development of a Gender Equality Index in Mexican States (GEIMS) in 
order to assess the level of gender equality across states.  Straus’ (1994:10) justification 
for using states as units of analysis in the U.S. can be applied to Mexico since  “each state 
has distinct characteristics based on its history, environment and resources, level of 
economic development, racial and ethnic composition, and numerous other factors”.  
These might be expected to be associated with differential opportunities for women.  In 
federal political systems such as that of Mexico, the states are often the initiators of 
legislation and public policies, and there is usually more information available at the state 
level that at any other level. 
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Centered in Mexico, the GEIMS overcomes some of the problems associated with 
working with data provided by different governments and different definitions (Dijkstra 
2002).  Nevertheless, one of the main problems in elaborating this type of indexes is the 
problematic relationship between what needs to be measured theoretically and the 
available statistics.  The GEIMS is inspired in most of the earlier cited works and it is 
adapted to the reality of a developing country such as Mexico.  The GEIMS combines 
several dimensions that assess the societal level of gender equality related to economic 
resources, political and public power, educational attainment and legal rights.  Previous 
indexes incorporated other dimensions of gender inequality such as health, well-being 
and family systems.  Variables capturing these realms of gender inequality are included 
within the four previously identified spheres.  The GEIMS is expressed as a percentage.  
A score of 100 represents perfect equality between men and women.  Scores tending 
toward the zero end of the scale reflect greater inequality favoring men.  As I will 
explain, the score can range above 100 indicating levels of inequality favoring women.  
This index compares the gender gap in each state and does not take the relative position 
of women across states into account in the different components of the construct.  It is 
therefore, a highly focused measure of the extent of inequality that does not tap absolute 
levels of privilege of either men or women.   
Thirty-six indicators were selected to evaluate the extent to which, compared to 
men, women have access to economic resources, education, positions of political power 
and decision making, and have their rights protected by state laws.  In the case of the 
economic, educational and political dimensions, the level of equality in a given state was 
calculated as a ratio of the percent of gender attainment score of women to the percent of 
men’s attainment in socially valuable positions in each state.  Gender attainment refers 
“to the absolute degree to which members of a particular gender have achieved socially 
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values statuses such as education or educational prestige” (Di Noia 2002:35), and it is 
expressed as a ratio.  In the case of legal equality, instead of a continuous score, each 
variable indicates the presence of absence of legislation granting legal rights to women: 
either protecting previously existing but traditionally ignored rights (i.e. harassment), or 
statuses that grant new rights (i.e. criminalization of rape within the marriage). 
I offer two justifications for expressing the variables as a ratio of the percentage 
of a valuable position occupied for women, relative to the percentage of this same 
position occupied for men.  Previous indexes such as that of Sugarman and Straus (1988) 
combine ratios of gender attainment and ratios of percentages.  For example, they 
combine they calculate the ratio of gender ratios in employment [(females employed / 
females in the labor force) / (males employed / males in the labor force)] with the ratio of 
percentages in state legislatures [(female state representatives / male state 
representatives)].  Although it is possible to compute a female labor force participation 
rate since information of the total number of women and those who are in the labor force 
is available.  On the other hand, it is impossible to compute a legislative participation rate 
since there is no information on the population at risk of running for office.  In this case 
the only information relates to the percentage of legislators who are women.  Therefore, 
for uniformity purposes, the GEIMS is a ratio of percentages. 
There is a second reason behind expressing each variable as a ratio of 
percentages: the goal of the index is to measure the gender gap in different spheres of 
social life, without taking into consideration the relative position of women across states 
in the different components of the construct, as it would be if the ratio would be the ratio 
of ratios (female attainments relative to all females, compared to male’s attainments 
relative to all males).   
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The ratio of percentages is a linear transformation of the percentage that 
represents women’s share in each dimension.  For conceptual reasons I choose to do this 
transformation that results in values that range from zero to infinity, with 100 
representing equality between men and women (50% / 50%).  In other words, women are 
100% equivalent to men or 100% equal with men.  Although both, each of the variables 
included in the index and the final index might mathematically reach values higher than 
100%, is theoretically and practically irrelevant since women are underrepresented in 
almost all valuable social dimensions.  If instead of a ratio the GEIMS would have been 
expressed as a percentage, equality would be represented by 50%, being intuitively more 
difficult to understand.  
The following examples might help to illustrate the process behind the 
construction of the GEIMS.  For example, the third economic indicator is the percent of 
women employed as civil servants, managers and administrators relative to percent of 
men in these same positions (see Table 2.1).  This ratio is then multiplied by 100.  In the 
case of Aguascalientes, according to the National Employment Survey (Inegi and 
Secretaría de Trabajo y Previsión Social 2004), 31.36% of all  civil servant, managers 
and administrators were women. Men occupied 68.64% of the positions.  The attainment 
score of labor force participation in Aguascalientes is 45.68 [(31.36 / 68.64) * 100].  This 
figure indicates that women’s share in these prestigious occupations is 46% that of men.  
Similarly, women’s attainment as state representatives (PO_4) in Chiapas is 11.1%.  The 
ratio was calculated by dividing the percentage of seats occupied by women at the 
Chiapas’ state legislature (10%) by that of men (90%).  
The construction of the GEIMS proceeded in two stages.  The first consisted of 
the calculation of each of the four subindexes (economic, educational, political and 
legal), and the second the combination of the four subindexes into a single overall 
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measure.  Two criteria were established for a variable to be included in a specific 
dimension.  First, after the standardization of the variables, the correlation between the 
indicator and the sub-index (after adjusting for the fact that the indicator is part of the 
index) should be equal or greater than .30 (Sugarman and Straus 1988).  The second 
requirement, paired to the first one, is that an increase in the alpha coefficient for index 
reliability should result from the deletion of the indicator from the index (Nunnally 
1978).  If an indicator had a correlation smaller than .30 but its removal from the index 
did not increase the alpha coefficient for reliability, the indicator was not excluded.   
The final coefficient for each sphere of gender inequality is a combination of the 
already identified measures.  As in previous indexes, both, each of the subindexes and the 
final GEIMS measure, is calculated by computing the arithmetic average (i.e. Austin and 
Kim 2000; Harvey, Blakely, and Tepperman 1990; Sugarman and Straus 1988; Yllo 
1984).  In the early stages of this index, assuming that there was no theoretical reason 
why each variable should have an equal weight in the calculation of each dimension of 
gender equality (see Dijkstra 2002), and following the methodology proposed by Casique 
(2004), I performed an unrotated factor analysis of the variables, and applied weights to 
each of the variables depending on their adscription to each factor and the proportion of 
the variance explained by each factor (results not shown).  The correlation between each 
of the subindexes with and without applying factor analysis was in all cases larger than 
.98.  The same was true for the final measure of gender inequality.  Therefore, for 
simplicity reasons each of the subindexes is the average of the variables included in that 
particular dimension. Similarly, the GEIMS is the average of the four dimensions.  
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2.2.a-  The Economic Equality Dimension (GEIMS_EC) 
As noted by Simone de Beauvoir it has been through gainful employment that 
woman has traversed most of the distance that separated her from the male (Beauvoir de 
1952).  Situational factors such as caregiving and care rearing, and resource factors such 
as the lower educational attainment have traditionally relegated women to the household 
sphere and prevented them from fully participating in the formal economy 
(Psacharopoulos and Tzannatos 1993).  Historically, for women, the most “important –
and the most achievable– form of power has been the economic”, which has contributed 
to their overall status in society (Blumberg 1984), and “may [have] set in motion the 
other mutually reinforcing political, economic, cultural, and social changes that reduce 
inequalities (Cotter, Hermsen, and Vanneman 2001).   
The assessment of gender equality in the economic sphere employs eight 
indicators that have been theoretically associated in the literature of gender stratification 
with gender inequality.  Table 2.1 sorts the states in rank order according to each of the 
indicators.  There are substantial state-to-state differences in almost all of the indicators.  
The first variable, Participation in the Labor Force (EC_1), reveals the 
underrepresentation of women in the labor force.  The gender gap ranges from 63% in 
Chiapas (100-36.6) to 34% in the Federal District, the most egalitarian state.  The values 
and the ranking of this indicator are very similar to that of Employed women (EC_2) that 
measures the percentage of those in the labor force actually employed.  In average, for 
each 100 occupied men, there are 54 women.  
The next two variables measure women’s access to traditionally male-dominated 
occupations: Civil Servants, Managers and Administrators (EC_3), and Professional and 
Technicians (EC_4).  In Mexico, women’s incorporation to the labor market has been 
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Table 2.1:  States Ranked in Order of Economic Gender Equality Indicators 














Rank State EC_1 State EC_2 State EC_3 State EC_4 State EC_5 State EC_6 State EC_7 State EC_8 
1 DF 65.7  DF 66.6  MOR 49.7  ZAC 82.0  OAX 25.8  CHIS 118.0 DF 74.6  DF 12.5  
2 MOR 63.7  MOR 63.5  NAY 48.6  DUR 78.6  SLP 25.1  OAX 111.4 GRO 68.9  QROO 10.6  
3 PUE 63.5  PUE 63.2  DF 47.0  NAY 78.0  QROO 21.8  GRO 106.1 MOR 67.8  GRO 10.5  
4 QRO 62.1  QRO 62.0  COL 47.0  SLP 77.1  BC 21.4  TAB 104.6 AGS 62.2  OAX 10.0  
5 HGO 62.0  JAL 61.8  ZAC 46.3  MOR 75.8  MEX 21.3  YUC 101.2 CHI  61.9  VER   8.3  
6 JAL 61.5  HGO 61.3  SLP 46.2  AGS 75.7  COAH 20.7  QROO 100.9 BC 61.6  MOR   8.2  
7 SON 61.4  COL 61.1  AGS 45.7  HGO 75.4  NAY 20.2  SLP 100.6 QRO 61.5  BCS   8.0  
8 COL 61.3  SON 60.8  TLAX 45.5  TLAX 71.3  COL 20.1  CAMP 100.5 JAL 60.1  NAY   7.5  
9 AGS 58.5  AGS 59.0  MICH 45.3  BCS 69.6  QRO 20.1  AGS 100.5 PUE 59.4  PUE   7.5  
10 OAX 58.3  OAX 58.3  HGO 44.9  COL 69.5  SIN 20.0  TLAX 99.4  HGO 59.0  BC   7.5  
11 GTO 57.9  GTO 57.9  JAL 44.7  SIN 68.0  YUC 19.2  ZAC 98.2  TAMP 58.3  HGO   7.2  
12 SIN 57.7  SIN 57.4  VER 44.4  JAL 67.6  VER 18.9  VER 98.1  COL 57.6  CHIS   7.1  
13 MICH 56.5  MICH 56.8  BC 44.4  MICH 67.4  BCS 18.9  DUR 97.8  OAX 57.5  CHI    7.0  
14 YUC 55.6  YUC 55.2  GRO 44.4  OAX 67.2  SON 18.4  BCS 97.4  SON 57.4  YUC   6.8  
15 NAY 54.0  GRO 53.6  GTO 43.8  COAH 66.5  MOR 17.6  NAY 96.3  NAY 56.9  JAL   6.7  
16 QROO 53.7  NAY 53.4  CHI  43.2  GTO 66.4  TAMP 17.0  PUE 95.8  SLP 56.7  QRO   6.5  


















18 GRO 53.5  TAMP 52.7  PUE 42.8  DF 64.9  GRO 16.7  DF 93.7  MICH 56.2  COL   6.4  
19 TAMP 53.2  MEX 52.6  QROO 42.6  PUE 64.3  DF 16.7  COAH 91.0  YUC 56.2  ZAC   6.3  
20 NL 52.5  NL 52.3  SON 42.5  VER 63.1  HGO 15.4  HGO 90.7  GTO 55.9  DUR   6.3  
21 CAMP 52.5  SLP 51.7  BCS 42.4  SON 63.1  JAL 15.0  MICH 88.6  ZAC 54.5  TLAX   6.2  
22 SLP 51.8  CAMP 51.7  SIN 42.1  GRO 60.7  AGS 14.5  TAMP 87.4  BCS 54.3  MICH   6.2  
23 TLAX 51.0  TLAX 50.0  QRO 41.6  TAMP 59.8  GTO 14.2  SIN 87.1  MEX 54.2  TAMP   6.1  
24 VER 49.9  VER 49.7  TAMP 41.5  MEX 59.3  NL 13.5  CHI  85.8  SIN 54.0  SON   6.1  
25 BC 49.9  BC 49.7  COAH 41.1  BC 58.3  TLAX 12.9  NL 85.3  DUR 53.8  TAB   6.0  
26 BCS 49.7  BCS 49.6  OAX 41.0  NL 58.3  PUE 12.8  QRO 84.9  CAMP 52.6  SIN   5.9  
27 COAH 48.4  COAH 47.7  MEX 38.1  CAMP 56.3  CHI  12.7  MOR 83.0  VER 52.5  SLP   5.8  
28 DUR 45.3  ZAC 44.6  YUC 38.0  YUC 55.4  DUR 12.7  SON 82.0  CHIS 50.2  CAMP   5.8  
29 ZAC 45.0  DUR 44.4  CAMP 37.9  CHI  54.5  CHIS 11.8  COL 81.3  COAH 49.6  AGS   5.6  
30 CHI  43.8  CHI  43.7  TAB 37.6  TAB 52.3  TAB 11.5  GTO 81.0  QROO 49.5  GTO   5.3  
31 TAB 42.2  TAB 42.1  NL 36.6  CHIS 47.8  MICH 10.1  BC 79.4  TAB 49.1  COAH   4.9  
32 CHIS 36.6  CHIS 36.2  CHIS 32.9  QROO 44.0  ZAC   9.8  JAL 78.4  NL 49.1  NL   4.4  
 Mean 54.1    53.9   42.9    65.1   17.0    93.8    57.2     7.1  
 STD   6.9      7.1     3.7      9.1     4.1      9.6      5.8     1.8  
Sources:  EC_1: Percent of 12 years and older females who are in the labor force (regardless if they are employed or not) relative to the percent of males (ENE 2004); EC_2: Percent of 12 years and 
older females in the labor force who are employed relative to the percent of males (ENE 2004); EC_3: Percent of women employed as public employees and managers (includes supervisors and 
administrative managers) relative to the percent of males (ENE 2004); EC_4:  Percent of women employed in professional and technical occupations relative to the percent of men in professional and 
technical occupations (ENE 2004). EC_5: Percentage of females who own a business relative to the percentage of males who own a business (ENE 2004); EC_6: Female’s (twelve years and older) 
average wage per hour worked relative to men’s average wage per hour (Inegi. 2000. XII Censo de Población y Vivienda Inegi. 2000); EC_7: Percentage of women who receive health benefits (in 
public or private institutions) as a result of their employment relative to the percentage of males receiving health benefits (Inegi. 2000. XII Censo de Población y Vivienda Inegi. 2000); EC_8:  
Percentage of female headed households in which the head of the household earns more than 10 minimum salaries a month relative to the percent of male headed households (Inegi. 2000. XII Censo de 
Población y Vivienda Inegi. 2000) 
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progressing rapidly since the seventies (Brown, Pagán, and Rodriguez-Oreggia 1999; 
Pedrero Nieto 2003), yet tends to be concentrated in certain occupations and areas of 
activity (Rendón-Gan 2003).  Women’s share of executive and public service positions 
has increased during the last decades but remains low (Zabludovsky 1997).  Table 2.1 
shows that women’s representation as public employees and managers compared to that 
of men ranges from 50% in Morelos to 33% in Chiapas, with an average gender gap 
across states of 67%.  Women are also underrepresented in professional and technical 
occupations.  Their share, though, is higher than in the previous category: for each 100 
males, there are 65 women.  
The fifth indicator measures Ownership of Businesses (EC_5), and reveals the 
largest gender gap in the economic sphere.  On average, for each 100 productive 
establishments owned by males, there are only 17 owned by women.  The size of the 
standard deviation shows the homogeneity across states.  Oaxaca and San Luis Potosí are 
the states with the smallest gap, around 78%.  At the other end, we find Michoacán and 
Zacatecas, where women have barely attained 10% of men’s positions. 
The next two variables are related to the employment conditions.  First, 
entitlement of receiving Health Benefits (EC_6) either in private or public institutions 
among those employed.  In the Federal District for each 100 employed men with health 
benefits, there are 75 women.  In Chiapas, Coahuila, Quintana Roo, Tabasco and Nuevo 
León, the ratio is less than two to one.  The second variable related to employment 
conditions is Average Wage per Hour (EC_7).  Since 1987 the gender earnings ratio has 
decreased (Brown, Pagán, and Rodriguez-Oreggia 1999), but still, in average, women’s 
hour earnings are 94% of that of men.  This is the economic measure in which women 
have reached higher levels of gender equality as revealed by the mean.  Nevertheless, in 
the southern states of Chiapas and Oaxaca women’s earnings are more than 10% higher 
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than those of men.  A plausible explanation might be related to structural conditions and 
to the influence of the farming sector.  Farming activities, in which males are 
overrepresented, are very low paid.  A similar phenomenon occurs in agriculture, the 
average salary for females tends to be higher than that of males, because women’s work 
tends to be concentrated in certain crops and regions in which the salary tends to be 
higher (Pedrero Nieto 2003; Barron 1997, cited in Rendón 2003).   
The last variable, (EC_8), measures gender inequality in households headed by 
males and females that are above the poverty line.  The percentage of female headed 
households in Mexico, as in the rest of the world, has increased over time.  However, the 
gender gap in terms of the head of the household income, however, has decreased 
(Asgary and Pagán 2004).  Cortes (1997) found that female head of household is not 
necessarily associated with poverty.  There is no data about the percentage of male and 
female headed households above the poverty level.  As a proxy, EC_8 represents the 
gender ratio of the households in which the head earns more than 10 minimum salaries a 
month (as of 2000, an average of 352 pesos; approximately 36 dollars).  In the Federal 
District, 12.5% of the households in which the head earns more than 10 minimum salaries 
are headed by women.  In contrast, in the northern states of Coahuila and Nuevo León, 
this percentage is below 5%.  
In sum, as revealed by these eight economic indicators, women are far from 
having reached equality with men.  We observe large variations in the sizes of the gender 
gaps.  Women and men’s average hour wages are almost leveled; which sharply contrasts 
with the important differences regarding businesses ownership.  Some states such as the 
Federal District and Morelos tend to rank mid or high in most of these indicators.  In 
contrast, states such as Chiapas or Tabasco tend to rank mid or rather low in these 
variables; denoting, thus, the gender inequality in the economic sphere.  
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As we have seen, each indicator measures an array of aspects of gender equality 
in the economic realm.  The first step in the construction of the composite measure of the 
economic dimension of the index (GEIMS_EC) is to perform an internal reliability 
analysis. This is presented in Table 2.2.  The first part presents the correlations among 
the initial pool of economic variables.  The second part shows that seven of the eight 
economic variables have a positive correlation with the rest of the variables (Cronbach 
Alpha = .67). The levels of gender economic (in)equality seem not to be associated with 
the gap in average hour wages (EC_6).  The last two columns only show the indicators 
that met the criteria of having a correlation between the indicator and the sub-index equal 
or greater than .30, and that the deletion of that variable should result in an increase in the 
alpha coefficient for index reliability.  The removal of EC_6 results in an increase in the 
index’s reliability (Cronbach Alpha .79).  The economic component of the GEIMS is the 
average of these seven measures.  The State coefficients of economic gender equality are 
presented ranked in Table 2.8. 
 
2.2.b-  The Educational Equality Dimension (GEIMS_ED) 
The educational dimension is the second sphere where the structural inequality 
between men and women might be observed.  Women’s access to education is associated 
with higher rates of participation in the labor market, better employment conditions and 
with higher access to decision making positions (Darcy 1987; Gaddie and Bullock 1995; 
Pedrero Nieto 2003).  Female’s access to higher levels of education has increased 
gradually in Mexico since the mid seventies (Cuétara 2001; Fuentes and Montes 2004; 
Rendón 2003).  There is no gender difference in terms of educational attainment among 
those under 25 years (Parker and Pederzini 2000).  The gap, nevertheless, persists among 
the older generations, perhaps due to the idea that education, especially college education  
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Table 2.2:  Reliability Analysis of the Economic component of GEIMS 
 
Economic Indicators Correlation  All Indicators (Standarized) 
Selected Variables 
(Standarized) 
  EC_1 EC_2 EC_3 EC_4 EC_
5 
EC_6 EC_7   r Alpha if 
item is 
deleted 
r Alpha if 
item is 
deleted 
EC_1 Labor force --        .63 .58 .73 .71 
EC_2 Employed .99*** --       .64 .58 .74 .71 
EC_3 Civil servants, managers and 
administrators 
.46** .47** --      .58 .59 .65 .73 
EC_4 Professional and technicians .29 .28 .69*** --     .28 .66 .32 .79 
EC_5 Business owners .28 .27 .09 - .02 --    .22 .67 .21 .81 
EC_6 Average hour wage - .47** - .47** - -.38** - .18 - .01 --   -.31 .79 -- -- 
EC_7 Health benefits .56*** .58*** .58***   .26   .04 - .24 --  .62 .58 .66 .73 
EC_8 Above poverty level households .24 .25  .26 - .17   .26  .31* .54**  .43 .63 .33 .79 
                  
                  Alpha 
Coefficient .67  .79 
***  p< .001;  **  p< . 05;  *  p< .01 
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is more important for males than for females (author’s calculation from World Values 
Survey 2000). 
I selected six educational indicators that intend to measure the gender gap in the 
educational arena.  The average number of years of schooling has been traditionally used 
for measuring the educational gap between men and women.  Behrman and Knowles 
(1999), though, argue for the need of using a diverse set of educational indicators.  
Therefore, several measures of educational gender inequality were included: literacy 
(ED_1), educational attainment measured as the average years of education (ED_2), 
women’s share of college (ED_3), graduate education (ED_4), and women’s share of 
traditionally male-dominated higher education areas such as engineering, agricultural and 
natural sciences (ED_5).  The last indicator measures women’ share of professional 
research positions (ED_6) as members of the SNI (Sistema Nacional de Investigadores, 
National System of Researchers). 
Table 2.3 sorts the states in rank order according to each of the educational 
indicators.  In most of the states women are underrepresented in the educational realm.  
In terms of the average years of education (ED_1), only in the northern states of 
Chihuahua, Durango, Sinaloa and Sonora, as well as in Nayarit, women have reached 
parity with men.  In contrast, Chiapas and Oaxaca are the states with largest gender gaps.  
In the case of literacy (ED_2) the gender gap is small, although existent.  For each 100 
literate men there are almost 98 women.  We find important differences across states, 
being again the gap greater in the southern states of Chiapas and Oaxaca.  The gender gap 
increases in the case of college (ED_3) and graduate education (ED_4).  In average, for 
each 100 men with college education there are 78 women; this figure decreases to 54 in 
the case of graduate education.  Notorious state-to-state differences emerge; while the 
gender gap in among those with college education is 7.5% in Nayarit, in Chiapas is of  
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Table 2.3:  States Ranked in order of Educational Gender Equality Indicators 






Rank State ED_1 State ED_2 State ED_3 State ED_4 State ED_5 State ED_6 
1 NAY 101.4 SIN 101.1 NAY 92.5 BC 71.4 PUE 38.0 JAL 54.8 
2 CHI  100.0 NAY 100.6 TLAX 86.1 NAY 65.2 DF 37.6 DF 54.6 
3 DUR 100.0 SON 100.5 CHI  83.8 TAMP 64.2 MOR 37.1 QROO 52.2 
4 SIN 100.0 COL 100.2 SLP 83.5 VER 59.3 SLP 36.3 MOR 50.0 
5 SON 100.0 DUR 100.2 TAMP 83.5 QROO 59.3 TAMP 35.5 SON 47.6 
6 ZAC 98.5 ZAC 100.1 SIN 83.2 TLAX 58.4 TLAX 34.8 CAMP 45.5 
7 BCS 97.6 CHI  99.8 BC 83.0 PUE 58.1 HGO 34.4 HGO 45.5 
8 BC 97.6 COAH 99.8 VER 82.8 DF 57.8 NL 34.2 CHIS 43.3 
9 COL 97.4 JAL 99.6 GRO 82.1 CHI  56.0 BC 34.1 VER 42.9 
10 SLP 97.1 BCS 99.5 COAH 81.6 JAL 55.9 AGS 33.6 MEX 40.7 
11 MICH 96.8 AGS 99.4 SON 80.5 MOR 55.9 QRO 33.4 BCS 39.6 
12 COAH 96.5 BC 99.4 PUE 80.2 MEX 55.8 GRO 32.5 COL 38.8 
13 TAMP 96.3 MICH 99.4 MOR 79.1 DUR 54.7 CHI 32.5 TLAX 38.5 
14 MOR 96.2 NL 99.3 HGO 79.0 GRO 54.6 DUR 32.3 ZAC 36.7 
15 JAL 96.1 TAMP 99.1 DUR 76.9 HGO 54.3 MEX 32.0 NAY 36.4 
16 AGS 95.1 GTO 98.3 ZAC 76.7 SIN 54.0 VER 31.8 NL 35.6 
17 NL 94.5 SLP 98.1 QROO 76.1 NL 53.4 SON 31.5 PUE 34.5 
18 GTO 93.9 DF 97.9 JAL 76.0 QRO 52.4 GTO 31.1 DUR 34.5 
19 TLAX 93.7 MOR 97.5 AGS 76.0 SLP 51.9 JAL 30.9 QRO 34.5 
20 HGO 92.8 QROO 97.4 NL 75.5 COAH 51.8 COAH 30.9 CHI  34.2 
21 VER 92.5 YUC 96.7 COL 75.5 BCS 51.7 BCS 30.5 YUC 34.0 
22 DF 92.0 CAMP 96.7 YUC 75.0 GTO 51.2 OAX 28.6 OAX 32.3 
23 CAMP 91.8 QRO 96.6 GTO 74.6 CAMP 50.4 QROO 28.5 TAB 28.9 
24 MEX 91.7 TLAX 96.5 CAMP 74.6 OAX 50.4 YUC 28.3 MICH 27.8 
25 QROO 91.4 TAB 96.3 QRO 74.5 MICH 50.1 SIN 27.8 SLP 25.2 
26 QRO 91.1 MEX 96.3 BCS 74.3 YUC 49.6 MICH 27.5 BC 23.3 
27 TAB 90.7 VER 94.9 OAX 73.6 AGS 47.6 ZAC 27.5 TAMP 22.6 
28 GRO 90.6 HGO 94.7 MEX 72.6 SON 47.2 NAY 27.1 GTO 20.0 
29 YUC 90.3 PUE 93.8 MICH 72.6 TAB 47.0 CAMP 26.4 SIN 20.0 
30 PUE 90.1 GRO 93.1 DF 72.2 ZAC 47.0 COL 26.2 AGS 15.6 
31 OAX 85.2 OAX 89.8 TAB 71.4 CHIS 42.6 TAB 25.3 COAH 14.3 
32 CHIS 83.1 CHIS 88.7 CHIS 64.8 COL 41.3 CHIS 25.2 GRO 10.0 
             
 Mean 94.8  97.8  78.4  54.2  31.5  35.6 
 STD 4.3  3.0  5.4  6.3  3.7  11.7 
Notes:  ED_1: Average years of schooling for females 15 years and older relative to the average years of schooling for males 15 years and 
older.  ED_2: Percent of the literate population 15 years and older who are female relative to the percent of men.  ED_3: Percent of 
the population 15 years and older with college education who are females relative to the percent of males.  ED_4: Percent of 
population 15 years and older with graduate education (M.A. or Ph.D.) who are females relative to the percent of males.  ED_5:  
Percent of the population 15 years and older females with higher education in the areas of agricultural sciences, engineering and 
natural sciences relative to the percent of males with education in these areas.  ED_6:  Percent of SNI members  (National System of 
Researchers, Sistema Nacional de Investigadores) who are female relative to the percent of SNI’s members who are males. 
Sources:  XII Censo General de Población y Vivienda. Inegi 2000 (from ED_1 through ED_5).  ED_6:  CONACYT 2005.  
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35.2%.  Similarly, these gender differences are also found among those with graduate 
education.  A closer look into some educational areas traditionally reserved to men, such 
as the agricultural, engineering and natural sciences, reveals that females are largely 
underrepresented in these areas.  In average, for each 100 men there are 31 women.  The 
states are not homogeneous as revealed by the size of the standard deviation.  Puebla is 
the state where women have a higher share (38%) followed by the Federal District and 
Morelos. On the other end, in Tabasco and Chiapas the gender gap is 75%.   
In addition to women’s traditional exclusion from higher education (Cuétara 
2001), research and academia have been perceived as traditionally elitist, male and 
patriarchal in its workplace culture, structure and values (Caplan 1994; Sutherland 1994, 
cited in Poole, Bornholt, and Summers 1997), creating a situation in which teaching and 
research positions were virtually barred to women.  The sixth column in Table 2.3 arrays 
states according to women’s attainment as researchers.  EC_6 assesses women’s share of 
research positions at the prestigious Sistema Nacional de Investigadores (SNI, National 
System of Researchers), which includes SNI´s candidates as well as accredited 
researchers.  Although women’s access to research positions has increased, the gender 
gap in this dimension remains the largest within the educational dimension.  On average, 
for each 100 male members of the SNI, there are only thirty-five females.  Differences 
across states emerge: Guerrero is the state where women face the largest gender gap as 
researchers (90%) while in Jalisco and the Federal District there are 54 women for each 
100 males. 
In sum, women are far from level with men in the educational realm. Although 
women are closer to men in terms of average years of study and literacy, they still are 
underrepresented at the higher levels of the educational system, especially in traditionally 
male-dominated specialties, or as professional researchers.  The southern states with a 
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largest percentage of indigenous population, Oaxaca, Chiapas and Guerrero tend to rank 
low in most of the measures of educational attainment, revealing that gender equality in 
education is far from being achieved.  In contrast, states such as Chihuahua, the Federal 
District and Nayarit tend to rank high in gender equality in most indicators of this 
dimension. 
For the construction of a composite measure of educational equality, it was 
conducted an internal reliability analysis.  This is presented in Table 2.4.  From the six 
original educational variables, only five are retained in the final GEIMS_ED.  The 
variable quantifying the gender gap in research positions (ED_6) is not associated with 
the rest of variables, and its exclusion from the index results in an increase in the internal 
reliability coefficient (Cronbach Alpha = .76).  Potential explanations might be related to 
the geographical mobility of the researchers or to the development of research centers 
result of the policies of the Science and Technology National Council (CONACYT: 
Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologia) and government decentralization policies 
(Vessuri 1997).  The state coefficients of educational gender equality and its ranking are 
presented in Table 2.8.  
 
2.2.c-  The Political Equality Dimension (GEIMS_PO) 
Women’s share of decision making positions is one of the areas in which women 
are more far from reaching parity with men (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2006).  At the 
macro level, the unequal access of women to leadership positions is associated with the 
low status of women in other spheres such as the economic and the educational (Moore 
and Shackman 1996; Oakes and Almquist 1993; Reynolds 1999).  At the individual-level, 
lower resources such as experience, education, time or money reduce women’s ability to  
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Table 2.4: Reliability Analysis of the Educational Equality Sub-index  




  ED_1 ED_2 ED_3 ED_4 ED_5 ED_6 r Alpha if 
item is 
deleted 
r Alpha if 
item is 
deleted 
ED_1 Average years of 
Education 
--  .59 .50 .65 .67 
ED_2 Literacy    .91*** --     .47 .55 .51 .72 
ED_3 College    .59***  .38** --    .56 .51 .68 .66 
ED_4 Graduate    .24  .16  .62*** --   .51 .53 .51 .72 
ED_5 Engineering, agricultural 
and natural sciences 
   .10  .04  .32*  .48** --  .30 .61 .30 .79 
ED_7 Researchers - .12 -.09 -.26 - .001 -.003 -- -.15 .76 -- -- 
            
              Alpha 
Coefficient .63  .76 
 
***  p< .001;  **  p< . 05;  *  p< .01 
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reach positions of political power and decision making (Gaddie and Bullock 1995; Manza 
and Brooks 1998).  The consequence of women’s better representation in the political 
sphere is the greater amount of public policies and legislation addressing women’s issues 
which might reduce gender inequality in other spheres (Jones 1997; Rodríguez 2003). 
For assessing the attainment of women in the political sphere, I collected eight 
indicators that measure women’s share of decision making positions in different levels of 
government from the three branches of the Sstate: legislative, executive and judicial, 
within each state.  As the representation of women in certain public offices might be 
dependent with the political climate or the nature of the election (Rodríguez 2003), the 
use of several measures of gender gap in different branches and levels of government 
reduces the likelihood of biased measurements due to the existing political climate when 
the data was collected.  Moreover, the use of multiple variables overcomes the constraint 
of some previous gender equality indexes that only included parliamentary representation 
(see Dijkstra 2002).   
Table 2.5 sorts the states in rank order according to each political indicator.  Most 
of these measures were compiled by the author using several sources.  This was a 
complex task given the heterogeneity of the political institutions across states.  The 
specific political design of some states made necessary the imputation of the inexistent 
data.  This is the case of the Federal District, where there are not municipalities, or the 
existence of indigenous governing boards under the system of Usos y Costumbres in 
Oaxaca (see Dalton 2003).  In these two cases the information regarding women’s gender 
gap as Trustees (síndicos) or City councilors (regidores) was missing.  I dealt with the 
missing data (implausible data) by imputing the mean (see Groves et al. 2004).  Instead 
using the variable’s mean as imputation method, the imputed value was the mean of all 
remaining available political variables for that specific case.
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Table 2.5:  States Ranked in order of Political Gender Equality Indicators 




Magistrates State Secretaries Federal Civil Servants 
Rank State PO_1 State PO_2 State PO_3 State PO_4 State PO_5 State PO_6 State PO_7 State PO_8 
1 DF(a) 45.5 CAMP 110.5 COL  66.7 QROO 53.4 BCS 100.0 CAMP 100.0 DF 140.0 CHIS 75.0 
2 CAMP 22.2 TAMP 92.0 YUC(c) 66.7 DF 46.7 QROO 100.0 YUC 100.0 COAH 50.0 CHI  75.0 
3 TLAX 9.1 ZAC 76.2 DF(a) 64.8 CAMP 45.8 YUC 66.7 DF 84.8 YUC 37.5 NAY 75.0 
4 MEX 8.8 CHI  75.7 SLP 61.1 BCS 40.1 TAB 50.0 AGS 75.0 CHIS 33.3 SLP 75.0 
5 VER 6.6 COAH 66.3 OAX(b) 25.2 NL 35.5 TLAX 50.0 QRO 75.0 MICH  33.3 DF(d) 64.8 
6 NL 6.3 SON 65.5 JAL 22.8 TAB 30.7 GRO 42.9 GTO 66.7 OAX 33.3 BCS 40.0 
7 QRO 5.9 DF(a) 64.8 AGS 22.2 PUE 28.2 SON 40.0 QROO 60.0 MEX 30.8 CAMP 40.0 
8 SIN 5.9 NAY 56.7 TAB 21.4 YUC 25.0 OAX 37.5 CHIS 50.0 COL  28.6 COAH 40.0 
9 SLP 5.5 SIN 53.3 PUE 20.6 COAH 25.0 PUE 36.4 SLP 50.0 DUR 25.0 MICH  40.0 
10 NAY 5.3 SLP 52.6 DUR 18.2 GRO 24.4 MOR 33.3 NL 47.1 QROO 25.0 MOR 40.0 
11 JAL 5.1 YUC 50.1 NAY 17.6 JAL 24.1 DF 25.0 MOR 44.4 VER 25.0 NL 40.0 
12 HGO 5.0 NL 49.7 QROO 14.3 GTO 24.1 DUR 25.0 MEX 42.9 NL 20.0 TAMP 40.0 
13 TAMP 4.9 AGS 49.2 MOR 13.8 SLP 22.7 ZAC 25.0 COAH 40.0 BCS 16.7 TLAX 40.0 
14 CHI  4.7 TAB 47.1 MEX 13.6 HGO 20.8 MEX 24.1 TAB 38.5 GRO 16.7 AGS 16.7 
15 YUC 3.9 COL  45.3 QRO 12.5 OAX 20.0 COAH 16.7 COL  30.0 NAY 16.7 BC 16.7 
16 ZAC 3.6 PUE 44.6 SON 12.5 NAY 20.0 HGO 16.7 HGO 30.0 AGS 14.3 COL  16.7 
17 CHIS 3.5 GTO 43.2 HGO 12.0 COL  19.0 SLP 16.7 ZAC 30.0 MOR 14.3 DUR 16.7 
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Table 2.5, Continued 
 




Magistrates State Secretaries 
Federal Civil 
Servants 
Rank State PO_1 State PO_2 State PO_3 State PO_4 State PO_5 State PO_6 State PO_
7 
State PO_8 
18 MICH  2.7 JAL 43.0 COAH 11.8 BC 19.0 SIN 14.3 OAX 27.8 ZAC 14.3 GTO 16.7 
19 GRO 2.7 MOR 42.1 ZAC 11.5 VER 18.5 CHI  12.5 GRO 26.7 TAB 11.1 GRO 16.7 
20 PUE 1.9 QRO 41.5 CAMP 10.0 SIN 17.6 NL 10.0 PUE 26.7 TAMP 11.1 HGO 16.7 
21 SON 1.4 VER 41.1 VER 9.8 MICH  17.6 CHIS 9.1 BCS 25.0 HGO 10.0 JAL 16.7 
22 OAX 1.1 BC 38.2 NL 8.5 MEX 17.2 VER 4.5 CHI  25.0 QRO 10.0 MEX 16.7 
23 AGS 0 MICH  36.7 CHI  8.1 ZAC 15.3 AGS 0 TLAX 25.0 CAMP 9.1 OAX 16.7 
24 BC 0 MEX 32.4 MICH  7.6 SON 14.8 BC 0 SIN 22.2 CHI  8.3 PUE 16.7 
25 BCS 0 HGO 31.2 CHIS 7.2 TLAX 14.3 CAMP 0 DUR 20.0 JAL 7.7 SON 16.7 
26 COAH 0 BCS 30.0 TLAX 7.1 QRO 13.6 COL 0 MICH  20.0 SLP 7.1 TAB 16.7 
27 COL  0 GRO 29.7 SIN 5.9 DUR 13.6 GTO 0 BC 18.2 BC 0 QRO 0 
28 DUR 0 QROO 29.2 GRO 5.3 AGS 12.4 JAL 0 NAY 16.7 GTO 0 QROO 0 
29 GTO 0 TLAX 25.8 TAMP 4.9 MOR 11.1 MICH 0 VER 15.8 PUE 0 SIN 0 
30 MOR 0 OAX(b) 25.2 GTO 4.5 CHIS 11.1 NAY 0 SON 12.5 SIN 0 VER 0 
31 QROO 0 DUR 23.9 BC 0 TAMP 10.4 QRO 0 TAMP 11.1 SON 0 YUC 0 
32 TAB 0 CHIS 20.4 BCS 0 CHI  10.0 TAMP 0 JAL 7.4 TLAX 0 ZAC 0 
 Mean 5  47.9  18.4  22.6  23.6  39.9  22.6  28.2 
 STD 8.5  20.3  18.9  11.1  27.1  25.2  26.1  23.9 
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Table 2.5, Continued 
 
Sources:  PO_1: Percent of majors who are women relative to the percent of majors who are males (Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal 2005).  PO_2: Percent of city councilors who 
are women relative to the percent of city councilors who are males (Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal 2005).  PO_3:  Percent of city trustees (sindicos) who are women 
relative to the percent of city aldermen who are males (Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal 2005).  PO_4: Percent of State representatives who are women relative to the percent 
of State representatives who are male (Author’s calculation 2005).  PO_5: Percent of Federal representatives elected in single district who are women relative to the percent of Federal 
representatives elected in single district who are male (Congreso Federal Mexicano 2005).  PO_6: Percent of Magistrados who are women relative to the percent of Magistrados who are 
male (Author’s calculation).  PO_7: Percent State Secretaries and Procuradores de Justicia who are women relative to the percent of State Secretaries or Procuradores de Justicia who are 
male (Author’s calculation based on information retrieved from the webpage of each State’s executive power and Secretaria de Gobernación’s Directorio Electrónico de Funcionarios 
Estatales, 2005).  PO_8: Percent of Federal Government Representatives in the States who are female relative to the percent of Federal Government Representatives in the States who 
are male Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal 2005).  
Notes:  (a)  The Federal District does not have municipalities. The coefficient for the variable Majors corresponds to the jefes delegacionales (delegation chiefs). The coefficient for the 
variables  Aldermen and Aldermen was imputed as the mean of the remaining political variables for this State. (b)  Oaxaca some indigenous communities follow the usos y costumbres 
in the election of their community and/or municipal leaders. Data was unavailable from the National System of Municipal Information (SNIM), the ratio was imputed by calculating the 
mean of the remaining political variables for this State.  (c )  Data unavailable from the National System of Municipal Information (SNIM), the coefficient was imputed by calculating 
the average of the remaining political variables for this State. (d)  Given the federal nature of Mexico, where the federal government is located at the Federal District, the Federal 





The indicators of political gender equality reveal higher levels of heterogeneity 
across states, and larger gender gaps compared to those of the economic and educational 
spheres, as shown by the size of the standard deviations.  The first political variable, 
measures women’s share of Majors (PO_1); on average, for each one hundred 
municipalities governed by males there are only five governed by a female.  Women’s 
share of the local executive power is concentrated in two thirds of the states.  In ten states 
women are not represented at all as majors.  City Councilors (PO_2) measures the gender 
gap in the municipal legislative bodies (Rodríguez 1997).  Women are better represented 
as city councilors than as majors, perhaps because it is a position of restricted authority 
and power (Massolo 1998).  On average, for each one hundred male city councilors there 
are 48 women.  Important cross-state differences emerge between the overrepresentation 
of women in Campeche and Guerrero, Tlaxcala, Durango, Chiapas and Quintana Roo, 
where the gender gap is greater than 70%. 
As in other countries, in Mexico, the gender gap in political representation tends 
to increase as the prestige and the power of the office increases (Gadsden Carrasco 2003).  
The gender inequality is larger among Trustees (PO_3), a political figure with public 
visibility that has financial and legal responsibilities (Massolo 1998).  In this municipal 
powerful political position, on average, women occupy 18% of the trustee positions 
occupied by men.  In Colima and San Luis Potosí women are better represented than in 
the two Californias, where no women is in such position –perhaps due to the small 
number of municipalities.   
The gender gap does not improve at the state and federal legislatures.  The level 
of gender equality, though, is greater than in the executive local branch (majors and 
trustees).  On average women have around 23% of male’s representation as State 
Representatives (PO_4) and as single-district Federal Representatives (POL_5).  The 
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Mexican Congress has 500 seats: 300 single district (based on population) and 200 
proportional seats divided in five circumscriptions of forty seats each (see Molinar-
Horcasitas 1991).  Given that only single district seats can be traced to a particular state, 
this measure excludes women’s representation in proportional seats.  Quintana Roo is the 
only state where women have a higher share of state-level legislative seats and women 
have reached parity at single district’s representation at the federal level.  In about one 
third of the states no woman was elected in a single-district seat.  There is not clear 
association between women’s representation at state and federal legislatures.  Some states 
that rank either high or low in both measures (i.e. Quintana Roo, Baja California Sur, 
Tamaulipas and Chiapas).  Campeche, in contrast, ranks third in women’s share of seats 
at the state legislature, but are absent at the federal level.  
Women’s representation at the judiciary branch is measured by women’s 
representation as Magistrates (PO_6) at the state’s Supreme Court.  The average 
attainment of women across states is 40%. Women have only reached equality in this 
dimension in Campeche and Yucatán, followed by the Federal District (85%) and 
Aguascalientes and Querétaro with 75%.  The two final variables measure women’s share 
of political power at the State executive level.  PO_7 measures women’s share of State 
Secretaries.  On average, women have attained 23% of the positions occupied by men.  
Again, important differences across states emerge.  While women are overrepresented in 
the Federal District, they lack representation in Tlaxcala, Puebla, Guanajuato, Baja 
California, Sinaloa and Sonora.  The last variable measures the gender gap among Civil 
Servants working as a liaison or commissioners between the federal and the state 
governments (PO_8) as representatives of Banobras, Sagarpa, Sedesol, DIF, National 
Commission of Human Rights, and commissioner of the State in front of the Federal 
Government.  On average for each 100 males in these positions there are 28 women.  In 
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six states no women occupy any of these positions.  In a nutshell, women are further from 
achieving parity with men in the political dimension than in the educational and 
economic spheres.  
For constructing a composite measure of political equality, first I performed an 
internal reliability analysis with the initial pool of political variables. The correlations and 
the reliability analysis are presented in Table 2.6.  Table 2.6 reveals that all variables but 
women’s representation as Federal Single District Representatives (PO_5) have positive 
correlation with the index and its removal would not result in an improvement in the 
alpha reliability coefficient, which is .70.  The elimination of the variable measuring 
Single District Representatives increased the intra-index internal reliability; resulting thus 
in a Cronbach Alpha of .75.  The reasons for their elimination are related to the fact that 
the proportion of women elected in single district seats at the federal legislature is 
sensitive to the number of districts, which vary across states.  As the number of 
seats/districts increases, both as single district and proportional seats, it becomes an 
opportunity for many candidates (including women) to be nominated and elected 
(Beckwith 1992).    
 
2.2.d-  Legal Equality Dimension (GEIMS_LEGAL) 
The legal status of women in a certain society is the fourth sphere in which 
structural gender equality is measured.  Is in the law where the differentiation between 
men and women is crudest (United Nations Development Program 1995).  Mexico signed 
the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) in 1999 and ratified it in 2002.  Mexican legislation, however, still does not 
guarantee the equality between men and women (Torres-Falcón 2004).  In the last years,  
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Table 2.6:  Reliability Analysis of the Political Component of GEIMS 
 




    




r Alpha if item is deleted 
              
PO_1 Majors --        .67 .60 .70 .65 
PO_2 City Councilors .42* --       .21 .70 .35 .75 
PO_3 Trustees .39** .10 --      .45 .65 .48 .72 
PO_4 State Representatives .43* .14 .20 --     .52 .64 .47 .73 
PO_5 Federal Single District Repr. - .13 - .32† .05 .47* --    .01 .75 -- -- 
PO_6 Magistrates .43* .26 .40* .41* .07 --   .49 .65  .71 
PO_7 State Secretaries .66*** .07 .51* .38* .08 .31† --  .61 .62  .68 
PO_8 Federal Civil Servants  .36* .23 .13 .01 -.19 .05 .36* -- .23 .70 .60 .75 
              
              Alpha 
Coefficient   .70  .75 
***  p< .001;  **  p< . 05;  *  p< .01 
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the legislation has gradually changed from the situation described by Guillé-Tamayo 
(2002) in which until 1997 it was mandatory for women in Aguascalientes to request 
written permission from their husband if they wanted to be employed, or by Hernández-
Castillo (2004) in which until 1998 women’s employment in Chiapas was conditioned to 
the husband’s permission based on non-interference of household responsibilities.  The 
move toward a greater equality in the law, however, has not occurred in all states.  The 
approval of legislation that protects women’s rights and eliminates gender discrimination 
is associated with higher numbers of women elected to a legislative body and with 
women’s economic and educational advance (Oakes and Almquist 1993; Reynolds 
1999).  For women, higher rates of labor force participation and education are associated 
with higher levels of political participation and involvement in public affairs (Togeby 
1994). 
I collected fourteen indicators that measure the presence or absence of legislation 
granting rights, promoting gender equality, or protecting already established rights for 
constructing a measure of women’s legal status until 2005.  These are presented in Table 
2.7.  The first variable measures whether or not the state grants women control over their 
reproductive rights, Abortion (LE_1).  Interrupting a pregnancy in case of risk of death 
for the mother; imprudence or negligence and genetic malformations of the fetus was still 
considered a crime in 21 States.  Fifteen states lack of specific legislation condemning 
Sexual Harassment (LE_2).  Similarly, 14 states do not have laws or statutes that at least 
formally guarantee gender balance in Political Representation (LE_3).  In twelve states 
its Constitution or political laws include an explicit mention to gender quotas or other 
affirmative actions.  In Coahuila, Chiapas, Querétaro, San Luis Potosí, Tabasco and 
Zacatecas, the protection of this right is weaker since the mandate for gender equality is  
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Table 2.7:  States that Approved Legislation Protecting Women’s Rights or Granting 
Already Existing Rights 
 










BC, COL, CHIS, CHI, DF, GRO, HGO, JAL, MEX, MOR, NL, 




CAMP, COAHa, COL, CHISa, CHI, DF, DUR, GRO, MEX, MICH, 
OAX, PUE, QROa, SLP, SINa, SON, TAB a, ZAC a. 
NO: Stealing livestock 
more punishment than 
offenses against women 
(LE_4) 
 





BC, BCS, CAMP, COAH, COL, CHIS, DF, DUR, GTO, GRO, 
JAL, MEX, MICH, MOR, NAY, OAX, PUE, QRO, QROO, SLP, 
SIN, SON, TAB, TAMP, TLAX, VER, YUC, ZAC. 
 




AGS, BC, COAH, CHIS, CHI, DF, DUR, GTO, GRO, HGO, JAL, 
MEX, MICH, MOR, NAY, NL, OAX, PUE, SLP, SIN, SON, TAB, 
TAMP, VER, YUC, ZAC 
. 
Rape within marriage 
(LE_7) 
 
BCS, COAH, CHI, DF, DUR, GTO, HGO, OAX, QRO, SLP, 
TAMP, YUC, VER 




AGS, BC, BCS, COAH, COL, CHI, DF, DUR, MEX, MICH, MOR, 





DF, HGO, MEX, OAX, PUE, QROO, SON, TAMP. 
Public funded shelters 
(LE_10) 
 
BC, DF, GTO, MOR, OAX, QRO, SIN, TAB. 
 
 64
Table 2.7, continued 
 
interpreted broadly in light of other legal provisions.  Crimes and offenses against women 
such as abusing a minor, raping or harassing a woman still receive lesser punishment than 
Stealing Livestock (LE_4) in the majority of states.  This crime typified in the criminal 
code and called abigeato (cattle theft), receives lesser punishment than crimes and 
offenses against women in twelve states. 
The second group of measures determines the presence of legal premises that 
grant protection to victims of family violence.  Both, men and women might experience 




DF, GRO, HGO, JAL, PUE 
NO Time for re-marrying 
(LE_12) 
 












Sources: LE_1: Abortion is not considered a felony in the penal code at least in these three cases: risk of death for the mother; 
imprudence or negligence and genetic malformations of the fetus (GIRE. 2005). In all states abortion is not considered a felony in case 
of rape.  Besides this and the three previously mentioned, in some states abortion is not criminalized in case of serious health 
consequences for the mother to be, find non-consented artificial insemination and economic reasons (when the woman has at least 
three children). LE_2:  Existence of Sexual Harassment legislation enacted by the State (Inmujeres. 2004).  LE_3: Existence of gender 
quotas or affirmative actions that guarantee a minimum political representation to women in the States’ Political Constitution or 
Electoral Laws (Pérez Duarte 2002).  LE_4: Statutes that provide a harder punishment for stealing livestock than any of the following: 
abusing a minor, raping or harassing a woman ((Pérez Duarte 2002).  LE_5:  Specific law for the prevention and assistance of the 
family violence (Data provided by Inmujeres 2005).  LE_6: Abuse of a family member is defined as a criminal offense in the Penal 
Code (Data provided by Inmujeres 2005).  LE_7:  Rape within the marriage is considered a felony in the Penal Code (Data provided 
by Inmujeres 2005).  LE_8: Violence against the partner is considered as cause for divorce in the Civil Code (Data provided by 
Inmujeres 2005).  LE_9:  Statutes that grant judges the authority of throwing out from the family household the abuser in cases of 
family violence (Pérez Duarte 2002).  LE_10: Existence of public funded shelters for victims of partner violence (Data provided by 
Inmujeres 2005).  LE_11: Statutes that allow that women could get married at a younger age than men. (Pérez Duarte 2002).  LE_12: 
Legislation (Civil Code) that mandate women to wait a certain number of days (from 180 to 300) before re-marrying after a divorce, 
while men are exempt from this wait (Pérez Duarte 2002).   LE_13:  Statutes that recognize the value of domestic work performed by 
women in the household economy (Pérez Duarte 2002).  LE_14:  Statutes that grant an allowance to women in case of common-
consent divorce (Pérez Duarte 2002).   
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of partner violence, but women are at a higher risk.  The existence of laws granting 
protection to victims of family violence contributes to the protection of women’s rights.  
The fifth legal variable assesses whether or not the state has passed specific Family 
Violence legislation (LE_5).  As of May 2005; only Aguascalientes, Chihuahua, Hidalgo 
and Nuevo León had not approved this type of legislation.  Whether or not Violence 
against a family member is considered a Felony is assessed in (LE_6); only 26 states 
prosecute it as such.  It should be noted that the four states lacking Intrafamily Violence 
legislation categorize domestic violence as a crime.  In contrast, in six states in spite of 
having approved specific legislation against violence, violence against a family member 
is not considered a felony (Baja California Sur, Campeche, Colima, Querétaro, Quintana 
Roo and Tlaxcala).  The next variable assesses the legal existence of Rape within the 
Marriage (LE_7).  It was not until November 2005 that the Supreme Court ruled 
recognizing rape within marriage.  Less than half of the states, nevertheless, condemn 
rape within the marriage.  The previous figure is not surprising given the fact that in 
eleven states the proven existence of domestic violence is not yet a causal of Divorce 
(LE_8).   
Whether or not the court can mandate the Abuser to Abandon the Household 
(LE_9) is a prerogative that only judges in eight states have: Federal District, Hidalgo, 
Mexico, Oaxaca, Puebla, Quintana Roo, Sonora and Tamaulipas.  Only eight states have 
Public funded Shelters (LE_10) for victims of domestic violence:  Baja California, 
Federal District, Guanajuato, Morelos, Oaxaca, Querétaro, Sinaloa and Tabasco.  
According to the data provided by the Inmujeres, there are only 32 shelters in Mexico, 
both directed by the government (11) and NGOs (21).  In nine states, women have no 
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place to go: Baja California Sur, Campeche, Colima, Guerrero, Jalisco, Mexico, Nayarit, 
Tamaulipas and Veracruz.3 
The third group of legal indicators refers to the institution of marriage.  The 
inequality between males and females is more evident in this sphere.  Only in the central 
states of Guerrero, Hidalgo, the Federal District, Jalisco and Puebla the Minimum Age for 
Marriage (LE_11) is the same for men and women.  Women’s differential position in the 
law is also reflected in the fact that only in six states women do not have to wait for a 
period that ranges between 180 and 300 days before Re-Marrying after a divorce 
(LE_12), while men do not have to wait.  The importance of Domestic Work (LE_13) is 
only recognized in nine states, and even in fewer states women have right to an 
Allowance in cases of Common-Consent Divorce (LE_14), among which the northern 
states are virtually unrepresented.   
In summary, legal equality between men and women is far from being reached.  
Most states fail in protecting women’s rights and the law treats differently men and 
women.  The exception is the Federal District where there is complete equality between 
men and women in these measures of legal equality.  In contrast, Table 2.8 reveals that 
Aguascalientes is the state where fewer laws that protect or grant rights to women have 
been passed.  The existence of laws and statutes, however, does not guarantee their 
enactment as revealed by Torres-Falcón (2004) in the case of domestic violence 
legislation.  
                                                 
3 In Mexico there are two types of institutions that offer protection to women: albergues that offer short-
term housing to women (from 48 hours to one week) while these women find a place where to go. In many 
cases as in Zapopan (Jalisco) abused women share the space with people in other circumstances: victims of 
natural disasters or unprivileged people waiting for receiving assistance in a hospital. Shelters offer a more 
comprehensive assistance, since women can stay longer, from a minimum of three months to a maximum 
of six months (depending on the shelter’s policies). In shelters women receive among others legal and 
psychological assistance, health promotion training, and workshops for their next incorporation to the labor 
market. 
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The legal equality dimension of the GEIMS was calculated in two ways since the 
variables were dichotomous rather than continuous as in the previous three dimensions. 
First, it was computed by adding the number of laws and statutes protecting women’s 
rights and granting rights to women, and dividing this number by fourteen (the total 
number of indicators of legal equality).  Second, following the same methodology used in 
the construction of the three previous sub-indexes: perform a Kuder-Richardson analysis 
of internal reliability (used for dichotomous variables; analyses not shown).  The results 
of the two subindexes are highly correlated (.96, p < .0001).  For simplicity, I opted for 
the first method of calculation.  Therefore, a state that passed all the fourteen laws and 
statutes has a score of 100 [(14 / 14)*100], reflecting thus the inexistence of gender gap.  
Similarly, a state that only has approved five of these measures has a score of 36.7 [(5 / 
14)*100] indicating that women have reached 37 percent of the equality with men in the 
legal sphere.  The coefficients for each state and its ranking are presented in Table 2.8. 
 
2.3.-  GENDER EQUALITY INDEX IN MEXICAN STATES (GEIMS) 
The value and rank for each of the spheres of the index is presented in Table 2.8.  
We can observe that some states rank very high in at least three of the four dimensions: 
Federal District, Nayarit, Sonora, and Chihuahua.  In contrast, we find the opposite 
pattern in the case of Chiapas, Tlaxcala, Nuevo León and Aguascalientes, ranking rather 
low in most of these spheres.  The dimension where women have reached higher parity 
with men is in the educational.  The gap nevertheless is 35.2%, meaning that women have 
achieved 64.8% of parity with men.  The largest gender gap is in the political realm; 
where women’s attainment is only 26% of that of men.  Women’s attainment in the 
economic and legal spheres is similar, 57% and 58%; meaning that women are slightly 
over half way of reaching parity with men in these realms.  As revealed by the size of the 
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Table 2.8: Components of the GEIMS ranked by Gender Gap in Each Component 
Rank State GEIMS_EC State GEIMS_ED State GEIMS_PO State GEIMS_LE
1 DF 49.7 NAY 72.0 DF 75.9 DF 100.0 
2 MOR 49.5 BC 70.4 CAMP 48.2 OAX 78.6 
3 HGO 46.5 TAMP 68.7 YUC 40.5 PUE 64.3 
4 COL 46.1 CHI  68.0 SLP 39.1 GRO 57.1 
5 AGS 45.9 SIN 67.7 NAY 34.5 HGO 57.1 
6 QRO 45.6 TLAX 67.0 COAH 33.3 MEX 57.1 
7 NAY 45.5 DUR 66.4 CHI 32.3 SON 57.1 
8 OAX 45.5 SLP 66.2 NL 29.6 COAH 46.4 
9 JAL 45.3 COAH 66.0 COL 29.5 SIN 46.4 
10 SLP 44.9 VER 66.0 CHIS 28.7 CHI 42.9 
11 PUE 44.8 MOR 65.8 QROO 27.8 COL  42.9 
12 SON 44.2 SON 65.7 AGS 27.1 MOR 42.9 
13 GRO 44.1 JAL 65.6 TAMP 24.9 SLP 42.9 
14 SIN 43.6 QROO 64.9 MOR 23.7 YUC 42.9 
15 GTO 43.1 BCS 64.7 TAB 23.6 QRO 39.3 
16 MICH 42.7 NL 64.6 MEX 23.2 TAB 39.3 
17 TLAX 41.9 PUE 64.5 QRO 22.6 ZAC 39.3 
18 BC 41.8 ZAC 64.5 MICH 22.6 BC 35.7 
19 BCS 41.8 HGO 64.2 OAX 22.3 DUR 35.7 
20 TAMP 41.2 GRO 64.1 GTO 22.2 GTO 35.7 
21 ZAC 41.2 DF 64.1 BCS 21.7 JAL 35.7 
22 VER 41.0 MICH 63.8 ZAC 21.6 TAMP 35.7 
23 YUC 40.9 GTO 63.7 PUE 19.8 VER 35.7 
24 MEX 40.8 AGS 63.7 GRO 18.6 CHIS 32.1 
25 DUR 40.6 MEX 63.3 JAL 18.1 MICH  28.6 
26 COAH 39.4 QRO 63.0 HGO 17.9 NL 28.6 
27 QROO 39.4 COL 62.9 SON 17.6 QROO 28.6 
28 CAMP 39.1 CAMP 62.7 TLAX 17.3 BCS 28.6 
29 CHI  38.1 YUC 62.4 DUR 16.8 CAMP 21.4 
30 NL 38.1 TAB 61.1 VER 16.7 NAY 21.4 
31 TAB 34.4 OAX 59.9 SIN 15.0 TLAX 21.4 
32 CHIS 31.8 CHIS 55.9 BC 13.2 AGS 14.3 
         
Mean  42.45  64.80  26.4  41.74 
STD   3.85   2.97  12.0  17.29 
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standard deviation coefficients, the states are somehow homogeneous in terms of 
economic and educational equality but heterogeneous in the political and legal 
dimensions.  
In order to construct a composite measure of the four spheres, first, I performed a 
correlation analysis of the four components of the index.  This is presented in Table 2.9.  
The economic, educational, political and legal spheres are not always correlated among 
themselves.  There are three exceptions, first, women’s attainment in the economic realm 
is positively associated with the existence of legislation that protects women’s rights (.40; 
p< .05).  This positive and significant association has been reported earlier by Welch and 
Gottheil (1978) who found a positive relationship between the reduction in the gender 
gap in certain economic variables and the equal treatment of females in legislation.  
Caiazza (2004) nevertheless found no association between women’s labor force 
participation relative to men’s and approval of women’s friendly legislation.  There is 
also a weak correlation between gender equality in the economic and educational spheres.  
This means that as the gender gap in educational attainment increases there’s a tendency 
of finding a bigger gender gap in the economic arena. The size of the correlation and the 
coefficient, though, are small.  Similarly, there is a small significant correlation between 
the reduction of the gender gap in the political sphere with the approval of legislation 
tending to protect women’s and minorities rights.  This relationship is similar to that 
reported in previous research studies (Caiazza 2004; Murphy 1997).   
The fact that there is no relationship between the other dimensions of gender 
inequality is surprising given that one would expect that women’s higher attainment in 
the educational and economic sphere would be related to a decreasing gender gap in the 
political sphere (Moore and Shackman 1996; Norris and Franklin 1997; Oakes and 
Almquist 1993), but seems not to be true in the case of Mexican states.  This might be 
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partially explained by Norris and Inglehart’s (2001:130) argument: “while improvements 
in women’s education and professional status serve as facilitating conditions for 
women’s empowerment, structural changes by themselves may be insufficient for women 
to achieve greater success in winning elected office. ”   
 








The final GEIMS index is calculated by computing the average coefficient of 
gender inequality for each of the four dimensions previously presented in Table 2.8.  The 
results for the composite Gender Equality Index in Mexican States (GEIMS) are 
presented in Table 2.10.  
The interpretation of the GEIMS final coefficients follows the same rationale than 
the interpretation of each of the sub-indexes: coefficients closer to the score of 100 
indicate more equality between men and women, while those approaching 0 denote 
higher inequality between genders.  Women in Mexico are not even half a way in 
reaching equality with men.  In average, women have achieved 44% of men’s positions in 
Mexican States.  Although the Federal District is the state in which women have reached  
Dimensions of 
Equality Correlations 
 GEIMS_EC GEIMS_ED GEIMS_PO GEIMS_LEGAL 
Economic ---    
Educational  .29* ---   
Political  .08 - .07 ---  
Legal   .40** - . 20 0.26 --- 
     
     
***  p< .001;  **  p< . 05;  *  p< .01 
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the highest level of gender equality, 72.4%, it is an outlier compared to the other states if 
we consider the distance between the states ranked in first and second place (statistical 
tests not shown).  The second most egalitarian state is Oaxaca, where the gender gap is 
48.4, followed by Puebla, San Luis Potosí where women have reached a level of equality 

















17 TAMP 42.6 
18 QRO 42.6 
19 ZAC 41.6 
20 JAL 41.2 
21 GTO 41.2 
22 BC 40.3 
23 NL 40.2 
24 QROO 40.1 
25 DUR 39.9 
26 VER 39.8 
27 TAB 39.6 
28 MICH 39.4 
29 BCS 39.2 
30 AGS 37.7 
31 CHIS 37.1 
32 TLAX 36.9 
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of 48.3.  At the other end, we find Chiapas and Tlaxcala, where women have reached a 
level of gender equality of 37.1 and 36.9.  
Once the Federal District is excluded, Mexican regions are quite homogeneous in 
terms of gender equality. The difference between Yucatán and Chiapas is only of 14.7 %, 
revealing that in Oaxaca, the second state with greater gender equality, women have only 
attained 14.7 more equality with men than in the state where the gender gap is greater, 
Tlaxcala.  This situation sharply contrasts with the U.S., where states are not so 
homogeneous in terms of structural gender equality, and the difference between the most 
and the least gender egalitarian states in the U.S. is 39.5% (Di Noia 2002), a larger 
difference than that reported by Sugarman and Straus more than a decade earlier (1988).  
Some of the poorest states such as Yucatán, Puebla, Oaxaca, or San Luis Potosí rank 
among the most egalitarian.  It should be remembered, though, that this index does not 
account for the levels of inequality across states, only measures the gender gap within 
each state.   
 
2.4-   REGIONS AND GENDER EQUALITY 
Whether or not there are regional patterns in gender equality posits an interesting 
question.  Several regional classifications have been made of Mexico on the basis of 
different factors: geographical, political, sociodemographic, cultural and historical (see 
review by Liverman and Cravey 1992).  The first part of Table 2.11 examines the 
possible existence of regional differences in gender equality in Mexico.  Bassols Batalla 
(1967, 1979 cited in Liverman and Cravey 1992) classifies Mexico into eight large 
geoeconomic regions “based on a large number of criteria: physical, demographic, 
economic and political; and he underscores the role of historical processes and political 
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economy in the development of regions” (45-46).  As mentioned earlier the Federal 
District is excluded from the analysis.    
Table 2.11:  Regional Differences in Gender Equality 
The ANOVA analyses reveal no significant differences in the overall measure of 
gender equality across regions.  When each of the spheres of the index is examined, we 
find significant differences in the educational and economic realms.  In the center, west 
and center-north, women have achieved greater parity with men in the economic realm 
than in other regions of Mexico.  In terms of educational gender equality, though, it is the 
southeast where women face a significant disadvantage compared to other regions.  The 
regions, as were defined by Bassols Batalla, nevertheless, are homogeneous in terms of 
political and legal equality.   
   GEIMS  ECONOMIC** EDUCATIONAL** POLITICAL LEGAL
Northwest 42.43 43.38 68.10 20.38 37.86 
North 42.95 39.17 66.25 27.99 38.39 
Northeast 41.24 41.11 67.33 20.80 35.71 
Center-North 42.56 44.00 64.80 29.27 32.14 
West 41.77 44.29 64.01 23.08 35.71 












Southeast 43.42 39.30 61.58 29.86 42.86 
Notes: Northwest: Baja California Norte, Baja California Sur, Nayarit, Sinaloa, Sonora.  North: Coahuila, Chihuahua, Durango, Nuevo 
León.  Northeast: Tamaulipas, Veracruz.  Center-North: Aguascalientes, San Luís Potosí, Zacatecas.  West (Occidente): Colima, 
Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán.  Center: Hidalgo, Morelos, Puebla, Querétaro, Tlaxcala, Estado de México. Southeast: Campeche, 
Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Yucatán.  
**  p< .05;  *** p< .001 
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2.5-  GENDER EQUALITY IN MEXICO 
The GEIMS is the first attempt to create a composite measure of gender equality 
in Mexico.  As a state-level gender equality measure, it quantifies the departure from 
parity in the representation of women and men in four key dimensions of social life: 
economic, educational, political and legal.  The GEIMS compares men and women 
within each state, but does not take into consideration the relative position of women 
across states.  This index is inspired in the GEI (Sugarman and Straus 1988), and it has 
been transformed and adapted to the reality of a developing country such as Mexico.   
Mexican women are far from reaching gender equality in the social structure with 
men.  Women have attained an overall level of equality of 44%.  Women fare worse 
compared to men in the political arena.  Females have barely reached 26% of equality 
with men in the political sphere.  The gender gap in the economic and legal spheres is 
similar, around 42%.  The law still treats differently men and women in Mexico and in 
many states women’s rights are virtually inexistent from the legal point of view.  
Similarly, women have hardly attained half of the positions conquered by men in the 
economic realm.  The area in which both genders are more at level is in the educational; 
nevertheless a gap of 35% percent still separates males and females.  
Mexican states are quite homogenous in terms of structural equality.  As opposed 
to the situation in the U.S. (Di Noia 2002; Sugarman and Straus 1988) there are not 
regional differences in Mexico.  There are states that tend to rank high in terms of 
structural gender equality, whereas others tend to rank low, nevertheless the differences 
among them tend to be rather small if the Federal District is excluded.  The Federal 
District constitutes without doubt the state in which women are more leveled with men.  
Several studies might help to explicate this phenomenon.  On the one hand, the Federal 
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District is by far the most developed state in terms of GDP per capita (Muñiz Martelon et 
al. 2004), and its relative high levels of structural gender equality could be potentially 
explained by the modernization perspective that claims that high levels of 
industrialization lead to decreasing gender inequality (see Moore and Shackman 1996).   
On the other, the greater gender equality in the political and legal spheres might 
be related to the fact that the left has dominated the Federal District legislature and the 
government for several periods and the culture of the center, around Mexico City, has 
always been more diverse and more leftist (Camp 1999; Lujambio 2000).  There is 
considerable research that concludes that the egalitarian ideologies of left-wing parties 
are more likely to favor women’s election to high political office (Norris and Lovenduski 
1995; Rule 1994).  Moreover, the higher share of women in political representation 
positions has been associated with ‘women making policy for women’ (Jones 1997; 
Rodríguez 2003).  At least in the case of violence against women legislation, the Federal 
District is seen as a referent in many states.  
One of the main problems in elaborating this type of indexes is the problematic 
relationship between what needs to be measured theoretically and what the available 
resources are (statistics) for the construction of the measures.  The collection of gender 
indicators for the construction of the GEIMS was challenging because of the difficulty of 
locating information, or because of the inexistence of some measures disaggregated by 
gender (i.e. amount and number of loans given to small businesses by gender, the percent 
of households with incomes above the poverty level).  Despite the efforts of the 
INMUJERES (Instituto de las Mujeres, Federal Women’s Institute) promoting the 
collection of statistics from a gender perspective, many measures that could be 
potentially included in the GEIMS were inexistent.  Among many others, this is the case 
of women’s share of faculty positions, which the IFAI (Instituto Federal de Acceso a la 
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Información, Federal Institute for Information Access) denied the access on the grounds 
of confidential information.  Another interesting fact is that gender political statistics at 
the state and local level only exist for the two most recent periods, while are inexistent 
for previous periods (personal communication of the Secretaría de Gobernación through 
the IFAI).   
As more data becomes available this measure of gender equality can be revised 
and updated.  For example, some variables from the political dimension such as number 
of elected state or federal representatives, and members of the cabinet tend to fluctuate 
from one year to another, depending on the political dynamics (see Rodríguez 2003), 
therefore, more robust measures can be created when further information would be 
available.  I attempted, nevertheless, to overcome this problem by including women’s 
representation in several levels of government (Dijkstra 2002:306).   
Either this index or any of its subscales can be adapted for assessing the level of 
structural gender equality in other countries and regions.  Future research might benefit of 
this methodological proposal since this index have the potential of being used to study the 
regional distribution of other social phenomenon related to gender in Mexico when it is 
believed that these could be influenced by an overall cultural environment (i.e. fertility, 
violent homicides, distribution of partner violence, public health issues such as AIDS or 
use of contraceptives, etc).  The GEIMS might also be used in multi-level analyses in 
order to assess what is the influence of supra-individual characteristics over a certain 
phenomenon after controlling for individual-level characteristics.  The homogeneity and 
size of the coefficients for each of the dimensions of gender equality reveal that almost 
all Mexican states, but the Federal District, are still in the early stages of their move 
toward gender equality.  Future research will be able to assess whether or not states are 
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advancing in terms of gender equality, and if this advance is occurring at the same rate 
across states.   
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CHAPTER 3:  BUILDING THE BRIDGE:  WHAT ABOUT THE 
CONTEXT?  INDIVIDUAL AND STRUCTURAL EXPLANATIONS 
OF PARTNER VIOLENCE IN MEXICO 
Social phenomena rarely display an ecological homogeneity throughout a territory 
or a country.  For various complex and interactive reasons, crime, single motherhood, 
divorce, unemployment, and other manifestations of overdetermined social processes 
define specific ecological areas in which their rates are high or low depending on other 
factors such as ethnic composition, legal structures, social history, local labor markets 
and much more.  Partner violence is no exception (Brownridge 2002; Nisbett 1993; Yllo 
and Straus 1990).  As in other countries, the prevalence of violence is not homogeneous 
throughout Mexico.  Data from the ENDIREH, Encuesta sobre la Dinámica en las 
Relaciones en los Hogares, (Inegi and Inmujeres 2003) reveals a pattern of 
heterogeneous distribution of  partner violence in Mexico: the states of Michoacán and 
Hidalgo have the highest rates of physical violence, around 10% while the northern state 
of  Nuevo León the lowest (5%).  Others types of violence, sexual, emotional and 
economic, vary as well by state.  For example, Chiapas has the lowest prevalence of 
emotional violence (21%) and economic violence (16%) while Sonora the highest (41% 
and 32%).  The reasons behind these differences and whether this variation is related to 
individual or structural factors pose a critical research question. 
The phenomenon of partner violence has been addressed from two opposing 
perspectives that differ in their foci: individualistic explanations and structural 
explanations.  Most studies focus on individualistic or micro explanations and take the 
individual and the relationship as unit of analysis, perhaps because family violence is 
considered a private matter (Dobash and Dobash 1979) that occurs behind closed doors 
(Gelles 2000; Straus, Gelles, and Steinmetz 1980).  Because of the dominance of such 
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individualistic approaches, the influence of socio-structural factors on domestic violence 
has not received the same attention in published research.  Perhaps the only exceptions 
are feminist explanations of violence against wives (Yllo 1984).  By focusing on different 
levels of analysis these two perspectives have produced a split in the methodology used 
to approach the topic.  In many ways these methodologies are in fundamental conflict 
(Straus 1990b)  Feminists have criticized quantitative research for being patriarchal and 
not addressing the root structural causes of partner violence (Dobash and Dobash 1988).  
Qualitative research has often been seen as a feminist counterpoint, although some 
radical feminist approached studies have used quantitative methodologies (Mooney 2000; 
Yllo 1988).   
The divorce between feminism and family violence approaches has been fostered 
by most feminists’ reluctance of acknowledging that factors other than patriarchy might 
influence the phenomenon of abuse against women (Heise 1998).  However, some 
feminists believe the structural patriarchal explanation of partner violence coexists with 
other individual or social explanations, and that the concept of patriarchy takes into 
consideration the global context in which individuals and their actions are embedded (see 
Bograd 1988; Yllo 1988).  Dutton (1994), on the other hand, in its controversial article 
about patriarchy and violence against women argues that research using the concept of 
patriarchy falls in the ecological fallacy since he believes that the phenomenon of 
violence against women is better explained by psychological factors than for the level of 
patriarchy.  
Since the publication of Heise’s (1998) proposal of adopting an ecological 
framework for conceptualizing the etiology of gender-based violence almost ten years 
ago, there have been few attempts to integrate under the same model these two different 
levels of analysis.  In Heise’s (1998:263-264) words, “an ecological approach to abuse 
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conceptualizes violence as a multifaceted phenomenon grounded in an interplay among 
personal, situational, and sociocultural factors”.  The family violence approach has 
mainly focused its attention into the individual, the family and the relationship, while the 
feminist approach considers that the reasons behind violence against women are found in 
the patriarchal societal structure.  By using a recent Mexican survey conducted in 2003 
(ENDIREH 2003), this chapter builds a bridge between the micro and macro.  Both 
approaches are put together in an ecological model that on the one hand explores if 
structural gender inequality might influence the heterogeneous distribution of partner 
violence in Mexico.  On the other, in a purely sociological study, it examines the 
influence of structural factors, specially the level of gender equality, in the prevalence of 
diverse types of violence against women in Mexico (physical, sexual, economic and 
emotional).  This analysis, therefore, becomes an empirical test of the liberal feminist 
postulates. 
The first part of this chapter reviews previous research about partner violence in 
Mexico.  The second section summarizes macro studies that examined the relationship 
between patriarchy and partner violence.  In the third part, the research questions are 
stated and the multi-level analytical model and strategy are presented.  The fourth section 
contains the data and variables used in this study.  In the fifth, the results section, I 
present the main findings.  Finally, the last part of this chapter includes the general 
findings and limitations, and the implications for future analyses of partner violence are 
also discussed.  
3.1-  MICRO-STRUCTURAL, FEMINIST, SITUATIONAL, AND INDIVIDUAL 
CORRELATES OF VIOLENCE IN MEXICO 
A number of theoretical approaches have been used to explain the phenomenon of 
partner violence.  Using Heise’s (1998) grouping of the factors influencing the 
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phenomenon of partner violence (individual, situational of microsystem, exosystem and, 
structural or macrosystem), the correlates of partner violence against women in Mexico 
are reviewed next (Heise’s theoretical model is presented in Figure 3.1).  
 
Figure 3.1:  Factors Associated with the Experience of Partner Violence  
 
Individual factors are those features of an individual developmental experience or 
personality that shape the individual response to his/her environment.  From the social 
learning perspective, existing research supports the hypothesis that aggression and 
violence are learned behaviors.  In other words, those who experienced violence during 
childhood or witnessed it among members of their families are at a higher risk of 
experiencing partner violence (Alberti Manzanares 2004; Castro 2004; Castro, Peek-Asa, 
García, Ruiz, and Kraus 2003; Díaz-Olavarrieta, Ellertson, Paz, Ponce de León, and 
Alarcón-Segovia 2002; Natera Rey, Juárez García, and Tiburcio Sainz 2004; Nisbett 
1993; Pozo del, Castro, and Ríquer 2004; Rivera-Rivera et al. 2004; Rivera, Allen, 
Chávez, and Ávila 2006).  Similarly, sociodemographic characteristics such as younger 











Note: Based on Heise’s (1998) model 
Situational        Personal History 
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(Castro, Peek-Asa, and Ruiz 2003; Díaz-Olavarrieta et al. 2002; Natera Rey, Juárez 
García, and Tiburcio Sainz 2004; Oropesa 1997; Pozo del, Castro, and Ríquer 2004). 
Exosystem factors are defined as formal and informal social structures that 
impinge on the immediate settings in which a person is found and influence or delimit 
his/her range of action.  The micro-structural perspective locates the causes of violence in 
the elevated levels of stress and the lack of available resources to deal with it, as well as 
the general deprivation and frustration that accompany poverty and social marginality 
(Gelles and Straus 1979).  Unemployment, socioeconomic status, the number of residents 
in the household, and residing in an urban or rural setting are factors that have been 
associated to violence against women.  The findings about Mexican women employment 
status are inconsistent, ranging from no effect (Oropesa 1997), to finding that 
employment enhances women risk of abuse (Alvarado-Zaldívar, Salvador-Moysén, 
Estrada-Martínez, and Terrones-González 1998; Pozo del, Castro, and Ríquer 2004), or 
that it reduces the probability (Castro et al. 2003).  Recent and more sophisticated 
research, however, has revealed that after controlling by the level of control exercised by 
the male partner, women’s employment reduce their risk of victimization (Villarreal 
2007).   
Poor Mexican women report higher levels of partner violence (Castro, Peek-Asa, 
and Ruiz 2003; Natera Rey, Juárez García, and Tiburcio Sainz 2004), although recent 
studies question these findings (Pozo del, Castro, and Ríquer 2004).  Similarly, there is 
no agreement either about the influence of residing in an urban or rural setting (Oropesa 
1997; Pozo del, Castro, and Ríquer 2004; Villarreal 2007).  In contrast, family structure 
seems not to be related to the experience of partner physical violence (Oropesa 1997; 
Villarreal 2007).  As opposed to what largely occurs in the U.S. (Riger and Krieglstein 
2000; Tolman and Raphael 2000), partner abuse is not more common among poor 
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women who receive public assistance in Mexico through the program Oportunidades (see 
edited book by Lopez and Sallès 20047). 
Situational or microsystem factors refer to those interactions in which a person 
directly engages with others as well as to the subjective meanings assigned to those 
interactions.  Heise conceptualizes the microsystem as the immediate context of the 
abuse.  Situational relationship characteristics associated with the distribution of power 
within the household, gender ideology and expectations, reflect the gender inequality in 
intimate relationships and have been associated with partner violence.  These situational 
dynamics are often confounded with the patriarchal system (see Dutton 1994).  
Nevertheless, patriarchy is a system of gender inequality in which women are placed in a 
subordinated position, not traits that can be attributed to individual-level factors.  The 
patriarchal system affects individual’s behaviors and ideology, and therefore situational 
relationship characteristics, but it must be conceptualized as something different than 
microsystemic factors.   
In Mexico several studies examine the influence of situational factors in the 
phenomenon of partner violence.  They found a positive relationship between decision 
making and physical, sexual, economic and psychological partner violence (Casique 
2004; Pozo del, Castro, and Ríquer 2004).  Similarly, Oropesa (1997) found that the more 
often women have the last word in decision-making the higher they report to suffer 
intimate partner physical violence.  In contrast, coactive control of women by men over 
women’s daily activities increases the risk of physical abuse (Villarreal 2007). 
Evidence from the U.S. reveals that women whose partners hold traditional 
beliefs and attitudes that support patriarchy, women’s subordination and gender 
inequality are more likely to be victims of partner abuse (Smith 1990). Others, however, 
found weak evidence (Sugarman and Frankel 1996).  Women’s attitudes have been also 
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associated with domestic violence since women with non-traditional gender roles 
attitudes have an increased risk of experiencing physical partner violence (Firestone, 
Harris, and Vega 2003).  The interactionist approach of gender (see Anderson 2005), 
contends that situations in which women hold non-traditional gender roles ideologies and 
tend to participate more in the decision making, man’s masculinities are challenged.  As 
consequence, men might feel threatened because of women’s gains of independence or 
their potential gains of independence, and more participation in decision making might 
result in an increase of violence, as it is the case of women heads of household (de 
Oliveira and García 1992). 
The literature is inconsistent, though, regarding the relationship between marital 
status and violence.  Some studies have found that cohabitation increases the risk of 
violence (Oropesa 1997; Villarreal 2007) perhaps because cohabiting relationships are 
perceived as more unstable than married couples and receive less support from other 
people (see Smock 2000).  In contrast, other studies have concluded that abuse is higher 
among married women (Díaz-Olavarrieta et al. 2002) and separated or divorced women 
(Natera Rey, Juárez García, and Tiburcio Sainz 2004).  
Finally, structural or macrosystem factors are the broad set of cultural values and 
beliefs that permeate and interact with the other three levels.  These factors operate 
through their influence on factors and structures lower down in the system.  The feminist 
perspective has placed the origins of partner violence in the patriarchal structure that 
generates a structured hierarchical relation between men and women in which men are 
dominant and women subordinated.   
Liberal feminists are also called equal rights or reform feminists and they believe 
that that the structural inequality between men and women generates a culture in which 
violence against women is tolerated (Dobash and Dobash 1979; Fox 1988).  Liberal 
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feminists usually work toward achieving civil and political equality, or political reforms 
that will improve women’s status in society in the context of the existing social order.  
The rationale behind is that as the status of female as a group becomes more similar to 
that of men in a certain society, women’s situation of subordination and domination will 
change (Dobash and Dobash 1992).  They believe that increasing the level of gender 
equality in the society, this will generate a reduction in the levels of partner violence.  In 
the context of this research, it is expected to influence as well the other three levels 
described above and illustrated in Figure 3.1.   
In Mexico, the analysis of the relationship between patriarchy and partner 
violence is recent (see Frias 2008).  Castro and Ríquer (2003; 2004) argue that previous 
studies that claim unveiling the link between patriarchy and domestic violence in Mexico 
fall into a methodological fallacy because the concept of patriarchy is reduced to 
individual factors, therefore, ignoring the influence of the social dynamics and structures 
in which individuals are embedded.  Frias (2008) examined the bivariate relationship 
between the structural level of gender inequality or the structural component of patriarchy 
and state-level rates of partner violence in Mexico.  She found inconclusive results and 
called for multi-level more sophisticated analyses.   
 
3.2-PATRIARCHY / GENDER EQUALITY BEYOND THE THEORY  
Although there is certain agreement that patriarchy is one of the causes of 
violence against women, few empirical quantitative studies have examined how 
patriarchy affects regional rates of partner violence.  Most of the published research that 
analyzes at the macro level the relationship between gender equality and violence and it 
is mainly centered in the U.S. and Western European countries.  However, the individual 
level and the structural level have not been put together in the same analytical model.  
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Kersti Yllo (1980; 1984) analyzed how the relationship between the marital balance of 
power (individual level measured as who had the last word in decision making) and 
domestic violence was affected by the level of gender inequality in different U.S. states.  
She found that the gender-equality balance in a society affects the association between 
the marital balance of power and violence.   
Yllo and Straus (1984; 1990) analyzed the effect of patriarchal structures and 
patriarchal ideology on domestic violence in 36 States of the U.S and found a non-linear 
relationship.  One would expect a decrease in rates of physical abuse as the level of 
equality between men and women increases.  However, the rates of physical aggression 
were higher in states with both, high and low levels of gender equality, than they were in 
states with intermediate levels of equality between men and women.  These results 
challenge the liberal feminist theory that hypothesizes that as the level of gender equality 
in the social structure increases, the rate of violence decreases.  Their explanation for the 
high levels of violence in state with more gender equality is related to males’ attempts of 
recovering their power by using violence (Yllo 1984; Yllo 1988; Yllo and Straus 1984).  
This is known as backlash theory, which postulates that as women gain power in the 
political, educational, economic and legal spheres, violence against women might 
increase as a result of men’s attempts to control women and their achievements. 
Straus (1994) conducted a similar analysis of the effect of patriarchy over wife 
abuse in which he controlled by economic inequality, social isolation and fragmentation 
of the states.  He found strong evidence that the higher the status of women in the U.S. 
the lower the probability of the state having a high rate of wife abuse (Straus 1994). He 
also found that social disorganization was related to higher rates of wife abuse, while 
economic inequality was not.  The problem with Straus and Yllo’s research is that they 
do not use state-level representative samples to analyze the heterogeneous distribution of 
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violence in the U.S. or conduct multi-level analyses.  Instead, they use the 1976 and the 
1985 Family Violence National Survey (details in Gelles 2000), and their analyses fall 
into serious methodological assumptions since they use a national representative survey 
to make inferences at the state level.  
In addition to violence against women perpetrated by a romantic partner, the level 
of structural gender equality, measured in different ways, has been also associated with 
rates of female homicides (DeWees and Parker 2003; Titterington 2006; Vieraitis and 
Williams 2002), rape and sexual violence both in the U.S. (for details see Martin, 
Vieraitis, and Britto 2006; Vieraitis and Williams 2002) and in international comparative 
studies (Austin and Kim 2000; Yodanis 2004).  The findings about the relationship 
between the level of structural equality and violence are contradictory since some studies 
find that an increase in gender equality is associated with lower levels of violence, while 
others reach the opposite conclusion (see Martin, Vieraitis, and Britto 2006).  
Regarding the influence of other structural variables, macro-level research 
examining the reasons behind the heterogeneous distribution of violence against women 
(either perpetrated by a romantic partner or strangers) or crime has found that population 
density is negatively associated with rape (Martin, Vieraitis, and Britto 2006).  Other 
studies have found no significant relationship (Brewer and Smith 1995; Vieraitis and 
Williams 2002).  Cross-sectional examinations (city, country or state-level) of the 
relationship between gender equality and sexual violence against women, have found no 
relationship between GDP and the rates of sexual violence, after controlling by several 
measures of gender equality (Austin and Kim 2000; Yodanis 2004).  
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3.3.-  RESEARCH QUESTION AND THEORETICAL MODEL: TOWARD AN 
INTEGRATION OF MULTIPLE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS  
The phenomenon of violence against women perpetrated by a romantic partner 
has been conducted in separated layers: the individual and the relationship on the one 
hand, and macro-structural analyses of the context surrounding the individuals on the 
other.  This research integrates these two multiple levels of analysis and, in what 
constitutes an empirical test of the feminist perspective.  The core assumption of this 
chapter is that the structural inequality between men and women in different spheres of 
society (economic, educational, political and legal) generates a patriarchal climate or a 
gender inequality atmosphere that has the potential of influencing individual’s 
experiences of partner violence.  More specifically, I examine the two following 
questions in this chapter: 
Q1:  Does the level of partner violence vary among states with different level of 
structural gender equality.  
Hypothesis 1 (liberal feminist hypothesis):  In states where the level of 
structural gender equality is high the prevalence of the different forms of 
partner violence will be lower than in states where the level of gender 
equality is lower.  
Q2:  Do individual-level characteristics of women experiencing partner violence 
vary among states with different levels of structural gender equality?  
Hypothesis 2 (the interaction hypothesis):  The effect of the individual-
level variables associated with experiencing partner violence (women’s 
share of decisions; women not holding traditional gender roles; 
employment, education –areas that might alter the traditional gender 
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balance in relationships) is mediated by the level of structural gender 
equality.  
 
The question of whether state characteristics, and specially the level of gender 
equality, are related to women’s likelihood of experiencing partner violence calls for a 
multilevel analytical strategy.  Multi-level models take into consideration that individuals 
are nested in larger unit clusters, in this case, states.  Straus’ (1994:10) justification for 
using states as units of analysis in the U.S. can be applied to Mexico since “each state has 
distinct characteristics based on its history, environment and resources, level of economic 
development, racial and ethnic composition, and numerous other factors”.  These might 
be expected to be associated with differential opportunities for women.  Hierarchical 
generalized linear models (HGLMs) offer a good modeling framework analyzing 
multilevel data with a non-linear structure as it is the case of binary outcomes 
(Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).   
 
3.4-  DATA AND VARIABLES 
3.4.a-  Level-1 Data  
The data used for level-1 are drawn from the National Survey on Household 
Relationship Dynamics (Encuesta Nacional sobre la Dinámica de las Relaciones en los 
Hogares, ENDIREH), conducted in 2003 by the Mexican National Institute of Statistics, 
Geography and Informatics (INEGI: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geografia e 
Informatica) as a request of the INMUJERES.  The ENDIREH is a national 
representative sample of women of 15 years and older who at the moment of the 
interview were either married or cohabiting with a male partner.  It is also representative 
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of eleven states that partially financed their own state-level representative samples: Baja 
California, Coahuila, Chiapas, Chihuahua, Hidalgo, Michoacán, Nuevo León, Quintana 
Roo, Sonora, Yucatán and Zacatecas.  The ENDIREH collected extensive information 
about different forms of partner violence, decision sharing and gender roles in Mexican 
households from October 20 to November 14, 2003 (see INEGI and INMUJERES 2004 
for more details about the sample and survey methodology), and serves as the source of 
information for estimates of rates of violence and level-1 independent variables.  I focus 
on the experiences of different types of partner violence during the year preceding the 
interview.  There are around 32,000 valid cases in the analyses after the missing data-
cases were removed (31,901 in the case of physical violence; 31,575 in the case of sexual 
violence, and 31,994 for economic and emotional violence).  The analyses apply sample 
weights to ensure national representativeness of the results.   
 
3.4.b-  Dependent Variables 
Violence is any act carried out with the intention or perceived intention of 
physically hurting another person (Gelles and Straus 1979), this includes different forms 
of violence: emotional or psychological, physical, sexual and economic.  The variables 
measuring physical and sexual violence are based on a variation of the Conflict Tactics 
Scale (CTS, see Straus 1990a), one of the most widely used instruments in the analysis of 
partner violence both in the U.S. and in comparative research (Yodanis, Hill, and Straus 
1997) and measures if the respondent experienced violence during the twelve months 
prior the interview.  The CTS and its revision, CTS2 (Straus, Hamby, Boney-McCoy, and 
Sugarman 1996) have been adapted for use in Mexico (Castro et al. 2003; Castro, Peek-
Asa, and Ruiz 2003; Peek-Asa, García, McArthur, and Castro 2002).  Castro and 
colleagues developed measures of patrimonial or economic violence and emotional abuse 
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that have been used in previous studies (see Castro, Garcia, Ruiz, and Peek-Asa 2005; 
Castro, Ríquer, and Medina 2004).  A woman will be consider a victim of physical, 
sexual, economic or emotional abuse if her partner has perpetrated at least one of the 
following acts within each category of violence in the last twelve months.  The following 
acts constitute:  
• Physical abuse:  (1) being pushed or having one’s hair pulled out; (2) being 
tied up; (3) being kicked; (4) having something thrown at one; (5) being 
slapped, punched, beaten with hands, fists, or other object; (6) being choked; 
(7) having been cut with a knife; and (8) being shot at with a fire arm.  
• Sexual abuse: (1) being forced to have sex against her wishes; (2) being 
forced to have any sexual activity against her will; (3) being forced to have 
sex under threat of physical violence. 
• Economic abuse:  [the partner (…)] (1) has complaint about how you spend 
the money; (2) has been reluctant to give you money even he has (stingy, 
miser); 3) has threatened you with not giving you money for daily expenses; 
4) has subtracted or taken money from you; 5) has forbidden you to work or 
study.  
• Psychological or emotional abuse: (1) being shamed, scorned, or having one’s 
appearance insulted or compared negatively to other women, (2) having 
property or household items destroyed, thrown away or hidden, (3) being held 
prisoner, forbidden to leave the house, or forbidden to receive visits, (4) one’s 
partner refuses to help with child care and domestic tasks even when he has 
the time; (5) being accused of having an affair, (6) being made to feel afraid of 
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him, (7) having family, friends and children turned against her, and (8) being 
given the silent treatment, having opinions or needs ignored or having 
affection withheld.  Furthermore, if the perpetrator threatens her to (9) leave 
her, take her children away, or kick her out of household, (10) hit her with a 
switchblade, knife, gun or rifle, (11) kill her, himself, or the children.  
Something to note is that emotional abuse includes threats and actions and 
most of the items outlined above are used by Tolman (1989), for the 
construction of a measure of psychological maltreatment.  
 
3.4.c-  Individual Level-1 Independent Variables: Exosystem, Personal History 
I identify four individual and relation-level sets of characteristics related to the 
experiences of partner violence: socio-economic and demographic, violence background, 
household characteristics (see Figure 3.2 for details about the variables that previous 
studies have shown to be associated with the different types of partner violence).  Among 
the personal history factors, the woman’s age and years of education are continuous 
variables, both measured in years.  Employment is coded 1 if the respondent worked for 
pay during the week preceding the interview and 0 otherwise.  Abuse background 
measures if the respondent experienced physical violence perpetrated by a family  
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member during childhood or adolescence.  It is coded 1 if any abuse was reported and 0 
otherwise.  Cohabitation assesses whether or not a woman is cohabiting, coded 1 if the 
respondent is currently cohabiting and 0 if she is married. 
The racial/ethic diversity in the couple is measured by the couple’s racial/ethnic 
composition.  This variable has four categories: non-indigenous couple; indigenous 
couple, man indigenous and woman non-indigenous, and man non-indigenous and 
woman indigenous.  This variable assesses whether or not an indigenous language is 
spoken by any of the members of the couple.  By measuring those who speak an 
indigenous language we are creating a proxy that allows us to identify, at least, the less 
acculturated indigenous individuals.  Indigenous extensive migrations out of the 
communities of origin, the stigmatization of indigenous peoples, their consideration as 
second-level citizens and the rejection of indigenous languages has worsened the 
identification of indigenous people by the language spoken (Janssen and Martínez Casas 
2006).   
Among the exosystem factors, the measure of socio-economic status follows the 
classification scheme used developed by Echarri (see Castro, Ríquer, and Medina 2004).  
This classification scheme is based on three household characteristics.  The first is 
average years of education of the members of the household.  This measure includes both 
those who have completed their education and those still in the educational system by 
imputing the expected number of years of schooling according to their age and gender for 
those who are still in school.  The second household characteristic refers to the 
occupational status of the household member with the highest potential income based on 
the average for that occupation.  The third household characteristic consists of household 
basic amenities such as water and electricity, the structural characteristics of the home, 
the number of people per room, and the availability of a kitchen.  Based on these three 
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characteristics, Echarri’s classification assigns each household to one of four economic 
strata:  very low (32.37% of the sample), low (37.38%), middle (16.90%), and high 
(13.36%).   Urban is a dichotomous variable that assesses whether the woman lives in an 
urban setting, more than 2,500 inhabitants (coded 1), or in a rural area (coded 0).  The 
number of residents in the household is a continuous variable that measures the number 
of people sharing the household with the interviewee.  
Situational characteristics of the woman are the interactions in which a woman 
directly engages with others as well as to the subjective meanings assigned to those 
interactions.  Three variables take into consideration the immediate context of the 
woman’s relationship.  Index of men’s expectations toward the woman measures twelve 
situations by which the man feels upset because the woman transgresses traditional 
gender roles in different spheres (Cronbach Alpha .69).  In the productive sphere, the 
respondent is asked if her husband/couple gets upset because 1) she works; 2) she earns 
more than he does. In the household, sexual and reproductive spheres, if: 3) she uses 
contraceptives; 4) she does not get pregnant; 5) she does not want to have sex, 6) he does 
not like how she raises children, 7) he believes she is not a good mother or wife, 8) she 
reminds him of his family duties.  And other areas, including the public sphere if, 9) she 
is jealous, 10) she does not obey him; 11) he does not like the way she dresses; 12) she 
visits (or is visited by) family or friends.  The index ranges from 0 (the male does not 
expect the woman to follow traditional gender roles) to 12 (the male expects the woman 
to fulfill the traditional gender roles, and its transgression results in men’s anger). 
The second variable measures Woman’s participation in household, children and 
reproductive decisions: 1) female’s employment; 2) how money is spent or saved; 3) 
what type of food is bought; 4) regarding permission from parents for their children to go 
out; 5) how to raise or educate children; 6) whether or not they will go for a walk and 
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where; 7) what to do when children are sick; 8) buy furniture, electrical appliances or car; 
9) moving to another house, apartment or city; 10) when to have sex; 11) family 
planning; 12) use of contraceptives; 13) who uses contraceptives.  This variable was 
computed as a percentage of the decision making the woman participates in.   
The last variable measures whether or not the Woman holds non-traditional 
gender roles.  This is a dichotomous variable based on women’s agreement or 
disagreement with four statements about gender roles:  1) “a good wife must obey his 
husband in all that he orders”; 2) “it is a woman’s obligation to have sex even if she does 
not want”, 3) when men’s income is enough for the household expenses, women a free to 
decide whether or not to work; 4) a woman can choose her friends even if her partner 
does no like them.  A respondent who disagreed with the first two statements and agreed 
with the other two was coded as 1, which means that she does not hold traditional gender 
attitudes and 0 otherwise (see Table 3.1 for more details about the variables and 
descriptive statistics).  
 
3.4.e-  Level-2 Data and Variables 
The selection of level-2 variables was complex because multi-level analyses 
become weak if many variables are included in level-2.  The informal rule of thumb is to 
include one level-2 variable for each 10 level-2 cases.  Given that I have 32 states, I 
included 3 level-2 variables. The key variable is the level of structural gender equality, 
and two control variables selected on the bases of their theoretical and empirical links to 
previous research on violence: the level of human development and population density.  
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Table 3.1:  Descriptive Statistics: Means and Row Percentages by Type of Intimate Violence 
 
 Physical Sexual Economic Emotional 
 No Yes Column % No Yes Column % No Yes Column % No Yes Column % 
Personal History                 
Cohabitation   ***   ***   ***   *** 
No 92.11 7.89  80.96 92.68 7.32  80.98 72.65 27.35  81.01 64.85 35.15  81.01 
Yes 85.53 14.47  19.04 89.65 10.35  19.02 62.97 37.03  18.99 57.53 42.47  18.99 
Agea   ***   **   ***    *** 
 40.09 35.32   39.63 38.86   40.55 37.47   40.45 38.26   
 (13.31) (11.90)   (13.32) (11.83)   (13.58) (12.11)   (13.49) (12.72)   
Years of educationa   ***   ***   ***    ** 
 7.30 6.84   7.34 6.55   7.35 7.05   7.22 7.33   
 (4.82) (4.50)   (4.79) (4.83)   (4.87) (4.59)   (4.82) (4.74)   
Race/Ethnicity   ***   ***   ***   *** 
Both indigenous 90.43 9.57  5.98 91.31 8.69  6.00 75.81 24.19  6.00 72.14 27.86  6.00 
Woman indigenous 92.33 7.67  1.36 92.59 7.41  1.33 59.23 40.77  1.36 58.26 41.74  1.36 
Man indigenous 81.07 18.93  1.71 86.82 13.18  1.70 61.60 38.40  1.71 53.55 46.45  1.71 
Non-indigenous couple 91.04 8.96  90.94 92.24 7.76  90.97 70.83 29.17  90.93 63.15 36.85  90.93 
Background of family violence   ***   ***   ***   *** 
No 93.88 6.12  59.69 94.76 5.24  59.75 76.80 23.20  59.62 70.40 29.60  59.62 
Yes 86.38 13.62  40.31 88.16 11.84  40.25 61.98 38.02  40.38 53.23 46.77  40.38 
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 Physical Sexual Economic Emotional 
Exosystem             
Socio-economic status   ***   ***   ***   *** 
Very low 89.25 10.75  32.42 90.90 9.10  32.32 70.51 29.49  32.37 64.92 35.08  32.37 
Low 89.89 10.11  37.35 91.66 8.34  37.34 66.05 33.95  37.98 60.31 39.69  37.38 
Medium 93.07 6.93  16.95 93.61 6.39  16.94 74.58 25.42  16.90 63.92 36.08  16.90 
High 94.65 5.35  13.28 94.31 5.69  13.39 80.11 19.89  13.36 68.17 31.83  13.36 
Urban   n.s.   ***   ***  
 
*** 
No 90.59 9.41  21.36 90.99 9.01  21.27 76.06 23.94  21.35 66.88 33.12  21.35 
Yes 90.93 9.07  78.64 92.40 7.60  78.73 69.39 30.61  78.65 62.54 37.46  78.65 
Employed   ***   *** n.s.     
 
*** 
No 91.46 8.54  65.12 92.86 7.14  65.08 70.90 29.10  65.18 65.19 34.81  65.18 
Yes 89.73 10.27  34.88 90.69 9.31  34.92 70.64 29.36  34.82 60.24 39.76  34.82 
Number of residentsa   ***   *** ***  *** 
    
 4.77 5.01   4.76 5.18   4.72 4.99   4.73 4.92   
 (1.98) (2.14)   (1.98) (2.17)   (1.95) (2.09)   (1.95) (2.08)   
Situational                 
Male patriarchal attitudesa 0.84 3.02 *** 0.86 3.16 *** 0.60 2.12 ***  0.47 2.04 *** 
 (1.33) (2.34)   (1.35) (2.31)   (1.04) (2.10)   (  .87) (2.02)   
Share of decision makinga 82.61 73.31 *** 82.78 70.12 *** 83.63 77.13 *** 83.78 78.18 *** 
 (21.93) (25.66)   (21.89) (25.23)   (21.87) (23.20)   (21.60) (23.53)   
Woman non-traditional gender 
roles and attitudes 
  **
*
   ***   ***   *** 
No 91.50 8.50  68.07 92.64 7.36  37.84 72.14 27.86  68.06 66.64 33.36  68.06 
Yes 89.47 10.53  31.93 90.97 9.03  32.16 67.98 32.02  31.94 56.69 43.31  31.94 
                 
TOTAL % 90.85 9.15 N = 31,961 92.10 7.90 N = 31,776 70.81 29.19 N = 32,095 63.46 36.54 N = 32,095 
Note: Rows percentage to 100%. Statistical test of group differences: Chi-square for categorical variables and T-test for continuous variables (age, education, number of 
residents, male patriarchal attitudes and share of decision making).  
a  M, SD in parentheses.*** p < . 0001;  ** p < .05;  * p < .10 
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Structural level of structural gender equality is measured by the Gender Equality 
Index in Mexican States (GEIMS: Frias 2008), which was presented and developed in 
Chapter 2.  As a control variable, the UN’s Human Development Index (HDI) measures 
the average achievements in each state in three basic dimensions of human development:  
a long and healthy life, education and a decent standard of living as of 2003 (PNUD 
2006).  It uses three measures: life expectancy, GDP and a composite index of education 
that accounts both for adult literacy and school enrolment.  As the GEIMS does not 
account for the relative inequality across states, the introduction of the HDI is of special 
relevance.  I checked for multicolinearity at level-2 between HDI and GEIMS.  These 
two variables are not correlated (σ=.29, p = .114).  Population density is the second 
control.  Because of the highly skewed distribution shown in preliminary analysis, I 
computed the natural log function of the population density for each square-kilometer in 
the state as recorded by the 2000 Census (Inegi 2003).  
 
3.5-  THEORETICAL MODEL AND ANALYTICAL STRATEGY 
The first step of the analysis is to estimate the unconditional or restricted model in 
order to test if there are differences across level-2 units (states).  Then, four unrestricted 
models are estimated for each type of violence (physical, sexual, economic and 
emotional) using the same set of individual and state-level variables for analyzing 
women’s likelihood of experiencing each type of partner violence.  
The first model includes personal history and exosystem factors.  The second 
incorporates situational factors since these have been often neglected in research about 
violence against women by their intimate partners.  The third model includes level-2 
variables and models the level 2 intercept by using three variables.  As it can be observed 
in Figure 3.2, these are direct contextual (level-2) effects, and will serve to test the first 
 100
research question (Q1: Does the level of partner violence vary among states with 
different level of structural gender equality?).  Finally, the fourth model includes the 
cross-level interactions of GEIMS over individual-level variables.  It models the slopes of 
individual-level factors that might change the traditional gender balance in intimate 
relationships.  This fourth model tests the second research question (Q2: Do individual-
level characteristics of women experiencing partner violence vary among states with 
different levels of structural gender equality?).  
For the estimation of the models it is used the statistical program HLM6 
(Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, Congdon, and du Toit 2004).  Because I want to explain the 
probability of experiencing each type of partner violence, and the dependent variable is 
dichotomous, I use a hierarchical logistic regression model.  For interpretation purposes 
all independent level-1 variables but the dichotomous are centered on their grand mean 
but all level-2 variables are left in their original metric.   
 
3.6-  RESULTS 
3.6.a-  Does the level(s) of partner violence vary across states?:  The Unconditional 
Model 
In order to determine whether or not there is variation between states in the 
prevalence of violence, and what the size of this variation is, I first estimate a model 
without predictors at either level (restricted model).  Given the binary nature of the 
dependent variable tat follows a Bernoulli sampling model, the level 1 model 
corresponding to the individual is: 
 
Ηij  = β0j 
and the level-2 model, state level, is: 
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γ00  is the average log-odds of violence (physical, sexual, psychological and 
economic) across Mexican states, 
τ00 is the variance between states in state-average log-odds of violence.  
 
Table 3.2 shows the results of the null model for the four types of violence.  In 
the case of physical violence, the results of the null model show that γ00 = -2.254 (se =  
0.098), and a variance of  .11.  Therefore, for a state with the typical physical violence 
rate, that is, for a state with a random effect u0j, the expected log-odds of violence is – 
2.254, corresponding to an odds of exp (- 2.254) = .1048.  In other words the typical state 
in Mexico has average log odds of physical violence of .092.   
 
Table 3.2:  Unrestricted Model: Cross-State Differences on Different Types of Partner 
Violence 
This corresponds to a probability of 1 / [1+exp (2.210)] = .095.  Which means that 
95% of the states lie between (.086, .013) with respect of the probability of physical 
violence.  Similarly, 95% of the states lie between .081 and .101 with respect of the 
  Physical Sexual Economic Emotional 
Fixed Effects      
 γ00 -2.254*** -2.4015*** -0.8279*** -.4961*** 
 τ00 .0984 .0526 .084612 .794 
 State average odds of violence .1048 .090577 .4369 .6088 
 Probability .095 .0827 .3040 .3784 
 C.I.  (.086 , .0128) (.081 , .101) (.369 , .519) (.518 , .716) 
Random Effects     
 STD .33247 .22474 .26595*** .29671 
 Variance component .11053*** .05051*** .07073 .088*** 
 df 31 31 31 31 
*** p < . 0001;  ** p < .05;  * p < .10 
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probability of sexual violence; .369 and .519 for economic abuse and; from .518 to .716 
for psychological abuse.  These results are drawn from the unit-specific model that 
contains the random effect4 from the level-2 model, and thus is a prediction of a state 
typical of the independent variables in the model.  
 
3.6.b-  Individual-Level Factors Associated with Physical Partner violence 
After showing that there are differences across states, I start the analysis in 
Model(s) A by estimating the effect of personal history and exosystem factors on partner 
violence.  Then, situational factors are included in Model(s) B. As HLM takes into 
consideration the nested structure of the data and as the null model has demonstrated that 
the probability of partner violence varies across states, the level-2 intercept is modeled as 
random.  Table 3.3 presents the robust unit-specific model odds-ratio results of the 
logistic regression analysis of individual-level variables predicting the risk of different 
types of partner violence taking into consideration the nested structure of the data.  
The results of the models in which situational factors are not included (Model 1A, 
2A, 3A and 4A) show that for the average woman, cohabitation and having experienced 
family violence during adolescence or childhood invariably increase the odds of 
experiencing any type of violence.  For example, women who are cohabiting have a 46% 
higher risk of experiencing physical violence, the risk is 32% higher for sexual violence, 
27% higher for economic abuse, and 19% higher for emotional violence.  Similarly, 
                                                 
4 Random effects are effects that are a subset of the total possible levels of a variable where the researcher 
is interested in generalizing to levels not observed.  In contrast, fixed effects are defined as being the only 
levels of a variable in which a researcher is interested in studying.  
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Table 3.3:  HLM Logistic Regression Analysis for Individual-Level Variables Predicting the Risk of Different Types of 
Partner Violence Taking into Consideration the Nested Structure of the Data 
 
  Physical Sexual Economic Emotional 
  Model 1A Model 1B Model 2A Model 2B Model 3A Model 3B Model 4A Model 4B 
FIXED EFFECTS         
Intercept (Average effect across individuals)   .04***   .04***   .07**   .05***   .39***   .37***   .57***   .58*** 
Individual Level Variables (Level-1)         
Personal History         
 Cohabitation (Married) 1.46** 1.41** 1.32** 1.28** 1.27*** 1.17** 1.19** 1.06 
 Age   .97***   .97***   .99 1.00   .98***   .99**   .99***   .99* 
 Years of education   .97**   .97*   .98   .98   .98**   .99*   .99   .99 
 Racial/Ethnic couple's composition  
(non-indigenous) 
        
 Both indigenous 1.05 1.16   .99 1.07   .89   .97   .80*   .90 
 Woman indigenous   .61   .44   .77   .55 1.39** 1.45 1.08 1.10 
 Man indigenous 2.09** 1.99** 1.52 1.35 1.41* 1.25 1.49 1.34 
Previous family abuse background (no) 2.19*** 1.57*** 2.23*** 1.54*** 1.89*** 1.43*** 1.99*** 1.49*** 
Exosystem         
 Socioeconomic status (high)         
 Very low 1.46** 1.09 1.17   .85 1.46** 1.22 1.13   .90 
 Low 1.28 1.06 1.09   .87 1.50*** 1.36* 1.17** 1.03 
 Medium 1.68 1.11 1.00   .92 1.22** 1.20** 1.17* 1.14 
 Employed 1.33** 1.07 1.47*** 1.21   .98   .83** 1.15**   .99 
 Number of residents 1.02   .97 1.08** 1.04 1.04** 1.01 1.03 1.00 




 Physical Sexual Economic Emotional 
 Model 1A Model 1B Model 2A Model 2B Model 3A Model 3B Model 4A Model 4B 
         
         
Situational         
 Patriarchal attitudes --- 1.73*** --- 1.75*** --- 1.83*** --- 2.23*** 
 Share of decisions ---   .99*** ---   .98*** ---   .99*** ---   .99*** 
 Woman's non-traditional gender roles --- 1.31** --- 1.52** --- 1.13 --- 1.41*** 
RANDOM EFFECTS         
Level-2 Variance  .077*** .13951***   .037*** .023*** .051*** .052*** .0767*** .079*** 
 N 31901 31575 31994 31994 
Note: Rows percentage to 100%. Statistical test of group differences: Chi-square for categorical variables and T-test for continuous variables (age, education, number of 
residents, male patriarchal attitudes and share of decision making). a  M, SD in parentheses.   *** p < . 0001;  ** p < .05;  * p < .10 
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having been a victim of family violence raises the odds of physical violence by 119%, of 
sexual violence by 123%, of economic violence by 89% and, of psychological abuse by 
99%.  
The effect of other personal history and exosystem factors varies depending on 
the violence type.  Younger, employed, lower educated and urban women are at a higher 
risk of experiencing physical violence than older, unemployed, rural and more educated 
women.  When the woman’s partner speaks an indigenous language and she does not, she 
has 109% higher risk of experiencing physical violence than non-indigenous couples.  
Similarly, and after controlling by indigenous ethnicity, women from the lowest 
socioeconomic category have 46% higher odds of experiencing physical violence than 
women from other socioeconomic strata.  For sexual violence, both employment and the 
number of residents in the household increase the odds of sexual abuse.  
The odds of experiencing economic violence are associated with lower levels of 
education, more residents in the domestic unit and living in an urban setting.  There is 
also a tendency of reporting higher levels of economic abuse as the socioeconomic status 
decreases.  Interestingly, is among cross-ethnic couples where women have a higher 
probability of economic violence: an indigenous woman coupled with a non-indigenous 
man has 39% higher odds of experiencing economic violence than non-indigenous 
couples (p< .005). Similarly, when the man is indigenous and the woman is not, the odds 
increase by 41% (p < . 10).  For psychological violence, higher levels of education, being 
in the middle socioeconomic status and living in an urban setting is associated with 
higher probabilities of experiencing emotional abuse.  In contrast, Model 4.A reveals that 
indigenous couples have 20% lower odds of experiencing psychological violence than 
non-indigenous couples.  Cross-ethnic couples are not statistically significant different 
than non-indigenous couples.  After controlling for situational characteristics, however, 
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the racial/ethnic composition of the couple is not a significant predictor of economic 
control or emotional violence (Model 3B and Model 4B). 
The next set of models, include situational factors associated with relationship 
characteristics and gender roles.  The analyses reveal that this set of variables have a 
strong predictability power.  For the average woman, having a partner with very 
patriarchal attitudes, is associated with an increase of all types of violence, but especially 
with psychological violence.  In contrast, the more the woman participates in the couple’s 
or household decision making the lower the likelihood of experiencing physical, sexual 
and economic violence.  Woman’s having non-traditional gender roles is associated with 
a higher risk for physical violence (31%), emotional abuse (41%), and especially for 
sexual violence (52%).  But it is not related with economic control.  By adding these 
situational variables some of the personal history and exosystem factors lost their 
significance.  I will discuss this in the next section, but this suggests that some of the 
explanatory power traditionally attributed to individual factors might have masked the 
influence of situational characteristics. 
 
3.6.c-  State-Level Factors Associated with Physical Partner Violence 
Multi-level models allow testing how level-1 and level-2 variables are associated 
with a certain phenomenon.  In order to test the second hypothesis –the level of gender 
equality affects the individual’s risk of experiencing partner violence-, I proceed to model 
an intercept-as-outcome model.  I am testing for the direct effects which are represented 
by a continuous blue line in Figure 3.2.  The goal in the first column of each type of 
violence is to model the intercept at the level-2 (variation across states), which, indeed 
contribute to explain the level 1 intercept (β0).  In other words, the differences in 
intercepts represent mean differences in the odds ratio of violence across states that can 
 107
be predicted from independent level-2 variables.  Therefore, the first model(s) for each 
type of violence (Models A) in Table 3.3 assume that the average level of violence across 
states is a function of the level of structural gender equality (measured by GEIMS), the 
population density and the level of human development (measured by HDI).  The model 
is defined as follows:  
 
Level 1 Model: 
 
Prob (Violence_physical = 1 | β ) = φ 
Prob (Violence_sexual = 1 | β ) = φ 
Prob (Violence_emotional = 1 | β ) = φ 
Prob (Violence_economic = 1 | β ) = φ 
 
Log [φ/ (1-φ) ]  = η 
 
Η  = β0 + β1 (Race/ethnicity) + β2 (Employed) + β3 (Years of education) + 
β4 (SES) + β5 (Abuse background) + β6 (Number of residents) + β7 (Urban) + 
β8 (Cohabitation) + β9 (Patriarchal attitudes) + β10 (Share of decisions) + 
β11 (Women’s traditional gender roles) 
 
Level 2 Model: 
 
β0 = γ00 + γ01(GEIMS) + γ02 (HDI) + γ03 (Log- population density) + u0 
 
β1 = γ10  β2 = γ20  β3 = γ30  β4 = γ40  β5 = γ50 
β6 = γ60  β7 = γ70  β8 = γ80  β9 = γ90  β10 = γ10 0 
β11 = γ11 0 
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For interpretation purposes all variables were centered around the grand mean, 
which allows the intercept (β0) to be interpreted as the average risk of violence for each 
state, after controlling for the characteristics of the individuals (Raudenbush and Bryk 
2002).  The level-2 predictors, however, are in its original metric.  Table 3.4 shows the 
hierarchical logistic regression analysis for variables predicting the risk of different types 
of partner violence.  The results from Table 3.4 indicate that the state-level variables 
associated with the risk of experiencing partner violence vary depending on each type of 
violence: physical, sexual, psychological and economic.  The level of gender equality is 
related with the odds of experiencing physical and economic violence.  An increase in 
GEIMS by one unit results in a decrease in the mean probability of abuse for the average 
woman (typical woman) in that state.  The size of the coefficient reveals, though, that the 
effect of gender equality is higher for physical violence than it is for economic violence.  
Similarly, population density is positively associated with higher risk of physical, 
economic and psychological violence, but it is unrelated to sexual violence.  In the case 
of sexual violence, the state’s score in the Human Development Index is negatively 
associated with the level of abuse for the average woman in any given state.   
These results provide partial support to the first hypothesis, the liberal feminist 
hypothesis, which would consider that in states where the level of structural gender 
equality is high the prevalence of the different forms of partner violence will be lower 
than in states where the level of gender equality is lower.  Therefore, being the level of 
structural gender equality a plausible explanation behind the heterogeneous distribution 
of some forms of partner violence in Mexico.  While the level of gender equality is 
negatively associated with the average level of physical and economic abuse, it is 
unrelated to the average probability of sexual and psychological violence.  As it can be  
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Table 3.4:  Hierarchical Logistic Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting the Risk of Different Types of Partner Violence 
 Physical  Sexual Economic Emotional 
 Model 1C Model 1D Model 2C Model 2D Model 3C Model 3D Model 4C Model 4D 
FIXED EFFECTS         
Intercept (average effect across individuals)   .26   .20   .23   .20   .23   .29   .74   .47 
Individual level variables (level-1)         
Personal History         
Cohabitation (married) 1.42** 1.43** 1.28** 1.29** 1.18** 1.18** 1.06 1.06 
Age   .97***    .97*** 1.00 1.00   .98***   .98***   .99*   .99* 
Years of education   .98* 0.99   .98   .96 0.99   .99 1.00 1.10 
Racial/Ethnic couple's composition  (non-indigenous)         
Both indigenous 1.18 1.19 1.05 1.05   .98   .99   .90   .91 
Woman indigenous   .44 0.43   .54   .54 1.46 1.39 1.10 1.06 
Man Indigenous 2.03** 1.99 1.32 1.32 1.26* 1.23 1.35 1.33 
Previous family abuse background    1.58*** 1.59*** 1.54*** 1.54*** 1.43*** 1.44*** 1.49*** 1.49*** 
Exosystem         
Socioeconomic status (high)         
Very low 1.10 1.09   .84   .84   .98 1.219   .88   .90 
Low 1.06 1.05   .87   .87 1.36* 1.36* 1.02 1.18 
Medium 1.12 1.11   .92   .92 1.20** 1.19** 1.14 1.13 
Employed 1.07 0.55 1.21 1.07   .82** 1.11   .99 1.61** 
Number of residents   .97 0.97 1.04 1.04 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00 
Urban 1.07 1.06   .90   .89 1.72*** 1.66*** 1.10 1.07 
Situational         
Patriarchal attitudes 1.76*** 1.76*** 1.75*** 1.75*** 1.84*** 1.84*** 2.23*** 2.23*** 
Share of decisions .98*** 0.99 .98*** 1.00 .99*** .99 .99*** .99* 




 Physical  Sexual Economic Emotional 
 Model 1C Model 1D Model 
2C 
Model 2D Model 
3C 
Model 3D Model 
4C 
Model 4D 
State-level variables (level-2)         
GEIMS   .97**   .97** 1.01 1.01   .98**   .99   .99 1.01 
IHD   .98   .98   .98**   .98* 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Log population density 1.50** 1.51**   .89   .90 1.36** 1.37 1.29** 1.30** 
         
Cross level interactions of GEIMS         
Years of education ---   .99 --- 1.01 ---   .99 ---   .99 
Employed --- 1.01 --- 1.00 ---   .99 --- .99*** 
Share of decisions ---   .99* ---   .99** ---   .99 ---   .99 
Woman's non-traditional gender roles ---   .98** ---   .99 ---   .97*** ---   .98*** 
         
RANDOM EFFECTS         
Level-2 variance   .070***   .070*** .022*** .0208*** .0378*** .03306*** .0706*** .0658*** 
PRE (restricted model - unrestricted model)   .367 .367 0.557 0.589 0.466 0.534 0.197 0.253 
N 31901 31575 31994 31994     
Note: Rows percentage to 100%. Statistical test of group differences: Chi-square for categorical variables and T-test for continuous variables (age, education, number of residents, male 
patriarchal attitudes and share of decision making).  
a  M, SD in parentheses.   *** p < . 0001;  ** p < .05;  * p < .10.    
(a) Level-2 variance, is the amount of variance between level-2 units that it is accounted for the predictors in the model.  
PRE = Variance unrestricted model  – Variance restricted model)  /  Variance unrestricted model  
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observed in Model(s) C, the coefficients and level of significance of level-1 predictors are 
the same as in those in Table 3.3 since Model(s) C attempt to explain the level-1 intercept 
(average effect across individuals).  
The test of the second hypothesis –the effect of the individual-level variables, that 
might alter the traditional gender balance in the relationships, associated with 
experiencing partner violence is mediated by the level of structural gender equality– 
requires modeling cross-level interactions.  The cross-level interactions included for each 
type of violence, which indeed are modeling the slopes of the variables of interest at the 
level-2, examine if the consequences of women’s transgression of traditional gender 
expectations vary depending on the level of structural gender equality.   
I identified four individual level variables for which previous research has found 
inconclusive effects: a) women’s share of decisions; b) women not holding traditional 
gender roles; c) employment, and; d) education.  These variables assess women’s 
departure from their ascribed social and family positions, and this research hypothesizes 
that the effect of this variables is mediated by the level of structural gender equality.  The 
following example might help to illustrate the rationale behind the selection of these 
specific variables.  A woman that holds non-traditional gender roles attitudes (thinks that 
a good wife must obey his husband in all that he orders, must have sex even if she does 
not want to, a woman can decide whether to work or not, and a woman can choose her 
friends even if her partner does not like them) might be more prone to suffer violence in a 
context of low gender equality than in a context of higher equality.  
As of the specifications of the model, the level-1 model is the same as in Table 
3.2. The level-2 model describes how differences in explanatory variables at level 2 relate 
to differences in the level-1 processes in each level-1 unit.  The level-2 model is defined 
as follows.  
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β0 = γ00 + γ01 (GEIMS) + γ02 (HDI) + γ03 (Log- population density) + u0 
 
β1 = γ10  β2 = γ20+ γ21 (GEIMS)  β3 = γ30 + γ31 (GEIMS)  β4 = γ40 
 β5 = γ50  β6 = γ60    β7 = γ70    β8 = γ80 
 β9 = γ90  β10 = γ10 0+ γ10 1 (GEIMS) β11 = γ11 0+ γ10 1 (GEIMS) 
 
The results of these models are presented in the second column for each type of 
violence.  I discuss the results for each level and their implications for each type of 
violence. 
 
3.6.d-  Individual and Structural Effects:  Physical Violence 
The probability of being a victim of physical partner violence is a combination of 
individual, situational and contextual factors.  Contextually, the average level of violence 
is a function of the level of gender equality and the population density.  As in the 
previous models, for the average woman, an increase in the level of gender equality 
(GEIMS) is associated with a lower probability of suffering physical violence.  In 
contrast, as the population density increases, the odds of physical violence increase as 
well.  At level-1, younger, cohabitating women and those who have experienced physical 
family violence as a child or adolescent have higher odds of experiencing physical abuse 
than older, married women and those who grew up without suffering physical violence.  
Relationship situational factors are associated with the likelihood of experiencing 
physical violence.  When the woman’s partner has patriarchal attitudes the risk of 
physical violence increases. Similarly, a woman with non-traditional gender roles has 
186% higher odds of experiencing physical violence by her romantic partner than a 
woman that does hold traditional gender roles and attitudes.  However, the consequences 
of having non-traditional gender roles vary across states depending on the level of 
structural gender equality.  As revealed by the coefficient that models the slope of 
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woman’s non-traditional gender roles as a function of GEIMS, an increase in GEIMS is 
associated with a reduction in the odds of violence.    
The following example, represented graphically in Figure 3.3 will help to 
understand this relationship. I selected five states that differ in their levels of structural 
gender equality for illustrating the effect of the structural level of gender equality 
(GEIMS) on women’s traditional gender roles and attitudes.  In the case of Tlaxcala, the 
state in which the gender gap is bigger, a woman that holds non-traditional gender roles 
had 54% higher odds of experiencing physical violence than a woman that embraces 
traditional gender roles [ exp (1.051 – 1.017 * TLAX’s GEIMS =  1.051-.6209].  In the 
case of Nuevo León, with a GEIMS of 40.2, a woman with non-traditional gender roles 
has 45% higher odds of experiencing physical violence than a woman with traditional 
gender roles.   
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Similarly, in Guerrero the odds of physical violence increase by 31% and by 20% 
in Oaxaca.  In the Federal District, the state where women have reached the highest level 
of gender equality, embracing non-traditional gender roles is associated with lower odds 
of experiencing partner violence.  Figure 3.3 clearly demonstrates how the context affects 
the individual.  Moreover, this example suggests that the radical feminist backlash 
hypothesis is dependent on the general level of structural equality since the negative 
effect of having non-traditional gender roles weakens as the level of equality increases, 
up to the point in which the tendency is reverted.   
The relationship between women’s share of household or couple decisions and 
physical violence is also influenced by the general context of gender equality.  In general, 
as a woman increases her participation in the decision making processes the probability 
of experiencing partner abuse decreases.  However, the effect varies depending on the 
level of gender equality of the state where the woman lives [exp (- .000192 * GEIMS)].  
For example, a woman from Chiapas that participates in 20% of the decision making has 
13% lower odds of experiencing violence than a woman whose couple monopolizes all 
the decision making [exp (- .000192 *10 * 37.1)].  The protective effect of participating 
in decisions, however, is higher for a woman from Puebla: if she participates in 20% of 
the decisions her odds of suffering physical partner violence decreases by 17% than a 
woman who does not participate at all.  Figure 3.4 illustrates how women increased 
participation in the decision making process varies by the state’s level of structural 
gender equality.  It can be observed that for a woman in the Federal District that 
participates in all the decisions, the risk of physical violence is reduced by 75%, while for 
a woman in Chiapas, the odds of suffering physical abuse are reduced by 51%.  Again, 
these differences are due to the gender equality context, which given even more support 
to the second hypothesis.  
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Figure 3.4:  Cross-level Effect of Women's Share of Decision Making and GEIMS 
 
As of the random effect, the level-2 variance represents the average cross-state 
intercept after having introduced level-1 and level-2 predictors.  Therefore, the typical 
state in Mexico has an average probability of physical violence of .070.  When this 
coefficient is compared with that of the restricted model in Table 3.1 ( .11053; p < .000), 
there is a (PRE) difference of .367.5  This difference must be interpreted as the proportion 
in the variance at level-2 reduced by including level-1 and level-2 correlates in the model 
(37%).  Between Model 1C and Model 1D in Table 3.4 there is not statistical 
improvement. Nevertheless, as I mentioned earlier, this analysis is theoretically and not 
statistically driven.  
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3.6.d-  Individual and Structural Effects:  Sexual Violence 
As in the case of physical violence, the probability of being a victim of sexual 
violence is a combination of individual, situational and contextual factors.  The average 
state-level of violence is related to the level of human development, but it is not 
associated with the level of structural equality.  For example, women from Chiapas, the 
state ranking the lowest in the HDI, have 30% higher odds of experiencing sexual partner 
violence than women from the Federal District, the state ranking the highest:  DF: exp [ (-
.021*88.37) – (-.021*71.14)].  
After controlling for relationship-situational and state-level variables, there are 
only two individual-level factors related to the probability of experiencing sexual abuse 
by an intimate partner in Mexico.  Cohabiting women have 29% higher odds of being a 
victim of sexual abuse than married women.  Similarly, having experienced family abuse 
while growing up is associated with 54% higher odds of experiencing sexual violence.  
Model 2D shows that the situational factors associated with the likelihood of 
experiencing physical violence also predict the likelihood of experiencing sexual abuse.  
As the woman’s partner number of patriarchal attitudes increases the risk of sexual 
violence increases as well.  Similarly, a woman with non-traditional gender roles and 
attitudes has 113% higher odds of experiencing sexual violence than a woman that does 
hold traditional gender roles attitudes.  As in the case of physical violence, the level of 
gender equality interacts with women’s participation in the household or couple’s 
decision making.  As the level of gender equality increases, the protective effect against 
violence of participating in a higher percentage of decision making also increases.  The 
graphic representation of this cross-level effect is the same as in Figure 3.3 because the 
coefficient of the cross-level interaction of GEIMS and share of decision making is the 
same than in the case of sexual violence (see Table 3.4).  The inclusion of level-1 and 
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level-2 variables in Model 3, the variance decreases by 56%.  By modeling the level-2 
intercepts the variance decreases an additional 3%: .59% [( .0505, df,=31, p< .000, χ2 = 
188.60) – ( .021, df = 28, p< .000,  χ2 =74.60)].    
 
3.6.e-  Individual and Structural Effects:  Economic Abuse 
Economic violence is perhaps the type of violence against women less studied in 
the existing literature.  Nevertheless, 29% of the Mexican women reported experiencing 
it during 2003.  As in the case of physical and sexual violence, the risk of experiencing 
economic abuse is also dependent on multiple factors.  The level of gender equality at the 
contextual level and the population density influence the average level of violence across 
states.  The results in Model 3D show a positive relationship between population density 
and the odds of economic abuse, and an inverse relationship between the level of 
structural gender equality and the probability of economic abuse: an increase in the level 
of gender equality is associated with a decrease in the odds of economic abuse.  The 
effect of GEIMS over economic violence, however, is smaller than the one over physical 
violence –each unit of increase in GEIMS decreases the odds of physical violence by 3%, 
and lowers the odds of economic abuse by 1%.  
At the individual level, younger, cohabitating, urban and women who suffered 
violence during adolescence or childhood are at a higher risk of experiencing economic 
abuse than older, married, rural and non-family abused women.  Interestingly, women 
who are in the middle categories of the socioeconomic status variable have a higher 
probability of experiencing economic control or violence than those in the extremes.  
Situational factors are associated with the likelihood of experiencing physical violence.  
When the woman’s partner has patriarchal attitudes the risk of experiencing economic 
abuse increases.  Similarly, a woman with strict traditional gender roles and attitudes has 
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a lower risk of experiencing economic abuse than those without them.  The effect of 
having non-traditional gender roles, however, is influenced by the level of gender 
equality as shown in the cross-level interactions of GEIMS in Model 6.  Therefore, as in 
the case of physical violence, the probability of experiencing economic violence for a 
woman without traditional gender roles is higher in a state with low levels of gender 
equality, than it would be for a woman living in a state where the level of structural 
gender equality is higher.  By including level-1 and level-2 predictors in the model, 
Model 6 accounts for 53% of the explained variance at level-2  [( .07073, df,=31, p< 
.000, χ2 = 680.01) – ( .03296, df = 28, p< .000,  χ2 =282.81)].    
 
3.6.f-  Individual and Structural Effects:  Emotional Abuse 
Emotional abuse is the most common form of partner violence in Mexico.  
Around 40% of the women experience it during the year prior the interview.  At the 
contextual level, the probability of experiencing psychological abuse is only positively 
associated with the population density.  At the individual level, younger women and 
those who experienced family violence while growing up are at a higher risk of 
experiencing emotional abuse than older women and those who never experienced 
violence during their childhood or adolescence.  To be employed is associated with being 
at a higher risk of experiencing partner violence. However, as revealed by the cross-level 
interactions in Model 8, the effect of employment varies across states depending on the 
level of structural gender equality.  As the level of gender equality increases, the odds of 
experiencing violence for an employed women decrease.  
Figure 3.5 exemplifies the complex relationship between employment and 
violence, and how this relationship is mediated by the context in six states with different 
levels of gender equality.  The second bar shows what the odds of suffering emotional 
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abuse would be for an employed woman in a state with a theoretical level of equality of 0 
(the gender gap between man and woman = 100), are 61% higher than those of an 
unemployed women.   
 
Figure 3.5:  Cross-Level Effect of GEIMS and Employment 
 
The first bar represents the comparison group (non employed women, or women 
in non-paid jobs).  If we focus our attention in the three first selected states (in ascending 
GEIMS order), we see how employed women are more likely to experience 
psychological violence than non-employed women in Tlaxcala, Veracruz and Campeche.  
However, the odds for an employed woman in Tlaxcala are 9% higher than those of an 
unemployed woman [exp (.048 - .0104 *36.9)].  In Veracruz, the odds are 6% [exp (.048 
- .0104 *39.8)], and 3% in Campeche [exp (.048 - .0104 *42.9)].  In Sonora, where man 
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almost the same probability of experiencing emotional abuse than non-employed women, 
only 0.7% lower odds [exp (.048 - .0104 *46.2)].  However, as the context of gender 
equality improves, to have a paid employment is linked with a reduction in the risk of 
experiencing emotional partner violence.  This is the case of Oaxaca, where employed 
women have 6% lower odds of experiencing psychological violence, or in the Federal 
District where the odds are 25% lower. 
All three relationship situational factors are associated with the likelihood of 
experiencing emotional violence.  As the woman increases her participation in the 
decision making processes her risk of emotional abuse decreases.  In contrast, as the male 
partner holds more patriarchal attitudes the risk of emotional violence increases.  As has 
been reported for the other types of violence, women with non-traditional gender roles 
have an increased risk of emotional violence.  Again, this relationship is mediated by the 
level of structural gender equality.  Figure 3.6 illustrates the inverse relationship between 
traditional gender roles and the odds of experiencing physical, economic and emotional 
violence increase.  However, the odds of violence tend to be lower in states with higher 
GEIMS.  
For example, in Aguascalientes, one of the states with the lowest gender equality 
(37.7), women holding non-traditional gender roles have 52% higher odds of 
experiencing physical violence  [exp (1.051 - .017 *37.7)], 43% higher risk of economic 
violence [exp (1.051 - .017 *37.7)], and 66% higher odds of psychological violence [exp 
(1.051 - .017*37.7)] than women with traditional gender roles.  In Quintana Roo, the 
odds increase by 46% in the case of physical violence, 34% for economic violence, and 
59% for emotional violence.  Although women with non-traditional gender roles attitudes 
are always at a higher risk of experiencing violence, in states with higher levels of gender  
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Figure 3.6:  Cross-Level Effect of Gender Roles and GEIMS on Partner Violence 
 
equality the odds tend to decrease.  Oaxaca is the state that ranks the second in terms of 
gender equality, however, although reduced, women that have non-traditional roles have 
20% higher risk of physical violence and 31% higher odds of emotional violence.  In the 
case of economic violence, however, there is almost no difference with more traditional 
women.  The Federal District, the most egalitarian state, women without traditional 
gender roles invariably have a lower risk of physical, emotional and economic violence. 
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greater gender equality the backlash theory looses its significance.  By including level-1 
and level-2 predictors in the model, Model 8 accounts for 23% of the explained variance 
at level-2  [( .088, df,=31, p< .000, χ2 = 884.96) – ( . 0.066, df = 28, p< .000,  χ2 
=425.38)].    
 
3.7-  DISCUSSION 
Partner violence is a common experience for Mexican women as revealed by the 
results of the 2003 ENDIREH: 9.2% of the women experienced physical violence, 7.9% 
sexual abuse, 29% economic control or abuse, and 36.5% emotional violence.  Given the 
likely underreporting of such type of behaviors the true prevalence of abuse is probably 
higher.  As in other countries, violence against women perpetrated by a romantic partner 
clearly represents a major social problem in Mexico, and as this analysis shows, it is a 
complex phenomenon affected by a multiplicity of factors at the individual, relationship 
and structural level.   
The phenomenon of violence against women perpetrated by her romantic partner 
needs to be studied from a holistic perspective that includes individual factors (personal 
history, situational, exosystem) as well as contextual-structural factors.  By integrating 
both types of factors into the same model, this research has shown that the reconciliation 
of the two traditionally divorced sociological perspectives in analysis of partner violence 
–family violence (micro) and feminist (macro)– is possible.  I carry to an end the long-
lasting divorce between these two theoretically perspectives that, perhaps due to 
differences in their methodological approach, have been conducting partial examinations 
of the factors associated with the phenomenon of violence against women.   
Until recent, quantitative sociological studies often have ignored the context 
(social structure) in which individuals and social life is embedded.  In this chapter I have 
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taken into consideration how the social structure, and the fact that individuals are nested 
into social units, affects an individual-level phenomenon: partner violence.  In Mexico, 
the level of structural gender equality explains, how the contexts affects, net of other 
factors, the experiences of partner violence.  On the other, it is a filter through which 
individual-level correlates of partner violence need to be carefully analyzed.  In other 
words, the general climate of gender equality reigning in a certain society mediates the 
effect of individual level variables.  Future research in other countries using a similar 
model will allow us to assess the effect of the patriarchal structure over partner violence 
in a cross-national perspective.  
In this chapter, I have overcome the ecological fallacy (structural characteristics 
cannot predict the actions or behaviors of individuals nested or belonging to that 
structural context) that most studies of patriarchy fall into (Dutton 1994).  Moreover, I 
took into consideration, individual characteristics and the context, as well as the 
interaction between them because patriarchy is a social system and cannot be reduced to 
individual traits.  The level of structural gender equality, which is indeed a measure of 
patriarchy, does affect directly the experiences of partner abuse of Mexican women.  This 
finding contradicts Dutton’s (1994) statement that there is not direct relationship between 
structural patriarchy and wife abuse.  
At the individual-level (micro), the phenomenon of violence against women is a 
multifaceted phenomenon grounded in an interplay of factors (Heise 1998).  Previous 
studies from Mexico have mainly focused on personal history and exosystem factors.  
Nevertheless, how the interactions in which a woman is engaged and the subjective 
meanings assigned to those interactions (situational factors) influence partner violence 
has not been object of the same attention.  Situational traits associated with relationship 
characteristics, however, have a more stable effect over the different types of partner 
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violence than personal history and exosystem factors.  Having experienced physical 
violence by a family member during childhood or adolescence, and having a partner with 
patriarchal attitudes that support patriarchy, women subordination and gender inequality 
are two individual-level features that invariably elevate women’s risk of experiencing any 
of the four types of partner violence.  In contrast, women’s participation in the household 
or couple’s decision making is negatively associated with the probability of experiencing 
physical, sexual, economic or emotional violence.  This finding is contrary to previous 
studies about Mexico, perhaps because of the inclusion of other situational factors 
(Casique 2004; Oropesa 1997; Pozo del, Castro, and Ríquer 2004).  
Contrary with what would be expected, violence is higher among women that do 
not conform to traditional gender roles, which indeed supports previous findings about 
Mexican migrants and Mexican-Americans in the U.S. (Firestone, Harris, and Vega 
2003). In other words, a woman who beliefs that a woman does not have to obey her 
husband, that she might say “no” if she does not want to have sex, that a woman is free to 
decide whether or not to work, and that a woman can choose her friends even if her 
partner does not like them, is more likely to experience any type of partner violence than 
one who does have traditional gender roles.  These results at the individual level support 
the backlash theory, which states that violence will increase in men’s attempt to 
compensate when women challenge the traditional balance of power in the household or 
for women’s attempts of independence.  
This type of analysis is one of the few in Mexico that takes into consideration the 
racial and ethnic composition of the couple.  It finds that at the individual level, when the 
male is indigenous and the woman is not, women are at an elevated risk of suffering 
physical and economic violence.  Most previous studies have only used as a control the 
indigenous-non-indigenous dichotomy, concluding that indigenous women were at a 
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lower risk of experiencing partner violence than non-indigenous women.  The fact that 
the racial and ethnic composition of the couple is a significant variable predicting some 
forms of partner violence is of relevance.  This calls for more sophisticated analyses, but 
potential explanations might be related to the status differential and different cultural 
expectations.  Cohabitation increases the risk of all types of partner violence.  However, 
after controlling by situational factors, there is not evidence that married and cohabitating 
women significantly differ in their probability of emotional abuse.  The risk is higher, 
though, for physical violence (42% higher odds), than it is for sexual (26% higher odds) 
or economic violence (18% higher odds).   
The relationship of other individual-level variables with the experience of partner 
violence is not consistent for the four types of violence.  For physical violence, younger 
and uneducated women have higher odds of abuse than more educated and older women.  
Younger, urban, unemployed and undereducated women are at a higher risk of economic 
violence than older, rural, employed and more educated women.  Similarly, women in the 
middle categories of socioeconomic status are at a higher risk of violence than those 
better off.  The model shows, however, no difference between women in the highest 
category of socioeconomic status and the lowest, perhaps because the lowest category 
represents very poor individuals, so economic control or economic violence is more 
difficult to be exerted when resources are not available.  In the cases of sexual violence, 
all women, regardless of their socioeconomic and demographic status have the same risk 
of victimization.  In the case of psychological abuse, the only variable associated with the 
risk of abuse is age: older women are less likely to experience emotional abuse than 
younger women.  
By using more sophisticated methodology, and combining the micro-and macro 
perspective into the same model, this research provides partial support for the liberal 
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feminist theory.  In the context of this paper, the liberal feminist hypothesis would argue 
that in areas where the level of gender equality is high, the rates of partner violence will 
be lower than in areas with less gender equality.  After controlling for other structural 
variables, the societal level of gender equality (measured by GEIMS) is negatively 
associated with state-level average levels physical and economic violence, but it is 
unrelated to sexual and emotional violence.  Perhaps the dynamics of sexual and 
psychological violence are different, and are less dependent on the level of structural 
gender equality.   
In addition to explain the regional rates of some types of violence, the level of 
structural gender equality interacts with individual-level and situational characteristics of 
women; supporting, thus, the second hypothesis.  Previous research presents inconclusive 
effects about individual-level variables such as education, employment, gender roles 
attitudes or decision making.  These variables that affect the traditional distribution of 
power and gender roles within the couple, as this research shows, must be understood in 
the broader context of structural gender equality.  The level of gender equality mediates 
the effect of employment, share of decision making and non-traditional gender roles for 
certain type of partner violence.  For example, a woman that holds non-traditional gender 
roles and attitudes is at a constant elevated risk of experiencing any form of partner 
violence.  However, her odds of violence vary depending on the level of gender equality 
of the state she lives in: she will have a higher probability of suffering violence if she is 
in a more patriarchal state than if she lives in a more egalitarian one.   
Similarly, employed women have a higher probability of emotional violence than 
unemployed women.  When the context is accounted for, employed women in states with 
higher levels of gender equality have lower odds of psychological violence than 
unemployed women.  The protective effect of women’s higher participation in the 
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decision making is also moderated by the level of structural gender equality; being the 
odds of experiencing physical and sexual violence much lower in states with higher 
gender equality than in states with lower levels, at the same level of participation in 
decision making.  Therefore, this research highlights the importance of taking into 
consideration the gender equality environment and integrating it in the analyses beyond 
pure descriptive considerations.  
The limitations of the analyses presented in this chapter are associated with the 
use of secondary data and the under-report associated with the social stigmatization of the 
phenomenon under study.  Perhaps the under-report is higher in this survey than in other 
family violence surveys because an interviewer administered the totality of the 
ENDIREH in Mexico.  The ENDIREH is representative of married and cohabiting 
women with a live-in partner; however it ignores same sex-couples and separated and 
divorced women, which have been shown to be at a higher risk of experiencing physical 
violence.  Future data-collections efforts should include these groups.  Another limitation 
associated with the use of a multi-level methodology is the small number of level-2 
predictors that can be included in the model. 
In the last decade there has been an increasing tendency to study partner violence 
taking into consideration the differential status between men and women in the 
relationship (see Anderson 1997; Kaukinen 2004).  The ENDIREH contains information 
about the woman’s couple (reported by the woman).  However, there is an elevated 
percentage of missing data in key variables that would allow conducting this type of 
analysis such as the man’s salary and occupation.  The high percentage of the Mexican 
population in the informal labor market and with unsteady jobs makes even more difficult 
this type of analysis.  
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As this chapter shows, understanding the context in which individuals are 
embedded is a central consideration in partner violence research.  Future research about 
partner violence has to include as well the context cultural and ideological structure.  
Ignoring the context, might lead to incorrect conclusions, not only in partner violence 
research, but in other types of social research.  Moreover, sociologists ignoring the social 
structure and explaining social phenomenon only by individual-level variables, are 












CHAPTER 4:  STATE, WOMEN’S MOVEMENT AND CIVIL 
SOCIETY IN MEXICO: A THEORETICAL APPROACH 
One of the fundamental theses of sociology is that the social structure influences 
individuals.  Throughout this work, I have highlighted the patriarchal nature of the social 
structure and its relationship to the phenomenon of partner violence.  Giddens’ (1984) 
theory of structuration suggests that social structure - traditions, institutions, moral codes, 
and established ways of doing things- is constituted through human agency, while it 
serves at the same time to enable individual action.  It is through the continuous repetition 
of the acts of the individuals that the structure is reproduced.6  Social structure is not the 
final determinant of individual action in as much as it, too, can be changed when 
individuals act differently, either because previous acts are ignored, replaced or 
reproduced differently.  
If we accept that the social structure can enable change and be changed itself by 
organized action, what role is played, then, by the State?  I understand the State as an 
institution that represents interests constituted elsewhere.  The State represents and 
reproduces the dynamics occurring in society and reflected in the social structure.  The 
State insinuates itself between the society and the social structure.  From this intermediate 
position, the State is potentially able to change how individuals or groups act through the 
laws it creates and enforces and through the use of force.  In this chapter, I adopt a post-
structuralist perspective (MacDowell Santos 2005; Waylen 1998) on the State, in which 
the democratic State is construed under two aspects: as an arena in which social tensions 
are manifested and negotiated; and as an agent of a sort, endowed with the potential for 
                                                 
6 Giddens (1984) defines social structure as the “institutionalized features of society which stretch across 
time and space, which involve the dual aspects of reflexive human actions and of their continuity over and 
above the individuals involved in any one instant”. 
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changing the social structure (and by implication, gender relations) through the use of 
force. 
Social movements are key actors in forcing the State to respond to specific 
demands, especially if the democratic State is put into a situation such that it fears the 
loss of public legitimacy.  The feminist and women’s movement7 has been instrumental 
in demanding that the State takes measures to eradicate patriarchal practices, such as 
violence against women perpetrated by strangers and intimate partner violence.  As 
Alvarez (1990) argues, there are many changes to women’s subordinate status that must 
be pursued primarily if not exclusively within the confines of the State, and the women’s 
movement has been fundamental in pursuing them.  
Thus, certain properties of the State –the hierarchical relationship between the 
State and society (Dobash and Dobash 1992:101); its representative/representing nature; 
its virtual power to change the social structure (understood in Giddens terms) through 
public policies and legislation– make it a privileged site that must be understood if one is 
seeking to understand the phenomenon of violence against women.  Violence against 
women is not, from this point of view, contingent, but must be seen as symptomatic of 
the patriarchal nature of the society (Dobash and Dobash 1977; 1979).  Also, the 
empirical analyses of the processes taking place within the State, and how the women’s 
movement and the State interact are of relevance for understanding the nature of the 
[patriarchal] Mexican social structure.    
Defining ‘the State’ is empirically and theoretically complex.  The State might 
include a variety of hierarchical levels: local, regional, federal and international 
                                                 
7 In Mexico, the term women’s movement refers not only to the feminist movement, but also to all women 
organizations that share the perspective that gender is an issue of political and social concern Lamas, 
Marta, Alicia Martínez, María Luisa Tarrés, and Esperanza Tuñón. 1995. "Building Bridges: The Growth 
of Popular Feminism in Mexico." Pp. 324-347 in The Challenges of Local Feminisms. Women´s 
Movements in Global Perspective, edited by A. Basu. Boulder: Westview Press..  
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organizations.  The State has to be understood as something dynamic since the both the 
realm of the State and the institutions which embody it have changed over time (Connell 
1990).  The State is “defined and experienced both as a set of institutions standing over 
and above us and as something which permeates our everyday lives and in which we all, 
wittingly or unwittingly, participate (Charles 2000: 5).  The duality of the state consists in 
the fact that there is both an exterior, hierarchical relationship between the State and 
individuals and the society while, at the same time, individuals and society exist within 
the State and constitute it.  As we will see throughout this chapter, the role of the State in 
guaranteeing women’s rights has been the topic of much debate.   
The 1990s Latin American political context offered an excellent environment for 
human rights activism, including women’s rights.  Many countries in the region, such as 
El Salvador or Guatemala, were engaged in democratization after a long period of civil 
violence, while others were shifting to democracy and pluralism after a period of 
authoritarian rule (i.e. Chile or Argentina), or pseudo-authoritarian rule in the case of 
Mexico.  Newly elected governments introduced reforms that aimed at fostering 
representativity, accountability and efficiency.  In most Latin American countries 
experiencing a transition toward democracy, “there was often public and governmental 
support for civil and political human rights to be seen as a way of deepening the 
democratic process” (Molyneux and Lazar 2003:31).  In the case of Mexico, the State’s 
legitimacy crisis after seven decades of uninterrupted government by the PRI (Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional) and lack of pluralism produced an opening favorable to 
civil society reforms.  When the PRI was fully in control, the feminist movement had 
difficulties articulating specific demands for the advancement of women’s rights as a 
result of the corporativist culture in Mexican politics which disallowed political 
movements the necessary autonomy within which to operate.  On the other side, the lack 
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of democracy and political pluralism explain the State’s lack of reaction to and interest in 
feminist demands.   
This chapter is structured in five sections.  The first two are theoretical in their 
nature.  The first section examines theoretically the State from a feminist perspective.  
The second piece traces the evolution of the feminist/women’s movement in Mexico.  
The third part covers the relationship between the state and the women’s movement in 
general.  The fourth examines how the Mexican women’s movement has articulated the 
fight against violence against women, both within the structure of the State and outside of 
it.  The final section includes the conclusions and a discussion of the role of the State and 
women’s movement in fighting one of the most brutal and explicit expressions of 
patriarchy: partner violence.  
 
4.1-   THE STATE FROM A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE 
The nature of the State is complex and ambivalent.  The State has the power to 
implement policy change and grant rights.  These features of the State, however, cannot 
be understood without taking into consideration the influence of social movements.  
There are several types of theories of the State.  Charles (2000) differentiates between 
representational and non-representational theories of the State, with the level of 
representation depending on whether or not the State participates in the construction of 
political interests, and thus represents itself, or limits its role to the representation of 
already existing interests.  Therefore, representational theories of the State such as 
Marxism or social-democracy see the State as “representing interests that are constituted 
elsewhere, usually at the economic level” (Charles 2000:6).  In contrast, non-
representational theories see the State as an actor in its own right, one that reflects its own 
political interests, and tend to focus on how the State exercises its political power.  
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The role of the State in the promotion of women’s rights, as well as its 
relationship with individual and organizational actors is best understood from the 
perspective of feminist theories of the State.  The State can be conceptualized along 
classical Weberian lines as a set of social institutions that have the monopoly over 
legitimate coercion and as the organizational source of social cohesion (Walby 1990).  
The modern Western State has gone through different stages of development.  The 18th 
and 19th centuries saw the emergence of the liberal state (classical liberal, liberal-
democratic and laissez-faire).  The liberal tradition differentiates between the public and 
private spheres.  The public sphere is the domain of the State, while the private sphere is 
left to the control of individuals, families, business enterprises, social organizations and 
local communities.  The 20th century witnessed the full development of the Welfare State, 
which found its most complete expression in the nations of northern Europe (Esping-
Andersen 1990; Esping-Andersen 1999; Esping-Andersen, Gallie, Hemerijck, and Myles 
2002).  Since the 1980’s a neo-liberal turn, characterized by the policies of Ronald Regan 
in the U.S., Olof Palme in Sweden and Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain, sought to 
reduce the role and prerogatives of the state in social life. 
Despite the adoption of neo-liberal policies, many developed nations and nearly 
all of the nations of Latin America retain the basic characteristics of Welfare States.  In 
what follows I will review different feminist analyses of the relationship between gender 
and the Welfare State, since there is no dominant cohesive feminist theory of the State 
(Waylen 1998).  Some theories view the State as exclusively repressive and controlling, 
others believe that the State enables individuals and groups to fulfill their interests and 
protect their rights.  A third group of theories falls between these two. As of the 
motivations and pressures behind the adoption of legislation and public policies, these 
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theories do not commit us to a representational or non-representational characterization 
of the State.    
 
4.1.a-   The Repressive and Controlling State 
The social control theory sees the State as repressive and controlling and women 
are viewed as victims of men’s control which is mediated and reinforced by the State.  
From this perspective, then, the State is not a mechanism for promoting social change 
because the State is a monolithic institution.  This structuralist approach sees the policy 
making content of the State as being representative of already existing interests, while 
formally it is regarded as an institution or group of institutions with a set of 
institutionalized rules and procedures that can be used for the representation of the 
interests and views of opposing social actors.   
Socialist feminists added the woman’s question to the traditional Marxist class 
analysis, and sought to determine the origins of women’s oppression.  They claimed that 
the male-breadwinner family structure and women’s economic dependence on men is 
supported by the capitalist State.  In terms of economic logic, this arrangement is 
beneficial for the capitalist mode of production since women’s work is cheap and 
flexible.  Therefore, as the State supports the capitalist way of production, the State 
becomes the natural advocate of patriarchy: the State guarantees the structures that 
enforce women’s subordinate role in society and those gender relations, either in the 
household or in wage labor, that are oppressive to women (McIntosh 1978).  From this 
perspective, the State is seen as the instrument of the ruling class, predominantly male 
and capitalist, and aims at maintaining both class and gender domination, essentially 
defined by the extraction of surplus labor value (i.e. Hartmann 1976).   
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In later formulations of this theoretical approach, patriarchy and capitalism were 
conceived as two linked systems of domination (Hartmann 1981; Young 1981).  
However, even those feminists who discard the apparatus of Marxian theory to explain 
the source of women’s domination agree that the State has functioned not only as a 
repressive and controlling institution vis-à-vis women as a social group, but, even over 
the course of the change from the nineteenth century liberal State to the twentieth century 
Welfare State, has shown itself unwilling and unable to represent the interests of 
subordinated groups, including women.   
In the book, Gender and Governance, Brush (2003) argues that the State 
maintains men’s social superiority and fosters women’s subordination in two different 
ways: directly through the structures, procedures, ideologies and discourses related to 
gender (gender of governance) and indirectly through the maintenance of a false 
appearance of gender neutrality (governance of gender).  Radical feminist analyses, such 
as those of Catherine MacKinnon (1989), which view the State as an instrument of 
patriarchal domination, deal mostly with the gender of governance.  State’s actions, or 
lack thereof, are conceived as a tool for reproducing the patriarchal system because the 
State is “male in the feminist sense: the law sees and treats women in the way men see 
and treat women” (MacKinnon 1989:161-162).  By governance of gender, Brush (2003) 
labels the actions of State institutions and practices of governance that perpetuate the 
different and unequal treatment of men and women in spite of the ostensible gender 
neutrality of State laws and policies, since these laws and policies are rife with gender-
laden assumptions.  As shown by Weldon (2002), these assumptions result in the State 
reproducing and promoting gender differentiation.  This perspective does not only fail to 
acknowledge the institutional and political complexity within the State, but also fails to 
acknowledge the relationship among social movements, society and the State. 
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4.1.b-  The Enabling State: The State as an Instrument for Social Change 
Although many feminists are critical of the way in which the State has intervened 
in women’s issues and perceive it as essentially male biased, some have, at some point, 
supported the intervention of the State (see Gray 1999; Piven 1990).  During the 1980s, a 
number of feminist studies examined women’s social movements and their demands on 
the State and many contemporary feminists are, after all, employed by the State and work 
within the State bureaucracy.  They have realized as part of their personal situation, thus, 
that the State is often contradictory, which gives them the opportunity to generated 
feminist public policies (Charles 2000). 
Liberal feminists tend to conceptualize the State as enabling.  Liberal feminists 
usually work toward achieving civil and political equality, or political reforms that will 
improve women’s status in society in the context of the existing social order.  For them, 
the State becomes a central instrument for social change.  As stated by Dobash and 
Dobash (1992:110), “state institutions are necessary for formulating legislation and new 
policies, for containing conflicts and for preventing ‘new forms of inequality and 
tyranny’”.  Civil society actors (individuals or social movements) might change the 
political agenda and legal culture of the individuals that compose the State; promoting, 
thus, social changes and representation of diverse groups’ interests and how the State 
relates to traditionally subordinated groups (MacDowell Santos 2004; Mirchandani 
2006). 
Those who see the State as an instrument for social change see the State as 
monolithic, and believe that men and women’s interests are ideally the same.  Contrary to 
the social control theory, women are seen as ‘beneficiaries’ of men’s solidarity mediated 
by the State (see MacDowell Santos 2005).  This conceptualization of the State has been 
criticized for its focus on the analyses of social policies and their effects on gender 
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relations rather than in understanding how gender interests are constituted and 
represented at the political level (Charles 2000). 
 
4.1.c-  Historical-Structuralist Perspective: The Enabling and Controlling State 
The historical structuralist perspective includes aspects of both previous examined 
perspectives.  In this perspective, the State is historically situated, therefore, depending 
on the historical and political context, the State might act as an instrument for social 
change (the enabling State) or promote male control over women’s lives and foster 
gender inequality (Gordon 1990; Piven 1990).  Alvarez (1990) summarizes this 
perspective in Engendering Democracy in Brazil,  
“the State is not monolithically masculine or antifeminist” (p.272).  “There are 
many changes in women’s subordinate status that must be pursued primarily, if 
not exclusively, within the confines of formal (male-dominated and sexist) 
political institutions” (p. 28) “The Brazilian case suggests that feminists should 
neither dismiss the State as the ultimate mechanism of male social control nor 
embrace it as the ultimate vehicle for gender-based social change. Rather, under 
different political regimes and at distinct historic conjunctures, the State is 
potentially a mechanism for social change or social control in women’s lives” (p. 
273).   
 
In a similar analysis of gender inequality Bourque (1989) argues, too, that it is a 
mistake to see the State as monolithic, and that the sometimes differing ideologies of elite 
State actors find expression in State policies and actions toward women’s issues.  State 
elites “are both potential sources of access as well as critical actors in the creation and 
maintenance of [gender] hierarchies” (p. 115), and their beliefs, values and attitudes must 
be taken into account in the explanation of both potential changes and the maintenance of 
the status quo in women’s lives.  Yet the unidirectional flow of power, from the state 
outward, which is promoted by the historical structuralist perspective has been criticized 
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for ignoring the contentions and interactions between the State and women’s movements 
in the formation of women’s interests (MacDowell Santos 2005).  However, as we will 
see next the State cannot ignore social movements demands, especially after those reach a 
dimension that put in jeopardy the State’s legitimacy.  
 
4.1.d-  Post-Structuralist Approach  
Post-structuralist feminists build upon the historical structuralist approach by 
grounding the study of gender in the analysis of State and social movement’s influence 
on the state in a specific historical, social and political context.  From this perspective the 
state is far from being a monolithic or unitary actor, “but a differentiated set of 
institutions, agencies and discourses” that can either promote women’s rights or 
contribute to women’s inequality (Waylen 1998:7).  The State is regarded as a multi-
dimensional construct, although each dimension has been defined by masculine traits. 
Although different types of State are dominated by particular forms of masculinity, 
different branches of the same State are more or less masculinized, and especially the 
higher levels of the State (Connell 1990; Franzway, Court, and Connell 1989).  
Masculinization is defined both as the gender of the State’s personal working in certain 
areas and the cultural dominant of the State apparatus.  For example, coercive sectors of 
the state are more male dominated and have a more masculinist ideology than branches 
concerned with areas such as health or education.  In addition, peripheral State 
institutions and activities are less masculinized than the central ones of coercion, decision 
making and political leadership (Franzway, Court, and Connell 1989). 
Like the historical structuralists, the post structuralists believe that the state per se 
has no inherent position or set of interests relative to gender and that it can either operate 
to constrain and control female autonomy or to enable it, depending on specific historical 
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circumstances.  As a consequence, post-structuralism conceives the State as both an agent 
and an arena in which the battles for women’s rights take place.  
The post-structuralist approach is neutral with regard to the issue of whether the 
State is essentially representative or non-representative.  This perspective takes into 
consideration not only the influence of external on the State, but also the organization of 
the State and the way in which institutions within the State and those people filling roles 
within those institutions  shape policy.  According to Charles (2000:24) this “shift can be 
seen as reflecting the resurgence of Weberian sociology in the wake of the declining 
influence of Marxism, but it has also to do with the shift from structural analyses to those 
which emphasize social action and individual agency.”  Therefore, the State acts to 
construct gender relations and has different impacts on different groups of women 
(Waylen 1998).  In Fraser’s (1989) examination of the Welfare State and gender, the 
State is defined as an “apparatus” that struggles with other actors in the process of gender 
formation, thus contributing to the determination of the level of gender inequality.  The 
post-structuralist approach is the perspective currently being adopted by most Latin 
America feminist scholars.  They conceptualize the State a ‘differentiated set of 
institutions’ and a ‘site of struggle’ both representing and reconstructing gender 
relations” (MacDowell Santos 2004).  Htun (2003) MacDowell (2005) and Molyneux 
(2000) have contributed to theorizing this new way of analyzing the State.  
Connell (1990) presents a slightly different perspective.  Rather than considering 
that the State is essentially patriarchal, she claims that the State is historically 
patriarchal, and that breaks away from the dominant patriarchy occur in certain contexts 
in which the State’s legitimacy is weaker, and/or the openness of the government is 
greater.    
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Is the State patriarchal?  Yes, beyond any argument, on the evidence discussed 
above. It is not ‘essentially patriarchal’ or ‘male’; even if one could speak of the 
‘essence’ of a social institution, this would exaggerate the internal coherence of 
the state. Rather the State is historically patriarchal, patriarchal as a matter of 
concrete social practices.  State structures (…) are effectively controlled by men; 
and they operate with a massive bias toward heterosexual men’s interests. 
At the same time the pattern of state patriarchy changes. In terms of the depth of 
oppression and the historical possibilities of resistance and transformation, a 
fascist regime is crucially different from a liberal one, and a liberal one from a 
revolutionary one. The most favorable historical circumstance for progressive 
sexual politics seems to be the early days of social-revolutionary regimes, but the 
later bureaucratization of these regimes is devastating. Next best is a liberal State 
with a reformist government; though reforms introduced under its aegis are 
vulnerable in periods of reaction.   
 
Connell (1990) argues further that gender struggles inside and outside the State 
might change both the gender order within the State institutions and the State’s regulation 
of gender issues.  For example it is well documented that the reluctance of police bodies 
to intervene in cases of domestic violence arises from a unwillingness to intervene in the 
private sphere, with domestic violence being seen as a private matter.  It was not until the 
issue reached public scandal dimensions due to the occurrence of an special event when 
the State intervened because its legitimacy was in jeopardy.  For example, in the case of 
Mexico, this occurred when nineteen women were raped by members of the Federal 
District Attorney’s Office.  In Spain, the State enacted legislation about gender violence 
(violencia machista) after a woman was killed by her husband after publicly having 
requested protection measures to the State in several TV shows.  
One of the most important theoretical contributions of Connell’s (1990) is to 
explain why a historically patriarchal and oppressing State might become increasingly 
enabling for women by adducing the notion of legitimacy.  While we may construe the 
State as a mutable institution in constant change, in order for the State to sustain itself 
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while reserving to itself the use of force, it must count on its citizens to regard it as 
legitimate.  The State can be both a repressive and an enabling state, but, Connell claims, 
there is a tie between women’s gains, the State’s need of legitimacy, and in the way in 
which demands to the State are presented.  For example, when the liberal-democratic 
State presents itself as allegedly gender neutral, it makes itself vulnerable to demands 
phrased within the liberal discourse (Connell 1990; Franzway, Court, and Connell 1989).  
When the demands are framed within the feminist framework, State concessions might 
serve a double purpose: control the feminist movement and to obtain legitimacy from 
groups traditionally critical of the State.  In sum, the State is contradictory and complex, 
because its relationship with society is a two way relationship: the State is constructed by 
gender relations and constructs gender relations.  As I have mentioned above, the 
relationship between the State and the society, nevertheless, is mediated by social 
movements (Charles 2000).  The relationship between social/feminist movements and the 
State is examined next.  
 
4.2-  FROM THE POST-SUFFRAGIST “FEMINIST MOVEMENT” TO 
“FEMINIST NGO’S”: SPECIALIZATION AND CHANGE IN THE MOVEMENT 
In Mexico, there is no material difference between the feminist movement and the 
women’s movement.  “In Mexico the term women’s movement refers not only to the 
feminist movement but also to all women’s organizations that share the perspective that 
gender is an issue of political and social concern” (Lamas, Martínez, Tarrés, and Tuñón 
1995:328).  The membership of the Mexican women’s movement is composed of four 
groups: middle-class feminists (both from inside and outside formal political parties), 
industrial workers and other employees, peasant women, and women from poor urban 
sectors.  In this section I will examine the relationship between the women’s movement 
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and the response of the State to women’s demands over the course of the evolution of the 
feminist movement in Mexico.  I will show how this evolution has been shaped by 
endogenous factors, the socioeconomic and political Mexican context, and the exogenous 
factor of the international context within which Mexico finds itself.  We will begin by 
looking at the purely endogenous history of the relationship between the women’s 
movement and the Mexican State. Through this section I will provide specific examples 
about this relationship based on the issue of violence against women.  
 
4.2.a-  Women’s Movements:  Theory and Relationship with the State 
As I have mentioned before, the strength of social movements in general, and in 
this case, the women’s movement, play a key role in determining whether or not the State 
is representative or non-representative in its nature.  Cross-national research demonstrates 
that strong, independently, organized women’s movements improve the State’s 
responsiveness to violence against women (Weldon 2002).  At the broadest, social 
movements are a form of “sustained claims-making interaction among power holders, 
participants, subject population – plus any other parties that involves themselves in the 
interaction” (Tilly 1999:258), all of which require a social and political segmentation that 
arose with modern society.  Defining what constitutes a women’s movement is complex 
and there are many controversies among scholars, perhaps as a result of the heterogeneity 
of social movements across regions (Molyneux 1998).  Molyneux (1998) argues for using 
the term movement for something that involves more in size and effectivity than small 
scale organizations, specially if these are few in number and have little impact.  However, 
she contends that a large number of small associations, even with diverse agendas, can in 
cumulative terms, come to constitute a women’s movement.  This is the case of Mexico, 
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where a large number of associations devoted to women’s issues have flourished in the 
last decade.  
According to Molyneux’s definition, a women’s movement does not necessarily 
require a single organizational expression, spatial location or an exclusively female 
membership.  In some cases, for example, the antifeminist campaign against women 
suffrage in the U.S., a women’s organization can position itself against the women’s 
movement, which should warn us against merging all women’s organizations with 
feminist’s movements (see Marshall 1985; 1997).  Nor is there a given threshold of size 
or organized structure that defines  women’s movements, given the heterogeneity of such 
across regions (Molyneux 1998).   
Cross-national research has concluded that it has been through the work 
concerning violence against women undertaken by the women’s movement, feminist 
organizations and related organizations, that violence against women has been recognized 
as a public problem, rather than as a private problem, a matter confined to the domestic 
space (Weldon 2002).  The activities of such organizations have been instrumental in 
putting the problem into the public agenda.  However, though women’s movements are 
necessary, they are not sufficient in themselves to evoke a government response.  Public 
opinion has to support the demands for the State response: “when public support for the 
cause they [women’s organizations] represent swells to such a great extent that policy 
makers must address their claims or risk loosing their political legitimacy” (Walker 1999, 
cited in Weldon 2002: 67).  Given this condition for efficiency, much depends on how 
the women’s movement is positioned –its degree of autonomy, its relationship to political 
parties or other significant opinion makers (business or the church, for example).  
Entanglements with political parties can complicate the extent to which the women’s 
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movement can introduce issues exclusively concerning with women, such as violence 
against women, on the public agenda.   
 
4.2.b-  The First Wave of Feminism in Mexico:  Militant Feminism 
The post-suffragist feminist movement in Mexico has evolved since the 1970s.  
The first stage of the movement, during the 1970s, was mainly identified with the left and 
centered in Mexico City.  The political opening created during President Echeverría 
regime (1970-1976) allowed the registration of opposition parties and allowed the 
emergence of new social movements, including women’s movements (Ramos Escandón 
1994).  This was a middle-class intellectual feminism of militant character, and directed 
its energies towards denouncing oppression.  One of the main characteristics of the 
feminist movement during this first period is its independence and autonomy from 
political parties and trade unions.  It was not a structured movement nor did it have a 
defined strategy, but rather, its actions were improvised and spontaneous (Bartra 1999).  
The feminist movement analyzed patriarchy and conducted activities of consciousness 
rising.  They organized their efforts around three main issues: voluntary maternity, sexual 
violence against women and freedom of sexual choice. 
One year prior the 1975 United Nations World Conference for the International 
Year of Women, held in Mexico, groups of women engaged in numerous activities in 
order to promote discussion of women’s issues in both the political and social spheres.  
During the UN conference, a group of women organized a parallel countercongress to 
that of the UN.  The main goal of the boycott was to attract international attention to the 
problems faced by women in Mexico and the indifference of the Mexican government 
(Rodríguez 2003).  Lamas et al. (1995) argue that the international attention generated by 
the conference induced women from the ruling party, PRI, to promote changes in 
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legislation that was discriminatory against women.  Some of these reforms included a 
constitutional reform granting gender equality, land property rights for women, and labor 
laws prohibiting discrimination against women.  The enactment of these reforms was 
more the result of international pressure rather than a real interest of the PRI dominated 
Mexican government.  Given Mexico’s weak judicial system, few of these laws were 
implemented.  After the UN Conference, the women’s movement increased its visibility 
by organizing demonstrations, creating feminist publications, presenting law proposals, 
making public declarations and organizing assemblies (for more details see Lamas, 
Martínez, Tarrés, and Tuñón 1995).  
During this period the Women’s Liberation Movement (Movimiento de 
Liberación de la Mujer, MLM) was created by a group of feminists that have been very 
active in different fronts of the fight for women’s rights in Mexico.  The MLM, while not 
the only group created during the seventies, was perhaps  the most significant because it 
had more cohesion, a greater capacity to adapt to the political landscape, and a cadre of  
members with lengthy -thirty years or more) experience in diverse spheres (Bartra 1999).  
By this time, other feminist groups were forming outside Mexico City.  Given the 
centralization of the Mexican political system around the Federal District, this marked a 
huge step in the diffusion of feminism across the country.  
 
4.2.c-  Second Wave:  Micro-Institutionalization of the Women’s Movement 
The second phase of the feminist movement took place during the 1980s and their 
actions were developed on two fronts: through strategic collaboration with political 
parties on  women’s issues, and going to the popular classes to inculcate feminist 
consciousness, which also entailed understanding and expressing working class defined 
women’s issues.  In 1980, the Coalition of Feminist Women (Coalición de Mujeres 
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Feministas) and the National Front for Women’s Rights and Liberation (FNALIDM: 
Frente Nacional de Lucha por la Liberación y los Derechos de las Mujeres)8, presented a 
law proposal for voluntary maternity, which included legalizing abortion, and was 
sponsored by the Comunist Party in the Federal Congress.  This proposal, though, was 
never discussed in the legislature. Given the opposition that the proposal faced, political 
leaders left aside the issue of abortion and in collaboration with some feminists turned 
their attention to less controversial issues such as increasing penalties for rape and 
support actions to fight violence against women.  
During the 1980s, Mexico, as other Latin American countries, experienced a 
process of micro-institutionalization of the movement into NGOs and other civil society 
organizations (Alvarez 1998b).  Political and economic factors, coupled with the 
fragmentation of the feminist movement and previous failed attempts to create a common 
feminist front were the crucial pre-conditions for the emergence of women’s groups and 
NGOs during this second period.  Politically, the increasing opposition to the single party 
domination of the government, and the political reforms introduced during the 1980s led 
to a context in which preserving credibility meant the erosion of the relationship between 
progressive political organizations and State-interest groups, which in turn opened up a 
political space for the proliferation of NGOs. This, consequently, created a network of 
channels to voice women’s demands both outside and inside of the party system (Camp 
1999).   
The economic crisis of the 1980s and the 1985 earthquake contributed to the rise 
of popular women’s movements.  With the assistance of feminists who left Mexico City 
in the 1980s, a myriad of women’s groups formed in other parts of the country devoted to 
solve women’s needs, especially those of poor women, and channel women’s demands 
                                                 
8 The FNALIDM was formed in 1979. It was the first organization to unite feminist groups with labor 
unions, gay organizations and leftist political parties.  
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emerged.  This phenomenon has been labeled by many scholars as “the rise of popular 
feminism” (Bartra 1999; Lamas, Martínez, Tarrés, and Tuñón 1995; Rodríguez 2003).  
As breaking with the party structures and developing constituencies were intrinsic to the 
rise of popular feminism, so to was the resulting professionalization and specialization of 
significant sectors of the feminist movement (Alvarez 1998b).  Ideologically, “popular 
feminism took the feminist demands of the 1970s and combined them with the demands 
of low income women” (Lamas, Martínez, Tarrés, and Tuñón 1995:335).  This focus on 
unprivileged women was the result of the combination of the predominant middle class 
and intellectual social background of those integrating the feminist movement during the 
1970s and their leftist and radical leftist ideological orientations (Marxism, Socialism and 
Anarchism).  This combination generated a “social class guilt” that sought alleviation by 
working with women from the lowest socioeconomic strata (Bartra 1999). 
In line with the new popular emphasis, many feminist embarked upon new, 
practical forms of political activism, creating support groups and NGOs to provide 
counseling, assistance and services to the popular sectors (Lamas, Martínez, Tarrés, and 
Tuñón 1995; Lang 2003; Martínez and Incháustegui 1998; Tarrés 1998).  Thus, as the 
women’s movement went forward, it divided between two factions: those providing 
services to women and those more centered in ideological issues.  Bartra (1999) argues 
that this split in the movement could be seen in the tensions between these two groups in 
the IV Encuentro Feminista Latinoamericano (IV Latin American Feminist Meeting).  
Moreover, the change from an ideological feminism centering on denouncing women’s 
oppression as result of the patriarchal nature of the society to a feminism based on 
providing services to those oppressed was a fundamental factor in the freeze of new 
members to the movement.  Bartra (1999) argues that feminist movement’s lack of 
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radicalism and the new role as service providers caused the disenchantment of the new 
generations.  
The women’s movement emphasis on service activities among the popular classes 
resulted in the creation of NGOs.  These NGOs tended to be set up for explicitly stated 
pragmatic goals directed towards different areas of social oppression (Tarrés 1998).  Each 
feminist NGO acted as a link or mediator between women or women’s grassroots 
organizations, and the governmental or non-governmental agencies providing financial 
support  (Martínez and Incháustegui 1998).  The very creation of these women’s NGOs 
challenged the image of the Mexican Welfare State, pointing to holes in the social 
welfare net just as the State was challenged, politically, by other NGOs as perpetuating 
itself by fraudulent means that undermined democratic norms –especially after the 1988 
elections.  In this atmosphere, women’s NGO’s and other groups mobilized to defend 
their formal interests. NGOs have thus become “the institutionalized space from which 
women can voice their demands and needs as well as the forum from which they can 
propose public policies related to the interests of women from a gender perspective” 
(Tarrés 1998:134).   
In an attempt to address the issues raised by the popular feminist movement, 
traditional feminists created a series of nation-wide women’s networks (redes de 
coordinación) as was the case of the Network against Violence toward Women (Red en 
Contra de la Violencia hacia la Mujer).  The main objective of these networks was to 
promote awareness and coordinating individuals, public and private organizations 
working for the same causes.  The goals of the feminist movement were broaden and the 
movement adopted a policy oriented position based on action rather than denouncing 
women’s situation throughout Mexico (see Rodríguez 2003).  The distinction between 
female participation, feminism and women’s movements was not longer significant 
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because a variety of women’s demands were placed into a larger political agenda (Ramos 
Escandón 1994).  Perhaps that is the reason why some argue that the term women’s 
movement refers both to the feminist movement and all women’s organizations that 
support the idea that gender is an issue of social and political concern (Lamas et al. 
1995).  
 
4.2.d-  The 1990s: Increasing NGOization and Participation in Formal Politics 
During the 1990s the professionalization and NGOization of the women’s 
movement coexisted with their struggle to participate in electoral and formal politics.  
Both phenomenons are associated with the Beijing Conference.  Politically, it was in the 
context of the legitimacy crisis that facing the State, and especially the intensified 
contesting of the identity of the PRI with the nation, that President Salinas decided to 
alloy his package of neo-liberal economic reforms with the implementation of expanded 
social programs such as Solidaridad9.  Lamas et al. (1995) argue that the program, in its 
role as intermediary came into competition with local social organizations, NGOs, and 
other political groups.  Therefore, beyond its assistance goals, the program constituted 
also an effort to reassert control over these organizations.  These organizations had 
formed to work on the level of the popular classes in improving the lot of the 
economically unprivileged, including women.  Solidaridad, instituting government 
resources devoted to that cause, may have made some NGOs seem superfluous in their 
                                                 
9 The Programa Nacional de Solidaridad is part of the stabilization measures carried out during the 
presidency of Carlos Salinas de Gortari during 1988-1994.  The program started in 1989 and was one of the 
most important mechanisms of political and social reform during Salina’s presidency. Coupled with several 
neoliberal policies, Solidaridad targeted those segments of the population living in extreme poverty, who 
were the population most affected by the implementation of new neoliberal policies.  Solidaridad allowed 
implementing the neoliberal policies without destabilizing the poorest.  There are some who claim that 
Solidaridad was used to recruit new political leaders for the already-in-crisis PRI (Kaufman and Trejo 
1996).  
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goals.  Other groups took advantage of public resources, but had to strategize to keep 
from being perceived as dependent on or as fronts for the government.  
The 1995 Beijing Conference fostered three important changes in Latin American 
feminism according to Alvarez (1998b).  First, the Beijing process highlighted the 
proliferation of spaces and places in which feminist discourses could circulate.  Second, it 
resulted in a diffusion and absorption of feminist discourses and agendas by organizations 
of civil society, international organizations and the State.  Finally, it resulted in the 
professionalization of important sectors of the feminist movement.  In the case of 
Mexico, the Beijing process exacerbated the already existing tendency to 
professionalization in the women’s movement as feminist scholars and NGO 
professionals were incorporated in the government’s preparatory processes and 
participated as official delegates in the conference.  
The Beijing process influenced the Mexican women’s movement both by getting 
more women involved in women’s issues and by the agreements reached.  In Mexico, as 
in other Latin American countries, many of the feminists participating in the official 
Beijing preparatory process choose to work within formal State institutions such as 
government bureaucracies or parliaments.  As we will see next, this does not necessarily 
mean that they were co-opted, as Alvarez states, “the notion of absorption –as opposed to 
co-optation– implies agency” (Alvarez 1998b:305).  
Many femocrats10 (feminist technocrats) consider that the State and international 
organizations are crucial arenas for feminist struggle.  In addition, the creation of 
governmental agencies specializing in women’s issues opened new spaces for feminist 
participation in State policy making because of the State’s need of experts in women’s 
issues.  On the other hand, critics regard feminists who have entered the State as 
                                                 
10 The term femocrats, explains Alvarez (1998: 306) is coined by Australian feminists and refers to 
“feminists from the movements who have entered the state or the development establishment”. 
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constituting a new gender technocracy that has bartered core foundational feminist 
principles for political power.  Given the political crisis in Mexico in the 90s, if one 
cooperated with the PRI on any level or at any position it could be seen as taking a stand 
with an entrenched establishment.   
In terms of the agreements reached in 1995, one concrete outcome for Mexican 
women after Beijing was their formal engagement in networks advocating for increasing 
women’s representation in electoral politics and the adoption of a quota system 
(Rodríguez 2003).  In a context of increasing political competition, and openness of the 
political system, this stage of the women’s movement was characterized by an interest in 
formal political participation.  Feminists turned to ensuring a greater proportion of 
women got into decision-making positions and the higher ranks of political parties.  The 
goal was to develop connections between the feminist movement and female politicians 
as a transitional stage towards a building a political majority that would enact structural 
transformations (Martínez and Incháustegui 1998).   
There were problems with this strategy. First, the election of more women to 
positions of political power is evidently dependent on the electoral context.  Moreover, 
the election of more women to public office has not automatically translated into better 
legislation and policies protecting women’s rights in the past (Martínez and Incháustegui 
1998; Rodríguez 2003).  In Mexico, the access of more women to the legislative power 
has not always meant that they have formed a cohesive block for protecting women’s 
rights.  The real influence of the women’s movement has derived indirectly through 
networks of personal connections, which can often be instrumental for achieving specific 
goals, especially in a political system rife with clientelism.  Thus, women’s alliances 
within the structure of the State and political parties have largely been formed around 
gender specific issues, influenced both by the party positions of the participants and by 
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their personal ideologies (Rodríguez 2003).  On the other hand, political parties are aware 
of the value of obtaining votes, and as a political strategy in the nineties they developed 
specific campaigns for targeting women.  Still, ulterior agendas, especially the struggle 
for power within the State and the embracement of women’s issues, make many women 
and feminists within political parties suspect that the women’s rights agendas issued by 
the political parties are not to be taken seriously (Lamas, Martínez, Tarrés, and Tuñón 
1995).  In this situation, the nineties saw the establishment of alliances between veteran 
Mexican women activists with women from NGOs and women’s organizations in order 
to advance women’s agenda.  
The NGOization of the women’s movement and the increasing interest in formal 
politics resulted in the formation of small elite of females with a great deal of symbolic 
capital. Collectively, they chose to promote changes in women’s lives through the 
established political channels.  To mention a few of the better known names:  Patricia 
Mercado and Cecilia Loría, prominent NGO leaders and active members of leftist 
political parties, were on the short list of three as potential candidates to the National 
Women’s Institute presidency in 2001 (Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres, INMUJERES); 
Patricia Olamendi, founding member of the Grupo Plural Pro-Victimas became General 
Director for Attention to Victims in the Federal District, an agency attached to the 
Attorney General’s Office;  Patricia Duarte, founding member of COVAC (Asociación 
Mexicana Contra la Violencia hacia las Mujeres, Collective for Struggle against 
Violence Toward Women) and member of the Grupo Plural Pro-Victimas, was a PRD 
candidate to succeed Patricia Espinosa as the president of the INMUJERES in 2006.  
Feminists and feminists NGOs have been able to influence public policy through 
consulting and advising government institutions from time to time (Martínez and 
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Incháustegui 1998), but this influence has been limited and dependent on the elected 
official, the party in government and the political climate.  
During this last period a new type of feminism was developed, professional 
feminism, women who work for feminism and live from feminism (mujeres que trabajan 
para el feminismo y viven de el) (Bartra 1999).  The emergence of this professional type 
owes much to an array of new pressures on the Mexican State from the international 
context of changes related to gender (policy programs promulgated by international aid 
agencies, for instance) and the corresponding internal development of public policies 
targeting women.  This elite is often regarded as “the feminist voice” by the State and 
mass-media.  This newly created professional elite sharply contrasts with the fate of more 
ideologically driven feminists, who have gradually been ostracized by media and State 
power because they are seen as radicals.  A young feminist very active in the defense of 
women’s right of having a life free of violence told me, when I asked her about the 
situation of the feminist movement 
The situation of the big feminists [well-known, publicly recognized] brings me 
sadness.  They are worn out; they do not have social nor economic resources.  
Their fight is and was very aggressive. If they had not been so radical, they would 
have not been left aside.  We need to find the way to incorporate them in the new 
movements.N4.1 
 
4.3- ABSORPTION, INCORPORATION, AND COOPTATION OF THE 
WOMEN’S MOVEMENT BY THE MEXICAN STATE 
Until the elections of 2000 in which Vicente Fox (PAN) was elected President of 
Mexico, the PRI was in control of the State during seven decades, the ‘perfect 
dictatorship’, as Mario Vargas Llosa put it.  Political alternation had already occurred at 
the state and local levels (see Rodríguez and Ward 1995).  The Mexican State has 
commonly been characterized as a corporatist system in which cooptation is a regular 
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method for defusing contention.  Under corporatism, major groups are recognized by the 
State, have institutionalized access to policy-making and receive financial support from 
the State.  In Mexico, the PRI/State on the federal level and the state governments on the 
regional monitored and channeled the demands of the most influential groups.  The fact 
that women’s groups were not very well organized, and the lack of a real political 
opposition, conditioned indeed the political options available to women’s organizations 
(Camp 1999; Jaquette 1994).   
In modern democracies, government often controls social movements through 
cooptation or absorption.  This can take the form of providing funds to potentially 
problematic groups, and hiring activist leaders or appointing them to boards.  It can also 
take the form of ‘symbolic reassurance’: governments set up special hearings, 
commissions, or agencies to address a particular concern or grievance. Alvarez (1998b) 
distinguishes between cooptation and absorption on the basis that the later is associated 
with a push from the agency of the targeted group, whereas  cooptation operates from the 
top down as the process of neutralizing a minority by assimilating them into the 
established group.   
Camp (1999) defines cooptation as the process by which the government 
successfully incorporates individual person or group into its ranks.  In Mexico, as in 
many other Latin American countries, social peace has long been kept by the cooptation 
tradition, as those  groups or social movements contesting the State are co-opted so as to 
inhibit them from engaging in oppositional political activities (Borda 1990; Craske 
1998b).  As Camp (1999:153) argues, “few people can resist the attraction of political 
power or money, and the government often rewards cooperation with prestigious posts. 
Some persons accept posts for financial reasons, others because of the possibility of 
working within rather than outside the system. ”   
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Throughout the history of the women’s movement and women’s NGOs the 
question of autonomy has proved to be divisive.  While some organizations support the 
participation of their members in the formal structure of the State (politicas), others 
oppose it (autónomas) as the first step towards subordination.  Members of the women’s 
movements during the 1970s opted for double participation in both party politics and in 
social movements.  At that time, the emergence of social movements was paralleled to 
the pressure shown by political parties and government officials to incorporate feminist 
concerns into their programs (Ramos Escandón 1994).  The women’s movement was 
aware that all branches of the State were very bureaucratic and that the state had a history 
of co-opting dissident voices.  As a consequence of striving for autonomy, the very 
emergence of women’s movements, especially those groups that refused to have a 
collaborative relation with the State, represented a challenge to a political system in 
which opposition was channeled through the State structures and the dominant political 
party (Ramos Escandón 1994).   
From the eighties until now, a part of the feminist movement and women’s 
NGOs, mostly the liberal feminists, believe that collaboration with the State is a channel 
for advancing women’s rights.  In Mexico, a number of key feminists choose to work 
within the formal structures of the State (legislators, government officials and women 
from political parties) to advance women’s agenda (Bourque 1989; Lamas 1998).  Two 
examples in the area of violence against women illustrate this.  First, the participation of 
well known feminists in the approval of new  legislation concerning victims of sexual 
crimes and reform to such law in the early 1990s (Lamas 1998).  And second, the 
feminist group Movimiento Nacional de Mujeres (National Women’s Movement, MNM) 
during the early 1980s promoted the creation of public agencies specializing in sexual 
crimes because they believed that it was the State’s task to provide attention to victims of 
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rape.  As we will see in the next section, the collaboration with the State of some 
feminists was sharply criticized by other feminists.  It is easy to see why, in the seventies, 
the feminist movement began with a generally fierce opposition to any cooperation with 
the State, given the lack of democratization, clientelism and corruption (Lamas et al. 
1995; Molyneux and Lazar 2003).  However, as the political openness and the process of 
democratization advanced, and international agencies added their pressures on certain 
gender issues, the situation “made [women’s organizations] working with the State both 
more possible and more necessary”.  In addition, many always subscribed to the idea of 
double participation arguing that “the [feminist] battle must take place both, outside and 
within the system”. N4.2 
The Mexican State comes into contact with women’s groups and NGOs for its 
own interest at least in two different ways: to provide an intermediary for the provision of 
services seen as responsibility of the State; and to give policies concerning women’s 
issues the patina of legitimacy.  The State is also intermittently using NGOs to obtain 
legitimacy for the approval of public policies or legislation.  In Mexico, even when 
feminist NGOs explicitly deny that they represent the women’s movement, they are too 
often conveniently viewed as doing so by elected officials and policymakers.  They can 
thereby claim to have ‘consulted civil society’ by virtue of involving a handful of NGOs 
in a particular policy discussion (Alvarez 1998a).  Jacquette (1994) claims that the 
Mexican State has tried to incorporate women’s groups and NGOs in their activities, very 
often using them as delivery tool, both of their own programs and of state public policies 
fostered by the state.  She considers, therefore, that “the State is exploiting women’s 
autonomy by letting women’s self-help voluntarism replace the State obligations” 
(1994:233). In fact, some NGOs in Mexico seem to be providing public services that 
formerly were (and still ought to be) the purview of the State.  Other researchers would 
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describe the new role of NGOs as being “agents of welfare provision” on behalf of the 
state (Craske 1998b).  In sum, as Alvarez (1998b) argues, feminists NGOs often became 
an efficient mechanism for the implementation of public policies from different levels of 
government.   
This new role of NGOs as pseudo-State agencies is generating the creation of a 
new generation of NGOs that have routinized obtaining resources from the State for the 
survival of its own members.  In those cases NGOs become a sort of business in which 
the State is their client.  Traditional NGOs view these new NGOs with suspicion.  They 
criticize them by saying “they just pretend that are doing something but they are not”, 
“their goal is not to provide services or help people, their objective is to obtain State 
resources for the profit of their members”, “women [from the women’s movement and 
women’s NGOs] realized that having an NGO is a business, therefore in certain states, 
almost all the women that constitute the women’s movement have their own NGO; they 
invite their fellows to become members; that’s the way in which they maximize the 
amount of resources that they receive from the State”.   
The explanation that Juan Manuel Contreras, a scholar with expertise in violence 
against women gave me when I asked him about the role of women’s NGOs and the 
women’s movement provides a precise account of the complex relationship between 
them and the State.  
The role of the NGOs and the women’s movement was key. They were 
responsible for giving visibility to the problem of violence against women.  NGOs 
continue being important, but as is the case in politics, there are some people from 
NGOs that think that the issue [domestic violence] is in fashion, and they want to 
carry that flag [start working about that issue because there are some resources] 
because that will allow them to move forward. (…)  
But I think that currently the State has more influence over the problem than 
NGOs.  NGOs must continue their fight.  However, their role is not as important 
as it was before because they complain about their lack of resources and the 
limitations of their actions.  Violence against women is already a public problem, 
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but it is important that NGOs continue putting pressure to the State. (…)  At the 
beginning the NGOs demanded State actions; now the NGOs are used by the 
State. The State is not acting any more.  There is a double dynamic: the State is 
leaving at the hands of NGOs the responsibilities that it is supposed to assume, 
and some of these NGOs become NGOs and work in the issue of partner violence 
because they get [economic] resources. N4.3  
 
Besides the purposive use of feminist and women’s NGOs by the State, the 
Beijing conference opened new State sponsored niches for experts in women’s issues.  
These experts were naturally found both in academia and in feminist NGOs.  The 
creation of governmental agencies specializing in women’s issues increased the 
professionalization of NGOs and feminists.  According to Alvarez, the situation in Chile, 
Brazil, Venezuela and Ecuador was such that women’s agencies “were typically 
understaffed, underfunded, and often far removed from the centers of power within the 
state, [so] they increasingly delegated or subcontracted data gathering, policy assessment 
(and increasingly, implementation), and other forms of ‘project management’ to feminist 
NGOs” (Alvarez 1998b).  In the case of Mexico this need multiplied as different levels of 
government (state and local) created their own women’s agencies.   
 
The INMUJERES:  The National Women’s Institute (Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres) 
The creation of the INMUJERES was the result of the strong pressure exerted by 
various groups of women and the feminist movement to the Mexican executive power 
(see Rodriguez 2003:134).  The INMUJERES is a federal decentralized agency 
(organismo autónomo descentralizado), created on January 12, 2001, and inaugurated by 
President Vicente Fox on March 8, the International Day of Women.  The INMUJERES 
was created to replace the National Women’s Council (Consejo Nacional de la Mujer), 
which had its origins in the Women’s National Program (Programa Nacional de la 
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Mujer: PRONAM).  The objective of the INMUJERES is the promotion of a new culture 
based on the equality between genders, and it is mandated to pursue gender equality and 
fight discrimination.  In November 2001, the Institute presented the program 
PROEQUIDAD (National Program of Equal Opportunities and Non Discrimination 
Against Women, Programa Nacional de Igualdad de Oportunidades y no Discriminación 
contra las Mujeres).  This program was the offspring of a consensus reached by the 
government, civil society organizations and academic institutions, and establishes the 
guidelines to be followed by the federal government in gender issues.  One of the main 
objectives of PROEQUIDAD is to prevent, penalize and eradicate violence against 
women.  
One controversy around the decree that created the INMUJERES concerned the 
election of the president of the institute. The law by which the INMUJERES was created 
states that the president of Mexico has to select the president of the INMUJERES from a 
shortlist of three candidates put forward by the INMUJERES board of directors.  If they 
cannot reach a consensus, the shortlist needs to have at least the support of three fifths of 
the board of directors (Ley del Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres, Art. 17).  At the time, 
President Fox had to choose from one of the three candidates proposed by the groups that 
promoted the creation of the Institute: Cecilia Loría, Patricia Duarte and Patricia 
Espinosa.  Loria and Duarte are two very well know Mexican feminists.  The selection of 
any of them would be interpreted by the broader women’s movement “as a real 
commitment on Fox’s part to the advancement of women’s of women’s and gender 
issues” (Rodríguez 2003:314).  Patricia Espinosa had been federal deputy and head of the 
PAN’s women’s sector, and her nomination as president of the INMUJERES would have 
pleased the PAN structure.  Both Mercado and Loria had declared their support for 
reproductive freedom and decriminalization of abortion.  In contrast Espinosa, loyal to 
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the PAN principles, was a defender of pro-life options.  “Fox was in a bind: on the one 
hand, he was faced with partisan and conservative pressures [for appointing Espinosa]; 
on the other, his commitment to women’s advancement was on the line.  He appointed 
Espinosa” (Rodríguez 2003:315).  The creation of the INMUJERES is the result of the 
collaborative effort of the women’s movement, exerting pressure on the Mexican 
government, but as Fox’s choice reveals, that pressure has definite limits. 
 
4.4-  FEMINIST AND WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS FIGHTS FOR GRANTING 
WOMEN A LIFE FREE OF VIOLENCE:  FROM RAPE TO PARTNER 
VIOLENCE 
The women’s movement struggle against violence against women has been 
pursued on two fronts: through direct NGO facilitated assistance, and within the 
bureaucratic structures of the State.  Ideologically, the feminist discourse against gender 
violence was originated in small female awareness raising groups.  In the first stage, the 
issue of rape, or sexual violence, defined the struggle against violence against women. 
The Mexican feminist movement lagged behind in directing attention to domestic 
violence, which gradually appeared on the feminist agenda due to grassroots movement.  
However, for a long time domestic violence did not receive the same amount of attention 
in terms of analysis and specific actions as rape (Bedregal, Saucedo, and Ríquer 1994).  
Violence against women is one of the last issues that brought women’s groups together.  
Since then, the situation has changed and the women’s movement has lost its momentum.  
Since then, the Mexican feminist movement is largely fragmented since feminists have 
not been able to overcome their political, ethnic, class and age differences (Lamas 1998).   
The issue of violence against women has been taken up by many different 
organizations, as we shall see, and has produced many different organizational 
trajectories over the course of the last four decades, from the very beginning of the 
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modern women’s movement in Mexico. One cannot impose one unilateral narrative over 
this history – although there are certain historic threshold points, such as the UN meeting 
in Mexico in 1975, and the Beijing summit of 1995, that changed the landscape in which 
the work against domestic violence against women took shape.  NGOs, feminist 
organizations, and the government both at the state level and the level of the federall 
government did not pursue anything like one collaborative agenda.  To make sense of this 
history, one must follow a myriad of different trajectories having different effects and 
receptions in different localities and regions.  Next, I present some examples. 
 
4.4.a-  The rise of NGOs that provide services to victims of violence 
Since the 1970s, NGOs have been crucial in drawing public attention to the 
problem of violence against women. (Borjón López-Coterilla 2000).  NGOs have played 
a clearly important role in providing services to victims and conducting research on 
partner violence.  Before the government started providing services to victims of partner 
violence, NGOs already offered them.  Nor do all the newly created NGOs providing 
services to victims of partner violence embrace a feminist ideology or label themselves as 
feminist organizations.  They are animated by a variety of ideological, religious and 
humanitarian beliefs.  Eli Bartra (1992) argues that NGO-provided services are mostly 
sporadic, and not of long duration.  This statement is in accordance with Juan Manuel 
Contreras argument regarding the entrepreneurial nature of NGOs, in that some provide 
services to victims as a revenue making activity.  
CAMVAC (Centro de Apoyo a Mujeres Violadas, Center to Support Raped 
Women) was the first NGO with the specific goal of dealing with the issue of violence 
against women.  Created in 1979, it brought together women with experience in 
psychology, medicine, academia and politics, creating an organization on the US and 
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European model (Duarte and González 1994).  CAMVAC both offered services to the 
victims of rape and conducted campaigns for raising awareness about rape in society.  In 
1984, CAM (Women Support Center: Centro de Apoyo a la Mujer) was founded in the 
state of Colima11, while Patricia Duarte in the Federal District founded the Mexican 
Association of Violence against Women (COVAC: Asociación Mexicana Contra la 
Violencia hacia las Mujeres).  These organizations had multiple objectives that ranged 
from direct assistance to female victims of violence to training, research and promotion 
of public awareness. 
Almost nineteen percent of those NGOs dealing chiefly with ‘women’s issues’ are 
taken up with the issue of violence against women.  As shown in Table 4.1, in the states 
with a higher percentage of NGOs devoted to violence against women range from 37.9 in 
Chihuahua, 33.3% in the State of Mexico and in Quintana Roo.  The Federal District is 
the state with both the highest number of women’s issues NGOs and NGOs dealing with 
violence against women.  The percentage of these (18.3%), however, is very similar to 
the national average, 18.7%.  According to the data provided by the INMUJERES, there 
are four states that do not have any NGO working in the area of violence against women: 
Baja California Sur, Durango, Nayarit and Tabasco.   
Initially, sexual violence – rape – was the priority goal for NGOs dealing with 
violence against women, but domestic violence was soon put on the agenda as attempts to 
promote sexual and reproductive health and other programs related to citizenship, 
development, and participation frequently encountered the effects of family violence.  
APIS (Acción Popular Integral Social) or Diarq Foundation, are two examples that 
                                                 
11 The origins of the CAM are found in the Colectivo Feminista Coatlicue de Colima. This feminist group 
was created in 1980 to deal with the issue of sexual violence, but in the passage of time it also began 
covering domestic violence. In 1982, the CAM proposed creating women’s shelters.  Griselda Alvarez, 
governor of Colima and the first female elected governor in Mexico, backed the project and disbursed 
funds to this center from the State Procuraduría.  
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State Human Rights 
Social 
Assistance Violence Health 
Family 
Promotion Other TOTAL
%  NGOs 
Violence 
Aguascalientes 1 2 2 1  1 7 28.6 
Baja California 1 15 11 7 4 8 46 23.9 
Baja California Sur    4  3 7 0.0 
Campeche 1  1    2 50.0 
Coahuila 3 11 6 4 3 19 46 13.0 
Colima  2 3   3 8 37.5 
Chiapas  5 2 8  6 21 9.5 
Chihuahua 2 4 11 3 2 7 29 37.9 
Distrito Federal 16 39 40 43 4 77 219 18.3 
Durango 1 1    1 3 0.0 
Guanajuato  6 4 6  6 22 18.2 
Guerrero  5 1 1  3 10 10.0 
Hidalgo   1 1  2 4 25.0 
Jalisco  6 2 3 1 12 24 8.3 
México 1 2 8 2  11 24 33.3 
Michoacán  1 3 3 1  5 13 23.1 
Morelos  3 3 2  6 14 21.4 
Nayarit  2  2  1 5 0.0 
Nuevo León  7 5 7  4 23 21.7 
Oaxaca 2 5 3 4  18 32 9.4 
Puebla 2 12 5 6 1 15 41 12.2 
Querétaro  1 2 2 1 1 9 16 12.5 
Quintana Roo 1 1 9 7 1 8 27 33.3 
San Luis Potosí  3 4 3 1 7 18 22.2 
Sinaloa   2 2   4 50.0 
Sonora  1 4 3 1 8 17 23.5 
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Table 4.1 Continued 
 
 
illustrate the extension (APIS) or the change in the organizational goals (Diarq 
Foundation) to include the issue of violence against women.  
APIS is an NGO based in the Federal District that works defending women’s 
rights.  Norma Banda Bustamante, coordinator of APIS, told me that APIS’ first goal was 
to promote women and children’s health both in rural and urban communities.  Members 
of the organization soon realized that it was hard to get women to attend the meetings, 
especially the second round of meetings.  The (few) women that attended often 
mentioned that their neighbors and friends missed the second meeting because their 
partner or husband had not allowed them to go.  Other women had visible signs of 
violence, and mentioned that their partners reacted with violence because of their 
attendance to the APIS meeting.  This input made the organization re-address its goals 




Promotion Other TOTAL 
%  NGOs 
Violence 
Tabasco 3 1     4 0.0 
Tamaulipas   1 1 1  3 33.3 
Tlaxcala 1 1 1 1 1 5 10 10.0 
Veracruz  1 5 3 6  12 27 11.1 
Yucatán 1 1 3 7  14 26 11.5 
Zacatecas 1  2 1  5 9 22.2 
         
TOTAL 40 145 142 137 21 276 761 18.7 
% of Total 5.26 19.05 18.66 18.00 2.76 36.27   
Source: Author’s classification based on information from INMUJERES (2006), Directorio Nacional de Organizaciones de la Sociedad 
Civil con Acciones hacia las Mujeres. Mexico: INMUJERES. 
Notes:  Most of the Organizations of the Civil Society had multiple organizational objectives. In those cases in which the organization had 
multiple objectives, if family violence or violence against women were among them, it was classified as such.  Human Rights organizations 
are those whose goal is to promote the defense and extension of human rights.  Under the label Social Assistance are classified those 
organizations that provide direct assistance to unprivileged people.  Violence organizations provide a variety of services to female victims of 
violence either perpetrated by strangers, acquaintances or family members.  Some of those NGOs provide also community education in the 
issue of violence against women, and promote actions.  Family Promotion NGOs are those who have among its objectives the promotion of 
nuclear family and the women’s position within the family. Finally under the label Other there are a diverse group of organizations which 
objectives are related to employment, occupation, education, promotion of the well-being of minorities and indigenous groups, among 
others.  In the event that the description of the organizational goals was not stated in the document, I performed an internet search in order to 
find them out.  In case that no information was available I classified those NGOs as Other.  
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and allot more time and resources to preventing violence and helping the victims of 
violence. In Norma Banda’s words  
One of the goals of APIS is to promote the participation of women, and we 
realized that women cannot participate in our activities if they are afraid of what 
their partner/husband will do to them.  N4.4  
 
Similarly, Diarq Foundation in Mexico City also changed its original goals to 
provide assistance and shelter to victims of partner violence. Diarq is a company that 
designs interiors and high-end furniture. It endows a private college, Centro, which offers 
studies in furniture design and interior design.  In 1997, Diarq founded a Foundation that 
assisted people with HIV.  Their experience showed them that a high percentage of the 
people using their services were women who were infected with HIV as a result of sexual 
abuse by their partner/husband.  This situation caused the Foundation to direct its efforts 
towards helping women who had experienced violence. Financed by several public 
institutions, such as INDESOL (National Institute for Social Development, Instituto 
Nacional de Desarrollo Social) and INMUJERES, company sponsors and private 
contributions, they created the third shelter for battered women in Mexico City in 
November 30, 2004.  
Other NGOs, most of which were influenced by the feminist struggle, were 
created as a result of the concern of their members with the problem of partner violence.  
However, not all of them would label their organization as feminist.  This second wave of 
NGOs was created from scratch with the sole objective of fighting from different fronts 
against violence perpetrated toward women.  These organizations were funded at the 
beginning with the resources of their founding members and they had a rather limited 
experience in the issue. A member of the Board of Directors of Casa de Apoyo a la 
Mujer, an organization that provides shelter to victims of partner violence, psychological 
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and legal services, as well as community training on the issue of domestic violence in 
León, Guanajuato, explained the process of creation of Casa de Apoyo as follows:   
We are about to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the creation of Casa de 
Apoyo a la Mujer.  After Beijing, we [eight women] got together because we were 
very concerned about women experiencing violence.  At the beginning we did not 
know how to do things, everything was home-made.  We even gave our own 
money to Casa de Apoyo.N4.5 
  
Similarly, Margarita Guillé Tamayo, President of the Network of Domestic 
Violence Shelters, and founder in 1996 of the first shelter for victims of domestic 
violence in of Mexico, recounted the process by which Mujer Contemporanea 
(Contemporary Women), an NGO that provides assistance to victims of family violence 
was created, 
When I was still a Communication student, I produced two radio programs [´Más 
Femenino´, and ´Ángulos: Proyección Femenina´].  It was very surprising to hear 
the experiences of women that suffered violence.  They would call to the radio 
show to tell their story.  They were in deep need of somebody listening to them.  
Some friends from the university and I founded the Magazine Mujer 
Comtemporanea.  We thought that through words we could change everything; 
that the problem was in people’s minds.  Then, we met with Emilio Viano 12.  In 
Mexico we had heard very little about the issue of domestic violence. He [Emilio 
Viano] helped me to realize that abused women needed help, that they needed 
public institutions to help them overcome their problems.  
In 1995 Mujer Contemporanea decided to open a shelter for victims of partner 
violence in Aguascalientes. (…)  We started receiving women not knowing 
exactly what to do; our actions were not backed legally.  At that time, the family 
violence law was inexistent.  Nobody questioned the existence of a shelter, but we 
were sometimes concerned about being accused of kidnapping women. n4.6     
 
                                                 
12 Emilio Viano, Ph.D. is a pioneer in the field of victimology, violence against women and victims rights. 
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4.4.b-  Feminist Struggle against Partner Abuse in Collaboration with the State 
The National Women’s Movement (MNM: Movimiento Nacional de Mujeres) 
was founded in 1972 and became one of the first feminist groups to address the issue of 
family violence and sponsoring one of the first thorough analysis of the nature of 
discriminatory legislation in Mexico.  After it addressed the issue of abortion, domestic 
violence became the new priority goal of the MNM.  This group defined violence against 
women as consisting both of sexual abuse and partner violence.  After the UN 1975 
Conference held in Mexico, the MNM and other feminist groups promoted the creation of 
a new group, Coalición de Mujeres Feministas (Coalition of Feminist Women).  This was 
composed of already existing feminist groups and both abortion and violence against 
women became the main issues (see Bedregal, Saucedo, and Ríquer 1994).   
In 1978, the Coalition of Feminist Women presented a document to the Federal 
District Attorney General’s Office (Procuraduria) which included not only an analysis of 
the legislation regarding rape, but also proposals to reform the process in cases of rape 
followed by the Attorney General’s Office.  This proposal became the baseline for the 
development of future proposals.  This was a threshold point, after which the issue of 
violence against women became a public problem that concerned public opinion.  
In 1984, the proposal was taken up by well-known feminists in collaboration with 
NGOs providing services to victims of sexual crimes.  These groups worked on a project 
that proposed important legal changes, mostly related to increased penalties.  The 
Mexican Unified Socialist Party (PSUM: Partido Socialista Unificado de Mexico) 
brought this project to the Congress in 1984, but it received little support.  During Carlos 
Salinas de Gortari’s presidency, after many years of feminist alliance building with 
female representatives, civil society representatives, civil servants, journalists, senators, 
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and intellectuals, a package of legal reforms concerning sexual violence was finally 
approved.   
As I pointed out earlier, after the 1980s economic crisis the increasing 
specialization of the feminist movement had resulted in its NGOization and 
professionalization.  At that moment, the experience of the NGOs was key for the 
development of the first governmental services for women.  The government drew on the 
extensive experience of the NGOs, and a number of them were instrumental in the 
training the personnel of governmental agencies such as the AEDS or CAVI and 
members of the judiciary power (Duarte and González 1994).   
During the late 1990s, some women from the MNM participated in the project 
that created public agencies with the objective of providing services for victims of 
violence.  Later, they also participated in the administration of those agencies.  The 
collaboration of feminists with the State generated controversy within the movement.  
Four of the most well known  heads of the MNM (Marta De la Lama, Esperanza Brito 
and Anilú Elias, and Barbara Yllán) were accused by fellow radical feminists of 
“collaborationism” [with the State] (Bedregal, Saucedo, and Ríquer 1994; Lamas 1998).  
Two lines of tension explain this controversy: a dissimilar conceptualization of the nature 
of the State (repressive/controlling), and different understandings of the role of the 
feminist and women’s movement (service/ideological).  
Traditional feminists who believe that the State was controlling and repressive 
opposed the collaboration of feminists with the State.  For example, in the case of the 
collaboration of women from the MNM in the creation of agencies for victims of 
violence, feminists from other groups and some from the MNM harshly criticized those 
who believed that their cooperation with the State could advance women’s rights.  They 
were accused “colaboracionismo” and “priismo” (collaborationism and supporters of the 
 169
PRI) (Lamas 1994).  The following passage by Ximena Bedregal (in Bedregal, Saucedo, 
and Ríquer 1994:57) illustrates the nature of the conflict: 
(…) some of the feminist that developed the [1984 law] proposal collaborated in 
the first stages of it with PRI congresswomen, thus generating an indirect 
relationship of collaboration and dialogue which is never discussed within the 
[Feminist] Movement.  In other words, the Movement has developed some sort of 
indirect and shameful relationship with the official circles through an implicit 
authorization given to some of their autonomous members, as long and they did it 
extra-officially.N4.7   
 
This conflict within the feminist movement goes back to the different strands of 
feminism I discussed in the first section of this chapter.  Liberal feminism, with its more 
accommodating views of the State vs. socialist and radical feminism, with their view of 
the State as the embodiment of entrenched patriarchal privilege generating repressive 
class and gender relations. The channels of action present themselves differently to 
feminist from different approaches.  While liberal feminists have tended to become 
femocrats, radical feminists and Marxist feminists have opted for conducting their work 
in grassroots organizations and engaging with the State “on its own terrain” (Charles 
2000).  Molyneux and Lazar’s (2003:42) argument for explaining NGOs reluctance of 
collaborating with the State might also explain the criticisms of some feminists toward 
those collaborating with the State: “Past experience of living under harsh dictatorships 
has affected NGOs personnel views about the desirability of cooperating with the state”.  
Other women opposed the collaboration with the State because they believe that 
assistance to victims of violence should be provided by the State, and not by the feminist 
movement.  Bartra (1992) argues, “I believe, of course, that assistance should be 
provided by the state, and that feminism work should be a political one: the revolution of 
every day life. (…) The objective of feminism should be fighting for eradicating rapists, 
and not to give bandages (Band-Aids) to raped women.”  Bartra (1992) nevertheless 
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argues that the State has never shown a real interest in providing services to battered 
women, a claim buttressed by the fact that it was not until 1996 that the first private 
shelter in Mexico opened its doors in the small city of Aguascalientes (Guillé-Tamayo 
2002).  As of May 2004, the INMUJERES has recorded the existence of 32 shelters for 
domestic violence in Mexico.  While some states have more public funded or non-
governmental shelters, others lack any resources for women who are trying to escape the 
experience violence. 
 
4.5-  CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have presented the theoretical elements that frame the qualitative 
part of my research.  By examining the different feminist theories of the State, I have 
provided a framework that will be used in the next chapters for discussing which 
circumstances determine whether the State will be enabling or repressive toward 
women’s issues.  I have also reviewed the recent evolution of the feminist/women’s 
movement, its NGOization in Mexico, and its relationship with the State.   
I have shown how the Mexican State has moved within the binary of the 
controlling/enabling paradigm with regard to women’s security and civil rights due to the 
work of the women’s/feminist movement, which indeed in Mexico is the same thing 
(Lamas et al. 1995).  The Mexican feminist movement has influenced the State in 
different ways: ideologically, through creating public opinion, and through direct 
collaboration with the State.  The international pressure for gender equality and 
guaranteeing women a live free of violence made the State borrow from the feminist 
movement in different ways: incorporating feminists in the ranks of the State, using 
women’s organizations as a delivery tool, and using the extensive experience of feminist 
NGOs for developing public policies.   
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This chapter has also covered the historical evolution of the feminist movement 
along ideological and organizational lines.  The evolution has been from a purely 
ideological movement to a mix of ideology/advocacy and service provider.  I have shown 
how the feminist movement is divided between a liberal group, who support the 
collaboration with the State, and a socialist/radical group, who believe that in maintaining 
independence vis-a-vis the State; against this division there is another, organizational one 
between those who consider that feminist should take an ideological stand versus those 
who directly deliver services to women.  
In the next chapter, I will use the theoretical framework reviewed in this chapter 
to analyze the process through which legislation about partner violence was approved.  
The approval and enactment of such legislation is an attempt on behalf of the State to 
introduce changes in the social structure.  I will analyze how the women’s movements 
forced the State to take measures to deal with partner violence, and the circumstances 




CHAPTER 5:  FAMILY VIOLENCE LEGISLATION: APPROVAL 
AND DIFFUSION  
The approval of family violence legislation and the design of public policies 
constitute attempts by the State to promote changes in the social structure.  The in-depth 
examination of both State measures to combat violence against women and the analysis 
of the context in which these measures are designed, enacted and implemented are of 
great practical and theoretical relevance.  It will allow us to see what set of circumstances 
force the State to act as well as whether the State’s actions have resulted in improved 
protection of women’s rights by closely tracing the path that goes from inscribing 
measures in the legal code to enforcing them.  In other words, how have the context and 
various actors (all in their diverse fields and power relationships) influenced the State to 
act from within what we have previously labeled the repressive-enabling cleavage?  
Taking a post-structuralist approach, this chapter will demonstrate that the State is plural 
and that there is a myriad of actors participating, in often unforeseeable ways, in the 
definition and protection of women’s rights.  The socioeconomic, political and historic 
context is of central relevance for understanding how women’s rights are defined and 
what type of protection is granted. 
Violence against women occurs in many forms and includes a variety of actions 
and behaviors that range from violence perpetrated by strangers to physical and 
emotional abuse by acquaintances and family members.  Violence perpetrated by 
strangers has traditionally been criminalized, as in the case of forcible rape.  Public 
opinion has taken far longer to see domestic abuse as a criminal problem.  In a first phase 
of the program to reform laws about violence committed against women, both the 
feminist movement and federal and state legislatures in Mexico addressed violence 
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perpetrated by strangers.  Once that the issue of rape was already addressed in the law, 
attention began to turn to domestic violence.  In contrast to stranger violence and rape, 
historically the State has been more reluctant to intervene in what occurs in private and 
behind closed doors (Straus, Gelles, and Steinmetz 1980).  Since partner violence has 
been traditionally considered a private matter, it has proved to be more difficult to frame 
as a public policy problem, since it is both more widespread and arouses more resistance 
to its control by the State.  
In Mexico, family violence legislation emerged from and is located in three 
different venues that focus on different aspects of the problem of domestic violence, 
which are distributed among specific family violence legislation, the civil code, and the 
criminal code (see Table 5.1).  Family violence legislation consists of administrative law, 
meaning that it includes norms that regulate the actions of the executive branch of 
government in the prevention of violence and the assistance of victims.  According to 
Barbara Yllán and Marta de la Lama (2002), two advocates of the first family violence 
law in the Federal District, the problem of family violence cannot be solved through the 
civil and criminal codes.  It requires immediate and specific actions that could offer 
several solution alternatives.  For example, the administrative laws create a council 
responsible for coordinating and fostering anti-family violence prevention and assistance 
policies;  provide guidelines for the psychological attention; assign different 
responsibilities to public agencies, specifying the type of services each will provide; and 
foster coordination measures among agencies, and sanctions.  One of the most important 
aspects of the law is that those involved in a family conflict can settle their differences 
using two administrative processes: conciliation and settlement, or arbitration 
(conciliación y amigable composición o arbitraje).  
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Table 5.1:  Family Violence Regulations in the Law, and Civil and Criminal Codes 
The civil and criminal codes, by contrast, are general rules that define the 
principles by which family relations should be developed and that determine whether or 
not the violation of those regulations will result in a sanction.  Therefore, the civil and 
criminal codes should deal with the manifestations of domestic violence and provide 
avenues for the dissolution of marriage and/or deciding upon the custody of minors.  In 
contrast, the family violence laws provide additional regulations about family violence 
and establish the responsibility of the executive power and the principles that govern the 
public agencies with prevention and assistance responsibilities.  These three sets of laws 
 Family Violence Law Civil Code Criminal Code 
Objective Creation of institutions 
and rules for protecting 
the family circle from 
abuse or violence.  
Creates the norms and 
principles under which 
the State agencies will 
conduct their goal of 
protecting, and assisting 
victims of family 
violence, and creation of 
agencies in charge of 




life has to be 
developed 






courts can impose 
upon offenders when 
crimes associated 
with family violence 
are committed. The 
sanctions may range 
from the payment of 
fines, repairing the 




Executive Power Civil Judge Criminal judge 
Initiation of the procedure Recipient of the violence Recipient of the 
Violence 
Recipient of the 




Required for approval Majority of the State 
Congress 
Majority of the 
State Congress 




are often collectively known as La Ley de Violencia Intrafamiliar, or The Law Related to 
Domestic Violence, perhaps because in many states family violence law was 
accompanied by amendments to the criminal and civil codes. 
Administrative family violence laws contain several elements: 1) definition and 
conceptualization of the different forms of domestic violence; 2) models of psychological 
and legal attention for families that experience violence; 3) procedures for reconciliation 
for those cases in which the violence has not yet risen to the level of an offense; 4) 
prevention programs that include promotion of public awareness, assistance to victims 
and development of institutional strategies to control the phenomenon; 5) sanctions; and, 
6) the creation of an unified system of public information and education. 
Prior to the adoption of new family violence administrative laws, opinion was 
split concerning the necessity of new laws, with some maintaining that the existing civil 
and criminal codes could be reformed and updated.  The reformist group believed that the 
law had to remain general, and that the objective of protecting individuals against family 
violence could be accomplished by including amendments both in the criminal and civil 
and criminal codes, such as specifying family violence as a justification for divorce, the 
denial of the custody of children for the aggressor, and the categorization of family 
violence as a felony.  In contrast, others believed that the phenomenon of family violence 
must be contextualized in the basic gender inequality and patriarchy typical of Mexican 
society, thus arguing for a detailed law that would separately and specifically regulate the 
phenomenon of family violence.  For the advocates of this approach, specific family 
violence legislation must go beyond amendments in the civil and criminal code.  
This chapter has two theoretical pillars: the feminist theory of the State (reviewed 
in the previous chapter) and theories of legislative diffusion, which are reviewed in the 
first section of this chapter.  I begin with the observation that several collective and 
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individual actors took part in the development and enactment of family violence laws.  
These included international organizations, actors at the federal-level who addressed the 
issue of violence against women, the Mexican women’s movement, and finally, a myriad 
of actors at the state-level.  Actors’ positions must be understood in the context in which 
they operated.  Theories of legislative diffusion are useful in understanding the position 
and roles of the State.  This chapter has two goals: 1) to examine the rationale behind the 
approval of family violence legislation and adoption of public policies on different levels, 
and 2) to study the process by which the family violence laws were approved based on 
the actors’ positions and the roles they played.  In order to understand the positions and 
role of these actors, and especially that of the State, both theoretical perspectives are 
required.   
Using the post-structuralist approach that I outlined in the previous chapter, I shall 
analyze state level cases (the Federal District, Jalisco, Guanajuato and Morelos) to show 
that the State can be labeled as either a controlling or an enabling State, or a mixture of 
both.  In other words, the controlling or enabling tendency of the State determines 
whether the State takes a progressive or repressive stance regarding the advancement of 
women’s rights.  It is also clear that the analysis of the roles of the State and of social 
movements’ influence on the State must be understood in specific historical, social, and 
political contexts.  In this chapter I show that the State is plural and must be considered as 
a “a differentiated set of institutions, agencies and discourses” (Waylen 1998:7).  Post-
structuralism conceives the State as both an agent and an arena in which the battles for 
women’s rights take place.  Therefore, the State acts to construct gender relations and 
impacts differently on different groups of women (Waylen 1998).  In Mexico, the 
approval of family violence legislation has followed three different paths: a) collaborative 
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effort between the State and NGOs/women’s movement; b) up-down or reforms driven 
from above; and, c) bottom-up or reforms driven from below.   
Through the examination of these four case studies, I will show in concrete terms 
how the State functions both as an agent and as an arena in which the battles for granting 
rights to women take place.  The cases divide up generally as follows: in the Federal 
District, the women’s movement and the State collaborated on the law; in Jalisco, civil 
society groups made the major effort to lobby for family violence legislation; in both 
Guanajuato and Morelos, a diffusion process promoted from above drove the enactment 
of family violence legislation.  These are two excellent examples of legislative diffusion.  
The case of Guanajuato is of special interest because it shows how, in the course of five 
years, the State changed from being an enabling State to a controlling State.  Regardless 
of the path followed for the approval of the legislation, these four cases demonstrate that  
in those situations in which the State can be labeled as enabling, there has been a direct or 
indirect search for legitimacy either on the part of the legislative and/or executive branch.  
In the next section, I provide a theoretical framework to understand how the 
legislation about family violence was adopted in the states. This will allow us to 
understand the roles and degree of influence of different international, federal and state-
level actors in Mexico as they related in differentiated political fields.  The second 
section focuses on the position of international organizations regarding the issue of 
violence against women and reviews the conventions and treaties signed by the Mexican 
government.  The third section examines the positions of the Mexican federation, 
analyzing the actions undertook to grant rights to women and protect them from violence.  
In the fourth part, I examine in detail the four state cases.  The final part contains the 
conclusions and shows how the role of the State (controlling/enabling) interacts with both 
the national and international context.  Regardless of the path through which the family 
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violence legislation was approved, there is a tendency from the different levels of the 
Mexican State to use the issue of violence against women as a mechanism for increasing 
its own degree of legitimacy, either at the international or state level.  
 
5-1- PATHS TO THE ADOPTION OF FAMILY VIOLENCE LEGISLATION IN 
MEXICO 
The transnational diffusion of both legislation and public policies is common in 
the increasingly globalized world system.  As one country, or a State or province within a 
country, enacts a novel legislative reform, the regulatory innovations are often spread and 
picked up by similar levels of government in other provinces or nations through a process 
of imitation or patterning.  Kurt Weyland (2005b) argues for the geographic pattern of 
diffusion, since the “innovator’s neighbors and other countries in the region are usually 
the first to emulate the new model; only after a while do nations in other regions begin to 
enact the change as well” (p.262).  Even here, novelty is not the sole driving factor: 
Decision-makers wait for an innovation to attain a minimal track record before they 
consider emulating it.  The desire quickly to enhance one’s legitimacy does not carry the 
day; some assessment of experience is required before policy-makers are willing to incur 
the political costs and risks involved in enacting significant change (Weyland 2005a).  
Weyland explains that diffusion entails the adoption of the same policy or legal 
framework in varied national settings, therefore producing “commonality in diversity” 
(p.265). Diffusion tends to proceed in waves; initially few States adopt the innovation, as 
track records around the reforms accumulate; gradually, diffusion increases, until it loses 
speed because it faces important obstacles or most countries have already emulated the 
trendsetter.  
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The theoretical framework developed by Weyland (2005b) in the study of the 
approval of pension reforms in Latin America is very helpful in understanding the 
Mexican case.  Weyland identifies four causal mechanisms that explain the diffusion of 
legislation: 1) External pressure; 2) State initiative with the goal of gaining legitimacy; 3) 
State initiative with the objective of pursuing some interests based on rational learning; 
and, 4) State initiative with the objective of pursuing some interests based on cognitive 
heuristics.  These causal mechanisms or perspectives, however, are not necessarily 
exclusive, since sometimes more than one cause is behind the approval or new legislation 
or public policies.  Figure 5.1 helps to clarify them. 
 






















Source: Weyland 2005b 
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The external pressure perspective argues that the adoption of similar legislation is 
the result of vertical imposition of general laws as the result of pressure originating in the 
international sphere, especially through the influence of international organizations.  This 
perspective has been used, for example, to explain the adoption of neo-liberal economic 
policies, as international financial institutions exert economic coercion (and promise 
economic rewards) for the adoption of such policies.  In many cases the adoption of 
legislation or public policies is the result of a domestic initiative.  Such domestic 
initiatives often reflect the international pressures felt by some particular constituency 
and the State’s search for legitimacy or some other interest.   
In the search for legitimacy, decision makers and policy makers attempt to gain 
international legitimacy by adopting recent policy innovations in order to demonstrate the 
State’s modernity and compliance with new international norms. Governments may fear 
“the stigma of backwardness and therefore eagerly adopt policy innovations regardless of 
functional need” (Weyland 2005b:270).  Legislation or policies spread rapidly because 
their adoption not only favorably influences domestic and international public opinion, 
but also because their appearance “raise the standard of modernity and appropriate 
behavior” (Weyland 2005b:270).  The difference between the search for legitimacy and 
the external pressure perspectives lies in the agency of the State since it adopts legislation 
not as result of coercion but because it is willing to follow international trends.  Different 
types of legislative reform lend themselves to different motivations in this framework: for 
instance, policy reform that are seriously redistributive, and thus challenge entrenched 
socio-economic forces, make this “inhospitable territory for purely legitimacy-enhancing 
emulation.” (Weyland 2005b:42) 
In the rational learning and cognitive heuristics approaches, decision and policy 
makers’ actions are driven by the pursuit of an interest rather than by the search for 
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legitimacy.  In the rational learning perspective, the appearance of a problem generates a 
broad search of already existing solutions to the same or similar problem.  Potential 
solutions are analyzed and the policy is adopted if rational cost-benefit analyses 
demonstrate its superiority.  In the limited rational or cognitive heuristics approach, 
actors’ actions are based on pre-existing cues.  As consequence, when a legislation or 
policy from a certain country receives lots of attention, it tends to be “widely adopted on 
the bases of its apparent promise, not its demonstrated success [by other countries]” 
(Weyland 2005b:271). 
Figure 5.2 shows how the legislation related to family violence has spread widely 
in Mexico.  In the course of ten years, from 1996 to 2006, all but three states (Chihuahua, 
Aguascalientes and Hidalgo) passed specific laws dealing with family violence.  
Similarly, most states also reformed their civil and criminal codes.  In some states these 
laws were specifically defined as family violence laws, while in others the law received 
the name of intra-family violence (violencia intrafamiliar).  The use of one term, family 
violence or the other, intrafamily violence is interchangeable (Yllán Rondero and De La 
Lama 2002).  The first law, approved in the Federal District, changed the name from 
intra-family violence to family violence.  This change had the objective of homogenizing 
the state and federal legislation; the amendments to the federal criminal and civil codes 
referred to the phenomenon as “family violence” instead of domestic violence or intra-
family violence.   
In 2006 Chihuahua enacted a law that guarantees a woman the right to a violence-
free life, Law Concerning Women’s Right To a Violence Free Life (Ley Estatal del 
Derecho de las Mujeres a una Vida Libre de Violencia).  This law was sponsored by 
representative Victoria Chavira (PAN), chair of the Gender Commission in the State.  
Domestic and family violence is included as part of the broader term of gender 
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violence.13  Although Aguascalientes has not introduced a family violence law, in 
November 2004 a law which set up the Institute for Prevention, Assistance, Sanction and 
Eradication of Family Violence was created and reforms were made to the social 
assistance code.  As part of this initiative family violence is defined, but there is no 
precise law to deal with it.  In Hidalgo, there have been several attempts to develop and 
pass legislation, but none has yet been approved.  
Figure 5.2:  Diffusion of Family Violence Legislation in Mexican States 
 
                                                 
13 The Ley Estatal del Derecho de las Mujeres a una Vida Libre de Violencia is the first law in Mexico that 
carries out the compromises required by the Mexican government upon the signature of the CEDAW.  This 
law embraces all types of violence against women, and not only those occurring in the family, as all other 
state-level laws in Mexico.   The high rates of violence against women in Chihuahua, coupled with the 
national and international outcry over the feminicides in Chihuahua City and especially in Ciudad Juarez, 
might explain why Chihuahua enacted a law with such a broad mandate for granting women the right of a 























# States Cumulative # States
 183
The lower trend in Figure 5.2 reveals that 1999 was the year in which states 
adopted legislation against family violence.  This peak occurred just before the intense 
electoral competition of 2000.  In the 2000 federal congressional elections and the 
presidential elections, Vicente Fox defeated the PRI presidential candidate, overthrow 
PRI’s hegemony.  Also in 2000, thirteen states held electoral contests to elect governors 
and/or the members of the legislative chambers.14  The family violence laws were 
approved the year before the electoral contests took place, perhaps as a way for political 
parties and candidates to have stronger platforms for the elections, and perhaps as a way 
of gaining political legitimacy for the elections.  
 
5.2- INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
The phenomenon of discrimination and violence against women has always 
received the attention of international organizations.  Mexico, as a member of the United 
Nations (UN) and the Organization of American States (OAS), has signed and ratified 
several conventions and international agreements by which the Mexican state has directly 
or indirectly affirmed guarantees of a life without violence for women.  Mexico, like 
other participant countries at the UN’s Decade for Women (1976-1985) conference held 
in Copenhagen in 1980, also signed a resolution for advancing the study of the causes and 
consequences of domestic violence in order to provide better assistance to its victims, 
which provided a vector for activists to promote the issue.  In 1979 the UN General 
Assembly adopted the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW), which can be described as an international bill of rights for 
                                                 
14 Federal District, Guanajuato and Morelos: governor, state congress and local elections in July 7, 2000; 
Mexico, San Luis Potosi, Sonora, Campeche, Colima, Querétaro and Nuevo León: State congress and local 
elections in July 7, 2000; Chiapas: governor elections in August 20, 2000; in Tabasco the governor, 
legislative and local elections took place in October 15, 2000, and in Jalisco in November 12, 2000. 
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women.  It is composed of a preamble and 30 articles that define what constitutes 
discrimination against women and sets up an agenda for national action to end such 
discrimination.  The CEDAW entered into force as an international treaty on 3 September 
1981.  
It was not until July 9, 1984, however, that Mexico signed the CEDAW.  By 
signing the CEDAW, Mexico indicated its commitment to legally and effectively protect 
women by adopting legislation against gender discrimination.  The CEDAW 
recommends that governments design specific policies for increasing equality between 
men and women and that they change sociocultural patterns that perpetuate 
discrimination against women (see http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/cedaw.htm). 
Formally, the issue of domestic violence was not discussed in the international 
arena until the 1985 UN Nairobi conference.  Groups of women from different countries 
with experience working with victims of domestic violence presented several resolutions 
that were intended for inclusion in the UN conference strategic plan.  Although the 
conference ended before these resolutions could be approved, several months later the 
UN’s General Assembly approved a Domestic Violence Resolution (40/36 of November 
29, 1985) incorporating the work of the conference participants.   
The project of the UN’s Declaration on Violence against Women was 
conceptualized during the World Human Rights Conference in 1993, since the problem 
of violence against women was underplayed in the CEDAW and the Human Rights 
Convention.  Violence against women was conceptualized as an obstacle for achieving 
gender equality and eliminating discrimination against women.  The Declaration of 
Violence against Women was adopted in December 1993, primarily to clarify the nature 
of violence against women, which, it stated, could be perpetrated by the family, the 
community and the State.  Violence was defined as 
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any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, 
sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such 
acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, regardless of whether it occurs in 
public or in private life (United Nations 1993, art. 1).  
  
The UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (United 
Nations 1993) states that “violence against women is a manifestation of historically 
unequal power relations between men and women.”  It singles out violence as an 
instrument by which women are forced into a subordinate position compared with men.  
The CEDAW and the Declaration on Violence against Women carried no enforcement 
mechanism against signatory countries that were found in non-compliance; rather, it 
merely indicated their commitment or good will.  
With the objective that these commitments should be enacted as specific 
legislation and public policies, the Organization of American States (OAS) prepared in 
1994 the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of 
Violence (Convención Interamericana para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia 
contra la Mujer), also known as the “Belém do Pará Convention“.  The definition of 
violence against women and the realms in which it could occur is very similar to that of 
the UN.  In contrast to the UN Declaration of Violence Against Women, this convention 
was supposedly binding upon signatory States.  One of the most important features of the 
Belém do Pará Convention is that either individuals or institutions might present charges 
against the States for violations of the Convention before the Inter-American 
Commission of Human Rights.  Mexico became a party to this convention in 1995; but it 
was not ratified by the Senate until December 1998.  As we will see next, the Senate’s 
ratification occurred after important legislative changes had already taken place as a 
result of the mobilization of Mexican civil society.  
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In 1999, the UN General Assembly approved the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women with the 
support and participation of governmental institutions and civil society organizations, 
especially women’s NGOs.  This protocol was included because the international 
mechanisms for guaranteeing the implementation of the CEDAW had proven to be 
inadequate, because no means for dealing with particular cases had been outlined, nor did 
they include the option of compensating victims for noncompliance by the State. The 
CEDAW Optional Protocol is a legal instrument that complements the CEDAW and 
creates a procedure for reporting violations to the CEDAW in those States that ratified 
the convention.  The motivations for the signing of the CEDAW seem to have less to do 
with a real interest in promoting women’s’ rights and more to do with concerns for image 
and a desire to conform to international standards (Craske 1998a; 1998b). 
International treaties and international conventions signed by the Mexican 
government do not effectively influence public policies or state and federal laws.  The 
testimony of a woman working for an NGO that promotes women’s human rights in 
Guanajuato summarizes the common feeling among members of the civil society 
movement.  Their belief is that Mexican institutions take action in a quest of legitimacy, 
since there is no real internal interest in changing the status quo.  As she said, 
When abroad, the Mexican government signs all possible conventions, those 
existing, and those not even existing.  The Mexican government is very skilled in 
human rights issues, but internally [in Mexico] nothing happens. There is no 
interest, the government has no intention. One thing is what occurs abroad, in the 
exterior, but here, treaties and conventions are not honored.  Moreover, Mexico’s 
reality is disguised abroad.N5.1  
 
In addition to the conventions and treaties, United Nations promoted the Violence 
Against Women campaign (VAW), which promoted attitude change and the enactment of 
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appropriate legislation sanctioning violence against women.  This has indeed become one 
of the most successful rights-based campaigns in recent years (Molyneux and Lazar 
2003).  According to Molyneux and Lazar, the VAW campaign confronted the long-
lasting division between the public and private spheres based on the feminist slogan “the 
personal is political.”  Headed by UNIFEM (United Nations Development Fund for 
Women), several UN agencies were involved in the Violence Against Women campaign:  
UNDP (UN Development Program), UNFPA (UN Population Fund), UNICEF (United 
Nations Children Fund), UNHCR (UN Commission on Human Rights), UNHCHR (UN 
Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights), UNAIDS (The Joint United 
Nations Program on HIV/AIDS), and ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean).  The campaign was timed to coincide with the 50th anniversary of the 
UN Declaration of Human Rights, and was implemented in different countries from 1997 
to 1999.  The campaign was very broad and included, among other aspects: preparatory 
work and reports in collaboration with NGOs; media campaigns; sponsorship of training 
for persons directly and indirectly involved in issues of violence against women; 
promotion of legal reforms, and other public awareness campaigns (for more details see 
Molyneux and Lazar 2003). 
 
5.3-  THE MEXICAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
The Mexican government has officially supported the affirmation of women’s 
rights by signing international conventions and treaties related to the issue.  The simple 
signature of those treaties, however, did not automatically translate into the passage of 
legislation protecting women against violence, and especially partner violence, the most 
common form of violence.  During the presidency of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-
1994), the Mexican government took several measures for protecting women against 
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violence.  As in the case of other Latin American countries (see Htun 2003), legislative 
reforms and public policies responded to the confluence of specific historical, national 
and international circumstances.  Moreover, as we will see, the first steps toward 
protecting women’s right to live free of violence was the result of factors other than the 
willingness to offer protection to women.  Therefore, these first governmental actions 
were perceived as an unintended consequence of prestige-making or legitimacy-seeking 
policies, although interpreted by some feminists as a victory of the movement. 
For many, the 1988 presidential elections marked the beginning of the Mexican 
political transition.  Claims of electoral fraud by the PRD put the hegemonic political 
party (PRI) and its president, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, in a crisis of legitimacy.  In a 
context of increasing international pressure for democratization, Salinas’ government 
attempted to seek legitimacy among new civil society actors excluded from the long-
lasting corporatist system.  Feminist groups were among these (Lang 2003).  Salinas 
promised changes for modernizing both the economy and the political structure.  These 
changes, however, were not connected to the democratization of Mexican society (Camp 
2003).  The modernizing wave affecting many Latin American countries by which they 
would become countries of the first world, imposed a set of neoliberal economic policies 
that weakened the traditional centralized State and were usually accompanied by the 
adoption of new forms of political participation, the adoption of policies protecting 
minorities, and granting voice to groups traditionally excluded from the political process.  
The same dynamic was repeated during Ernesto Zedillo’s presidency (1994-2000). 
The issue of violence against women has been used by the Mexican federal 
executive to serve a double purpose.  On the one hand, making it a priority would make 
feminists and women’s movements feel represented by the State.  On the other, this issue 
would “make Mexico look like a modern and democratic country” (Lang 2003:74).  
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These two purposes would increase the Mexican government legitimacy level, both 
nationally and before of the international community.  Several examples of this kind of 
“impression management” (Goffman 1959:17) can be taken from this era.  For instance, 
in December 1988, one of the first reforms of president Salinas’ was to stiffen penalties 
in rape cases, ignoring an already existing, more ambitious project proposed by both 
feminists and federal congresswomen in 1984.  President Salinas’ initiative was harshly 
criticized for disregarding previous efforts.  
The scandals of nineteen rapes perpetrated by several judicial police officials, 
bodyguards of the Federal District Assistant Attoney’s (sub-Procurador) Javier Coello 
Trejo, were followed by a strong protest from feminists, politicians, and a number of civil 
organizations (González Ascencio 1995).  As in many other countries social movements 
responded with outrage to these facts and made several demands to the government: they 
demanded legal reforms which would recognize violence against women as a public 
problem and not as something in the realm of the private sphere, and they demanded 
government action in recognizing and in promoting public awareness of violence against 
women, the concrete mechanism for which was governmental action in increasing 
sensitivity on the part of judges and criminal justice officials (see Weldon 2002).   
These circumstances forced President Salinas to a public commitment of 
reforming and modernizing the institutions of the State, and especially the judiciary 
system (Lang 2003).  The State institution that promoted the first reforms was the Federal 
District Attorney’s office (Procuraduria de Justicia del Distrito Federal –PFJDF), the 
institution responsible for the officials accused of sexual abuse.15  Surprisingly, all 
institutions created to protect women from sexual and partner violence were incorporated 
into the Attorney General’s Office: In 1989, the Specialized Agency in Sexual Crimes 
                                                 
15 The Procurador is the equivalent to the Attorney General. The Procuraduría would be the offices and 
agencies dependent on the Attorney General.  
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(AEDS: Agencia Especializada en Delitos Sexuales), in 1990; the Center of Integral 
Services for Family Violence Victims (CAVI; Centro de Atención Integral a la Víctima 
de Violencia Intrafamiliar); and in 1991 the Center for Support Therapy (CTA: Centro de 
Terapia de Apoyo).   
Given the capabilities and forms of expertise characteristic of the Attorney 
General’s Office and the symbolism of subordinating these three agencies to the very 
office accused of systematically condoning rapes, AEDS, CAVI and CTA, seem to have 
been compromise responses to public concern by political forces that did not have in 
mind women’s well-being.  Police bodies and the judiciary system in Mexico tend to be 
conservative, corrupt, patriarchal, and hierarchical institutions in which agencies dealing 
with women’s issues were not welcomed.  The words of a female lawyer employed at the 
CAVI at the time of its creation illustrate the lack of interest of the State and specifically, 
that of the Attorney’s General’s Office: 
I competed with other 200 lawyers to get the job. I was selected, and I accepted 
the job because the pay was good.  They [men at the Federal District Attorney’s 
Office] did not want this agency.  We had to write the CAVI manual of 
procedures.  The agency was finally created, they gave us space, but we had to 
start from scratch… you know… sweeping the floor, clean the windows.  We 
even had to hang information on the walls and go to schools to give information 
to women (…).  They did not want us; we did not have any resources; we did not 
receive any type of support, and they considered us as aviadores.N5.2   
 
The CAVI was created in 1990, six years before the enactment of the first family 
violence law in Mexico.  At the time, the CAVI seemed the result of the government’s 
commitment to the issue of partner violence, and therefore, its creation was regarded as 
battle won by the women’s movements and NGOs.  However, the real objective behind 
the CAVI was to improve public safety and preventing crime, since family violence was 
regarded as increasing crime. This objective is revealed in its creation agreement:  
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(…) importance of creating a Center for Intra-Family Violence Assistance for 
preventing and sanctioning anti-social conducts (…).  This Center (...) will 
provide complete assistance (…) with the objective of fighting and reducing the 
number of crimes in the Federal District.  (…) Family violence (…) promotes 
anti-social behaviors, hurts the victims both directly and indirectly, generates pain 
[to the victims] and promotes crime”.  (PGJDF, Agreement N. A/026/90, cited in 
Lang 2003:79).N5.3 
 
This hidden goal of the CAVI coupled with the clientelistic Mexican political 
culture and the embryonic administrative structure further complicated the delivery of 
services and attention to women victims of violence.  In Mexico, when public officials in 
positions of responsibility are promoted or invited to join another agency, they tend to 
take all their staff with them.  For example, the CAVI had five different directors its first 
ten years of existence.  As Lang (2003) argues, this makes it impossible to develop tacit 
knowledge or the kind of organization that transmits the expertise learned from 
experience.  She concludes that “in this context, it is obvious that the creation of agencies 
for providing assistance to victims within the Attorney General´s Office organic structure 
responded to a [government] populist strategy” (2003:77).N5.4 Moreover, the actions 
initiated by the executive seem to have used the impression that the State was taking the 
issue of violence against women seriously as an attempt to gain legitimacy, without in 
fact creating an agency directly interested in stopping violence against women.  
 
5.4-  THE APPROVAL OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION CONCERNING FAMILY 
VIOLENCE 
In 1997, President Ernesto Zedillo signed several federal initiatives introducing 
civil and criminal code reforms about family violence both on the federal level and in the 
Federal District.  The press referred to these reforms as the Family Violence Law (Ley de 
Violencia Familiar).  Until that time there were not specific regulations about family 
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violence.  Excessive cruelty (sevicia) was a cause for divorce; however it was difficult to 
prove.  The Grupo Plural Pro-Victimas (Grupo Plural) promoted these reforms.  The 
Grupo Plural was created in January 1990 by a group of women from different spheres of 
society who came together after the nineteen rapes perpetrated by members of the 
General Attorney’s Office.16  Upon its creation, its first goal was the enactment of 
legislative reforms concerning sexual violence perpetrated against women.  After these 
reforms were enacted, Grupo Plural lobbied for changes in family violence legislation.  
Led by Grupo Plural, the preparation for these reforms started in 1995.  Patricia 
Duarte, from COVAC, got in touch with several prominent political women from all 
political parties to build common strategies for the approval of legal reforms.  Among 
those participating were Carolina O’Farril, the leader of the feminist organization of the 
PRI in the Federal District, Patricia Olamendi and Patricia Garduño from the PAN, 
Amalia García and Leonor Cárdenas from the PRD, Aída González, Dulce María Sauri 
from the PRI, Barbara Yllán and Jazmine Olmedo, as well as several well-known 
feminists such as Marta de la Lama.  Despite their ideological differences, they invested 
their energy in the feminist project and turned it into a legislative proposal.  In the words 
of one of the above- mentioned women,  
[this process] was difficult. We were not friends, but at the time there was 
something that brought us together.  At that moment we started working. (…) The 
family violence law17 is the result of two intense years of meetings and 
agreements amongst many people and institutions.N5.5 
Civil society groups, members of Grupo Plural as well as congresswomen and 
female senators from all political parties requested that President Ernesto Zedillo sign the 
package of legal reforms concerning family violence.  Although the official version is 
                                                 
16 Feminists, civil servants, journalists, intellectuals, representatives and senators, among others, composed 
the Grupo Plural Pro-Victimas.  
17 This informant referred to the package of legislative changes about family violence as “ley de violencia”. 
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that President Zedillo invited the members of Grupo Plural and the congresswomen to 
Los Pinos (see Barbieri 2003: Ch. 9), the results of my research show that it was the other 
way round.  Obtaining the president’s signature was the political strategy, as revealed by 
the words of Maria Elena Cruz (PAN) 
There was an intense controversy because some [congresswomen] believed that 
we should not go, and that his signature [President Zedillo] was not needed.  
Others said [to the opposition of some congresswomen to attending to the 
president’s official reception and requesting his signature] ‘we are in a political 
system in which the president, the executive power, is very strong (…) 
constitutionally. [Mexico] is a presidential [political] system and (…) if we want 
these reforms to be approved, we need to obtain a lot of votes’.  As the PRI had 
239 seats, with the president’s signature they thought that would have those 239 
votes guaranteed (in Barbieri 2003).N5.6   
 
The pressure that the supporters of the legislative changes put on the executive 
power to get the president’s signature was proportional to the atmosphere of political 
instability and symbolic meaning of the reforms.  The day after scheduling the 
President´s signing in Los Pinos, Emilio Chauffet, the Secretario de Gobernacion, was 
informed that president Zedillo intended to sign the proposal and submit it to the 
Congress for its approval.  Emilio Chauffet disagreed with this plan because the proposal 
had been promoted by a non-PRI political party.  In a context where opposition parties 
were jeopardizing the long-lasting PRI hegemony, the PRI wanted to be considered the 
promoter of the legislation.  Dulce María Sauri (PRI) presented an alternative proposal, 
which slightly differed to that developed and backed by Grupo Plural.  Grupo Plural 
representatives called President Zedillo´s personal assistant and let him know that Grupo 
Plural was opposing the PRI proposal.  
On November 5, 1996, one day before the proposed signing in Los Pinos, Patricia 
Duarte (founder of COVAC), Patricia Olamendi (coordinator of Grupo Plural), Patricia 
Garduño (PAN) and Carolina O´Farril (Independent and chair of the Gender Commission 
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in the Congress) were having dinner in a restaurant when the management took a phone 
to their table, as somebody from the President’s office on the other end told them that the 
President was not going to sign the legislative proposal.  This left them perplexed.  
Patricia Garduño, called their PAN fellows and explained the situation to them; 
PANISTAS declared their intention of not attending the signing event.  The reaction of 
the PRD and independent congresswoman was quite different.  They called President 
Zedillo´s office and let him know that the signing event could not be cancelled because 
the press would be there, and that women from Grupo Plural and civil society would be 
there as well.  They claimed that not signing would have very serious political 
consequences for the PRI.  Their strategy worked and the family violence legislative 
proposal for amending the civil and criminal code was signed one day later.  PAN’s 
representatives changed their mind, and at the end they attended to the signing event. 
After the president’ signing, Amalia García (PRD) introduced the proposal in the 
Congress, which began the second part of the battle for its approval.  Female politicians 
supporting the reforms were labeled by their party fellows as locas (crazy).  All women, 
regardless of their political colors complained that their male fellow party members were 
dismissive of the issue of family violence, considering family violence as something 
without importance.  After its presentation at the Congress, some congressmen were 
reluctant to vote for this family violence legislation, as one of the most active members of 
the Grupo Plural and congresswoman explains:  
One PANist [congressmen] told me, ´How come I will not be able to slap my 
daughter when I need to.  In contrast, men from the PRI and PRD did not say 
anything although they thought it.  In contrast, men of the PAN were more honest 
and showed their reluctance to support the proposed reforms.N5.7 
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A turning point in the discussion of the reforms about family violence was the 
criminalization of marital rape. The issue of marital rape generated a split between male 
and female representatives that cut across parties.  Across political parties, many 
congressmen came out in opposition to the criminalization of marital rape on the grounds 
of debito conyugal (mutual obligation of spouses to participate in sexual intercourse),  
arguing that this type of legislation would induce married and cohabiting men to get the 
services of prostitutes (see Barbieri 2003).  The reform was approved with the support of 
169 votes (89 representatives voted against and 156 representatives did not attend to the 
voting for several reasons). All congresswomen but one from the PRD backed this 
reform.  While the opposition of PANist congressmen was clear, the opposition of some 
PRD and PRI members was somewhat unexpected because the PRD sponsored the 
reform in the Congress, the issue of violence against women was part of the PRD’s 
electoral platform, and President Zedillo supported this set of reforms.   
While marital rape was the most relevant reform in the criminal code, the most 
significant reforms in the civil code were that family violence could be a cause for 
divorce, and that all family members had the right to a life free of violence.  In the newly 
enacted civil and criminal codes, the defining features of violence were: 1) violence can 
be physical or emotional; 2) has to occur more than once; 3) might cause harm or not; 
and 4) the aggressor and the recipient of the violence have to live in the same household.  
These features capture violence on a broad scale, since emotional as well as physical 
violence is included.  The definition of family violence, however, does not include 
economic and sexual violence within the family.  For family violence to exist, violence 
has to occur more than once, regardless if it causes harm or not.   
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5.5-  THE APPROVAL OF FAMILY VIOLENCE LAWS AT THE STATE LEVEL 
The states in Mexico have the power of legislating social assistance.  And state 
legislators considered family violence to fall into the category of social assistance.  The 
goal behind the creation of a family violence law was to provide a set of rules that 
promoted prevention and provided public assistance to victims of partner violence.  
Prevention is conceptualized as a way of eradicating domestic violence.  Assistance to 
victims has the goal of breaking the circle of violence within the family.  Therefore, the 
administrative family violence laws have a dual objective.  First, the prevention of crimes 
within the family structure at the same time that protect the institution of the family; and 
second, avoiding the resolution of the conflict through a criminal process by promoting 
the alternative use of administrative institutions and governmental agencies.  In that way, 
justice can be more effectively administered, since counseling is provided free of charge 
and without the need of hiring a legal counselor (Yllán Rondero and De La Lama 2002). 
Most of the amendments to the criminal and civil state codes which include the 
issue of family violence took place around the same date in which the administrative 
family violence laws were enacted.  However, not all the states have passed such 
amendments as illustrated in Table 5.2.  According to the data provided by the 
INMUJERES, as of June of 2005 all states but eleven (Campeche, Chiapas, Guanajuato, 
Guerrero, Hidalgo, Jalisco, Nayarit, Querétaro, Tabasco, Yucatán and Zacatecas) 
modified the civil code to include family violence as a cause for divorce.  In the case of 
the criminal code, all states but Campeche, Colima, Querétaro, Quintana Roo and 
Tlaxcala consider family violence a felony.  In contrast, in less than half of the states is 
rape within the marriage recognized as such and punished in the criminal code: Baja 
California Sur, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Federal District, Durango, Guanajuato, Hidalgo, 
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Civil Code Criminal Code 
  Family Violence as 
Cause for Divorce 
Family 




Aguascalientes  X X  
Baja California 7/4/2003 X X  
Baja California Sur 3/20/2005 X X X 
Campeche 6/27/2002    
Coahuila 10/25/2002 X X X 
Colima 2/14/1998 X   
Chiapas 7/8/1998  X  
Chihuahua  X X X 
Distrito Federal 7/8/1996 X X X 
Durango 12/23/1999 X X X 
Guanajuato 2/4/2000  X X 
Guerrero 4/13/1999  X  
Hidalgo   X X 
Jalisco 12/18/2003  X  
México 31/12/2002 X X  
Michoacán  2/11/2002 X X  
Morelos 1/20/1999 X X  
Nayarit 12/5/2004  X  
Nuevo León 15/2/2006 X X  
Oaxaca 9/15/2001 X X X 
Puebla 4/6/2001 X X  
Querétaro  12/31/1996   X 
Quintana Roo 7/15/2000 X   
San Luis Potosí 7/28/1998 X X X 
Sinaloa 12/7/2001 X X  
Sonora 3/20/2001 X X  
Tabasco 4/12/1999  X  
Tamaulipas 6/1/1999 X X X 
Tlaxcala 5/4/2001 X   
Veracruz  9/8/1998 X X X 
Yucatán 9/7/1999  X X 
Zacatecas 2/19/2003  X  
Sources: Author’s revision of administrative laws.  Information about the reforms in the civil and criminal 
codes from:  Inegi. 2006. Hombres y Mujeres en Mexico 2006. Aguascalientes: Inegi.  
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Oaxaca, Querétaro, San Luís Potosí, Tamaulipas, Veracruz and Yucatán.  By June 2005, 
Campeche was the sole state that had not enacted any reform to its criminal or civil 
codes, although it had enacted the administrative family violence law.  
The process of promoting the adoption of legislation has followed three different 
paths: a) collaborative effort between the State and NGOs/women’s movement; b) top-
down, or reforms driven from above; and, c) bottom-up, or reforms driven from below.  
In the next four sub-sections, we will examine the typical cases of the Federal District, 
Jalisco, Morelos and Guanajuato to show the roles played by extra-State actors, and the 
relationship between them and the State in the process of promoting legislation.  These 
four cases also show that the formal approval or reform of administrative family violence 
legislation is dependent, as well, on the fundamental enabling or a controlling stance of 
the state in question.   
 
5.5.a-   Collaborative Promotion of Women’s Rights between the State and 
Women’s Movements: The Case of the Federal District 
The first family violence law in Mexico was enacted in the Federal District.  
Some countries in Central America and Latin America had already approved legislation 
on  family violence, either specific laws or reforms in the civil or criminal code: Puerto 
Rico (1989), Argentina (1994), Bolivia (1995), Chile (1994), Ecuador (1995), Panama 
(1995), Paraguay, Peru (1993), Uruguay (1995).  In 1996, the same year that the family 
violence law was approved in the Federal District, some other countries also passed 
reforms: Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua.  
The enactment of the Law for Family Violence Prevention and Assistance 
(LPAVIF: Ley de Prevencion y Asistencia de la Violencia Intrafamiliar) was preceded by 
several years of hard work and collaboration between the women’s movement and 
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congresswomen.  The Commission of Special Attention to Vulnerable Groups (Comisión 
de Atención Especial a Grupos Vulnerables) at the Federal District Legislative Assembly 
made a call for the creation of a special institutional forum (mesa legislativa) with 
responsibility for developing legislation on protecting individuals against family 
violence.  This group was created in May 30th 1995, and both governmental and non-
governmental groups were invited to participate in this forum.  The legislative proposal 
was presented by the Marta de la Lama (PRI), who at the time, 1996, was vice-president 
of the Commission of Special Attention to Vulnerable Groups at the Federal District 
Legislative Assembly, and was written by Bárbara Yllán Rondero, member of the Grupo 
Plural, the MNM and founder of the Specialized Agency in Sexual Crimes (Agencias 
Especializadas en Delitos Sexuales) in 1989.  
The process of drafting the law was lengthy.  Both Marta De La Lama and 
Bárbara Yllán undertook a process of building alliances, lobbying, and reaching 
agreements.  The project originated with women from outside of the Federal District 
Legislative Assembly and continued with family violence experts and governmental 
agencies whose support was regarded as necessary for the approval of the initiative.  The 
initiators of the proposal believed that support would become general as the perception of 
the importance of the law became widespread.  As we will see, this turned out not to be 
the case.  The approval of the law required an extended process of overcoming multiple 
obstacles in the Legislative Assembly and obtaining the required quorum for the approval 
of the initiative.  
In the first stage, Yllán and De La Lama held numerous meetings with women 
from different political parties and civil society organizations, all of whom were well 
known for their expertise on women’s issues.  Many of the women who participated in 
this project were also participating in the parallel group that promoted the amendments in 
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the federal civil and criminal codes about violence against women.  These women 
“showed their solidarity, made constructive comments and encouraged us; however, they 
were not convinced of our success” (Yllán Rondero and De La Lama 2002:viii).  In this 
first stage, their efforts went unnoticed in the Legislative Assembly, 
We [Bárbara Yllán and Marta De La Lama] started working, without anybody 
within the [Legislative] Assembly paying much attention to us, busy as they were 
with the city’s ´big issues´, among which, of course, are not, at present or back 
then, those related to women  (Yllán Rondero and De La Lama 2002:viii).N5.8 
 
In the second stage, Yllán and De La Lama sought the support and compromise of 
experts and governmental agencies.  Many of these experts were males, and while some 
made constructive suggestions, others questioned the need for such legislation, or 
pursued their own ideological agendas, or were just plain mocking.  The participation of  
Federal District public agencies such as the Human Rights Commission, CAVI, the 
Coordination of Minors and Disabled (dependent from the Federal District Attorney´s 
Office), Junta de Asistencia Privada, Secretaria of Education, Health and Social 
Development, and the Dirección General de Atención Ciudadana were  perceived to be 
key for the presentation of the initiative to the Federal District Legislative Assembly 
(details in Yllán Rondero and De La Lama 2002).  
In the third phase, they sought stronger support from the executive power, as well 
as from the Committee of Justice and Committee of Government from the Legislative 
Assembly.  The words of Marta De La Lama illustrate the difficulties found at this stage, 
Here [in the third phase] we faced big surprises: some of them [people supposed 
to back the proposal] presented to us a full legislative project that was useless 
because of its declarative nature.  They requested us to support this project, and of 
course, we refused. A person from another [political] group, key for our goals, 
when he/she was with us, offered his/her support, but when we were not present 
he/she would act otherwise.  (…) a male ordered a staff member of our group to 
sabotage the project.  In order to get her boss to stop bothering her, we pretended 
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to have a fight with her, in front of her supervisor, with several staff members, 
complaining about her attitude. N5.9 
 
On the day that the law was scheduled to be voted on, the other political parties 
(non-PRI) requested that the vote be postponed since they wanted to introduce 
amendments to the proposal.  De La Lama believes that as other political parties realized 
the importance of the law, which was to be the first family violence law in to be enacted 
in Mexico, all such political parties, and especially their female legislators, not only 
wanted to support the law, but also wanted to be seen as promoters of the legislation 
before the public.   
The law defines violence as any recurrent, intentional and cyclic act of abusive 
power or neglect with the objective of dominating, subduing, assaulting or controlling 
physically, verbally, psycho-emotionally or sexually any member of the family, inside or 
outside of the family residence.  The relationships between the perpetrator and the 
recipient of the violence are defined broadly: kinship by consanguinity, current or past 
relationship of civil affinity; marriage, cohabitation or common law relationship. It 
further states that the acts of violence have to cause harm. The law regulates violence 
within the family, expanding very broadly the understanding of what constitutes family.  
The law includes a new conceptualization of the term “family” that went unnoticed in the 
legislative discussions.  The concept of the family was inspired in the 1992 Belem do 
Pará Convention, in which family is defined as a group of people that lives together not 
necessarily linked by legal family ties.  As we will see in the next section, this definition 
of family has been object of controversy in other states, such as in Jalisco. 
The law was the joint effort of female legislators and the women’s movement. 
Published in July 1996, it was to become law within the next 30 days.  However, the 
Reglamento, rules governing the implementation of the law, was not approved until 
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October 21, 1997; exceeding, thus, the 90 day-limit set in the Mexican constitution.  This 
reflects the lack of political interest by the Federal District Legislative Assembly, as well 
as indicates that the previous measures taken for protecting women might have responded 
to circumstances other than genuine interest on specific violence mitigation.  Moreover, 
some researchers argue that the delay in approving the Reglamento, was due to the 
absence of specific public policies about partner violence (Borjón López-Coterilla 2000).   
 
5.5.b-  Top-Down  Promotion of Women’s rights:  Promotion  of Family Violence 
Legislation in Morelos and Guanajuato 
In the case of Morelos and Guanajuato, the legislation was promoted from above.  
In these cases the role of the women’s movement and NGOs was subsidiary since they 
become involved in the process at the request of a state representative: in Morelos a 
member of the Commission of Health, Laura Ocampo (PRI), and in Guanajuato, Maria 
Lucia Micher Camarena (PRD).  
 
5.5.b.i-  The case of Morelos 
Led by state representative Patricia Elton (PRI), the first attempt to approve 
family violence legislation in Morelos occurred in 1997.  Patricia Elton was member of 
the Committee for the Promotion rof a Risk-Free Maternity (CPMSR: Comité Promotor 
por una Maternidad sin Riesgos), founded in 1993 with the goal of decreasing the risk of 
maternal mortality.18  In that NGO she met members of CIDHAL (Comunicación, 
Intercambio y Desarrollo Humano para América Latina) such as María Luisa Becerril.19  
                                                 
18 The Comité Promotor por una Maternidad sin Riesgos (CPMSR) was composed by 31 members of 
several public institutions, civil society, international organizations and nine state-governments.  
19 CIHDAL is the first women’s center established in Mexico. It was founded in 1969 by Betsie Hollants, a 
Belgian journalist and pioneering feminist in Mexico who devoted her life to creating spaces and 
opportunities for women’s growth and development.  
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Founded in 1969, CIDHAL is a feminist NGO that provides educational alternatives and 
services to empower women and foster active citizen participation.  CIDHAL had been 
working on the issue of violence against women and had developed connections with 
people from the academia, such as Rosario Valdés.  Patricia Elton called members of 
several NGOs working on gender issues for a meeting in which she presented a family 
violence law proposal.  As recounted by one of my interviewees from an NGO:  
Patricia Elton became aware of gender issues due to the influence of the Morelos´ 
feminist movement.  (…)  One day she showed up with a [family violence] law 
proposal, and asked for our advice.  She [Patricia Elton] liked her proposal.  The 
proposal was almost a copy of the one in the Federal District.  But we, women 
from several NGOs, reviewed and made suggestions about the legislative 
proposal, in order to adapt the law to the context of the State of Morelos.  Some 
people think that it was Patricia Elton’s proposal, but the truth is that we [NGOs] 
were also behind the law.N5.10 
 
The law was presented to the Congress at the end of the legislative period.  While 
the legislative proposal was still under consideration by congressional commissions, the 
legislature ended, so no action was taken.  In 1997 the legislative elections in Morelos 
produced a 30 percent of female representation in the Morelos’ Congress, since eight 
women were elected.  Among them, Laura Ocampo (PRI), chair of the Health Committee 
took responsibility for orchestrating the second attempt to pass a family violence law in 
Morelos.  She took as a template the law enacted in the Federal District.  She argued that 
the law that would promote societal awareness about the issue of partner violence, and 
that it was not to be a repressive or sanctioning law.  Laura O’Campo built alliances 
based on her belief that the approval of the legislation would be easier to gain by making 
tactical compromises with those involved in the process of passing and applying the law.  
The process of alliance building and lobbying took place in three fronts: the civil society, 
the Congress and within the institutions of the executive and judiciary power.  This 
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process, however, was not very complicated since it was a “light and non-ideological 
law”.  
Invited by Laura Ocampo, several NGOs participated in the discussion of the 
legislative proposal before its presentation to the Congress.  Most of them had already 
participated in the first initiative of Patricia Elton: Comité por una Maternidad sin Riesgo, 
Convergencia 8 de Marzo, Comité de Seguimiento de Beijing, Mujeres en Lucha por la 
Democracia, CIDHAL, and the Centro de Apoyo a Trabajadoras Domesticas.  Pilar 
Lomelín and Rosario Valdés, member of the National Institute of Public Health and 
coordinator of the Program of Action against Domestic Violence, also participated in the 
discussions.  The goal was to obtain the support of experts in the area of family and 
partner violence both from institutions within the state and from the civil society.  In fact, 
it might seem that the feminist civil society movement in Morelos is broad since several 
NGOs participated in the process.  Nevertheless, the general feeling is that in Morelos the 
appearance that there are many women involved in women’s NGOs is deceptive, since 
“there are a handful of women that belong to several NGOs. Indeed, there are only three 
or four women who are really concerned about advancing women’s causes, but there is 
not such a thing in Morelos as a woman’s movement”, as a State representative from the 
49th Legislature said.N5.11 
The nonexistence of a Committee of Gender and Equity in Morelos’ Congress 
perhaps motivated all female representatives, regardless of their political ideology, to 
unify.  Female representatives at the time in which the law was enacted mentioned that 
their fellow male representatives from all political parties used to make jokes about them 
and the law by saying:  “Now, I cannot hit my vieja”, “You want to make us wash the 
dishes”, “We won’t support your law.”N5.12  Female representatives lobbied with their 
fellow male representatives in order to seek unanimous support for the new legislation.  
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Being framed as an “awareness promotion” law, female representatives in Morelos made 
sure that no ideological position-taking would complicate its passing.  
Laura Ocampo also sought the participation of municipalities and public agencies 
from the executive and judiciary power such as the DIF, Secretaria de Salud, physicians, 
Secretaria de Gobernacion, Consejería Jurídica del Estado, the State Attorney’s Office, 
lawyers and judges among others.  At five forums, an unprecedented in the history of the 
Morelos’ Congress, the legislation was presented and discussed.  Social and political 
actors could voice their opinions about the legislative proposal.  In sum, these five 
meetings had the goal of reaching a solid consensus among those that would be somehow 
involved in the implementation of the law.  Strategically the Consejería Jurídica del 
Estado was lobbied, too, as its support was key to preventing a potential veto of Governor 
Jorge Morales Barud (PRI).   
The process in Morelos went very smooth.  Both members of NGOs and female 
representatives involved in the legislative approval mentioned that there were few 
internal discussions.  Everybody agreed that the law proposal received the support from 
the society and political actors because it was not a punitive law, nor did it have political 
connotations that could be appropriated by any political party.  Only the lawyer’s bar 
openly opposed the law.  Once the proposal got to the floor of the Congress there was 
already a consensus for its enactment.  “For men, this [family violence law] was just 
another law”, said Emma Margarita Alemán Olvera.  All representatives, except one 
female representative, supported the law.  Laura Ocampo believes that she was not really 
opposing the law, but that she wanted a stronger law that would include sanctions.   
We did an excellent lobbying work at different levels.  No men opposed the law 
in the Congress.  Only a female did.  She wanted a punitive law.  She did not 
understand that at that moment we needed a consensus law.  She opposed it not 
because she did not believe in the law, or because she was not supporting it; she 
opposed the law because she believed that the law should go further.N5.13 
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Most of those involved in the process of approving the family violence law have 
mixed feelings about it.  While they agree that it was important to have a law, they also 
agree that the lack of sanctions against perpetrators of family violence made it an 
incomplete law (una ley mocha).  The general opinion can be summarized by a member 
of the feminist NGO CIHDAL at that time,  
We reached a consensus, we wanted a law, we wanted for the issue of family 
violence not to be invisible anymore.  The law has the goal of raising awareness 
in the population.  The [contents of the] law are not what we wanted, but at least 
we got a law.N5.14 
 
Clearly for most people in Morelos, the approval of the family violence 
legislation was the result of a diffusion process originating in the Federal District. The 
important objective was the approval of some form of family violence legislation.  The 
words of a family judge that participated in the above mentioned forums could not be 
more enlightening, 
The law (Family Violence Assistance and Prevention Law) is the result of a 
political fashion.  It is just a copy of that of the Federal District.  Most time laws 
are approved here because they are approved there.  There was not such a thing as 
a detailed study for analyzing the social characteristics [of Morelos] to see if the 
law could be applied here.  (…) In the state [Morelos] someone [a state 
representative] hears that there was a violence law somewhere and they wanted it 
to be approved here, but specific studies were missing.N5.15  
 
5.5.b.ii-  The Case of Guanajuato: The 2000 Law and its Reform in 2005 
The case of Guanajuato is very similar of that of Morelos.  In the two cases there 
are a lot of commonalities in terms of the process by which the first family violence law 
was enacted, and the characteristics of the women’s movement.  Guanajuato is a very 
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interesting case study both because the process of approval of the first family violence 
law in 2000 and its subsequent reform were driven by female state representatives.  In 
this case, the impetus for the legislation was also from above.  The work prior to the 
approval of the family violence law was led by María Lucía Micher Camarena (PRD), 
member of the Gender and Equality Commission with extensive experience in the area of 
family violence.20  The first family law in Guanajuato was also the result of the 
promotion, and the procedure is very similar to the one in Morelos.  As one state 
representative said: 
A representative, Malu (María Lucía Micher Camarena), brought the initiative 
and sought the support of some women.  She took the law of the Federal District 
as an example.  She followed the same procedure and the same model followed in 
the Federal District.N5.16 
 
In Guanajuato the legislation was supported by the governor, Vicente Fox.  His 
administration promoted changes favoring and supporting the women’s agenda, perhaps 
with the additional motive of Fox becoming a strong candidate for Mexico’s Presidency 
(Campos Beltrán 2004).  The small Guanajuato women’s movement as well as women’s 
NGOs also supported the first partner violence law.  However, as in the case of Morelos, 
most people consider that rather than a grassroots feminist movement, there was –and 
there is– in Guanajuato a handful of women working toward the advancement of 
women’s issues.  A state representative, said: 
There are women that work for women’s rights, but besides Milenio Feminista 
and Las Libres21…  no, there is not a women’s movement that lumps them 
                                                 
20 Lucía Micher Camarena, had broad experience in the feminist movement.  She was the founder of a 
human rights association, Hermanas Miraval. She was member of Milenio Feminista, and prior becoming a 
congresswoman in Guanajuato had work for women’s human rights, specially reproductive and sexual 
rights.  She was also a member of the representation Committee of Mexico in Beijing.  
21 Las Libres, I was told in an interview with an insider in the women’s movement, was composed at the 
time by five or six women that get together from time to time. The main issue is that women get involved 
for a time, and then they leave the organization.  
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together.  Sometimes they get together and promote some actions depending on 
the legislative work.  Their actions are intermittent and there is not a structured 
movement.  They only get together in certain situations.N5.17 
 
A member of the Guanajuato´s Commission of Human Rights, very active in 
several grass-roots organizations believes that in addition to the “reigning conservatism 
in Guanajuato´s society”, cultural reasons might explain the absence of an organized 
feminist movement.  She argues:  
There is not a women’s movement.  It is a cultural matter. It is hard for women to 
work for other women.  It is hard when they are called gossipy, lesbian, and that 
their husband is a mandilon.  That affects many women, and they do not want to 
get involved because of the social pressure.N5.18 
 
While the first law was the result of a collaborative effort promoted by María 
Lucía Micher Camarena, the second law, in 2005, faced opposition from the women’s 
movement.  In 2005 the Congress enacted a new family violence law offered by the PAN.  
Promoted from above, the 2005 law opened up conflicts with the women’s organizations 
and the feminist movement in Guanajuato.  As in the case of Morelos, women in the PAN 
group in the Congress of Guanajuato sought alliances with members of civil society 
organizations and public institutions.  It was not hard for them to get the unanimous 
support of the executive branch.  In contrast, among NGOs and members of the feminist 
movement, the loyalties were divided.  Some NGOs working in the area of family 
violence, partially created and financed by the government backed the proposal.  In the 
words of a member of the feminist movement, 
The women’s movement in Guanajuato has its origin in the feminism.  The PAN 
promoted the creation of women’s groups with the goal of fighting family 
violence. But they do it from a governmental and social assistance perspective, 
not from a feminist perspective.  There are also some women’s NGOs, but many 
times those are fake organizations.  About the issue of violence, there are many 
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organizations that allegedly provide services, but the fact is that there are very few 
of them that actually do it.N5.19 
 
The feminist movement and some women’s NGOs openly expressed their 
opposition to the proposal.  Moreover, they felt that they were being asked to participate 
in order to give legitimacy to the process, since those promoting the law were following 
an ideological and prestige-enhancing stand.  For this group, the general feeling was that 
the 2005 law “confounded gender violence and family violence; and the goal of the law 
was to promote conciliation.  But the problem is that conciliation is often confounded 
with ´(re)conciliation´”, said a member of the feminist movement that participated in the 
process. N5.20  Moreover, the law is applied in such a way that reconciliation is imposed on 
women, while the perpetrator of violence receives no sanction, since the main goal is to 
keep the family together.  Another woman, member of Las Libres, described the process 
as 
The gender Commission [in the Congress] has a majority of PAN’s 
representatives, and they have not understood what gender is.  Violence is just an 
issue that they talk about, but they do not have any training in gender issues.  We 
had said that legislative reforms were necessary, and that the DIF should not have 
so much importance under the new reform.  (…)  and of course… female 
legislators proposed legislative reforms, but their reforms were centered in the 
family, confounding gender violence with family violence.  Gender inequality and 
power inequality were key in the previous [2000] law.  The Congress created 
several working commissions in order to get a consensus about the law… but the 
PAN introduced its proposal and they did not pay attention to us.  We were told 
that we should let it to be enacted, and that later on we would be able to introduce 
changes…  No …  There was a public debate about the law, we even got into TV, 
and we believed that the law was not useful, just as was not useful the previous 
one. N5.21 
 
Those opposing the 2005 law arranged a meeting with the Governor, Juan Carlos 
Romero Hicks (PAN), in which they asked him to veto the law.  His reaction was to ask 
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them to support the law, “because we would reform the law a week later”, said a member 
of an NGO that participated in that meeting.  The Governor Romero Hicks not only did 
not want to confront the PAN-controlled Congress, but he thought that the family must be 
kept together, just as the law intends by promoted couple reconciliation. 
The position of the PRI, is complex and has to be understood in the political 
context.  The first reaction of the PRI to the 2005 law was to reject the law, but in the end 
it supported the legislation.  A PRD representative said “in Guanajuato, the PRI is also 
representing the right.  The PRI co-governs with the PAN”.  Monica, a woman from the 
women’s movement in Guanajuato shed some light about the reasons why the PRI ended 
up voting in favor of the law, 
The PRI said that they were not going to support the law. The family violence law 
was for a while stopped in the Congress.  Then the PAN wanted to get a proposal 
that would get the support of all.  But as the PAN has majority in the Congress…  
it got approved in the Gender Commission.  Then, the law was sent to the Justice 
Commission and it got stopped there.  But all this process coincided with the 
approval of the state budget, and all the sudden the PRI did not see any problems 
in the law.  The law was approved with the support of all political parties but the 
PRD.N5.22 
 
The PRD presented an alternative legislative proposal about the same time as the 
PAN.  Their proposal placed the origins of violence in the inherent inequality between 
the sexes and presented family violence as a social problem.  In the words of a former 
PRD state representative, “the reform of the law approved by the PAN was something 
done very fast. They [PAN] did not want our proposal to be considered.  The enactment 
of the second law was favored by political interests, because they got a new law without 
evaluating the previous law.”N5.23  The PRD proposal was never analyzed.  The general 
feeling among insiders is that the PRD presented the law for political reasons, because “it 
is a leftist party, and that is what supposed to do.  None of its representatives [from the 
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PRD] is interested in the issue [of family violence] but women from other political parties 
are even less interested in the issue” said Monica.N5.24  Another female from an NGO was 
also skeptical of the PRD goals by saying, “the PRD presented a proposal for reforming 
the law, but we need to see it very carefully since the PRD has populist goals.”N5.25  
Those who supported the second law criticized those who were against the new 
law.  For example, a PAN congresswoman in Guanajuato said “they [Milenio Feminista 
and Las Libres] are in disagreement with the law. They are very radical.” N5.26 Similarly, a 
member from a NGO said “Las Libres do not want to reach agreements, they are very 
radical. I believe that it is an ideological issue. They are socialist but the government is 
very conservative”.  She added “the problem here is that NGOs are very linked with 
political parties..N5.27  Nevertheless, all those interviewed from the feminist movement or 
women’s NGOs, NGOs working with victims of partner violence, regardless of whether 
or not they supported the law, were connected to a political party, and harshly criticized 
the 2005 law.  They defined the 2005 law as “going backwards.”  A lawyer working in a 
NGO that provides assistance to victims of partner violence expressed her 
disappointment saying, “They made a fool out of us. The original law did not work and 
the reform did not work either.” 
After the 2000, the new PAN majority in the Congress and the Governor Juan 
Carlos Romero Hicks (PAN) promoted important changes limiting women’s rights.  
Political institutions in Guanajuato made a move toward the right.  Everybody but those 
linked with the PAN complained about the traditionalism and conservatism of the right.  
For example few months after Governor Vicente Fox left the government in the hands of 
Ramón Martínez Huerta (substitute Governor), the Congress, controlled by the PAN, 
approved a reform in the criminal code by which abortion even in the case of rape would 
be considered a felony.  When the PAN first introduced the reform, it declared that the 
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issue of abortion was not going to be changed.  However, when the reform was discussed 
in the plenary, the issue of abortion in case of rape was included in the reform package.  
The punishment was an economic sanction and prison penalty ranging from three months 
to six years for those women who had an abortion after being raped.  The response of the 
women’s movement in the State of Guanajuato, and at the federal and international level 
was immediate and this so called reform was vetoed by Governor Martínez Huerta.  The 
issue of the criminalization of abortion in case of rape generated an important break 
between the feminist movement and some women’s NGOs.  For them both the executive 
and legislative power lost their credibility.  María, a former member of Milenio Feminista 
explained,  
The people in this government try to give an image of plurality. When Vicente 
Fox was the Governor or Guanajuato, we collaborated with the government, even 
in the approval of the family violence legislation. But now, no, we don’t.  We 
have our position well defined.  We do not participate because we are not 
interested, we do not participate because we already know that it is a game, and 
that everything is already cooked.N5.28  
 
Similarly, the tension between governmental institutions and the feminist 
movement is noticeable.  For example, a member of the Women’s Institute in Guanajuato 
said, 
It is very complicated to work with women from the feminist movement.  It is a 
challenge. I think that we should work together, but it is very complicated. (…)  
There are few NGOs in Guanajuato and they have done a good job, for example, 
promoting the creation of the Women’s Institute, but perhaps the way in which 
they promote things is not the correct one.  They [NGOs] have very good things, 
and somehow they are linked with the government, but the way in which they act 
is not the right one.  Some of the NGOs have a lot of experience, and it would be 
excellent to find a new way in which NGOs and the government in Guanajuato 




5.5.b.iii-  Lessons From the Experiences of Morelos and Guanajuato  
In sum both in Guanajuato and Morelos the law was approved because of the 
initiative from above, and the participation of the civil society was something that 
legitimized the law.  But as the 2005 law in Guanajuato shows, although the legislative 
power (PAN) sought the consensus of the society, when consensus wasn’t forthcoming, 
they enacted the legislation anyway.  The 2000 family violence law in Guanajuato and 
the 1999 law in Morelos are good examples of legislative diffusion since this type of 
legislation had already been approved in the Federal District.  Key informants consider 
that sections of both laws are very similar to that approved in the Federal District, further 
confirming the theory of legislative diffusion based on imitation.  As has been shown, 
what was important in Morelos was the fact of the approval of the law, regardless of its 
content.  Anticipating the possibility of problems and opposition associated with the 
content of the law, Morelos’ congresswomen decided to pass a law with the sole goal of 
promoting social awareness.  In the case of Morelos, is an obvious case of quest of 
legitimacy, in which the institutions and definitions created were very similar to those of 
the Federal District.  
In the case of Guanajuato, besides seeking legitimacy, the process of approval of 
the 2000 law adheres to a limited rational or a cognitive heuristic model.  In Guanajuato, 
however, an unique factor is the support received from Governor Vicente Fox, whose 
position as the PAN presidential candidate expanded the attention of the law to a national 
level and gave him every incentive to create the impression of co-operation with civil 
society groups. Several years later, however, with national attention directed elsewhere, 
the new PAN majority in the Congress approved a new law that limited considerably 
women’s protection in cases of family violence.  
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5.5.c-  Bottom-up Promotion of Women’s Rights: Reforms in Family violence 
Legislation as a Result of a Civil Society Movement in Jalisco  
The family violence legislation in Jalisco was not the direct result of women’s 
movement and feminist movement efforts.  In Jalisco, the family violence law was the 
result of a grassroots exercise of citizenship.  Jalisco is regarded as one of the most 
machista states in Mexico.  Most of my interviewees in Jalisco coincided in picturing 
Jalisco as the place where machismo was originated.  In the words of a lawyer,  
Here, in Jalisco, the machismo is predominant.  Machismo has prevented men and 
women from being recognized as equal. Although women in theory have equal 
rights, very often women feel that they only can get little crumbs.N5.30 
 
The situation in the state of Jalisco differs from that of the Federal District 
because in Jalisco there are few NGOs and civil society organizations that work for 
women’s rights and a consolidated feminist movement is absent.  In the words of Juan 
Carlos Ramirez, professor and researcher from the Universidad de Guadalajara: 
There is not such a thing as a feminist movement in Jalisco.  Moreover, there is 
confrontation among those women who label themselves as feminists. There is 
fragmentation among them.  They have not been able to overcome their 
differences, and they [feminists] have not been able to set themselves in a group 
with a cohesive program.  However, there are civil society organization that have 
eventually agreed on certain issues [over here he was talking about the issue of 
the family violence law].N5.31 
 
The origins of social mobilization and exercise of citizenship in Jalisco can be 
traced to the massive explosions of 1992 in the metropolitan area of Guadalajara, the 
capital of Jalisco.  The explosion of a pipeline on April 22, 1992 caused 212 deaths and 
the properties of thousands of people were damaged.  In the aftermath, Jalisco’s civil 
society got together to demand visible political changes from Governor Guillermo Cosío 
Vidaurri (PRI), demanding the creation of a committee of inquiry.  This was the first time 
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in contemporary history that Jalisco’s citizenry participated directly in political matters 
beyond the electoral participation.  The 1992’s experience fostered the creation of new 
social networks and civil society groups with the objective of influencing in local and 
state-wide politics.  Noticeable among them is the Mutual Support Network for Social 
Action (Red de Apoyo Mutuo para la Accion Social: RAMAS) that fostered a social 
policy agenda that was later assumed by the state government.  The explosions also 
resulted in the establishment of the Civil Society Forum (Foro de Organizaciones Civiles) 
that was able to get the government compromise for implementing a social agenda.  
The increasing civil society participation in Jalisco, their demands for democratic 
openness and the creation of new spaces of participation led the Jalisco´s Congress and 
its governor, Alberto Cárdenas (PAN), to promote a legislative initiative concerning civic 
participation in 1997.  Since 1995 both the local government and the Congress were for 
the first time in the hands of a non-PRI political party, the PAN.  The Civic Participation 
Law was approved in 1998 and incorporated two forms of direct political participation: 
popular initiative and referendum.22  Through these two ways of participation citizens 
might present law initiatives for reforming, or annulling existing laws or codes, as well as 
approving new legislation.  Until the approval of the law, only the Governor, the state 
Congress, the Jalisco’s Supreme Court, and the city-councils could introduce reforms in 
matters of their competence.  For some, the reason behind the Civic Participation Law 
was the PAN’s aim to coopt the civic participation movement.  In that way the PAN, 
“would not have to face the [political] discredit and the [civil society] pressure” so 
common in previous PRI governments (Zúñiga, Ibarra, and Aguilar 2003:95).  The law 
                                                 
22 The Civic Participation Law of Jalisco was approved in January 31, 1998. The referendum requires the 
support of 2.5% of the electorate for its presentation to the Electoral Council (Consejo Electoral).  The 
Popular Initiative only required the support of 0.5% of the electorate.  This law also approved the 
plebiscite, a mechanism through which citizens can decide over the Governor’s acts and decisions.  
Although citizens are the ones who have to decide, only two-thirds of the Congress or the Governor can 
present a plebiscite initiative in front of the Electoral Council.  
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would give the PAN the support and legitimacy of the citizenry while retaining the 
control of political institutions.  The Civic Participation Law was an excellent political 
strategy since the PAN did not expect that the civil society would reach a consensus 
around any particular issue nor obtain the  number of signatures, about 17,000, 0.5% of 
the electorate, required by law to make their participation valid (Zúñiga, Ibarra, and 
Aguilar 2003).  
The first popular initiative resulting from the newly approved Civic Participation 
Law was the (intra)Family Violence Law.  The proposal contained not only a specific 
family law, but also proposed reforms into the civil and criminal codes.  The initiative 
was orchestrated by the Colectivo Voces Unidas (United Voices) which rationally 
analyzed what could be a good topic for the first popular law initiative.  The federal and 
international context, the fact that many states had already approved family violence laws 
together with the nature of the topic made of the issue of partner violence the content of 
the first civic participation initiative in Jalisco, and in the country.   
The issue of family violence was also being discussed at the national and 
international arenas.  Feminist organizations throughout Mexico and in the international 
sphere were pushing for the approval of legal reforms in the area of partner violence.  
The Mexican Senate ratified the CEDAW in December 1998, and the support given by 
President Ernesto Zedillo to the National Women’s Plan (Plan Nacional de la Mujer).  
Moreover, by 1998 seven states in Mexico had already passed family violence 
legislation: Federal District (1996), Querétaro (1996), Coahuila (1997), and Colima, 
Chiapas, San Luís Potosí and Veracruz in 1998.  
Prior the presentation of the popular initiative, several organizations had been 
working on the issue of family violence and had made several attempts to obtain the 
cooperation of public institutions in the protection families against family violence.  In 
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1995, the Coordination Committee of Female NGOs in Jalisco drafted a document with 
actions toward the protection of women and children against family violence, which was 
handed to the candidates for Governor.  In 1996 took place the forum Legal Alternatives 
to Fight Family Violence (Alternativas Legales para Enfrentar la Violencia 
Intrafamiliar), and in 1997 the third national forum “Against Violence toward Women”.  
Jalisco’s public agencies such as the Ministry of Education, Attorney General’s Office, 
Jalisco’s institute of Social Assistance, and DIF; the University of Guadalajara through 
the program of gender studies (PIEGE: Programa de Investigacion y Estudios de 
Genero); and NGOs such as the Centro de Investigacion y Atencion a la Mujer (CIAM: 
Center for Women’s Research and Assistance), and the Mexican Foundation for Family 
Planning (MEXFAM participated in these two events).  In November 1997, CIAM gave 
Governor Alberto Cárdenas a proposal draft for the Law on Assistance and Prevention of 
Family Violence for Jalisco.  This first legislative proposal never made it to the Congress.  
In 1998 the Mexican Institute for Community Development (IMDEC: Instituto 
Mexicano de Desarrollo Comunitario) organized a seminar on methodology and public 
participation.  Several groups from the Committee for the Coordination of Social 
Organizations, members from several NGOs, university professors, members of the 
Feminist Millennium (Milenio Feminista), and CIAM who attended the seminar 
brainstormed about how to call the attention of the State to the issue of family violence 
against women and children.  In order to preserve the non-partisan appearance of the 
issue, and to increase the likelihood of a popular initiative to pressure the legislature and 
the Governor, Voces Unidas made sure that the issue of partner violence would not be 
endorsed by any political party, nor official or traditional actors from Jalisco’s public life 
would take its ownership (Aguilar Villalobos and Alatorre Rodriguez 2000; Zúñiga, 
Ibarra, and Aguilar 2003). 
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The CIAM, leaded by Andrea Medina, again took up the proposal draft for the 
Law on Assistance and Prevention of Family Violence for Jalisco submitted to the 
Governor about one year before.  The goal was to create a legislative initiative focused on 
family violence that would reach the Congress using the popular initiative as per the 1997 
Civic Participation Law.  Soon after, members from the ITESO (a Jesuit university) and 
other civic organizations such as Alianza Cívica joined the first group, and formally 
created the group “United Voices, Opening Paths”.23  The organizations members of 
Voces Unidas had extensive social capital as a result of having participated in several 
citizenship networks and community initiatives, their links with the intellectual and 
business worlds, their connections with the Catholic Church and mass-media, as well as 
their relationship with the PRI and PAN.  
The situation in Jalisco was different from other states since there were no 
feminist organizations working in the area of domestic violence.  Contrary to the process 
in the Federal District, where seasoned organizations in the area of violence against 
women participated in the process of making visible the problem of violence against 
women and got involved in the process of preparing and approving the law, in Jalisco 
there were no such organizations.  The words of a prominent member of Voces Unidas 
could not be more revealing: 
Unlike in other states, in Jalisco there are not civil organizations working in the 
area of domestic violence. When the movement is created [Voces Unidas] we 
were seeking that the government would fix the problem.  We [Voces Unidas] are 
co-responsible in making the problem visible, construct a social demand, and 
denounce the need of specific legislation as well as the lack of specialized 
agencies for victims of partner violence. (…)  Victims of partner violence had 
very few places where to go.  They could go to the University of Guadalajara, 
and24…  well, with the exception of CIAM, there were not specialized 
organizations in Jalisco.   (…)  The issue of family violence could not have been 
                                                 
23 The name of the group in Spanish is “Voces Unidas, Abriendo Caminos”. The group, however, was 
publicly know as Voces Unidas. 
24 The University of Guadalajara, the Law school provided free consultation in matters of partner violence. 
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brought to the public sphere by the women’s movement because Jalisco and the 
State are vaccinated against feminism.N5.32 
 
The groups that composed Voces Unidas had two main goals.  First, the 
democratization and the promotion of new forms of political participation; and second, 
the approval of a family violence law.  The placement of these organizations within the 
two axis might be explained both by their gender composition and their organizational 
goals.  IMDEC, Alianza Civica and ITESO, were mixed gender organizations, stressing 
the means by which the legislation was enacted (popular initiative).  IMDEC’s goal was 
to promote processes and strategies of civic participation and communication.  The 
objective of Alianza Civica was to promote transparent and clean elections, as well as to 
foster democracy and public participation. The objective of the Jesuit University, ITESO, 
is to give response to social welfare needs and support actions that among others advance 
democratic participation, human rights and social justice.  CIAM was a feminist 
organization seeking to help women through the professional experience of their female 
members. Violence against women soon became the sticking point of CIAM.  Milenio 
Feminista was composed of several civil organizations, including unions, indigenous, 
academic NGOs, for which both the approval of the legislation and the popular initiative 
were equal priorities.  While the different priorities among the groups comprising Voces 
Unidas caused a lot of tension in the group, the fact that Voces Unidas was composed by 
both men and women was seen as something positive, since “only providing a female 
image would be [considered by the society and politicians] as aggressive¨ (words of 
Marisela Mongel in Zúñiga, Ibarra, and Aguilar 2003:134).  
After a long internal process the project was presented to the citizenry on 
November 25, 1998, the international day commemorating for the victims of violence 
against women (see Zúñiga, Ibarra, and Aguilar 2003 for details).  Although the details 
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about the project of the Family Violence law remained unclear to many in elite circles, it 
soon received the support of prominent figures from different spheres of Jalisco’ society 
such as the president of the ITESO, David Fernández; the assistant Bishop of 
Guadalajara, José Trinidad; the rabbi of the Jewish community; and María Marván, a 
well-known political analyst, just to mention a few.  The project was also backed by 
many social leaders, journalists and the business sector.  After an extensive publicity 
campaign and many activities for raising public awareness, Voces Unidas’ project 
received the support of 40,872 signatures. 
It was not only the above mentioned different perspectives held by the different 
groups of Voces Unidas that created conflict within the group, but also the ownership of 
the initiative claimed by Andrea Medina of CIAM.  Several members of Voces Unidas 
agree that Andrea Medina wanted to be recognized as the intellectual author of the 
project, which indeed was part of her B.A. thesis.  Andrea Medina gained visibility and 
was often perceived as the spokesperson of Voces Unidas greatly increased the tension 
and disagreements within Voces Unidas, leading to a split in Voces Unidas even before 
the presentation of the legislative proposal to the Congress, with Angeles González, 
professor of the Universidad de Guadalajara, becoming the new spokesperson for Voces 
Unidas. 
The tension between Voces Unidas and CIAM increased even more at the 
beginning of February 2003 as CIAM had not submitted the final law proposal project, 
which was supposed to be revised by specialized lawyers.  When at last the draft was 
handed to Voces Unidas, and reviewed by the lawyers, the tension increased further.  
Gabriel Gallo Alvarez, at that time a faculty member of ITESO, describes the nature of 
these tensions,  
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(…) since at the beginning the legal part of the project was in the hands of CIAM, 
represented by Andrea Medina Rosas (…) the legal objectives for preventing, and 
sanctioning intrafamily violence were very clear…  Finally, and given the 
concerns of Voces Unidas, on February 23,, 1998 a committee from the [ITESO’s] 
law school reviewed the legislative proposal and found that it did not fulfill the 
expectations generated by the social movement, that at the time was very 
advanced stage (…)  [Together with that group of lawyers I worked] to avoid the 
two possible negative consequences: stop the proposal several days before its 
official presentation date, or that the proposal would have a different content from 
that previously announced to the society and to the Church.  For this reason, we 
worked for three weeks, first to postpone its presentation, initially projected for 
March 8 (the International Woman’s Day) and second, work with the purpose of 
the project to keep all the lawful proposals for preventing, dissuading and 
sanctioning all behaviors that cause damage to the family, remove the repressive 
[issues in the law proposal] and some gender considerations that were not linked 
with the initial goal of the movement [Voces Unidas]” (Zúñiga, Ibarra, and 
Aguilar 2003:161-162).N5.33 
 
The day before the project was to be submitted to the Congress, Andrea Medina 
made changes that had an important impact both in the proposal and in Voces Unidas.  A 
member of Voces Unidas described the reaction of the group: 
She made changes. Those changes were not discussed by Voces Unidas and 
created both a situation that impacted Voces Unidas, and the possibility that the 
legislation would be approved without so much danger.  It is very complicated to 
reach a consensus. There was a fight between individual and collective 
interests.N5.34  
 
Gabriel Gallo Alvarez further explains the nature of the changes from the 
perspective of the ITESO that were mainly about the concept of family: 
We have to recognize that when the document was presented to the Congress, 
[Andrea] Medina Rosas made some changes that, without being very significant, 
created an unnecessary fuss around the project. (…)  ITESO participated in the 
[popular] initiative, but it was never directly or indirectly involved in the 
objective of attempting against the concept of family, marriage, or other matters 




The legislative proposal of Family Violence, supported by popular initiative was 
submitted to the Congress in March 26, 1999.  The Congress was responsible of 
analyzing and modifying the proposal for its subsequent voting.  The initiative, not made 
public at the time, and without knowledge of the important changes introduced by Andrea 
Medina, received the tacit support of two of the three Commissions that the proposal had 
to go through: the Commission of Equality and Gender, chaired by Rocío Gaytán (PAN); 
and the Commission of Social Assistance, chaired by Salvador Ávila (PAN).  The 
Commission of Legislative Studies, Constitutional Affairs and Regulations chaired by 
Porfirio Cortes (PRI), however, was not very favorable to the proposal.  Voces Unidas 
did not see its “exercise” of citizenship as complete after the proposal made it to the 
Congress, and began a new lobbying phase, seeking alliances to pressure the Congress 
for the proposal.  
When the content of the proposal, which included the CIAM’s changes, was made 
public, conflict exploded again, generating a public debate about the contents of the 
proposal.  According to the public opinion and actors involved in the process, the 
controversy was in different areas: how (intra)family violence was conceptualized, the 
concept of family, and whether or not the State should be allowed to intervene in a 
private family matter.  Within the next days the proposal, without the modifications of 
CIAM was presented again in the Congress, and the Congress made public its 
commitment of having the proposal evaluated by November 26, 1999.  However, the 
controversy had already been made public.  
Most of the public debate was about the concept of family.  As in the approved 
Federal District LPAVIF, the bill as it was finally presented to the Congress in Jalisco 
contained the concept of familias (families, in plural).  The concept of familias was 
problematic because in addition to the nuclear family, other types of unions could be 
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recognized as well, especially homosexual couples, or polygamy.  The controversy 
reached one of its peaks when Juan Sandoval Iñiguez, the Cardinal of Guadalajara, said 
that Voces Unidas had not only fooled the Church but also thousands of members of the 
catholic congregation that supported the project.  He added “this is a project that destroys 
the family, and therefore, the society, because it allows the indiscriminate intervention of 
the State in the family’s privacy” (in Mural, June 17, 1999).  His claims, however, were 
groundless since it was the non-modified proposal that was being discussed in the 
Congress.   
The controversy and polarization of Jalisco’s society was such that the Congress 
decided to put Voces Unidas’ proposal on hold.  In response, Voces Unidas began an 
active campaign to get the proposal enacted.  After a long process of building alliances 
with different actors in the process, and recognizing the problems faced during the 
process, Voces Unidas received the support of the Church once more.  The governor of 
Jalisco, Alberto Cárdenas Jiménez reaffirmed his support of the project on November 15, 
1999.  The Congress had not finished debating the bill by November 26, 1999, the 
supposed deadline agreed to when the proposal was first presented in the Congress.  
On week later, in December 1, 1999, the Congress finished the evaluation of the 
proposal that consisted in reforms both in the civil and criminal codes, and the approval 
of a family violence law.  Voces Unidas had won a very partial battle.  From the forty 
state-representatives in Jalisco, twenty-nine voted against considering the reforms in the 
civil and criminal codes.  Nevertheless, they agreed upon the addition of the content of 
the Ley de Prevencion y Asistencia a la Violencia Intrafamiliar, to the Social Assistance 
Code, which indeed regulates the agency responsible for social assistance and family, 
DIF.  
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Voces Unidas, however, dissatisfied with the failure of the Congress to 
incorporate the reforms in the civil and criminal codes, demanded a response.  In 
February 2000, a women’s organization called Círculo de Mujeres por Mexico (Circle of 
Women for Mexico, a group created to support the political campaign of Luis Donaldo 
Colosio, a PRI presidential candidate assassinated in 1994, and that currently works 
toward in the areas of civic training and creation of public opinion) presented a complaint 
in front of the State Commission of Human Rights against the Jalisco Congress.25  The 
State Commission of Human Rights investigated the reasons why the Congress had not 
evaluated the part of the popular initiative concerning with the civil and criminal codes 
amendments.  It concluded that the Congress had to evaluate the reforms in the civil and 
criminal codes.  Despite the pressure exerted by the State Commission of Human Rights, 
the mass-media, and Voces Unidas, the Congress did not make the changes in both Codes 
until August 23, 2000.  
In Jalisco, the law was the direct result of an initiative from below, in which the 
content of the law and the institutions to be created by the law were discussed among its 
members.  The family violence law was approved, but the dynamics differ greatly from 
those of other states, since only Jalisco experienced the promotion of the law from below.  
Not only among the four states in my set, but among all the states in Mexico, Jalisco’s 
experience is unique.  This is the only case in which there was a public debate that 
explicitly surfaced the double purposes of the law, split between the protection of the 
individual and the promotion of the family.  In this case, as I have demonstrated above, 
even among those supporting and leading the popular initiative, the promotion of the 
family absorbed the notion of the protection of individual women from family violence.  
The actions of the Jalisco Congress show that the law was approved not because of any 
                                                 
25 The State Commission of Human Rights has the goal of protecting individuals or organizations human 
rights that have been violated by civil servants or public institutions.  
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interest in the goal of diminishing violence against women in the family, but rather as a 
form of  legitimacy-seeking, in which the impression of interest is created to produce 
political and status gains, as is implied by its inclusion in the Social Assistance Code.  By 
including it in the Social Assistance Code, the Code that mainly regulates the DIF and its 
activities, the true goal of family promotion and protection is evident.   
 
5.6-  CONCLUSION 
The approval of administrative legislation sanctioning family violence and 
authorizing preventive measures against it in Mexico’s states has followed different 
paths: top-down, bottom-up and a collaborative effort between civil society and the State.  
In all states, the approval of family violence legislation has been the result of a diffusion 
process that in most of the cases can be explained by the need of the State to restore lost 
legitimacy, or to obtain it.  The issue of obtaining legitimacy cuts across levels: 
international, federal and local-state level.  This chapter has shown how the enabling 
State in terms of issues of violence against women has become such, due to the search for 
legitimacy.   
At the international level, Mexico signs most international conventions and 
treaties that contain actions for guaranteeing that women have a life free of violence.  
However, this national signature is more a declaration of good will than an enforceable 
writ, since it has taken several years for its ratification from the Mexican Senate.  At the 
Federal level, the creation of public agencies for victims of partner violence and rape was 
the result of the scandal of nineteen rapes perpetrated by agents within the Federal 
District Attorney’s Office.  This was seen as a symptom of the underlying corruption and 
deceitfulness of the State.  Many regarded the creation of these agencies as a battle that 
was won over the status quo forces within the State; or as concessions of a controlling 
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State that was progressively changing its role to an enabling State.  In reality, though, the 
Federal District government’s concern was not about women’s rights, but about the 
increase in crime as well as placating public indignation and civil society mobilizations 
following the scandals.  The State was forced to provide some response to this society 
mobilizations, as Walker (1991) claims “when public support for the cause they 
[women’s organizations] represent swells to such a great extent that policy makers must 
address their claims or risk loosing their political legitimacy” (cited in Weldon 2002).  
The reaction of the federal executive has also been mediated by legitimacy issues.  
When Grupo Plural sought the support of President Zedillo to the package of reforms to 
the criminal and civil codes, he consented, but given that the proposal originated in the 
PRD, members of the PRI wanted to boycott the signing event.  If these reforms were 
originated by a non-PRI party, the public acceptance for the PRI would increase even 
more.  It was not until members of the Grupo Plural let president Ernesto Zedillo know 
that the press was cognizant of plans for his attendance at the event that the president’s 
office realized the political consequences in terms of public relations damage that would 
ensue if he did not sign the legislation; thus,  the signing took place.   
The goal of administrative family violence laws is to facilitate the access to 
justice for victims of partner violence.  In most cases the enactment of administrative 
laws were accompanied by modifications in the civil and criminal codes.  However, as 
we will see in the next chapter, these administrative laws are more symbolic than 
effective for protecting women’s rights, given their unbridgeable duality of objectives: 
protecting individuals within families from violence, and the promotion of the family.  In 
the Federal District, there was an international pressure for approving family violence 
legislation, arising not only from the international commitments made by the Mexican 
government, but also because other countries in the region had already passed similar 
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legislation.  In the case of the Federal District, the collaborative effort between women’s 
movement, NGOs and legislators, resulted in an analysis of previous legislation in order 
to draft the legislative proposal.  Following Weyland’s (2005b) typology of legislative 
diffusion, the Family Violence Prevention and Assistance Law followed a rational 
learning process.   
For the other states, the geographical origin of such diffusion was the Federal 
District. As the legislation was already approved there, other states felt the pressure for 
approving similar legislation.  As consequence, legitimacy became a key issue in the 
approval of the family violence law in Morelos.  The main goal in Morelos was to have a 
law approved regardless of its content.  That is the reason why it approved a law mainly 
centered in promoting public awareness, and trying to avoid any issue that was expected 
to generate controversy.  Therefore in Weyland’s (2005b) typology, the force behind the 
approval of the law in Morelos was a quest for legitimacy.  In the case of Morelos we 
have seen how legislators promoted the approval of the legislation in order to 
demonstrate State’s modernity, and as Weyland argue, governments fear “the stigma of 
backwardness and therefore eagerly adopt policy innovations regardless of functional 
need” (Weyland 2005b:270) 
Guanajuato constitutes an excellent example of how the context influences the 
State and how legislation and public policies change depending on broader sociopolitical 
circumstances.  The case of the family violence legislation in Guanajuato illustrates how 
the State moved from being an enabling State in 2000, when the first law was approved, 
to a repressive State in 2005 when the second law was passed.  The case of Guanajuato 
shows also that the State is plural and that the same action –family violence law- might 
have different significances for the multiple actors constituting the State.  For example, 
Governor Vicente Fox supported the legislation in 2000 because he wanted to become a 
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strong candidate for the presidency, in what Weyland would define as a quest for 
legitimacy; the State Congress behavior falls into the cognitive heuristics category, since 
the Federal District legislation was being taken as a reference by many states, and it was 
“widely adopted on the bases of its apparent promise, not its demonstrated success” 
(Weyland 2005b:271).   
In the lapse of five years the legislation about family violence in Guanajuato 
changed from being an enabling legislation in terms of women’s rights to controlling 
legislation in terms of the familist agenda.  The approval of the second family violence 
law in 2005 was not a consequence in the change of the political forces in the state since 
the PAN had both control of the governorship and the state congress.  After Vicente Fox 
had already been elected president, the PAN approved a second law in 2005, which by 
requiring public authorities to impose a reconciliation process on abused women and their 
aggressors, actually limited women’s rights.  This issue will be discussed with further 
detail in the next chapter, in which I will analyze how on paper the State might be 
formally enabling, but in its actions the State might be labeled as controlling. 
The case of Jalisco also demonstrates how the reaction of public opinion and the 
search of legitimacy influenced the approval of family violence.  Jalisco’s family 
violence legislation is an unintended consequence of the civic participation law approved 
in 1997 with the goal of creation new forums of participation.  The family violence law 
was the result of an exercise of participation that caught the State by surprise.  After the 
controversy generated by different actors about the concept of family and the right of the 
State to regulate private issues, a pseudo-law was approved.  It was a pseudo-law because 
it was not an autonomous law as in the other cases studied in this chapter.  After a 
lengthy process of approval, the law was included as part of the Social Assistance Code.  
As consequence the DIF, the public assistance institution of the government, was 
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responsible for its implementation, fostering the “family promotion” part of the 
legislation, and, therefore, providing limited rights to women.   
Therefore, in Jalisco the DIF has been given responsible for interpreting and 
implementing the law, which is subject to change depending on the ruling party of the 
moment.  Just for illustration purposes, some of my informants in Jalisco mentioned the 
informal letter that was sent by the higher ranks of the DIF, in which governmental 
agencies dealing with domestic violence cases were requested not to provide legal advice 
to those women willing to initiate a divorce procedure, “because the DIF is an institution 
for the promotion of the family, not for its destruction”.  Jalisco’s Congress approved the 
legislation due to all the pressure received from the mass-media and the society.  
However, the length of time elapsed since the presentation of the proposal and its final 
approval, as well as its inclusion in the Social Assistance Code, supports the hypothesis 
of a lack of interest on behalf of Jalisco’s legislative power.  Therefore, the family 
violence laws had the goal of granting legitimacy to State institutions, or to individual 
people, as was the case of Vicente Fox, governor of Guanajuato.  In the case of Morelos, 
regardless of the content of the law, the important matter was to have a family violence 
law.  In sum, the law responded to different objectives and strategies.   
This chapter has also demonstrated that the State is plural and that there is a 
myriad of actors participating in the definition and protection of women’s rights.  
Following a post-structuralist approach, I have shown that in addition to the State, other 
actors need to be taken into consideration when analyzing legislative diffusion.  The 
socioeconomic, political and historic context is of central relevance for understanding 
how women’s rights are defined and what type of protection is granted.  Not only might 
different institutions have differing goals, but also different people within the institutions 
might have different agendas or attitudes, as evidenced by the division between male and 
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female legislators.  While most congresswomen were supportive of the approval of the 
family violence legislation, their male counterparts often expressed their reluctance 
toward this type of initiatives, characteristically in the form of joking comments – 
implying at once discomfort with the issue and the desire to de-legitimate it as a serious 
legislative concern.  This issue will be further explored in the last chapter. 
The approval of administrative family violence legislation does not necessarily 
translate into better protection of women’s rights. As we will also see in the next chapter 
this type of legislation has had the unintended goal of reinforcing women’s traditional 
gender roles within the family rather than a real protection of women’s rights within the 
family by prioritizing keeping the family together.   
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CHAPTER 6:   THE CONTENT OF THE FAMILY VIOLENCE 
LEGISLATION:  HOW NEW LAWS AND HIGH EXPECTATIONS 
CONVERGED TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS-QUO 
 
Administrative family violence laws were approved in almost all states 
guaranteeing the right for all family members to live free of violence.  The key research 
question addressed in this chapter is whether this objective has been achieved.  Violence 
is used by men as a way of securing and maintaining male dominance and female 
subordination, which are central to the patriarchal social order (Radford and Stanko 
1991).  In what follows I examine the ways in which violence against women is defined 
and how the administrative legislation on family violence attempts to protect women by 
attempting to balance gender-based power relations within the family. 
In the previous chapter we saw that the family violence legislation was enacted in 
most Mexican states as a result of pressure from a variety of sources and actors, including 
civil society and international organizations whose activism gave rise to a legitimacy 
crisis concerning this issue.  However, enactment of legislation is only one step towards 
the achievement of the stated objectives of that legislation.  In order to differentiate the 
legislation from the achievement of its objectives I employ the terms “responsiveness” 
and “effectiveness.”  One major part of government responsiveness is bureaucratic 
responsiveness, which refers to the extent to which specific bureaucracies respond to 
complaints and requests. Government responsiveness in general refers to the extent to 
which government acts in response to problems or citizen demands (see Weldon 2002 for 
further discussion and references).  Responsiveness, however, does not necessarily imply 
effectiveness.  
 232
Effectiveness refers to policy impact, which in the case of family violence refers 
to the extent to which state initiatives (laws or public policies) ultimately reduce the 
prevalence of the problem.  In Mexico, the State was responsive to citizen’s demands and 
international pressures that led to the crisis of legitimacy.  However, in terms of actually 
reducing the prevalence of violence, the State faced a dilemma that forces us to question 
the effectiveness of the actions taken by the State.  The dilemma was inscribed in the 
objectives of the state’s administrative family violence legislation itself as it aims at both 
guaranteeing family members security from violence and also strives to promote and 
sustain the unity of families.  The latter aim meaning, in real terms, keeping the victim of 
violence and her assailant together.  The latter objective is clearly conveyed in such 
statements as, “since the stability and development of families are of public interest and 
human solidarity “ (see the Family Violence Prevention and Assistance Law in the 
Estado de Mexico), and “(…)[since] the family [is] the indisputable bastion for the 
preservation of society, the State must establish the suitable mechanisms for its 
integration and preservation. Therefore, it is of vital importance to fight face to face 
against everything that goes against the family unit and causes its deterioration; since 
there is no  doubt that the family is the origin of the social community” (Colima’s Family 
Violence Law).26   
As we saw earlier, domestic violence is a phenomenon that has serious 
consequences for the individual, families and the society in general.  While zero violence 
should be the ultimate objective, something far short of that is the likely reality of even 
enlightened efforts at reform.  In some cases, Mexican women who seek the intervention 
                                                 
26 Que el maltrato familiar es una manifestación frecuente de violencia, cuyos orígenes se remontan a la 
antigüedad, y siendo la familia, el bastión indiscutible para la preservación de una sociedad, el Estado debe 
establecer mecanismos idóneos para su conservación e integración, resultando de vital importancia, 
combatir frontalmente todo aquello que vaya en contra o en deterioro de la unidad familiar que 
necesariamente es el origen de la comunidad social. 
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of the State are sent back to their homes and their husbands and to a dangerous situation 
that has not changed.  The assessment of the ultimate effectiveness of the law depends on 
which of the competing goals of the legislation we focus on, protecting individual women 
from family violence or promoting the stability of the family. 
Understanding the origins and consequences of this contradiction forms the core 
of this chapter.  To this end I examine the specific provisions of the law, the 
interpretations of those agencies in charged of implementing the law, and the female 
victims of partner violence, as well as the extent to which the law and public agencies 
charged with enforcing it are used by the female victims of partner violence.  As we will 
see, the patriarchal context and the pervasiveness of patriarchy in the State, reflected by 
the attitudes and actions of individuals working for and representing the State, and the 
strong familistic tradition in Mexico interact to create an situation in which rather than 
protecting women from family violence, the agencies charged with the task of protecting 
women tend to foster her revictimization if this is necessary to preserve families, no 
matter how dysfunctional they are. Familial ideology essentializes and universalizes the 
conception of women as wives and mothers, as economically dependent, as passive, 
dutiful and self-sacrificing across a broad range of personal laws (Kapur and Cossman 
1996:101, cited in Ahmed-Ghosh 2004). 
In the first part of this chapter I present an overview of the contents of the law in 
the administrative family violence legislation in Mexico.  In the second part I analyze 
whether or not the differences in certain aspects of the legislation are associated with the 
structural level of gender equality.  In the third section I present empirical data about the 
interpretation of the family violence law on behalf of the State agencies and women.  By 
a detailed analysis of the conciliation process, I will show how individual and family 
protection is negotiated and understood.  Formal conciliation is a process in which some 
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attempt is made to settle disputes between the aggressor and the victim with the aid of a 
mediator who helps both parties reach an agreement regarding their rights and 
obligations, without having to go to court.  
More specifically in the first part of this third section I examine how public 
agencies conceptualize conciliation and transform it in reconciliation.  In the second part 
I review how the requirements of the conciliation process revictimize the woman and 
either directly or indirectly pushes her to stay in the family.  Finally, in the third section I 
review how the woman is faced with a dilemma posed by the patriarchal social structure, 
to choose between the well-being and unity of the family or her own well-being.  The 
choices made by women will differ according to their individual and situational 
characteristics.  Finally, in the last part of the chapter I present the conclusions and I 
discuss the effectiveness of the law for protecting the individuals and their families.  
 
6.1- GENERAL OVERVIEW ABOUT THE CONTENTS OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAWS REGARDING FAMILY VIOLENCE 
The legislation regarding family violence, as we saw in the previous chapter, is 
widespread.  However as we will see throughout this chapter it is heterogeneous 
regarding its contents (for specific details about the contents of the administrative family 
violence laws by state see Pérez Contreras and Mora-Donatto 2006).  The structure, 
although not the content, of the legislation is quite similar in all states and it is divided in 
the following eight sections, which content is summarized below:  1) general rules; 2) 
creation of a Council for Family Violence Assistance and Prevention; 3) assistance to 
victims of family violence; 4) prevention of family violence; 5) administrative procedures 
for resolving controversies related to family violence; 6) infractions and sanctions, and; 
7) mechanisms for appealing the sanctions and resolutions.   
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1- General Rules:   
a. Main goal of the law. 
b. Definitions of key institutions created by the law and responsible for its 
application, as well as already existing institutions. 
c. Key concepts of the law such as prevention, assistance and coordination. 
d. The scope of the law: definition of individuals protected under the law and the 
types of relationships between individuals involved in violence acts which are 
protected under the family violence law. 
e. Definition of the acts constituting family violence (i.e. physical, sexual, 
psycho-emotional and economic).  It also includes the definition of both 
perpetrator and victim of family violence. 
f. Public institutions and agencies responsible for the implementation of the law. 
There are several institutions responsible for the application of the law. 
Among those we find the Governor or its equivalent in the Federal District 
(Government Chief), Secretary of Government, Secretary of Education, 
Secretary of Health, Secretary of Public Security, Secretary of Social 
Development, the State General Attorney’s Office, and the State Women’s 
Institute. According to some laws, the municipal governments bear 
responsibility for the execution of the law.  Such are the cases of Guanajuato 
and Oaxaca.  Also variously bearing responsibility are institutions of the 
judiciary power, such as the Center for Legal Assistance in Jalisco; the State’s 
Congress such as in Colima; or the State Commission of Human Rights.  The 
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specific responsibilities and competencies of each institution toward the issue 
are outlined, and the mechanisms of coordination among them are established.  
2- Creation of the Council for Assistance and Prevention regarding Family Violence 
a. Creation of the council and its composition.  All states, in which the 
legislation has been enacted, but Nayarit, have a Council for Assistance and 
Prevention of Family Violence.  In Tlaxcala, it is called Technical 
Commission in Family Violence.  The councils are composed by several 
members from the institutions responsible for the implementation of the law.  
In many states, one or several NGOs will be permanent members of the 
council.  This is for example the case of Morelos, Coahuila, Colima or the 
Federal District.  In other states such as Guerrero, Estado de México, 
Veracruz and Yucatán.  NGOs can become part of the Council at the 
Governor’s request.  The Council is presided over by the Governor in most 
states.27  In some states they include representatives of municipalities and 
members of the civil society or private sector with expertise in family 
violence.  
b. The role of the council:  To coordinate, evaluate and promote actions and 
specific public policies for prevention of family violence and assistance to the 
victims.  These actions will be translated into a general program that will 
establish the actions for the institutions responsible for its implementation.  In 
some states the Council is also responsible for the sponsoring studies about 
 237
family violence, assisting in the professional training of public employees 
working in institutions dealing with family violence, keeping an statistical 
database about family violence, conducting public awareness campaigns, 
acting as a coordinator not only among the institution and NGOs in the State, 
but also between the local and federal levels.  Also in some states such as in 
Jalisco and Sinaloa the Council will promote the creation of a Board of 
Finances (patronato) that will assist the Council to obtain funds for the 
development of family violence programs.  
c. How often the Council members will be summoned by the president of the 
council.  The frequency ranges from once a month in Baja California Sur, 
Jalisco to six months in Morelos, Durango, Querétaro or Zacatecas. In most of 
the states the Council meets once every three months.  
3- Assistance to Victims of Family Violence 
a. Characteristics of assistance: Not only the recipient of violence, but also the 
aggressor, as well as other members of the family are by law in most states 
eligible to receive assistance.  Attention of different kinds (i.e. therapeutic, 
educational, and protective of the victims) is made available both by private or 
public institutions.  State courts might mandate the aggressor to receive 
specialized attention in public agencies.  
b. Prohibition of discrimination due to race, marital status, nationality gender, 
socioeconomic status, and religion:  The attention will be free of stereotypes, 
                                                                                                                                                 
27 In the following States, the position of chair of the council is honorific: Tabasco, Puebla, Nuevo León 
and Federal District.  In these States, the council is not presided over by the Governor: Baja California, 
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sexism, or other forms of bias and will have the goal of protecting victims of 
family violence, reeducating those that perpetrate violence and reducing and if 
possible eradicating violence in the family.  
c. Professional requirements of personnel providing specialized services:  
Personnel providing professional services should have specialized training, be 
board certified, have professional integrity, and be sensitive to the issues of 
human rights. 
d. Relevant institutions and roles of these institutions.  
e. Collaborating institutions:  Institutions that are responsible for providing 
assistance to individuals that experience family violence (i.e. TSJ, Secretary 
of Public Security, Secretary of Governance, State Attorney’s Office, DIF, 
Municipalities, State judges). 
4- Prevention of family violence 
a. Institutions with responsibilities in the prevention of family violence.  The 
institutional design in each state is different, but among those with in charge 
of prevention programs we find the Secretaries of Education, Health, Social 
Development, DIF, Women’s Institute or Secretary of Women, the State 
Superior Court (TSJ), and the State Commission of Human Rights.  
b. Specific tasks for prevention: 
i. Development of educational programs in schools about family 
violence and human rights. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Coahuila, Guerrero, México, Jalisco, San Luis Potosí, Sinaloa, and Zacatecas. 
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ii. Promotion of awareness campaigns and specific actions in 
communities where a higher incidence of family violence has been 
detected, and among vulnerable groups such as youth and indigenous 
peoples.  These actions will be carried out by specially trained 
personnel.  In some states, the law plans programs for low-income 
areas.  In those cases, these programs will try to incorporate low-
income people in their implementation. 
iii. General awareness campaigns, including those developed in 
collaboration with the mass-media.  
iv. Promotion of research about the causes and consequences family 
violence.  The results of this research are to be used to design new 
models of assistance to victims and accused/perpetrators, as well as 
to design new prevention programs. 
v. Promote awareness and training of public employees in the executive 
and judiciary power, and specially those in direct contact with those 
affected by family violence. 
vi. Create awareness of the law in different institutions. 
vii. Creation of a registry of governmental and non-governmental 
institutions that provide assistance to victims. 
viii. Promotion of legal reforms. 
ix. Fostering awareness and provide specific training for teachers and 
creation of a “parenting school” (escuela de padres) in which issues 
of family violence will be addressed.  
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5- Administrative procedures for resolving controversies related to family violence: 
Procedures of conciliation and arbitration.  
a. Institution(s) responsible for the mediation (mediación), conciliation 
(conciliación) and arbitration (arbitraje o amigable composición).  These 
methods of resolving family violence incidents do not exist in all states.  Some 
states only institute conciliation, not arbitration, while in some there are no 
mediation programs.  These institutions are diverse: Family Violence 
Attention Units (UAVIs: Unidades de Atencion a la Violencia Intrafamiliar), 
the Procuraduria de la Defensa del Menor y la Familia dependent from the 
State or Municipal, DIF, and family judge. 
b. Main characteristics of the procedures:  Whether or no the conciliation 
procedure is initiated at request of the parties or the public agencies 
responsible for conducting it will always attempt to resolve the controversies 
through conciliation.  Rules are different and sometimes vague on how many 
times the procedure must be attempted, or whether it is compulsory or not.  
For example, in Morelos, the law states that “the conciliation might be 
attempted as many times as is required”. 
c. Rules on the conduct of these procedures:  Rules differ on whether a public 
agency can offer legal counsel to or find legal counsel for the victim of family 
violence.  State rules differ, too, on whether or not the perpetrator of violence 
is given compulsory notice to report to the agency providing assistance to 
victims for an interview or to attend conciliation meetings.  Procedures are 
defined concerning the arbitration process and whether or not those involved 
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in family violence must attend one, and what penalties ensue for non-
compliance. 
d. Judge’s role:  Different rules in the states determine whether the institution 
responsible for conciliation must take the conciliation agreement to a member 
of the judiciary power in order to make sure that the agreement is enforced.  In 
some other cases this is left up to the signatories.   
e. Protective orders: Whether the institutions responsible for assistance, 
mediation, conciliation and arbitration have the responsibility to request 
measures for victims of family violence differs among the states. 
f. Consequences:  Penalties for breaching the agreements reached in the 
conciliation or arbitration agreements.  
6- Infractions and Sanctions.  Not all state laws contain sanctions to be applied to the 
infractions to the law.   
a. Definition of infractions:  These include: The non-appearance of perpetrator 
after due notice has been given, breaching the agreements reached in the 
conciliation or arbitration process; acts of family violence that are not 
provided for in other bodies of law; acts committed in the process of 
conciliation, mediation and arbitration; unwillingness to receive psychological 
assistance from the units for victim assistance; and recidivism. 
b. Sanctions: Conditions the circumstances which automatically initiate the 
application of sanctions.  
c. Type of sanctions: Written warning, psychological therapy for aggressors, 
economic, and prison.   
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d. What the payments of the sanctions will be used for:  Very few states 
explicitly state that the sanctions will be used to finance programs of family 
violence prevention and assistance.  
e. Integrity of public employees:  Sanctions for those employees failing to fulfill 
the requirements of this law or acting in an unprofessional manner. In some 
cases, those penalties included in regulations outlining responsibilities of 
public employees will be applied, or specific sanctions will be included in the 
law.  
7- Mechanisms for appealing the sanctions and resolutions reached or applied by the 
agencies responsible for arbitration, mediation and conciliation:  Existence of 
appealing mechanisms to the administrative resolutions, time and institution to which 
the appeal has to be presented. 
6.2- PROVISIONS OF THE FAMILY VIOLENCE LAW FOR PROTECTING 
WOMEN AND FAMILIES:  VARIATION ACROSS STATES AND PATRIARCHY 
As we have seen above, the contents of the law are very diverse.  There was no 
set standard across the state’s that approved administrative legislation concerning family 
violence.  Here, I wish to focus on eight features of the legislation that determine the 
level of protection of women against family violence:  1) types of violence enumerated in 
the law, 2) whether or not the physical violence has to occur repeatedly for it to be 
considered as family violence, 3) the structuring of conciliation and 4) arbitration 
processes for resolving controversies, 5) compulsory conciliation, 6) the attribution of 
responsibilities to institutions –rather than to the victim of partner violence– for notifying 
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alleged perpetrators to be present at the conciliation process; 7) sanctions; and 8) creation 
of shelters.  
When domestic violence became an issue of public interest due to the emphasis of 
the feminist movement, domestic violence was mainly associated with physical violence 
(see Yllo 1988).  It was not until more recently that other types of violence such as 
emotional or economic violence began to be labeled as such.  All legislations include 
physical and psycho-emotional violence.  In the states of Yucatán, Tlaxcala, Oaxaca and 
Colima, partner sexual violence is not characterized as family violence.  Women are 
virtually left without protection against marital rape in Tlaxcala and Colima because rape 
within the marriage is not categorized as a felony in the criminal code.  Economic or 
patrimonial violence is the form of violence less included in the legislation.  The fact that 
physical violence has to be recurrent in order to be classified as family violence has given 
rise to controversy, because in states that require recurrence (66% of states), women are 
left vulnerable to one time incidents.  The criminal code offers no relief, since that the 
baseline for State intervention is set so that the injuries inflicted as consequence of 
physical violence must last a certain period of time.  
Conciliation is a form of mediation whereby disputes may be settled between the 
aggressor and the victim with the aid of a mediator helping both parties to reach an 
agreement regarding their rights and obligations without having to go to court.  In the 
case of family violence, 86% of the family violence administrative laws envision 
conciliation as the first response to domestic violence disputes.  In six states, conciliation 
has been made mandatory for both parties.  While those involved in family violence will 
reach an agreement in the process of conciliation, in the arbitration process, an impartial 
referee from a public institution agreed to by both parties sets a hearing and determines 
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the best resolution of a dispute.  Twelve states offer this second venue of resolving family 
violence controversies.   
The problem with the conciliation and arbitration processes is the inequality of 
power between the abused and the abuser.  These processes tend to occur shortly after the 
violence.  The victim of partner violence is, therefore, put in a coercive situation, face to 
face with her partner/abuser, and urged to reach an agreement that will end the violence.  
For obvious reasons, this situation may well increase the distress already experienced by 
women who have had to share the same space with their assailant.  This distress might be 
exacerbated and provoke new episodes of domestic violence if the woman, rather than a 
public employee, is responsible for handing the notification by which the abuser is 
requested to attend to the public agency for receiving assistance or participating in a 
conciliation process.  
Finally, laws that include sanctions and specific provisions for the creation of 
shelters for victims of partner violence offer an increased protection of women.  
Sanctions have proved dissuasive for partners who engage in violence.  Seventy percent 
of the enacted laws contain sanctions for those involved in family violence or those who 
breach the conciliation or arbitration agreements.  In contrast, only 31% of the laws 
provide for battered women shelters.  In the U.S. domestic violence shelters have been 
around for several decades.  As of 2000 the National Directories of Domestic Violence 
Programs registered 1,386 shelters (Tieffenthaler, Farmer, and Sambira 2005).  By 
contrast, it was not until 1996 that the first shelter opened its doors in the small city of 
Aguascalientes, Mexico (Guillé-Tamayo 2002).  As of May 2004 the National Women’s 
Institute (Inmujeres) reported the existence of only 32 shelters for battered women in 
Mexico.  While some states have additional publicly funded or non-governmental 
shelters, others lack any source of refuge at all for victims of partner violence, which 
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points to an insufficiency both in resources and in the regulatory vision that should attend 
to the situation of battered partners.   
What factors explain the discrepancies across states?  As we have seen throughout 
this dissertation, the level of structural gender inequality is associated with individual-
level factors.  Here I test whether or not the level of structural patriarchy is associated 
with the contents of the law.  In other words, I analyze whether or not the effects of 
patriarchy operate differentially in the contents of the law depending on the degree of 
patriarchy in the state, as measured by the GEIMS developed in Chapter 2.   
Table 6.1 presents features of the legislation associated with women by level of 
structural gender inequality.  The classification of the states into three categories serves 
the purpose to find commonalities among states.  From the thirty-two states that compose 
Mexico, three of them are not included in the analyses for two reasons: because their 
violence against women legislation was not put in terms of specific family violence  
(Chihuahua and Hidalgo), or because the provisions in the Social Assistance Code are so 
vague that cannot be compared with other laws (Aguascalientes).28  By using the GEIMS, 
In the low gender equality category we find seven states: Baja California Sur, Chiapas, 
Durango, Michoacán, Tabasco, Tlaxcala and Veracruz.  In those states the level of gender 
equality ranges from 36.9 in Tlaxcala to 39.9 in Durango.  This means that from a scale 
in which 100 represents equality between men and women, in the states with low gender 




                                                 
28 In the case of Jalisco, the family violence provisions are also included in the Social Assistance Code, 
however, it was intended to be enacted as a law.  The provisions are far more complete and extensive than 
in the case of Aguascalientes.  
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Table 6.1: Characteristics of the Administrative Family Violence Legislation by Level of 
GEIMS 
 
The level of structural gender equality in the states of the middle category ranges 
from 40 to 45.  The states in the medium category are: Baja California, Campeche, 
Guanajuato, Jalisco, Nayarit, Nuevo León, Querétaro, Quintana Roo, Sinaloa, 
Tamaulipas and Zacatecas.  Finally those in the high equality category, are states where 
the level of gender equality is higher than 45; Colima, Morelos, Guerrero, Mexico, 
Sonora, Coahuila, Yucatán, San Luis Potosí, Puebla, Oaxaca and the Federal District.  
 Level of Gender Equality (GEIMS) 
 Low Medium High 
 Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD 
GEIMS 38.84 1.3 41.8 1.2 49.3 7.9 
Year 2000 2.6 2001 2.7 1999 1.2 
Types of Violence 3.0 0.6 3.4 0.5 3.0 0.8 
Recurrent 57.1 0.5 63.6 0.5 72.7 0.4 
Conciliation 85.7 0.4 81.8 0.4 90.9 0.3 
Conciliation compulsory 66.7 0.5 0.0 0.0 20.0 0.4 
Arbitration 42.9 0.5 30.0 0.5 54.5 0.5 
Institution carries citations 28.6 0.5 45.5 0.5 45.5 0.5 
Sanctions 66.7 0.5 50.0 0.5 90.0 0.3 
Shelters 28.6 0.5 45.5 0.5 18.2 0.4 
% NGOs in violence 7.7 8.5 24.9 15.9 19.3 9.5 
NGOs in the Council 42.9 0.5 63.6 0.5 45.5 0.5 
 
Notes:  States with low level of gender equality: Tlaxcala, Chiapas, Baja California Sur, Michoacán, 
Tabasco, Veracruz, and Durango. States with medium level of gender equality: Nuevo Leon, Baja 
California, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Zacatecas, Queretaro, Tamaulipas, Campeche, Sinaloa and Nayarit. 
States with high levels of gender equality: Colima, Morelos, Guerrero, Mexico, Sonora, Coahuila, 
Yucatan, San Luis Potosi, Puebla, Oaxaca and Federal District.  
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Among those, the Federal District with a level of gender equality of 72.4, followed by 
Oaxaca, where the gender gap is 48.4.  
Table 6.1 shows interesting differences among the legislation enacted in the states 
depending on the level of structural gender equality.  On average, the states where 
women have achieved higher levels of equality with men enacted the legislation earlier 
than in states with lower levels of gender equality.  In terms of the types of violence 
specified in the law, no difference is found, however, between states in the high and low 
patriarchy category.  In these states, in average, three types of partner violence are 
included in the law.  These tend to be physical, sexual and psychological/emotional 
violence.  The states with medium levels of gender equality also tend to include 
patrimonial or economic violence.  This difference might be associated with the fact that 
those states on average enacted the legislation about two years later than the states with 
higher levels of equality.  Another of our indicators, the legal provision that physical 
violence must recur in order to be considered violence and thus, to be regulated by the 
administrative family violence law, shows that 64% of the states in the high and medium 
category of structural gender equality tend to require repetitiveness of the behavior, while 
the states with lower levels of gender equality partner violence does not need to be 
recurrent to be regulated with the administrative family violence legislation.  
Regarding the conciliation process, most laws explicitly include conciliation as 
the preferred process through which couple violence can be resolved.  All states with low 
levels of gender equality but Baja California Sur include conciliation.  The two states that 
do not include it among the intermediate states are Nuevo León and Querétaro.  San Luis 
Potosí is the only state among those in the higher category of gender equality which does 
not contemplate conciliation, perhaps because its law is among the vaguest administrative 
family laws in Mexico.  However, the most salient statistic concerning conciliation is that 
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it is mandatory, regardless of the will of the parties, precisely among states with low 
levels of gender equality, that is, five states of the seven in the low gender equality 
category (67%): Chiapas, Michoacán, Tabasco and Tlaxcala.  The arbitration process is 
included in 43% of the laws of states with low gender equality, in 30% in the states of the 
intermediate category, and half of the high category.  
Another feature of the family violence legislation that might contribute to 
women’s victimization is notification.  When delivery of diverse citations to the 
aggressor falls upon the female victim, the invitation to further physical abuse can be 
expected –so much so that this can be thought of as a disincentive to victims not to 
involve the state in domestic violence incidents.  In 29% of states with lower levels of 
gender equality, some public agency, normally the department of transportation or the 
municipal police, is assigned the task of notifying the alleged perpetrator by citation, in 
contrast to states with medium and high levels of gender equality, where the percentage is 
45.5%.  As for sanctions, almost all laws enacted in more egalitarian states (90%) include 
sanctions for acts of family violence, and violations of the conciliation or arbitration 
agreements.  This percentage lowers to 67% in states with higher levels of patriarchy and 
to 50% in the states in the intermediate category. 
One of the few specific measures for the protection of women is the creation of 
shelters.  Only nine states make the State responsible for creating shelters for victims of 
family violence:  Oaxaca and San Luis Potosí, among the states with higher levels of 
gender equality; and, Baja California Sur and Tlaxcala among the states with lower levels 
of gender equality.  It is among those states with intermediate levels of gender equality 
where on average more laws contain specific provisions for the creation of shelters:  
Guanajuato, Jalisco, Nuevo León, Querétaro and Zacatecas.  It should be noted, though, 
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that some of those states enacted the law recently, like Nuevo León in 2006, or recently 
reformed the code, as with Guanajuato.  
The last two lines of Table 6.2 record the presence of anti-family violence NGOs 
in the states.  There are four states that do not have any single NGO with that purpose: 
Nayarit, Durango, Tabasco and Baja California Sur. The last three are states with low 
levels of gender equality.  The average percentage of NGOs that have family violence or 
violence against women among their goals is 8% in the states that fall in the lower gender 
equality category.  In contrast, the percentage is more than doubled in states with the 
highest level of gender equality, and tripled in the states of the intermediate category.  
The presence of NGOs might be associated with differences in the legislation, but it is not 
correlated with the presence of NGOs in the Councils for Prevention and Assistance of 
Family Violence.  
It is not possible to make a clear conclusion about how the structural level of 
patriarchy in any given state affects the law features.  For example, in more patriarchal 
states (lower level of structural gender equality) more cases of legislation in which the 
conciliation is compulsory are found.  In addition, the legislation in these states does not 
attribute the responsibility of handing citations to the abusers to any public institution; 
falling thus on female victims the responsibility of handing over the notification.  
Nevertheless, perhaps as a protection for women, more patriarchal states do not require 
recurrence of violence in order to be considered family violence.   
On the other side, in states with higher levels of gender equality (medium to high) 
we do not observe many salient differences in the laws, perhaps because the level of 
structural gender equality in Mexico is still low and there are not many differences in 
terms of GEIMS among these two groups.  The legislation that apparently offers more 
protection to female victims of partner violence is found in states with medium levels of 
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gender equality: more types of family violence are recognized as such, fewer laws 
include conciliation, and in none of those states is the will of the aggressor and the victim 
disregarded in mandating public agencies to set up conciliation.  Furthermore, in almost 
50%, the responsibility of handing the notification falls to a public institution. Around 
50% nominally pledge to create shelters.  In these states the law is the least punitive, 
because only half of the laws in states with medium levels of gender equality include 
sanctions.  
We can only speculate for the reasons behind these differences.  One possibility 
goes back to the pattern of diffusion: as the laws in the medium category were approved 
and reformed more recently, it is also more likely that they picked up on the track record 
of other states and incorporated more effective measures for protecting women.  As of the 
characteristics of the law in the low equality category, these might reflect the patriarchal 
climate governing the state.  Finally and unexpectedly, higher levels of gender equality in 
a state do not translate into legislation more favorable in every aspect to women’s rights.  
Again, the pattern of diffusion might provide one explanation for this, as those states with 
higher levels of gender equality were also more likely to be the innovators or first 
adopters of laws against family violence. The lag is in reforming imperfections in these 
laws as they became evident, but the track record was picked up by states who devised 
their laws later.  
 
6.3-  FAMILY VS WOMEN’S INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS:  EFFECTIVENESS OF 
THE LAW, INTERPRETATION BY STATE AGENCIES AND VICTIMS  
The formal protection of women against family violence is inconsistently 
materialized in State’s public policies and the actions of public agencies.  Again, we find 
contradictions between what is formally stated in the law –protection of women and 
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families– and how this is interpreted, showing thus how the State is plural and the 
protection of women’s rights is dependent on a broader political, and structural context, 
as well as on women’s situational factors.  In the previous part of this chapter I identified 
several characteristics of the legislation that determine the level of protection of women 
against family violence.  I will now show how the workings of some of these legal 
provisions that are intended to keep the family together as well as protect victims of 
domestic violence have, in some cases, led to the sacrifice of family violence victims to 
the goal of family unity.    
Most laws provide protection for several forms of partner violence.  Over time it 
has been easier to identify and prove the existence of physical and sexual partner 
violence.  The identification of economic, psychological or patrimonial violence, 
nevertheless, is still difficult.  Although these forms of violence are included in the law, 
both public authorities and women victims have a hard time conceptualizing these types 
of violence.  Most of the people providing assistance argue that women have started 
labeling as violence physical and sexual abuse, but find psychological and patrimonial 
abuse hard to define.  A lawyer working in an NGO in Chihuahua said, “(…) normally 
women tend to experience more than one type of violence.  In the event of psychological 
or economic violence, women feel that there is something wrong in their relationship but 
they do not conceptualize what is happening to them as violence”.N6.1 
Women tend to seek help when violence has become physical.  Often they have 
had a history of enduring other forms of violence leading up to the physical abuse.  
Public authorities and specially the law enforcement agencies have a hard time 
recognizing psychological violence.  A woman working in a specialized agency in family 
violence in Morelos explained that to identify and prove the existence of psychological 
violence is very complicated.  They need that an expert to perform an evaluation and 
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write a report. In some cases we even need witnesses.  Press charges only for 
psychological violence is much more complicated than in the cases of physical injury.  
As a result, regardless of the provisions of the law for other types of violence than the 
physical and sexual, the activities of public agencies are mainly centered in these two 
types of violence.  
 
6.3.a-  Conciliation and Reconciliation of the Family: Maintaining the Status Quo as 
a Result of Socioeconomic Pressures, Patriarchal Culture and the State 
By the process of conciliation couples goes through a process in which disputes 
may be settled between the aggressor and the victim with the aid of a mediator who helps 
both parties reach an agreement regarding their rights and obligations.  As we saw in the 
previous section, in some states the conciliation is mandatory and in some others the 
conciliation process is considered a forum for those involved in family violence to settle 
their conflicts if they so desire.  The data from the interviews conducted with key 
informants in the states show that a very high percentage of women (from 70-80% 
depending on the state) opt for the conciliation process.   
But before analyzing the causes why women opt, or are made opt for the 
conciliation, and what are the consequences of it, it is necessary to understand the 
dynamism of the phenomenon of partner violence.  In collaboration with Ronald J. 
Angel, we analyzed the dynamism of partner violence and concluded that women 
experience violence in brief bursts, transitioning in and out of violence in a short period 
of time (Frias and Angel 2007).  Research from the U.S. indicates that in some cases men 
who have been violent cease their violence without the separation of the couple 
(Campbell, Rose, Kub, and Nedd 1998; Donato and Bowker 1984; Feld and Straus 1990; 
Johnson 2003; Wofford, Mihalic, and Menard 1994).  In perhaps as many as half of the 
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cases of violence reported in representative surveys in any one year, the respondent 
reported no case of violence by the next year (Aldarondo 1996; Feld and Straus 1990; 
Wofford, Mihalic, and Menard 1994).  
For some couples the cessation of abuse is possible (Campbell and Soeken 1999). 
This seems to occur in the event that the frequency and severity of the partner violence 
has not escalated (Frias and Angel 2008).  However, research using shelter samples 
suggests that once violence occurs it usually continues, and often escalates until the 
woman is injured or until she leaves her partner (Pagelow 1981).  These differences are 
associated with the different type of abuse experienced by women: common couple 
violence or patriarchal terrorism (Johnson 1995).  
The reasons behind the reform of the abuser and/or the discontinuation of 
violence occur are unclear.  Johnson and Leone (2005) suggest the possibility that 
changes in the emotional context of the relationship can result in specific conflicts that 
can escalate into periodic but non-persisting violence.  Walker (1979) explains the 
temporary discontinuation of violence as part of a cycle of violence that includes tension 
build-up, acute battering, and contrition or reconciliation.  For many women several 
attempts are required before they are able to leave permanently (Bybee and Sullivan 
2005).  Their return to the shared space, according to research, increases the possibility 
that they will suffer even more traumatic violence than those who never leave (Anderson 
2003; Campbell, Miller, Cardwell, and Belknap 1994; Hebert, Silver, and Ellard 1991; 
Sullivan, Basta, Tan, and Davidson 1992).  In some cases, the end of the relationship 
does not mean the end of the violence, since many violent partners continue abusing the 
woman (Bachman and Saltzman 1995; Bybee and Sullivan 2005; Sev'er 1997).  
Conciliation is compulsory in the laws of some of the states in which I conducted 
interviews with key informants. This is the case of Morelos.  In other states, conciliation 
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is not compulsory, but there is an informal rule in the public agencies responsible for 
assistance to attempt the conciliation several times.  This is the case of Jalisco.  In other 
states such as the Federal District or Guanajuato, the policy of privileging conciliation 
depends on the judgement of individuals within the agency.  In Chihuahua, a state where 
the law against violence towards women is not supplemented or encoded in a family 
violence law, women seem not to face strong pressure to use conciliation to resolve the 
family violence hostilities.  In fact, in all states where I had an opportunity to question the 
experts about their perceptions concerning the law, one of the first things that they would 
mention was the conciliation process and the difficulties associated with it.  I identify 
three main set of problems associated with the conciliation:  1) Goals of the institution 
with responsibility of conducting conciliation processes; 2) The conciliation process and 
its requirements; 3) Individual and situational characteristics of the individuals 
participating in the conciliation process within a non-supportive structural context. 
 
6.3.a.i-  Goals of the institution with responsibility of conducting the conciliation 
process  
The overriding problem with conciliation is that it is often confounded with 
reconciliation.  In other words, public authorities take advantage of the conciliation 
process, which is open-ended as to the separation or the return of the woman to the 
shared domestic space, to promote only one outcome, the reconciliation of the couple. 
This derives from a fundamental devalidation of partner violence as a serious offense on 
the part of public institutions.  The testimony of a woman working in an human rights 
NGO in Guanajuato illustrates this point, 
The problem is that the DIF, and in general, all governmental institutions in 
Guanajuato do not see family violence as a serious offense. They understand 
family violence as a conflict. That is the reason why the DIF [institution 
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responsible of conducting conciliations] understands conciliation as reconciliation 
of the couple.  Family violence is a crime, but they do not see it as such.  There is 
not conciliation in cases of car theft. Why then family violence can be resolved 
through conciliation?N6.2  
 
The high crime rates in Mexico, and the efforts for decreasing the criminological 
indexes in Mexico have also influenced how family violence disputes are being handed in 
the State Attorney’s Office.  A well known feminist scholar from the Federal District 
who has conducted extensive research in violence against women from a legal 
perspective affirmed in an interview, “in the Federal District Attorney´ Office the 
informal order is that family violence cases need to be resolved through conciliation 
because they want to reduce the crime indexes”.N6.3  The testimony of a high official in a 
Morelos State Attorney´ Office specialized agency in violence against women could not 
be more enlightening,  
We promote the reconciliation from the MP.  Sometimes women are pushed to 
continue with the relationship and the conciliation is stimulated. (…) When the 
woman pardons the aggressor, then the case is over, even though it originally was 
a crime prosecuted ex-officio.N6.4 
 
Respondents from all states where the family violence law was enacted agreed 
that the conciliation process does not work if it is structured in this way, contributing 
instead to the revictimization and subordination of women.  All of them concur in that the 
objective of the conciliation is to keep the family together in a very paternalistic way, and 
that the interest of the administrative law in family violence, rather than taking violence 
committed against the victim as its main focus, takes its object to be preserving the 
family.  The paternalism and fierce defense of the family in public institutions seems to 
be true regardless of the political party in the executive branch.  “Here, in Jalisco, we do 
not want the relationship to be broken up, we want to exhaust all possible options before 
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that”, said a psychologist of the DIF Jalisco.N6.5  Marta Torres, a professor from the 
Colegio de Mexico and author of several books about domestic violence said, 
Domestic violence is seen as a little fight (pleitecito), and the State attempts to 
resolve it as if they [the couple involved in family violence] were children. (…)  
The interest of public policies and the executive power in the way that it interprets 
the law, is not the abused woman, it is the family.  What they are interested on is 
not on individual rights, they aim to keep the family as a basic social unit.  (…).  
Governmental institutions classify families into two types: good and bad families, 
functional and dysfunctional families.  The wife has to be sweet, loving, and 
affectionate.  She has to take care of her husband and back him.  In other words, a 
traditional wife. (…) Many institutions in charge of implementing the family 
violence legislation, such as the DIF, reproduce traditional gender roles, and 
somehow what they think is ‘as we cannot convince the husband not to be violent, 
then, we have to subdue the woman; women have to be confined to their 
traditional roles.N6.6 
 
The State’s paternalistic attitudes and its fierce defense of the family contribute to 
the revictimization of women.  The legislation is reinterpreted by public agencies and 
individuals within public agencies in order to keep the family together.  In some cases 
this is a concrete order imposed on those working in these public institutions, while in 
other cases a specific mandate is not needed because individuals understand that the 
familial agenda is presupposed.  Public employees working in DIF Jalisco’s agencies 
received a letter from the higher ranks of the institution urging them to keep the family 
together and discouraging women from breaking the family.  Only in cases of extreme 
cruelty, those involving severe violence, do they recommend the woman get a divorce, in 
order to “safeguard women’s physical integrity, and to protect her from economic and 
emotional violence”.  Another informant from the DIF Jalisco told me, 
The State has, thus, a paternalistic function.  For example the DIF Jalisco has the 
idea that psychologists have to do everything possible to keep the family together.  
And that is why they push women to the conciliation process: to keep the family 
together, regardless of how the woman feels in the family, or regardless if she 
suffers violence or not.  In Jalisco there is a very conservative view of the family.  
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The legislation provides that family violence should not be allowed, but the fact is 
that institutions collaborate in the perpetuation of violence.N6.7    
 
Roberto Garda, member of CORIAC (Colectivo de Hombres por Relaciones 
Igualitarias), argues that the PAN, especially at the federal level, somehow places part of 
the responsibility for the violence on the woman.  “Violence exists because the woman 
answers back her husband.”  He claims that the PAN gives advice to women, and 
promote el empoderamiento a la Mexicana (empowerment in the Mexican style), which 
means that women are empowered in traditional female roles leaving intact oppression, 
subordination and machismo.  In Roberto Garda’s words, “empoderamiento a la 
Mexicana consists in promoting changes that maintain the status-quo.”N6.8   
 
6.3.a.ii-  The Conciliation Process and its Requirements 
The second set of problems raised by respondents from public institutions and 
women from NGOs and feminist movement in all the states but Chihuahua is related to 
the nature of the conciliation process.  Most key informants highlighted the inequality of 
power between the aggressor and the victim.  In general the conciliation process is not 
backgrounded by previous or concurrent psychological work done on the aggressor party. 
The power status differential makes the conciliation a burden for women. The testimony 
of a lawyer working in a religious NGO that provides assistance to victims of domestic 
violence in Guanajuato illustrates this point,  
The conciliation process is like a brainwash for women in order to get them to 
continue in the relationship.  In the conciliation the woman loses everything but 
the man does not lose anything (…).  The conciliation process is not fair.  Despite 
that the person responsible for carrying out the conciliation is there, women are 
still very influenced by their husbands, and everything that they say.  The 
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conciliation process should not be promoted if the husband does not receive 
psychological assistance first.N6.9 29    
 
Similarly, a woman from Guanajuato’s Women’s Institute argued, 
Experts argue that there cannot be conciliation with previous work and that 
conciliation cannot occur because men and women are not in equal conditions.  
Conciliation only makes sense when the woman is empowered, but not in any 
other type of conditions.N6.10 
 
The conciliation occurs in a moment in which the woman is at a very high risk of 
experiencing more violence.  Some of the men that attend to a public institution for a 
conciliation process are very upset because they are not aware of their behavior, they do 
not believe that their partner sought help and that they were required to go to a public 
agency.  Since the process of conciliation occurs in few days or weeks after the woman 
goes to the public agency, some women experience threats and verbal abuse such as 
name-calling.  In some cases even there have been attempts to physically abuse the 
woman during the conciliation hearing.  The testimony of Rosa, in a Municipal DIF from 
Morelos exemplifies the danger for revictimization faced by women during the 
conciliation process and the unbalanced power dynamics, 
Women are afraid to speak. We understand the level of violence exerted by the 
man when he threats the woman in front of us and does not let her speak.  
Sometimes the man talks for several hours.  He complains about her not being at 
home, the food not being ready when he arrives home, the house not being 
properly cleaned and ordered (…)  There has been times in which I feared for the 
woman’s life.  Some men are very upset and demanding. When we see that type 
of situations we require a police to be present during the conciliation hearing.  
Sometimes the aggressor has attempted both to hit me and the woman who filed 
the claim”.N6.11  
                                                 
29 “La conciliación es un lavado de cerebro a las mujeres para que continuen en la relacion.   En la 
conciliacion la unica que sale perdiendo es la mujer, y al hombre no le pasa nada (...) La conciliacion ni es 
justa nie s equitativa.  Aunque haya terceras personas las mujeres son muy influenciables por el marido.  La 
conciliacion no deberia existir si el varon no recibe atencion psicologica primero”.  
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The process of conciliation is very often conducted by people that do not have 
much experience in the issue.  That is why some of my interviewees think that the 
conciliation process does not work.  For example in the DIF Guadalajara the conciliation 
process is carried by social workers.  The director of the agency responsible for 
conducting the conciliation process said that social workers “have a greater knowledge of 
the problem of domestic violence”.  He added, “if the conciliation is carried out by 
lawyers, it would adopt a more legal and less humane approach”.  The administrative 
family laws provided for the creation of many centers of assistance and conciliation.  The 
generalized concern among people interviewed from public institutions not involved in 
conciliation processes, as well as those from NGOs and/or the women’s movement, is 
that conciliation is carried out by people without specific training in the issue.  A woman 
occupying a high responsibility position in the Federal District CAVI said, 
If the conciliation process is carried out by somebody who is knowledgeable in 
family violence and in conciliation, great.  Otherwise it is rubbish.  The ones who 
don’t understand the conciliation process make the aggressor and the victim to 
talk to each other.  That is not conciliation, that is a conversation.  (…)  A lawyer, 
instead, provides alternatives and proposals, but the individuals are the ones that 
take the decision.N6.12  
 
Another problem associated with the conciliation process is who handles the 
notification to the abuser.  As we saw in the previous section, the administrative law 
about family violence in some states does not provide that a public institution will handle 
the citation to the aggressor in order for him to show up in the institution that provides 
assistance to victims of family violence.  In many cases the aggressor does not know that 
the woman sought assistance, and the commonality is that women are still living with the 
perpetrator of violence.  The fact that women have to handle the notification to the man 
places them in a situation of risk.  Similarly, to continue living with the aggressor when 
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the notice is handed also increases the risk of experiencing further violence.  New 
episodes of violence and conflict might occur after delivering the citation due to the 
partner’s anger, which is why  some women opt for not delivering them, or inform the 
public agency the after that the notice was delivered everything is resolved. This is the 
best scenario, because a high percentage of women never go back.  In some cases, people 
working in the agencies responsible for conducting conciliations and providing assistance 
have developed strategies to overcome the potential situations of violence that might arise 
if the woman handles the notification.  Some of these strategies involve placing the 
victim of partner violence in another place than her house, and some others entail the 
good will of public employees working in the agencies.  The experience of a female 
lawyer working in the DIF Morelos illustrates this point, 
Prior 2003 we [Procuraduria de la Defensa del Menor y la Familia] requested the 
support of preventive police bodies to deliver the notice.  Now, the woman has the 
option of giving it to the police, and the police is the one handing the notice.  If 
the police are unable to handle it after two attempts, they let us know.  
Afterwards, in theory is women’s responsibility to do it.  Sometimes I do it, or I 
get that a woman’s relative or friend to do it.  Normally, I try to make sure that 
they are not home during this period, especially when he receives the notice.  In 
some cases they are there, and that is very dangerous for the woman.  Many 
women do not want to leave the house because they are afraid that they will be 
accused of house desertion, which is impossible because there is a reason behind 
–partner violence.  Not leaving is very dangerous for them.N6.13  
 
6.3.a.iii-  Individual and situational characteristics of the individuals participating in 
the conciliation process, and the structural context. 
The third set of issues regarding the conciliation process is associated with 
individual and situational characteristics of the individuals participating in the 
conciliation process, as well as the structural context.  Of special relevance here is the 
discrepancy between the rationale behind women’s use the conciliation process and its 
real purpose.  Most women, in all states attribute a new meaning to the conciliation.  
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They just want somebody with authority to “reprehend or scold the man about his violent 
behavior”, “slap at her husband’s wrists”, “tell her husband that hitting your wife is 
wrong”, or “tell her husband that if he continues with that type of behavior we will put 
him into prison”.  This type of use of the conciliation has many similarities with public 
agencies goal of keeping the family together.  A member of the Center for Attention of 
Family Violence (CENAVI: Centro de Atención a la Violencia Intrafamiliar) in 
Guanajuato told me “90% of the women who arrive here, they do not want a divorce, 
they just want that we talk to the aggressor and that we give him a tirón de orejas (slap at 
his wrists).”  The same pattern is also found in those cases of extreme violence that 
constitute criminal offenses.  A female state judge in a criminal court in Jalisco argued, 
Approximately 90% of the females that suffer violence do not want to break the 
marriage.  Women believe that they have to forgive him, and that all 
administrative and criminal process has the objective of giving a lesson to the 
man.N6.14 
 
Individual, situational and structural factors contribute to women’s 
“reinterpretation” of the purpose of conciliation.  Individually, women who experience 
violence experience mental health problems such as posttraumatic stress, depression, 
anxiety, low self-esteem, and panic attacks, and are at a higher risk of suicide. Physical 
health of victims of partner violence tends to deteriorate as a result of permanent and 
temporary injuries, creating possible functional impairment and increasing likelihood of  
chronic pain syndrome, AIDS and gastrointestinal disorders, among others (Heise and 
García-Moreno 2002).  As a result of those problems, abused women are less likely to be 
employed and are more likely to face employment problems (Lindhorst, Oxford, and 
Gillmore 2007).  Women who are unemployed and those who lack financial resources are 
more likely to suffer repeated violence and they are less likely to leave their abusers 
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permanently than employed women or those with more financial resources (Bybee and 
Sullivan 2005; Gelles 1987; Strube 1988). 
In all the states my respondents said that most women opt for the conciliation for 
two reasons: psychological and low self-esteem issues, and economic dependency.  
While economic dependency for higher class women means avoiding the loss of their 
socioeconomic status, for poor women it is associated with survival – a real fear in some 
cases, but fictitious for those women who are the primary breadwinner in their family.  
Although women from all social classes experience violence, everybody agreed that 
better-off women are more likely to go through the conciliation process because they do 
not want to lose their socioeconomic status.  A psychologist that used to work for a 
public agency providing assistance to victims in Jalisco said, 
Most women back out of their original decision.  They sign the conciliation 
agreement and give the man a second, third, or fourth chance.  (…)  I think that 
economic dependence of the woman is a key aspect.  That is the reason why 
women from higher social classes, if they seek assistance, are more likely to sign 
an agreement and stay in the relationship. Due to their economic dependency, 
they do not want to lower their socioeconomic status.N6.15  
 
Lower class women also go through the conciliation process because of economic 
issues. They are poor and very often they rely on the husband’s income.  When they 
know that economic sanctions are going to be imposed to their aggressor, or that he can 
be put into prison, they do not want that to happen because they do not have economic 
resources.  They cannot support their children, and as many of them will return with their 
abuser, their financial situation will worsen even more.  Economic situation and childcare 
are the two main reasons many women decide to stay in the relationship and not to 
initiate a criminal procedure.  A female state judge in Guanajuato explained how many 
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women go to their office to request that she dismisses the case, and that she wants to 
forgive the aggressor. 
Poor women tolerate domestic violence partially because of economic reasons.  
Poor people file more demands than people better off, but they are more likely to 
withdraw the demand because of all the cost that it generates.  They might have a 
state-appointed lawyer, but they need to pay for the copies and certificates. If they 
do not have money for food, they cannot find money for the required certificates, 
copies and other paperwork.  (…) Both in the administrative and criminal 
procedures, poor women forgive the aggressor because they need the money.  
Sometimes their self-esteem is so low that they think that they cannot make it 
without them.  Many times this is a stupid thought because they are supporting 
him, and even giving him money for his vices.N6.16 
 
Structurally, the patriarchal nature of the society and familism influence women 
to go through the conciliation-reconciliation process.  Familial ideology naturalizes and 
universalizes the construction of women as wives and mothers, as economically 
dependent, as passive, dutiful and self-sacrificing, across a broad range of personal laws 
(Kapur and Cossman, 1996 cited in Ahmed-Ghosh 2004).  Many times the victims’ 
family disapproves the fact that women seek help in public institutions.  Many women 
are told, “es tu cruz” (it’s your faith), “la mujer sólo es valiosa si tiene un hombre al 
lado” (women are only worthy if they have a man at their side), “la violencia del esposo 
es algo que por génetica tenemos que sufrir, yo lo he aguantado y tú lo has de aguantar” 
(husband’s violence is something that genetically have to endure, I suffer it and you have 
also to suffer it), “eres una mujer, y sufrir violencia es parte de ser mujer” (you are a 
woman, and experiencing violence is part of being a woman).  That victims of partner 
abuse can expect such phrases from their closer social network reflects how embedded 
patriarchy is in Mexican society.  In the context of these attitudes (ideological 
patriarchy), it is understandable that a high percentage of women forgive their aggressor 
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and, if anything, undergo a conciliation process to keep the family together.  My 
interviewees said that most women say that they want to save their family.   
These individual and situational characteristics, coupled with the patriarchal 
social structure that promotes and naturalizes female’s subordination and violence against 
women, interact with the cycle of violence in order to keep women within the family, and 
in a high risk of experiencing violence.  Walker (1979) argues that after violent episodes 
couples go through a honey-moon period in which the man shows how sorry he is.  
During this time the aggressor expresses his regret and he promises that he will never do 
it again. It is during this period when the administrative conciliation process takes place.  
However, without any type of intervention and change, the cycle of violence consisting in 
tension build-up, acute battering, and contrition or reconciliation is likely it will occur 
again.  “I have seen men promising the sky and the stars (prometer el cielo y las estrellas) 
to women; women have forgiven them, and I have seen again the same women coming 
and seeking help”, said a social worker from Guanajuato.N6.17 
 
6.3.b-  The Conciliation:  An Agreement Intended for Change that Keeps 
Everything More or Less the Same 
The administrative legislation about family violence provides that before 
proceeding with the conciliation process, both the aggressor and the victims must receive 
assistance, for women, in the form of social, legal and psychological assistance, and for 
men, psychological assistance that dovetails with mandated therapy.  While on the paper 
this looks good, in reality it is often rushed, the requirements of psychological therapy for 
both the man and women are often tacitly waived and the executive power agencies have 
little or no mechanisms of enforcement.  The testimony of a scholar from the Federal 
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District that has conducted extensive research in the issue will help to understand how in 
many agencies speed both the attention and the conciliation process.  
Women go the public agency seeking help.  Many times they do not know what 
they want, but they want help.  In few hours they have received assistance from 
several departments. They have had interviews with people from the department 
of social work, as well as the legal and psychology department.  After she repeats 
the same history, that institution notifies the aggressor that he is required to go to 
the agency.  The police notify the husband in those cases in which the law 
provides so, in other states is the woman the one handling the notification.  What 
happens next is obvious. More or less 50% of the women will never go back to 
the public agency, others will withdraw the complaint against the abuser, and 
many others desist.  The public agency arranges to meet the man and the woman 
with half an hour of difference.  The husband arrives to the agency very upset, 
and everybody, both men and women working in the agency try to calm down the 
man and tell him that they will look for solutions.  Men go to a short therapy of 
half an hour, and in case he wants, he is required to go to the agency another day 
for the conciliation process.  In some cases men are required to go to 
psychological therapy before to proceed with the conciliation process.  In some 
other cases the conciliation process might occur at that same time.  The 
conciliation agreement is signed in the agency, and in it is included a mutual 
respect clause, and the compromises both of the male and the woman. In some 
cases [states] there might be a clause by which both, the aggressor and the victim, 
acquire the compromise of going to psychological therapy”.N6.18 
 
In some states such as Jalisco men are asked to receive psychological therapy.  
But a closer look to the psychological therapy process for men in Jalisco revealed the 
problems associated with it.  Informants from the DIF Jalisco, which provides 
psychological group therapy for men, told me that of the ten men in an average case that 
were supposed to attend the therapy, only five will show up for the first meeting, which 
diminishes in the meeting thereafter until the men stop showing up.  In some cases they 
cannot make it due to work constraints, but more relevantly, their incentive for being in 
therapy is the return of their wife, and once she returns, they have confidence that she 
will, or they know for sure that she will not they stop coming.   
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Because public agencies such as the DIF have no coercion power – in Jalisco only 
the CEPAVI and judges have it– they cannot do much about forcing men to attend.  
Under these circumstances, if the abuser does not receive psychological attention, the 
conciliation agreement is likely to be worthless.  Even in the cases in which the man 
receives therapy, given its short duration, it is unlikely that changes have occurred.  The 
words from a female state judge in a criminal court in Jalisco illustrates this position, 
According to my experience, the conciliation agreement is often worthless.  
Women continue experiencing violence, perhaps in lower levels, but they still 
suffer violence.  I do not think that the conciliation agreement brings domestic 
violence to an end.  For that is required psychological work on both sides.  It is 
really unlikely that people with emotional and psychological problems will 
change without treatment. I do not believe in conciliation.N6.19  
 
Most laws provide that public agencies have to offer assistance to both, the 
aggressor and the victim, but these agencies are often under-staffed and their budgets 
barely allow them to provide assistance to women.  In Guanajuato, for instance, women 
from several NGOs and experts in several governmental agencies argued to me that there 
were not enough resources for programs targeting men.  When public institutions face the 
dilemma of allocating resources to programs and activities targeting woman or men, they 
normally lean toward programs that provide assistance to women.  Respondents in all 
states contend that public campaigns that attempt to promote awareness about family 
violence have generated a huge demand of services that have not been paralleled with an 
increase in resourcing by the State.  Therefore there are not enough services for women, 
and even less for men, if any.  Even in the case that men’s programs exist, as it is the case 
of the CAPPSI, Center for Psychological Prevention and Attention (Centro de Atención y 
Prevención Psicológicas) in Chihuahua, men tend not to finish the psychological 
treatment. Julieta Colomo, director of the CAPPSI explained that almost 85 percent of 
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women finish the psychological treatment.  In contrast, this percentage is only about ten 
percent for men.  
Most administrative family violence laws give the executive the power of 
sanctioning family violence behaviors as well as violations of conciliation and arbitration 
agreements.  The penalties are either arrest or the payment of a fine.  Previous research in 
the U.S. has shown that domestic violence offenders who were arrested by the police and 
convicted in court were less likely to reoffend (Sherman and Berk 1984; Tolman and 
Weisz 1995; Ventura and Davis 2005).  Other studies, however, have yielded 
inconclusive findings ranging from the non-effect of the arrest to the interaction of the 
arrest with the individual ties to social networks (see review by Ventura and Davis 2005).  
Ford and Regoli (1992) found that recidivism is more frequent in cases in which the cases 
were dropped because the victims decided not to take legal action against their abuser.  
Similarly, batterers ordered by the court to go to an intervention program have lower 
rates of reassaulting than those who enter voluntarily to the program (Gondolf 1997). 
Reliable data about whether or not the conciliation or arbitration agreements bring 
partner violence to an end doesn’t yet exist, because in many cases in which the 
agreement is breached, women do not go back to the public agency to request help, or it 
takes several additional episodes of violence for the woman to go back.  The institutions 
responsible for conducting conciliations vary across states.  In most states the DIF is the 
institution responsible for carrying out the conciliation and arbitration process.  However, 
in some states, such as in Colima or Sinaloa it is the State’s Attorney’s General Office the 
agency in charged for conciliation, in Durango or Veracruz the administrative municipal 
courts, in Puebla the Procuraduria General de Justicia, and in Quintana Roo the Center 
for Legal Assistance dependent from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia.  In the case that 
the courts are promoting the conciliation, the conciliation agreement can be automatically 
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enforced.  When it is an administrative institution such as the DIF, without enforcement 
power, which is responsible for conducting the conciliation, nothing happens when 
conciliation agreements are violated.  
Some family violence laws take into consideration the lack of enforcement power 
of executive agencies by providing a judicial route for those agencies to take in cases of 
non-compliance.  For example, in the states of Baja California, Durango, Oaxaca and 
Zacatecas the agency that conducts the conciliation process will send the judge the 
conciliation agreement for its ratification.  Similarly, in the Estado de Mexico, the 
agreement will be sent to the Center of Judicial Mediation for the same purpose.  In the 
states where I did my research, it is the individual who must ask the judge for an order to 
fulfill the agreement in case of breach.  This process is time consuming, and leaves the 
victims of partner violence virtually unprotected.  For that reason the agencies 
responsible for conducting the conciliation process have developed two strategies for 
increasing the protection of women in the terms of the agreement.  The first one involves 
urging the woman to seek judicial ratification of the agreement.  The second tactic is for 
the agency to independently seek ratification of the agreement in front of the judge.  The 
testimony of a woman working in the CENAVI in Guanajuato exemplifies the first 
strategy and mentions some of its problems.  
With the current legislation after the conciliation agreement is signed, the woman 
has to seek the judge’s ratification.  In that way the agreements have the same 
category than a sentence (cosa juzgada).  The problem is that many times women 
do not go to the court and therefore no much can be done when the agreement is 
breached.  (…)  In those cases in which the agreement is not honored a civil or 
criminal procedure can be initiated.  But this is very complicated, because it 
requires a lot of work with the female victim of partner violence in order to start 
that alternative processes.N6.20  
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In some states, when the woman has not ratified the agreement and does not want 
to press criminal charges, the agencies responsible for assistance and conciliation often 
initiate another conciliation process, as revealed by key informants from Guanajuato and 
Morelos.  In Jalisco, it is promoted a second strategy for forcing the fulfillment of the 
conciliation agreement that consists in that the agency responsible for conciliation seeks 
the ratification of the judge.  The director of legal services at the DIF Jalisco explained 
the reluctance of some judges to ratify the conciliation agreement, 
In general, here in the DIF Jalisco we seek all conciliation agreements to be 
ratified by the judge.  But there are some judges that agree in ratify them but 
others do not want to.  Those who do not ratify the conciliation agreements claim 
that it is voluntary jurisdiction, so they can decide whether or not they do it.  And 
we don’t have the option just to go to cooperative judges.  In Jalisco, when you 
file a demand, this is assigned randomly by a computer to a certain judge.  That is 
the reason why depending on who is the judge the conciliation agreement is 
ratified or not.N6.21  
 
The situation of Chihuahua exemplifies the cases in which the conciliation 
process takes place in the State Attorney’s Office.  Women in Chihuahua do not face any 
pressure to undergo a conciliation process.  If the victim and the aggressor agree, a 
lawyer is responsible for conducting the conciliation process.  Informants of the State 
Attorney’s Office affirmed that the conciliation is not compulsory; they give the option to 
the victim and it is up to her to decide whether or not she wants an agreement.  If the 
agreement is breached, the woman might go back to the State Attorney’s Office.  At that 
moment she is informed that they can initiate a criminal case for family violence 
In some states, those agencies responsible for conciliation can also impose fines 
and detain the aggressor for several hours due to the acts of family violence or due to 
breaching the agreement.  In Morelos, even though the public agencies have the 
possibility of imposing fines, they don’t.  Two main issues contribute to this decision.  
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On the one hand, when public authorities have a case in which the aggressor and the 
victims have few economic resources, are unemployed or hold down steady jobs,  the 
dilemma is that of imposing an economic sanction may mean allowing further economic 
harm to come to the woman without money for feeding herself and her children.  The 
second rationale for not imposing fines or short prison time is the lack of enforcement 
mechanisms within the executive.  Of course, enforcement of the conciliation agreement 
is more likely to occur if this has been ratified by the judge.  A male providing assistance 
to women in a joint program between the Federal Health Ministry and the DIF Morelos 
explained this with the following words, 
If the conciliation agreement is breached in theory we can impose fines, but these 
are never paid.  We are trying to sign an agreement with the Secretary of Finances 
in order to them having the responsibility of collecting the fines and require its 
payment.  Therefore, we do not impose fines nor we do arrests.  If the conciliation 
agreement is not honored the only alternative that we have, of course if the 
woman wants, is to document all the family violence situation in front of the State 
Attorney’s Office and press criminal changes on the grounds of ‘no significant 
change [on behalf of the man], and therefore the breach of the agreement and new 
acts of violence constitute a family violence crime.’N6.22  
 
As to the question of the success of the sanctions, fines, mandatory therapy and 
temporary prison penalties imposed by administrative agencies, the general opinion 
shared by NGO members and government employees is that these are poor tools for 
preventing new domestic violence.  Without doubt the lack of reinforcement of the 
sanctions for family violence contributes.  Only once did a high official at the State 
Attorney’s Office in Jalisco, a woman, mention the benefits of the new administrative 
legislation about family violence, in contrast to the assessments of other people from that 
same state,  
There are changes with the law [in Jalisco].  Men who are arrested for domestic 
violence we send them to treatment. I think that there is not a lot of relapse, men 
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do not tend to reoffend. I do not know if it is because they are afraid of the 
consequences of because psychological therapies are working.  Bails might be as 
high as 30,000 pesos. (…) I think that men have realized that if they beat they will 
be punished. Before, everything was very different”.N6.23  
 
6.4-  CONCLUSION 
At the beginning of this chapter I showed that administrative legislation regarding 
family violence was constructed around a dual objective, that of preventing women from 
being victimized by abuse in the household, and that of keeping the family together as a 
“basic social unit.”  The question that I attempted to answer is whether the laws 
effectively fulfill this dual objective.  Based on my research the response is no.   That 
makes us wonder whether or not the responsiveness evidenced in the legislation enacted 
by the State corresponded to the demands of the international treaties, Mexican society, 
and the women’s movement.  Their demands were centered in guaranteeing women a life 
free of violence, which included the most extended form of violence: partner violence.   
Throughout this chapter I have shown that the states differ in their protection of 
women and the family.  Certain characteristics of the administrative family violence 
legislation seem to be associated with the general level of patriarchy in the states.  For 
example, states with higher levels of gender inequality (measured with the GEIMS) are 
more likely to enact laws that make conciliation mandatory.  Similarly, states with higher 
levels of gender equality are more likely to attribute sanctioning power to the agencies 
that provide assistance and conduct the conciliation process.  
This chapter has put special emphasis in the process of conciliation.  I have shown 
differences between the formal provisions of the legislation (what it intends) and the 
material execution of the legislation by public agencies responsible for its 
implementation.  Conciliation is intended to resolve controversies between the 
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perpetrator and the victim of domestic violence; however, this is interpreted by many 
public agencies and victims of partner violence as a process tending towards 
reconciliation, especially by those not trained in the conciliation process, perhaps due to 
the similarity of the words.   
The patriarchal nature of the society is displayed in many instances.  Women are 
victims of invisible patriarchal pacts (Maquieira and Sanchez 1990) that contribute to 
their subordination and their experiences of violence.  First, the law has the dual objective 
of protecting the woman and the family, which might be impossible in many cases.  
Second, due to the strength of the patriarchal system, familism is deeply rooted in 
Mexican society, which places women before the choice of keeping her own physical and 
psychological well-being versus maintaining the well-being and integrity of the family.  
Third, the lower status of women in society in the economic and educational spheres –
also the effects of patriarchy– provides a context of socially and economically limited 
choices within which the victims of partner violence have to decide between their own 
well being and their family.  And fourth, the (patriarchal) values of those interpreting and 
executing the law also influence in the individual versus family dichotomy.  
The administrative family violence legislation has generated a lot of expectations 
in the civil society and among feminists because it was thought that it would contribute to 
the protection of women against domestic violence.  This has turned out to be far from 
reality, since the protection of the individual was captured by a seemingly synonymous, 
but in fact deeply antithetical effort to protect the family.  The government does not 
provide enough resources for the protection of women.  All the public awareness 
campaigns and all the advertising of services made by executive power agencies 
responsible for providing assistance and developing prevention programs generate 
interest that cannot be satisfied, given the  resources for supplying such programs and 
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services.  A demand has been generated, but the supply is definitely insufficient and of 
poor quality.  
The agencies are understaffed, the assistance is rushed, and there are not resources 
to address the immediate situation of women, i.e, their need to be sheltered from a 
dangerous domestic space.  The administrative legislation on family violence does not 
make special provisions for providing services to victims of partner violence as other 
laws, such as the U.S. Violence against Women Act (VAWA) do.  The WAVA, for 
example, includes redistributive measures for providing the following services to victims 
of partner violence: housing, education, shelters, direct financial assistance, child care, 
and job training.  In Mexico, the decision of whether or not these services will be 
provided is left to the executive branch.   Material provision is especially important, since 
many battered women are economically dependent on their abusers, and especially 
among low-income women, discontinuation of abuse has been associated with lesser 
financial strain (Frias and Angel 2007).  In Mexico, only nine states (Baja California, 
Guanajuato, Jalisco, Nuevo León, Oaxaca, Querétaro, San Luis Potosí, Tlaxcala and 
Zacatecas) have specific provisions regarding the responsibility of the State to create 
shelters for victims of family violence.  Even in some states such as Guanajuato or 
Zacatecas, the law provides that all municipalities need to have a shelter.  Again, the 
law’s wording is one thing, implementation is another,   because there really is not an 
adequate public funded shelters in each municipality. 
My research has also shown that both the lack of programs for aggressors and the 
cases in which they exist, the lack of resources for financing them also jeopardize the 
objectives of the law.  So far, public policies have focused on the victim, devoting little 
or no attention at all in the aggressor.  Without any type of intervention, aggressors will 
continue with their violent behavior, proof for which exists in the high degree of repeated 
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offenses by perpetrators of family violence who are not given proper attention.  In these 
cases we have to put, therefore, into question the effectiveness of the administrative 
family violence laws. 
In a nutshell, without further reforms of the legislation, the allocation of more 
resources devoted to agencies that provide assistance to victims, and the development of 
additional programs that effectively target both, aggressors and victims, the law is 
ineffective.  Evidence that the Mexican State was responsive is shown by the legislative 
power exerting itself to provide a law regarding family violence, but as the law seems to 
be ineffective, the question becomes whether the legislature was engaging in symbolic 
legitimacy-making actions, a form of impression management, with no real intention to 
stop violence against women, or whether, as time passes and institutions adapt to the 
many facets of family violence, things will change.  
So far, given the cooptation of the feminist movement and NGOs into the 
structure of the State that I described in Chapter 4, there is little criticism of the 
effectiveness of the family violence law and its interpretation by the agencies that must 
implement it.  As consequence, there is not real pressure for change.  The State made big 
promises, made a big fuss about the protection of all family members and the family in 
itself; however, as I showed throughout this chapter, the law seems to maintain the status-
quo.  The contents of the law and its interpretation by both the victims and public 
employees, preserves and reinforces the sacred institution of patriarchy, and patriarchal 
gendered relations are reaffirmed in the best interests of the family.  
It could be argued, though, that regardless of the effectiveness of the law, and 
whether or not it includes redistributive measure, “legal reforms might not put food on a 
woman’s table, but they can have an important effect on her treatment in the criminal 
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justice system” (Weldon 2002:18).  For example these laws might extinguish the judicial 
habit of considering any type of domestic violence as a private matter. 
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CHAPTER 7: 
PLURALISM AND GENDER CONTRADICTIONS WITHIN THE 
STATE:  PARTNER VIOLENCE POLICY MAKING AS A 
CONTESTED PROCESS  
 
By combining the theory of gendered organizations and feminist theories of the 
State, I expand upon previous theoretical analyses of the role of the State in promoting 
women’s rights and show that, as proponents of the post-structuralist theory of the State 
argue, the homogeneous appearance of the State masks a multifaceted organization 
composed of numerous actors with interests and agendas that variously collude and 
collide.  The specific content of the law was analyzed in the previous chapter.  In this 
chapter I analyze the relationship of State-level actors and illuminate important 
contradictions among those actors.  These contradictions result in the lack of a unified or 
coordinated response to the issue of domestic violence, both among branches of 
government and within the same branch.   
The goal of this chapter is to document the fact that the State is plural, and an 
arena of struggle in which individuals social movements, and different governmental 
agencies meet ultimately to further their specific interests and agendas.  The defense of 
women’s rights and the activities of specific organizational actors depend on the structure 
of political opportunity, and the sensibility of key players within those organizations.  As 
part of the analysis I analyze the role of gender in influencing the attitudes and behaviors 
of those same actors. 
In previous chapters I analyzed how the administrative family violence legislation 
was approved (Chapter 5), and whether or not the law really protects women from 
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domestic violence (Chapter 6).  Throughout these two previous chapters I have discussed 
the construction, reconstruction and negotiation of gender within the structure of the 
State. In this chapter, building in the two previous chapters, I specifically analyze the 
contradictions within branches of the State, which involve how gender is exhibited within 
the State.  In the first part of this chapter the emphasis will be on the literature on 
gendered organizations and gender styles in the three branches of the State.  The second 
part focuses on legislative power, wherein I analyze the interplay of gender and political 
ideologies within the state Congresses.  In the third part, the most extensive, I provide an 
analysis of how the State’s dealing with domestic violence in the executive power is 
articulated into three distinct types of institutions: public agencies that provide services to 
victims of partner violence, the police or law-enforcement bodies, and the Governor.  
Finally, the fourth part surveys the judiciary.   
My analysis of each of the branches of the State emphasizes two aspects: first, I 
report on how the issue of domestic violence is ordinarily dealt with on the various levels 
of the government.  Second, I analyze the assessment function: how do the members of 
other branches of government and corresponding civil society actors and organizations 
assess the degree of success enjoyed by each branch of government charged with dealing 
with some aspect of domestic violence, and how does the gender of key actors affect the 
general response toward partner violence?  In the fifth section of the chapter, I examine 
the strategies employed by individuals empowered to deal with women’s rights to make 
sure that the laws are applied.  In the last, the concluding part of this chapter, I show that 
I have added a necessary dimension to the post-structuralist theory of the State by tracing 
the effects of the gender of those that make and carry out policy within the State through 
the whole mechanism of dealings with domestic violence.  
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7.1-  FEMINIST THEORY OF ORGANIZATIONS AND GENDER STYLES IN 
THE THREE BRANCHES OF THE STATE 
Joan Acker’s (1990) feminist theory of organizations sees organizations as arenas 
in which societal images of gender are reproduced.  The State, as an organization, is not 
only highly bureaucratic (Ferguson 1984, cited in Acker 1990), but it is also gendered, by 
which I mean, following.  Acker (1990:146) argues that “to say that an organization, or 
any other analytic unit, is gendered means that advantage and disadvantage, exploitation 
and control, action and emotion, meaning and identity, are patterned through and in terms 
of a distinction between male and female, masculine and feminine”.  Within the 
organizations, the divisions of labor and power, the construction of gender symbols or 
images, and the interactions between (male/female) individuals, contribute to individual’s 
“choice of appropriate work, language use, clothing, and representation of self as a 
gendered member of organization” (Acker 1990:147).   
Therefore, gender is both constructed and reproduced in organizations.  In 
organizational logic, both jobs and hierarchies are abstract categories that have no 
occupants, no human bodies and no gender.  The bodiless worker who occupies the 
abstract gender-neutral job has no sexuality, no emotions and does not procreate.  The 
concept of job, however, is gendered, because “the abstract worker is actually a man, and 
it is the man’s body, its sexuality, minimal responsibility in procreation, and conventional 
control of emotions that pervades work and organizational processes” (Acker 1990:152). 
For women to succeed in male-dominated organizations in which they find 
themselves doing works traditionally reserved for men, and especially at the top of male 
hierarchies “requires that women render irrelevant everything that makes them women”, 
such as emotions and their own gender (Acker 1990:153).  What Acker argues is also true 
for women wherever they work in the ranks of the highly male-dominated State 
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bureaucracies.  Since the rise of feminism in the seventies, most States of the developed 
nations have made a formal compromise with gender equality to give women greater 
access to a broader range of public administration positions, in accordance with the 
representative nature of bureaucracy.  This trend might have introduced new dynamics as 
more women reach positions of power to force a reconsideration of Acker’s theory of 
gendered organizations.  Yet, the truth is that the higher levels of both national and 
international bureaucracies, parliaments and judicial courts are still highly masculinized, 
which is also true in the case of Mexico (Acker 2004; Fernández Poncela 1995; Paxton, 
Hughes, and Green 2006; Rodríguez 2003).  Even as a percentage of the public 
workforce, the percentage of women employed lags behind their percentage of the 
population.  In Mexico, women’s share of employment in the public sector and 
international organizations is almost the same than in the private sector, 35% and 36% 
respectively (Encuesta Nacional de Ocupacion y Empleo 2006 cited in INEGI 2007). 
The higher ranks of the three branches of the State (legislative, executive and 
judiciary) are highly masculinized.  Whether this entails the prevalence of a distinct 
masculine style regarding decisions, policies and legislation related to women’s issues 
has been the subject of an extensive literature.  The findings are often contradictory (see 
Martin, Reynolds, and Keith 2002).  Some argue that if there were higher numbers of 
women holding positions in the State, there would be changes both in public policies and 
legislation related to women’s issues and in the practical dealing of State institutions with 
women.  In contrast, others argue that the masculinist norms embedded in organizational 
culture and practices might override any effects associated with women’s higher numbers 
in institutions.  Because women are in a subordinated position in the patriarchal society 
and theyoccupy a less-valued gender status, they experience more gender bias and are apt 
to be more aware of other women’s experiences (Klein 1984; Scott 1997 cited in Martin, 
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Reynolds, and Keith 2002). But in the case of domestic violence, as it entails men’s 
violence against women, gender beliefs, and feminist consciousness (commitment to a 
gender politics aimed at eliminating women’s societal disadvantages) affect how 
individuals handle these cases (see Martin, Reynolds, and Keith 2002) 
More specific research has been done on the question of whether the gender 
composition of the three branches of the State (legislative, executive and judiciary) leads 
to more gender-conscious policy making.  This discussion is of relevance because it 
contributes to understanding the multiple levels of contradiction within the state 
(branches, and gender within branches) in Mexico.   
 
7.1.a-  Legislative 
The representation of women in the federal Mexican legislature has increased 
from 3.4 percent in 1964 to 17.2 percent in 2003.  This steady increase has been partially 
promoted by the adoption of gender quotas in Mexico (further details in Rodríguez 2003).  
In state legislatures women are better represented than at the federal level.  As of 2005, 
20 percent of all the state deputies were female.  Women’s representation is not 
homogeneous across the states.  Table 7.1, presented below, shows how the 
representation of female ranges from 8 percent in Durango to 39 percent in Quintana 
Roo.  Only the Federal District, Campeche and Quintana Roo have a proportion of female 
deputies above the 30 percent.  
Kathlene (1994) has shown the effect on the political realm of the historically 
predominant male presence in politics, which makes men resistant to women’s presence 
and views, especially when they are perceived as tokens or intruders.  Previous research 





























State % Female  # Seats # Women 
Aguascalientes  11.11 27 3 
Baja California  8.00 25 2 
Baja California Sur 28.57 21 6 
Campeche  31.43 35 11 
Coahuila  20.00 35 7 
Colima 20.00 25 5 
Chiapas  15.00 40 6 
Chihuahua  24.24 33 8 
Distrito Federal* 31.82 66 21 
Durango  8.00 25 2 
Guanajuato 19.44 36 7 
Guerrero 19.57 46 9 
Hidalgo  17.24 29 5 
Jalisco 19.35 31 6 
México  14.67 75 11 
Michoacán  17.50 40 7 
Morelos 13.33 30 4 
Nayarit 16.67 30 5 
Nuevo León 26.19 42 11 
Oaxaca  16.67 42 7 
Puebla  19.51 41 8 
Queretaro  12.00 25 3 
Quintana Roo 39.13 23 9 
San Luis Potosí  18.52 27 5 
Sinaloa 18.92 37 7 
Sonora  12.90 31 4 
Tabasco  23.53 34 8 
Tamaulipas 21.88 32 7 
Tlaxcala 15.63 32 5 
Veracruz 24.00 50 12 
Yucatán  20.00 25 5 
Zacatecas 26.67 30 8 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on SNIM (2005) 
Notes: * Legislative Assembly of the Federal District  
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concentrate on the promotion of policies favoring women’s issues (Carroll 2001; Dodson 
and Carroll 1991; Jones 1997; and review by Swers 2001).  In her book, Women in 
Mexican Politics, Victoria Rodriguez (2003:145) concludes that Mexican women in the 
legislative branch are relegated to less influential positions, as for example chairing less 
influential Congressional committees.  Women in politics in Mexico have hesitated to 
pursue a gender political agenda due to party constraints.  Among all female legislators, 
PRD legislators seem most likely to express personal agendas more inclusive of women’s 
issues.  A consequence of the larger numbers of women in the legislative branch, and the 
building of alliances among women from different political parties and the civil society is 
that Mexican female deputies have been able to promote legislation concerning women’s 
issues.  
 
7.1.b-  Executive 
There are few women serving as state executives.  As of 2005, only one of the 32 
states, Zacatecas, is governed by a woman, Amalia García (PRD), who was elected 
governor in 2004.  In the history of Mexico, only two other women have been elected 
governors: Griselda Alvarez in Colima (1979-1985), and Beatriz Paredes in Tlaxcala 
(1987-1992), both members of the PRI.  Two other women have been appointed as 
interim governors: Dulce María Sauri in Yucatán (1991-1994) from the PRI, and Rosario 
Robles as jefa de gobierno of the Federal District from the PRD.  So far, no woman from 
the PAN has been elected State governor. 
According to the INEGI (2007), as of 2006 women constituted 30 percent of the 
federal government employees in Mexico.  As Table 7.2 shows, there are only two 
federal ministries in Mexico in which the percentage of government employees is equal  
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Table 7.2:  Representation of Women in the Executive Power (Selected Offices) 
to 50 percent (Social Development Institute) or greater (INMUJERES).  Women are 
relatively better represented, too, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  In contrast, in the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Farming, Rural Development, Fishing and Food, their share 
drops below 20 percent.  Results from the 2003 Institutional Culture Survey (see 




Agriculture, Farming, Rural Development, Fishing and Food 18.0 
Communications and Transportation 20.0 
Social Development 34.6 
Economy 34.6 
Public Education 39.3 
Energy 29.5 
Public Administration 34.3 
Government 30.2 
Treasury and Public Credit 33.1 
Navy 28.3 
Environment and Natural Resources 26.9 
Agrarian Reform 30.7 
Foreign Affairs 48.6 
Health 39.0 
Public Safety 32.2 
Employment and Social Security 37.0 
Tourism 34.7 
  
Agencies (Selected)  
  
National Commission for the Development of Indigenous Peoples 23.1 
Federal General Attorney's Office 37.5 
National Council of Disabled People 25.0 
Electoral Federal Institute 22.7 
Family Integral Development (Desarrollo Integral de la Familia) 46.4 
Mexican Petroleum 16.4 
National Women's Institute 67.1 
Institute for Social Development 50.0 
Mexican Institute for Social Security 31.3 
National Council for Educational Development 36.9 
Source:  Mujeres y Hombres en Mexico 2007. Aguascalientes: INEGI. 
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INMUJERES 2005) show that in the federal public administration only 2.4 percent of top 
executive positions are held by women, 13.9 percent at the general director level and 29.1 
percent at the assistant director level.   
In their study of state agency heads in the U.S., Saidel and Loscocco (2005) found 
in that women departmental heads were more likely than men to have among their top 
priorities policies specifically intended to help women.  These differences, however, 
disappeared after controlling by the type of public agency. For Mexico, very little 
comparable research is available.  
 
7.1.c-   Judiciary 
After the legislative branch, the judicial branch offers the most opportunities for 
women.  The representation of women in the judiciary branch has increased steadily.  In 
1984, women accounted for 7.3 percent of top officials; in 1987, 9.5 percent; in 1989, 
12.5 percent; and 12.4 percent in 1992 (Fernández Poncela 1995).  The current 
representation of women in the judiciary varies by state as shown in Table 7.3.  There are 
several states where the percentage of women occupying positions in the judicial system 
tends to be rather high: Campeche, Chihuahua, Puebla and Yucatán. 
Research about different gender styles in the judiciary branch in Mexico is not 
currently available.  Nevertheless, research based on the U.S. has found that women 
judges in state supreme courts tend to vote more liberally in some non-women’s issues, 
and that their presence tends to increase the probability that male judges in the same 
institutions also support liberal positions (Songer and Crews-Meyer 2000). Many other 
studies have found gender differences between male and female judges in their judicial 
decisions (Coontz 2000).  Martin, Reynolds and Keith (2002) report that female judges 
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Table 7.3:  Percentage of Female Federal Judges and Magistrates by State 
State Federal Collegiate 
Judges 
Federal Unitarian / 
District Judges 
Magistrates 
Aguascalientes  11.1 0.0 42.9 
Baja California  16.7 26.7 15.4 
Baja California Sur 33.3 0.0 20.0 
Campeche  33.3 66.7 50.0 
Coahuila  8.3 0.0 28.6 
Colima 5.6 5.3 23.1 
Chiapas  22.2 0.0 33.3 
Chihuahua  16.7 44.4 20.0 
Distrito Federal* 35.8 35.9 45.9 
Durango  0.0 33.3 16.7 
Guanajuato 0.0 14.3 40.0 
Guerrero 8.3 50.0 21.1 
Hidalgo  16.7 0.0 23.1 
Jalisco 5.6 5.3 6.9 
México  9.1 37.5 30.0 
Michoacán  0.0 11.1 16.7 
Morelos 0.0 16.7 30.8 
Nayarit 0.0 33.3 14.3 
Nuevo León 0.0 0.0 32.0 
Oaxaca  11.1 25.0 21.7 
Puebla  25.9 33.3 21.1 
Queretaro  0.0 25.0 42.9 
Quintana Roo 0.0 25.0 37.5 
San Luis Potosí  0.0 60.0 33.3 
Sinaloa 0.0 30.0 18.2 
Sonora  20.0 10.0 11.1 
Tabasco  0.0 0.0 27.8 
Tamaulipas 16.7 9.1 10.0 
Tlaxcala 0.0 0.0 20.0 
Veracruz 13.3 33.3 13.6 
Yucatán  33.3 66.7 50.0 
Zacatecas 11.1 0.0 23.1 
Sources:  Percent of federal judges in collegiate tribunals who are women relative to the percent of federal judges in 
collegiate tribunals who are male (Author’s calculation based on information from the Consejo de la Judicatura Federal 
2005). Percent of federal judges in district or unitary courts who are women relative to the percent of federal judges in 
collegiate courts who are male (Author’s calculation based on information from the Consejo de la Judicatura Federal 2005).  
Percent of Magistrados who are women relative to the percent of Magistrados who are male (Author’s calculation). 
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have fewer stereotypes about women and issues of domestic violence than male judges, 
and a higher level of commitment to a gender politics aimed at eliminating domestic 
violence. However, whether these perceptions and beliefs translate into practice is 
impossible to know. 
 
7.2-  LEGISLATIVE POWER 
In an earlier chapter we reviewed the process by which the laws concerning 
sexual and domestic violence were approved.  However, besides the approval of the 
administrative family violence legislation, the legislative power is responsible for 
initiating other types of legislation regarding family violence and violence against 
women.  As I showed in the previous chapter, almost all states in Mexico have approved 
family violence legislation, but some civil and criminal codes have still not been 
reformed.  Considering the administrative nature of family violence laws, without those 
reforms women remain unprotected in many states.  In addition, state congresses bear the 
responsibility for approving the budget, thus holding the strings for programs that are 
designed to be carried out by governmental agencies.  In all these areas, ideological 
differences among political parties and gender differences both in the state and federal 
congresses condition the degree of activism that can be expected from legislative power 
in relation to family violence.   
The gender ideology of the three main political parties is quite different.  The 
PAN upholds a conservative ideology that supports the maximum separation of the 
private and public sphere economically, while supporting the patriarchal ideology that 
posits the household and the family as the central female domains.  Given these 
programmatic notions, the PAN assigns a subordinate role to women in their  
participation in politics (Fernández Poncela 1997).  The PRD upholds a more egalitarian 
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ideology and at least rhetorically defends parity between men and women in elected 
offices, making it the party most likely to openly fight for women’s rights. Finally the 
PRI falls somehow between the PRD and the PAN (for details about the ideological 
positions of each party see Rodríguez 2003).  Thus, the consensus view of the political 
experts is that we have the PAN on the right, the PRI in the center and the PRD in the left 
(see Klesner 2005).  But this grouping often differs from the electorate’s, who tend to 
place the PAN in the center and the PRI on the left, the positions depending on pro-
regime (right) versus antiregime (left) attitudes rather than on the traditional dimensions 
of economy, social policy or/and religion (Moreno 2003).   
All political parties have expressed interest in the issue of domestic violence.  
Political parties have come to include the issue of domestic violence in their platforms 
due to such different factors as the international pressure for gender equality and public 
opinion, where there is general agreement that violence against women is harmful for 
families, women and the society in general.  However, there is a contradiction between 
the actual priorities of the parties and their rhetoric concerning the issue of domestic 
violence.  Both male and female politicians tend to publicize their stances against family 
violence as a campaign issue even though it is not legislatively dealt with as a priority.  
Domestic violence is fashionable (está de moda) said most of the people I interviewed.  A 
former federal legislator and the director of a municipal women’s institute in Jalisco 
articulated this idea as follows: 
Domestic violence is in fashion and it is politically profitable.  It is very 
welcomed in the electoral process. Any political candidate, regardless of the 
position (local, state or federal) is very well regarded if he/she supports the issue 
or has participated in the implementation of policies. For them [candidates] this 
issue is necessary. Women are fifty-two percent of the electorate, and a candidate 
more appealing to female voters is more likely to be elected. That is why all of 
them carry the domestic violence flag.N7.1 
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7.2.a-  Ideological Differences in the Legislative 
Almost all of the people interviewed mentioned differences in the level of concern 
and initiation of actions toward ending violence against women between male and female 
legislators.  However, gender solidarity must be understood relative to political/party 
ideology.  Legislators and civil servants in top executive governmental agencies like to 
claim that the political party with which they are affiliated or nominated them is the 
driver behind dealing with the problem of domestic violence in the legislature.  As public 
administration top executive chiefs are political appointees they tend to be loyal to the 
political party.  Both PRI and PRD politicians agree that PAN legislators are less active 
in sponsoring family violence issues in state congresses.  This idea is also reflected in the 
opinions of members of the women’s movement and scholars with expertise in family 
violence, who think that leftist oriented political parties are more concerned about and 
provide better solutions to the problem, a stance taken, for instance, by Juan Manuel 
Contreras, a young scholar from the Federal District.  
Somehow left wing political parties are more interested in the problem [of family 
violence], they have a more egalitarian gender view than more conservative 
parties that have views that contribute to perpetuate the inequality system.N7.2  
 
It is unrealistic to state that the PAN is not supportive of family violence issues.  
Quite the contrary: the PAN´s ideological doctrine, contains specific mentions to the 
family, considering the family as one of the key social units, even more important than 
the State (Partido de Acción Nacional 2002).  So, why is the PAN perceived as less 
concerned about family violence issues?  The answer is linked to the different ideological 
perspectives toward the phenomenon.  The family violence perspective, the feminist 
perspective, the public health and the crime approaches have some similarities but are 
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quite different because each of them places the origins of partner violence in different 
realms.  In addition, as we saw in the previous chapter, the double objective of the 
legislation –protection of the family members from family violence and the promotion of 
the family- also contributes to the general believe that the PAN is not supportive of 
family violence issues.  The PAN, without any doubt, is supportive of the family 
promotion aspect of the administrative family violence legislation.  Maricela Julian 
Contreras, a PRD representative at the Federal District Assembly summarized the conflict 
between perspectives as follows,  
(…) there are differences among parties. For example, the PRD’s feminist view is 
that domestic violence has to be reduced and eradicated in order to provide 
women with a better quality of life.  Female legislator from the PAN, on the other 
hand, believe that as domestic violence affects the family, it has to disappear in 
order to keep the family intact.  It is gender versus family. There are many people 
with a lot of experience who want to change things, but within the same political 
group you can find shades. These shades are even within my own party. N7.3 
 
These ideological perspectives have permeated the scholarly research about 
partner violence, or perhaps the research has partly created the ideological response.  
Therefore, individuals not embracing a PAN ideology or a family approach to the issue 
are more likely to criticize PAN for its (non)actions, blaming them for not having an 
interest. My research shows that in all states PAN legislators are as concerned about 
family violence as legislators from other political parties.  But PAN’s position of giving 
preeminence to the family rather than the individual woman makes the PAN appear to be 
uninterested in family violence.  However, in reality, they prioritize the family promotion 
aspect rather than the individual protection of women against partner violence.  An 
illustration of the above is provided by a very active member of the extinct political party, 
Mexico Posible.  Mexico Posible was a leftist political party which merged with other 
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parties in 2006 to compose the Alternativa Socialdemocrata y Campesina30 after failing 
to keep its political registry in the 2003 federal elections.  In an interview held in Mexico 
City she said, 
During the 57th legislature (1997-2000) there was an important advance in 
women’s issues. After that, the rise of the PAN brought people with rightist 
ideologies that took the wrong way.  The Church and several conservative 
organizations put pressure on them. They want to appear like they are doing 
something for women, but this is just the façade.  For example, they have 
strengthened institutions such as DIF and the Institute for Public Charity (Instituto 
de la Beneficencia Pública) that provide assistance to women.   
President Fox’s government will go down in history not only because it was the 
party that took the PRI out of the government, but also because it was unable to 
promote the democratic consolidation.  In little time, with their family 
perspective, the PAN attempted to promote changes in the areas where the greater 
gains [in women’s issues] were achieved, such as in the area of domestic 
violence, or reproductive rights. N7.4  
 
Some PAN legislators do not recognize themselves in the image cast by scholars, 
members of civil society and women’s movement and fellow legislators from PRD and 
PRI.  For example, a female legislator from Guanajuato (PAN) argued that there are 
differences among political parties, but they all share the same interest in eradicating 
domestic violence.  There are voices in the civil society movement and members of 
governmental agencies who argue that though PAN’s female legislators want to be 
sensitive to women’s issues, they are limited because the PAN leadership exerts a closer 
control over its members than other political parties.   
 
                                                 
30 Alternativa Socialdemócrata y Campesina changed its name to Alternativa Socialdemócrata in 2007.  It 
is a moderate leftist political ideology.  They call it la nueva izquierda (the new left).  They advocate for 
women’s reproductive rights, same-couple rights, environmental issues and euthanasia, among others. 
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7.2.b-  Gender Differences among Representatives in State Legislatures 
Beyond the differences among the political parties, my research shows that there 
are further differences between males and females within each political party.  People 
from public agencies believe that women tend to be more sensitized to family violence 
issues than men, regardless of the party they belong to.  Men hold machista attitudes 
because men have been socialized in that way from generation to generation.  Male 
legislators see domestic violence as an issue of interest mostly to feminists, of viejas 
locas, and they do not perceive it as something serious, explained a member of a 
governmental agency in Chihuahua.   
At the state level there have been some male legislators from all political parties 
who opposed family violence legislation and displayed patriarchal attitudes during its 
debate.  For example, in the case of Jalisco, a PRI legislator chairing one of the 
commissions that had to approve the family violence law proposal said that “women need 
blows to keep them under control”.N7.5  Jalisco is the state in which my interviewees 
reported that male legislators had –at the time of the discussion of the law proposal in the 
State Congress– the worst attitudes not only toward female legislators but also to female 
members of the civil society supporting the law proposal.  The words of one of my 
interviewees illustrate this: 
They would say that we were against the family, that we were lesbians, even some 
of the women supporters of the family violence legislation were sent a sausage.  
You know… as they though that we were lesbians, just to check if we liked 
sausage (penis).N7.6 
 
Female legislators from all political parties mentioned how hard it is to get the 
support some of her fellow male legislators on certain topics related to women’s issues.  
Family violence is one of them.  However female legislators from the PAN were less 
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likely to mention the opposition of their fellow party legislators.  It has always been 
female legislators who initiate proposals regarding women’s issues to the frequent 
opposition of male legislators, even in those parties, such as the PRD, which have 
publicly stated support for gender equality.  Among the female legislators I interviewed, 
the belief is expressed that male legislators are simply mirroring the patriarchal nature of 
society.  In an interview with Maricela Julian Contreras, a PRD representative from the 
Federal District Legislative Assembly, she said:   
Women are still the ones that care about other women (que se ocupan de otras 
mujeres). The patriarchal and machista culture are very rooted in Mexico.  We, 
women we fight with men, even within the same party.  We fight against their 
sarcasm, against their machista attitudes. In the political parties, as well as in 
society, there are machos, there are authoritarian men.  But we have to fight for 
equality between men and women. (…)  There are misogynic men everywhere, 
and men with ideologies that are very difficult to change.  Still, women fight for 
other women.  Men in politics can back our proposals, but it is still a problem for 
men to introduce proposals for women. N7.7 
 
Most of the people that I interviewed argue that this issue will not be solved by 
having more women in the legislature but only if these are women sensitive to the issue.  
Several of my interviewees, most of them from the women’s movement explained this 
issue using the same sentence, “I do not believe in parties, I believe in people” (Yo no 
creo en partidos, yo creo en la gente).  The situation of Chihuahua, where at the time the 
violence against women law was being discussed, illustrates how individual 
characteristics of female legislators are key for the promotion of legislative changes about 
violence.  One of the members of Mujeres por Mexico, a feminist NGO in Chihuahua 
said: 
We [NGOs] communicated representative Victoria Chavira (PAN) the need for a 
law [about violence against women].  We had several meetings with 
representative Chavira and several of her own advisors and advisors from the 
Congress. (…)  Representative Chavira showed a great deal of interest.  But she is 
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the only one both in the Congress and in her party who is interested.  She has a 
personal interest in doing something, she is very responsible.  It is something 
individual, sometimes other female representatives from the Gender and Equality 
Commission attend to the meetings, but she is the only one with genuine interest.  
She has been responsible for the openness of the State Congress toward gender 
issues. N7.8 
 
In an interview with representative Chavira, she acknowledged the lack of support 
that she is receiving from female legislators. 
Female legislators from other political parties and even from the PAN, if they do 
not obstruct my work they do not help either.  But their moment has not come yet.  
(…)  The patriarchal system is so strong that there are very few lights of 
liberalism in the Congress. I proposed all women from all political parties to work 
together in the law about violence against women.  I started working but they 
were not very interested. Then, I invited people from NGOs to analyze a write a 
law proposal draft. N7.9 
 
7.2.c-  The Budget 
There is a clear difference between what was approved in the laws and the 
implementation of policies and specific measures following the approval of the law.  
Funding for domestic violence programs is insufficient.  The legislation on family 
violence does not allocate funding for specific programs or assistance to victims.  In 
Mexico, as in many other Latin American and Caribbean countries, “most campaigns for 
a law on domestic violence focused on the content of laws and overlooked details of 
implementation, including an estimate of the resources required” (Luciano, Essim, and 
Duvvury 2005:125).  In the case of Mexico, information about the budgetary allocations 
of domestic violence policies is unavailable (Luciano, Essim, and Duvvury 2005).  When 
I requested that information from the INMUJERES in 2006 through the IFAI, and they 
were unable to tell me how much resources were spent at the federal level in family 
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violence programs.  There are no publicly available year to year budgets, and the 
availability of funding depends on the priorities of the administration in office at the time.   
Perhaps that is the reason why I found that the biggest complaint among people 
from the agencies devoted to provide services to victims of partner violence, legislators 
from parties different to the one that has the majority, and NGOs that receive part of their 
budget from governmental funds is that the legislation about partner violence is not 
translated into a set budget.  The budgeting process goes like this: the Governor of each 
state submits a budget to that state’s Congress, where it is debated, changes are made in 
allocating resources, and its final form is agreed to.  In this process, if the budgetary 
resources for domestic violence are not disaggregated into specific programs, it means 
that these resources can be reassigned to other programs by the government without such 
reassignment attracting attention.  The words of a woman, very active in a leftist party 
and responsible for the coordination of gender issues in that party, could not be more 
enlightening,  
Any governmental act or political promise not translated into a budged is 
populism. Any [political] initiative that aims to incorporate a cross-sectional 
gender perspective, such as in the case of partner violence, requires changes in the 
public budgets. N7.10  
 
In sum, the legislative power is divided, not only in terms of political parties, but 
also in terms of the gender split within each political party.  Although legislators from all 
political parties will officially claim bragging rights for combating domestic violence, the 
truth is that there are different perspectives for dealing with the issue and it is differently 
prioritized according to political circumstances.  The differences between perspectives 
line up, clearly, as family vs. non family, in which the first, defended by the PAN, aims 
to keep the family together regardless the situation of violence.  All the concern, and 
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complex legislation about family violence, has not been translated, however, into a 
realistic budget.  This is evidence, to my interviewees, that the rhetoric which goes into 
populism, campaigning, or other political strategies doesn’t cash out in terms of real 
legislative interest.  The budget is the bottom line, the true indicator of State’s priorities.  
 
7.3-  EXECUTIVE POWER 
The executive power is made up of several agencies and actors, among which we 
can put into separate categories those public agencies providing assistance to victims of 
partner violence, the police or law-enforcement agencies at the state and municipal level 
Attorney’s Office –Ministerio Publico (MP)–, and the Governor.  My analysis of these 
three factions within the executive power demonstrates the effects of contradictions 
within the State as well as the contradictions and tensions within the motives and actions 
of the actors in each branch of the State.  Margarita Guillén, the director of the Red de 
Refugios (shelters´ network), illustrated the difficulties of implementation of the law.  In 
her interview she recounted the pilgrimage of a battered woman whose story exemplifies 
the inefficiency and lack of coordination of governmental agencies, as well as the 
response of the MP.   
There is certain laziness that infects the denunciation of domestic violence.  There 
are CAVIs (Centro de Atención a la Violencia Intrafamiliar) and specialized 
agencies in sexual crimes, but they are saturated with work.  They need more 
technicians in domestic violence, more skilled and specialized staff, proper 
services (…) Women go through a critical route.  Let me tell you the case of a 
battered woman.  This is a real situation.  She arrived from Sinaloa.  The police 
brought her to the shelter fearing for her life because her husband’s connections 
with the narco (drug trafficking).   
She arrived to the shelter in very serious conditions, completely bruised, beaten 
and having been raped with an object.  In fact, the woman was still alive because 
her husband’s violence left her unconscious.  I think that her husband thought he 
had killed her.  She requested our help and we accompanied her to a specialized 
agency of the MP in order to get a certificate of her injuries.  But the specialized 
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agency was not open on Saturdays and Sundays. Then, we go to a normal agency 
of the MP.  The officers appeared to be indifferent; while we waited they went out 
for dinner.  We waited approximately for one hour and a half.  They knew that the 
woman had been beaten.  Finally, they helped us.  We were told that the only 
thing they could do for her was to take her testimony because the doctor 
responsible for certifying the injuries was not there.  We had to go to a hospital.  
We were in an urban area; can you imagine what can happen in a rural area?   
Finally, we arrived to the hospital emergency services.  When the doctor saw us, 
after waiting for more than one hour, he said there was nothing he could do 
because we did not bring with us the formal request from the MP nor the specific 
MP form specifically used to certify injuries.  Then, we went back to the MP, we 
got the document and then we went back to the hospital.  Back in the emergency 
room we were told to come back the following day.  We returned the following 
day.  This woman was accompanied by us [workers from the shelter].  Can you 
imagine somebody that has to go through all this process by herself?  It is very 
unlikely that she would end up pressing charges against her abuser.N7.11 
 
7.3.a-  Governmental Agencies that Provide Assistance to Victims of Domestic 
Violence 
The increasing public attention on the issue of violence against women and the 
approval of legislation in the states are two of the factors behind the creation of public 
agencies with the goal of providing assistance to victims of partner violence.  In any 
given state there are multiple agencies both at the state and municipal level where victims 
of partner abuse can request help.  For example, as we saw in the previous chapter, at the 
state level the following agencies providers of  legal, psychological, and social assistance 
to victims of partner violence, can be found: the Women’s Institutes, the DIFs through 
the Procuraduria de Defensa del Menor y Familia, the General Attorney’s Offices, State 
Commissions of Human Rights, the site of the councils for assistance and prevention of 
family violence, state-funded shelters, and specialized agencies for victims of family 
violence.   
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The above mentioned agencies coexist with diverse public agencies at the local or 
municipal level such as the municipal DIF, local Women’s Institutes, municipal police 
bodies, and local agencies specifically created to provide assistance to victims of partner 
violence.  In addition, women can also seek assistance in the numerous NGOs that have 
among its objectives the assistance of victims of family violence or the promotion of 
actions for its eradication.  These private organizations and NGOs have flourished as 
result of the support received from the State, which has even been recognized in some 
laws.  For example, the state of Jalisco has assumed the responsibility for promoting 
private or non-profit initiatives that aim at creating agencies or organizations to provide 
assistance to victims of family violence (Art. 26, Ley para la Prevención y Atención de la 
Violencia Intrafamiliar del Estado de Jalisco).   
Yet, this flourishing of different agencies has led to coordination problems. In 
most states, for instance, the governmental agencies responsible for assisting victims of 
partner violence have failed to build collaborative structures to negotiate the multiplicity 
of victim assistance agencies.  Practically, this results in women having to go from one 
agency to another in search of assistance from the state level to the municipal or among 
agencies within each level (municipal and state).  My respondents referred to this fact as 
“peloteo” or “peregrinaje” (pilgrimage).  The process that women have to go through, 
going from agency to agency, until they receive assistance has been called by those 
working in public agencies as ruta critica (critical route).  The dysfunction of the peloteo 
for women has functional consequences for the governmental institutions because the 
same domestic violence cases are often counted several times by each contacted agency.  
In most states public agencies are required by law to keep track of the number of cases 
they provide assistance since their resources tend to be dependent on the number of cases 
they provide assistance to.  The discouragements of the “peloteo” result in victims not 
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seeking help.  In addition, governmental data about services provided to victims of 
domestic violence have become unreliable because cases are counted multiple times. 
Those working in or with the public agencies tend to be less critical of the 
services they provide than NGOs, scholars and the women’s movement.  Dr. Juan Carlos 
Ramirez, a researcher and scholar from the Universidad de Guadalajara (UdG) who used 
to be member of the Jalico’s Council for the Prevention and Assistance of Family 
Violence, coordinated a research project to evaluate the quality of the victim assistance 
services provided by public agencies which found that no institution in Jalisco was doing 
a satisfactory job.  “The first time we called, it took them more than one hour to reach the 
last phone, and when we were connected to the last phone, it turn out that it was a fax”, 
said Dr. Ramirez.N7.12  Similarly, the director of a municipal women’s institute in Jalisco 
mentioned that she has called several times to the emergency number for victims of 
domestic violence and that nobody has responded to her calls.  My respondents adduced 
the lack of coordination among these agencies, the peloteo, and the inefficient agency 
service as reasons why women desist from seeking further assistance and even pressing 
charges against the abuser.   
Those critical of public agencies argue that public agencies are understaffed and 
often composed of individuals lacking any training in domestic violence issues.  They 
also mentioned the lack of professionalism, the high demand of the services and the lack 
of resources assigned to these agencies.  All my interviewees but one agreed that the 
service provided to women were inefficient and insufficient.  Despite this, all of them 
also agreed that the situation was improving and that the agencies were gradually 
professionalizing.  In states where those public agencies have been functioning for a 
longer period of time, such as in the Federal District, there is less criticism than in states 
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such as Jalisco or Morelos, where these agencies are of more recent creation.  For 
example, Dr. Ramirez, described the situation in Jalisco as follows,  
People responsible of the implementation of family violence programs have a 
limited knowledge of the issue of domestic violence; they offer a bureaucratic 
response to the problems. They are clueless about the importance of their role in 
assisting and preventing family violence (…) women are revictimized in multiple 
ways when they go to public agencies. It is complicated to find a reliable agency 
in which the procedure to follow in cases of family violence is clear and the 
woman is treated with respect.N7.13 
 
Among the target states in this study, Jalisco stood out as the state with the most 
coordination problems.  All my interviewees from governmental agencies mentioned 
them.  Several of them told the same story, which seemed to symbolize the overwhelming 
lack of coordination in which they operate: each agency prints its own information 
brochure about partner violence, which means that the brochures, though officially they 
are supposed to be used by all the relevant governmental agencies, contain conflicting 
and confusing information.  What is unclear is whether Jalisco is suffering from 
idiosyncratic personnel problems, as many of my interviewees in Jalisco claim, or 
whether the low level of coordination is also common in other states with the same inter-
organizational rivalries, lack of resources, and varying levels of engagement along the 
personnel chain.  Members from the academia, former members of Voces Unidas, former 
members of governmental agencies and even the director of one public agency, agreed 
with the idea expressed by a psychologist very active in Voces Unidas,  
The problem of coordination among governmental agencies is reduced to a 
problem of protagonism of the people in front of them.  Individuals leading these 
agencies are concerned about their own prominence; they want to be the center of 




Both, experts interviewed from public agencies and NGOs tend to agree that high 
uncertainty regarding the status of the family violence programs (its scope and resources) 
is introduced with each change in the government.  I found that  those providing first line 
assistance to family violence cases in governmental agencies were most inclined to 
express anxiety about  the progress they had made being undone by  the party being put 
in power in the next electoral period.  The fact that domestic violence is a public opinion 
concern compels the State to guarantee minimum efforts for its eradication, but the 
position of each new government is uncertain.  In Jalisco, for example, one of my 
interviewees mentioned that in a previous annual budget, the legislature assigned four 
million pesos (approximately 400,000 dollars) to the CEPAVI (Consejo Estatal de 
Prevencion y Asistencia a la Violencia Intrafamiliar), but that these resources were 
disbursed to another program when the government changed.  Margarita Guillén, director 
of the Shelter Network of Mexico, summarizes this generalized anxiety as follows,  
The attitude and compromise of public agencies has changed, but the change is 
not sufficient.  Each time that the government changes we have to lobby 
(cabildear).  The problem is that the issue of domestic violence is not 
institutionalized yet.  The newly arrived person needs to be sensitized, and many 
times in every change in the government you lose everything that you achieved 
before. But little by little, we have been able to embed the issue of domestic 
violence within public opinion. N7.15 
 
The gender differences previously reported within the legislative branch of the 
State are not found in governmental agencies providing services to women.  I questioned 
my interviewees about whether or not there were different styles of providing service to 
victims of family violence among governmental employees offering legal, social and 
psychological services.  All of them agreed that gender differences in governmental 
agencies were not a problem, perhaps because most of them are leaded by women and the 
services are also mainly provided by women.  However, I found that respondents from 
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the women’s movement and NGOs embracing a feminist ideology tend to say that some 
governmental agencies treat women badly in PAN dominated.  This does not refer to the 
quality of the assistance, but rather to the preeminence given to the promotion of the 
family rather than to the protection of women’s individual rights.  As in the case of the 
legislative power, these opinions are linked with ideological differences regarding the 
type of assistance and services to be provided by the government.  This finding is even 
stronger in those states where the PAN’s leadership has extended over more than one 
legislative election and governorship.  The PAN approach to family violence, aiming to 
keep the family together, is different from the feminist approach, centered on the safety 
of the individual woman.  As a consequence, the women’s movement and feminist NGOs 
are very critical of the services provided by PAN controlled public institutions and, 
especially, those provided by the DIF in those states.   
As we saw in a previous chapter, in Jalisco the institution responsible for 
implementing the family violence law is the DIF.  I was told by several of my 
interviewees in Jalisco and members of the civil society that DIF institutions providing 
legal services to victims of partner violence received the order from a high official of the 
institution (alguien de la alta jerarquia) prohibiting legal services from providing 
assistance for filing for divorce.  This fact can explain the ideological answer of a 
feminist psychologist privately working with victims of partner violence, “women are 
very badly treated in the DIF [Jalisco], they are forced to continue the relationship with 
their abusers.  The DIF forces the reconciliation of the family, and avoids by all means 
the divorce of the couple. N7.16  
Similarly, a woman from a NGO from Chihuahua said regarding the Chihuahua 
city (governed by the PAN) public agencies: “There is a strong offensive from the 
conservative right to promote a certain family model, saying that the marriage can be 
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dissolved only in cases in which there is danger of death, so that if there are only golpes, 
the marriage must continue”.N7.17  Also in Morelos, a very a critical member of the 
General Attorney’s Office, who self-defined herself as a feminist, said 
The DIF makes a big fuss, women are only important because they are members 
of the family.  The DIF regards the family as mom, dad, and son.  With this sort 
of conceptualization they frown on couples separating.  If they get separated or 
divorced, then it is not longer a family. That’s the reason why they want to keep 
the family together, regardless of the woman’s situation of violence. N7.18 
 
7.3.b-  Police Bodies:  Special Focus on the Ministerio Publico (General Attorney 
Office) 
The police and MP in Mexico are held in low regard by Mexican citizens.  The 
problems of Mexican police forces are both nationally and internationally well known 
and have been extensively documented (Brown, Benedict, and Wilkinson 2006).  These 
problems include a lack of accountability, high turnover rates, poor compensation and 
extensive corruption (Urbalejo 2003).  Davis (2006) argues that the corruption and 
distrust of police in Mexico is aggravated by a weak judicial system.  These two 
institutions “exist as two interrelated entities that together undermine the rule of law” 
(pp.55-56).  Davis (2006) puts the structural responsibility for the current dysfunctional 
situation of the police force on the long lasting political domination of the PRI.  The 
situation started changing during the presidency of Vicente Fox (2000-2006), who 
prioritized the reform of police institutions and fighting corruption in Mexican public 
institutions (Davis 2006; Moloeznik 2003; Urbalejo 2003).   
One of the main problems of Mexican police bodies is corruption, 
institutionalized in the famous mordida.  The mordida is nothing other than those gifts, 
payoff or bribes given to officers in order to avoid law enforcement or to get police 
officers to perform their duties.  The problem is compounded by the poor wages paid to 
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the police.  Police officers have a very low profile, and the requirements for joining the 
police are so low that almost any individual can join the force.  The profile of police 
officers, among which are the ones that have to deal with victims of partner violence is 
described by Arteaga Botello and Lopez Rivera (2000:61):  
“most have had a personal history involving law breaking, violence, bitterness 
and resentment, and drug consumption, and few have gone beyond a primary or 
secondary education.  A large number of applicants (…) have legal problems that 
lead them to leave their place of origin. (…) There are also persons who have 
been police officers most of their lives, and have gone from one police force to 
another, after being discharged for violent behavior, corruption, or links to drug 
trafficking and consumption”. 
 
The law-enforcement bodies create an order and a hierarchy, and through the 
socialization impose among its members values that make possible the reproduction of 
certain attitudes and behaviors, such as corruption.  “Everything in the police force is 
handled with money.  No favor from companions, commanders, or the upper ranks is by 
good will. Everything must be paid for” (Arteaga Botello and López Rivera 2000:66).  
Police often focus on the lucrative aspects of their work, dismissing cases and situations 
that do not contribute to their own profit or their institutions profit.  In describing the 
corruption of the police forces in the center of Mexico, Arteaga Botello and Lopez Rivera 
(2000:68) recount the behavior of Mario, a four-year veteran police officer in charge of 
training and socializing a newly arrived officer in a case of domestic violence.  “At about 
8:00pm a women approached [Mario], crying, her clothing soiled, complaining that her 
husband had beaten her. The police officer didn’t pay her any attention either”.  
Although police forces from all levels of the State –local, state and federal– are 
seen as corrupt, some analyses show that the public has more trust in the federal police 
force than the state police, which in turn is perceived more positively than the municipal 
police (Brown, Benedict, and Wilkinson 2006).  Many Mexicans believe that citizens 
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who are able to pay the largest bribe are more likely to receive a better treatment from 
police officers. As result, it is not surprising that the 2000 World Values Survey revealed 
that only 29 percent of Mexicans have “some” or “a lot” of trust in the police.  This lack 
of trust in the police has been associated with the high levels of corruption.  But 
Mexicans seem to be tolerant of corruption: 64% believe that corruption is not serious 
(Moloeznik 2003).  The image and social prestige of the police are so damaged that the 
recruitment and retention process for police personnel has become increasingly 
complicated, while complications also obstruct those who are attempting to reform the 
police force culture.   
The view of the police bodies that deal with domestic violence in the states where 
I conducted my research is uniformly that they constitute a highly masculinized and 
hierarchical institution and that in their performance they contribute to the revictimization 
of women.  Such views are even expressed by those working in the higher ranks of the 
State General Attorney’s Office.  The occupational culture of the police leads to 
exaggerated patriarchal notions of women and the family (Rigakos 1995).  Previous 
research by Edwards (1989) and Stanko (1989) has found that patriarchy is not only 
perpetuated by individual male attitudes, but by the organization itself through its 
informal rules.  
Before analyzing gender issues within the MPs and how they relate to other 
governmental institutions and other branches of the State, we should note that the 
situation in Mexico does not fundamentally differ from that in Canada or the U.S., as 
research has shown.  Women are often reluctant to call the police, and police officers 
tend to minimize situations of domestic violence, or perceive it as not constituting a legal 
problem; they are too inclined to behave arrogantly in front of abused women, and 
inclined to consider them as uncooperative and weak (Gillis, Diamond, Jebely, 
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Orekhobvsky, Ostrovich, MacIsaac, Sagrati, and Mandell 2006; Hannah-Moffat 1995; 
Menjívar and Salcido 2002; Stephens and Sinden 2000).  These attitudes have been 
linked to the traditional views of women’s roles held by officers (Saunders and Size 
1986). 
The attitudes of MPs are often dismissive of women’s experiences of violence, 
and in their attitudes it is clear that they are reproducing the societal patriarchal attitudes.  
The issue of partner violence is often sexualized or reduced to a sexual matter, women 
are treated as sexual objects, and many MPs recommend women resolve the situation of 
violence through sex.  The responses and literal expressions that reported to me the key 
informants from the three branches of the state and NGOs in the five states that I studied 
illustrate this fact.31  
 
• Why not do you go home and you start heating your husband’s bed? 
• If you were raped, it is because you looked forward to it  
• Madam, please go home.  
• Why don’t you go home and have sex with your husband? 
• Madam, why don’t you give your husband another chance?  
• If you do not have a physical mark, there is nothing I can do.  
• Madam, he only hit you a little bit, it is better that you go home and do not 
make him angry again.   
                                                 
31¿Por qué no se va a casa y empieza a calentarle la cama a su marido?; Si a usted la han violado es porque 
usted se lo buscó; Señora, por favor, márchese a casa;¿Por que no se va a casa y se acuesta con su marido;? 
Señora ¿Por que no le da usted otra oportunidad a su marido?; Si no tiene alguna marca física no puedo 
hacer nada; Señora, sólo la pego un poquito, mejor váyase a su  casa y no le haga enojar; Señora y no trajo 
las actas de nacimiento de sus hijos?  Ya la habían pegado muchas veces antes según lo que me está 
diciendo, y no podía usted esperar a venir hasta que hubiera sacado la actas de nacimiento de la casa?; Sí, 
ya se que usted dice que su marido la ha violado, pero necesito que me traiga dos testigos antes de levantar 
el acta; Señora, piense bien si va a regresar con él antes de levantar la denuncia; Señora, ¿Cómo es posible 
que la hayan violado si usted no está ni llorando?  
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• Madam, why you did not bring your children’s birth certificates?  You had 
been beaten many times according to what you just told me, and could not you 
wait to come here until you got the birth certificates?   
• I know that you told me that your husband raped you, but I need you to bring 
two witnesses before pressing charges.   
• Madam, think about whether or not you are going to go back with him before 
pressing charges.  
• Madam, how come is it possible that you claim you were raped, and you are 
not even crying?  
 
Yet, despite the insensitivity of these frequent police remarks, state human rights 
commissions seldom receive complaints against MP or civil servants involving that type 
of attitudes.  The State Commission of Human Rights (Comision Estatal de Derechos 
Humanos: CEDH) is a public institution independent from the government, responsible 
for defending citizens’ interest from malfeasance committed by public administration 
practices or civil servants.  Although women may be disturbed, feel betrayed by the 
institutions, or are solicited for mordida, they tend not to denounce the perpetrators at the 
CEDHs or go to any other agency because they expect that this will lead to 
revictimization, explained a female working at the Guanajuato’s CEDH.  Although the 
patriarchal and dismissive attitudes toward women seem to be common in all the states 
that I studied, the corruption problems in some states create an additional burden for 
women who are victims of partner violence.  The few that arrive to the CEDH often 
complain about the insensitive treatment they received in the MP agencies, but see the 
fact of giving bribes to the officers as something normal.  Sergio Vallespin, president of 
the Morelos’ CEDH explained the situation in Morelos with the following words: 
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Many of the women that arrive to the CEDH Morelos try to give us 100 pesos 
[around 10 dollars] since in all institutions they go to have to give money.  Few 
women do it in gratitude for the services, but the majority do it by custom.  We 
tell them that our services and assistance are free.  What happens is that they are 
used to ‘pay under the table’ (por debajo de la manga) to public employees if 
they want to speed a process or an issue.  For example, in the MP, if you do not 
have money the investigation does not advance, or the complaint is not processed.  
Even there are women who told me that as his husband has economic resources, 
he paid the MP to not follow upon the violence case, or to get favorable reports.  
Almost 50 percent of the cases are complaints about MP in cases of domestic 
violence are about officers’ inappropriate conduct because accepting money from 
the husband. N7.19 
 
This situation contrasts sharply with the one described in Chihuahua by Leopoldo 
Gonzalez Baeza, visitador de la CEDH Chihuahua, where allegedly MPs are not so 
corrupt.  However, although mordidas are not common in Chihuahua, it does not follow 
that the patriarchal attitudes and dismissive comments about the experiences of the 
victims of abuse by the police are diminished, as confirmed by members of the 
Chihuahua CEDH, public agencies, NGOs and members of the women’s movement.  
In the state [Chihuahua] corruption does not exist and MPs have an acceptable 
salary.  They do not ask for a mordida. Most of the cases against MP are related 
to the length of time that it takes them to put the report together. Here MPs do not 
ask for bribes.  Before it was common, but now it is not.  In Chihuahua MP are 
very controlled.  Machista attitudes might exist, but these are being reduced over 
time. Even when MPs are not trained in gender issues, both men and women MP 
can make machista comments against women that experience violence.N7.20 
 
Although the general opinion regarding MPs is bad, all the respondents saw some 
improvement in the situation over the last few years.  The process of sensitizing police 
officers and MPs is perceived differently by those who are in MP agencies, or are in the 
higher ranks of the State Attorney’s Office.  Those tend to be optimistic, as opposed to 
those who belong to other State institutions and NGOs.  The biggest improvements have 
occurred when institutions have been led by management which prioratizes partner 
 308
violence and violence against women.  In an interview with the Coordinator of Assistance 
for Victims of Crime and Community Services in the Jalisco Attorney´s General Office 
explained. 
The State General Attorney, Leobardo Larios Guzman, has conceded importance 
to the issue of violence against women, and he wants citizens to receive a good 
service from the Procuraduria.  Almost 2000 people in the Procuraduria have 
already received training in the issue of violence against women.  It is a difficult 
and slow process because of the issue [partner violence] but I think that the 
training is working.  There is not as much machismo as there used to be in the 
Procuraduria.  There are a lot of myths about the MPs, and some of them are 
disappearing.  At least here [in Jalisco] those were true in the past.  Almost all 
officers were changed in a process that started in 2002.  We went through a 
process of internal control because some of our officers were engaged in violence 
themselves, and there were cases of corruption.  We cleaned up everything, and 
since then, I think that the situation has improved.  I believe that all depends on 
the person responsible of the institution. N7.21 
 
However, it all ultimately depends on the institution and the personnel working 
for that institution.  In Jalisco, there have been actions for sensitizing MPs and local 
police officers; however, the issue of partner violence is very often dismissed by the 
higher ranks. A woman very active in community matters and very involved in the 
process of approval of the family violence law explained to me that she was responsible 
of training 42 police officers in a municipality of Jalisco.  After talking to them, she 
realized that most of them had committed disciplinary misdemeanors, and that their 
attendance to the domestic violence seminar was the disciplinary action.  She argued that 
there is an enormous need of training in gender and domestic violence among the police 
and MP.  
In an interview with Marta, a MP providing direct assistance to victims of partner 
violence in Chihuahua, she mentioned some of the reasons why women say that they 
were treated badly by MPs.  Her explanation depended on the bad image of the police: 
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There is the image of the MP as being the worst thing.  Sometimes women arrive 
here and they want us to fix their life, and very often they do not understand that 
we must follow a procedure.  We have been trained in gender and violence 
against women.  But when women arrive here they do not understand that we 
must interrogate them.  Above all they get very upset when we realize that they 
are forging the charges.  Then, they say that we treated them bad.N7.22 
 
Given the criticism that the police are unable to protect women, women are 
included within the police force.  Moreover, special agencies for the protection of women 
are created.  The inclusion of women is based on the belief that women are more suitable 
for dealing with women and their protection (Feinmann 1986; Radford 1990).  In 
Mexico, as elsewhere (see Radford and Stanko 1996), when feminists criticized the 
behavior of police officers dealing with domestic violence cases, and specially after the 
rape of several women by members of the Procuraduria, the Federal District set up 
special units responsible for dealing with domestic violence and sexual cases.  These 
specialized offices soon opened in other states.  
All interviewees from governmental agencies, the judiciary branch, NGOs and the 
feminist movement consider that abused women tend to receive better service in 
specialized MP units.  However, as has been evidenced above with the testimony of 
Margarita Guillén, specialized MP agencies in some states are closed during the 
weekends, those days of the week when couples tend to spend more time together.  The 
specialized agency of the state of Morelos in Cuernavaca was no exception to this rule in 
2005, when I conducted my research.  The office lacked of resources and personnel.  At 
times there was only one person in the office, which consisted of a medium  sized room 
with two tables. Otherwise, the furniture was almost inexistent; for instance, lacking 
filing cabinets, there were at least four piles of files scattered about the office.  During my 
interview I could see that there were only two white outdoor style plastic chairs that were 
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pulled next to the desks in which people could seat themselves.  This situation 
exemplifies the precariousness of resources for specialized agencies in some states.  
Whether treatment of abuse victims would be ameliorated by the hiring of more 
women in the police forces remains unclear according to the data provided by my 
interviewees.  I found however, that in all the states, that the perception of the degree of 
difference made in the treatment of victims by woman MPs was associated to the branch 
of the State or organization to which the respondent belongs, with NGO members or 
members of the women’s movement and in the case of the legislative power to the 
political ideology.  It is not associated, however, with the gender of the interviewer.  I 
found that: 1) people from NGOs, the women’s movement and scholars think that there 
are not gender differences among MP officers; 2) legislators from parties holding a more 
traditional gender ideology (PAN) think that men and women MP have different styles, 
that women tend to be more nurturing and understandable and that provide better 
attention to female victims of partner violence.  In contrast, legislators from non-PAN 
political parties are more likely to believe that there are not differences between men and 
women; 3) members of the higher ranks of governmental agencies and those providing 
direct assistance to victims of family violence also think that women are more sensitive 
toward the issue of partner violence and have a different [and better] style of providing 
services; 4) Judges opinion shows no clear pattern by state or gender.  
Monica works in an NGO and she is very active in the Chihuahua’s women’s 
movement.  When I asked her whether or not women MPs treat victims of domestic 
violence differently, she responded with a clear no, as all other interviewees from NGOs 
and scholars involved in research and governmental projects about partner violence.  
Most of them agree that being a woman is not a vaccine against patriarchy.  The fact that 
men and women have the same style might be a consequence of the culture of the police 
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departments, highly masculinized, and with strict principles of hierarchy and obedience. 
However, none of the people interviewed suggested this idea.  In Monica’s words,  
Women in the MP or in public agencies are not any different from men.  To have 
a female body is not a guarantee of a better treatment for victims of partner 
violence. Both men and women are trapped in a patriarchal culture. If women do 
not receive training, both men and women are equally insensible. N7.23 
 
On the other hand, PAN legislators and people working in public agencies that 
provide services to victims of family violence and some judges claim that female MP 
have a different style than males when they have to provide services to women abused by 
their partner.  They argue that in general all women have characteristics making for 
solidarity with victims because they have the same gender or because biologically women 
are different than men.  “Women are completely different. They have other qualities such 
as emotional intelligence that allows them to help female victims of violence in a 
different way [than men do]”, said a female PAN legislator from Jalisco.N7.24  The 
testimony of a female judge from Morelos further illustrates this claim 
Regardless if it is a domestic violence situation or not, I think that women treat 
differently victims of crime than men.  Women treat victims better, in a more 
humane way. Perhaps it is a biological reason.  Women are more sensitive, more 
understanding, they are more patient for understanding conflict and its sources.  
Women are also more skilled in conflict resolution.  Men, in contrast, are more 
practical and distant regarding family problems.N7.25 
 
Based on the interviews I identified three main reasons given for why MPs might 
treat women badly:  1) systematic patriarchy; 2) dysfunctions peculiar to police 
departments, and; 3) the perception that women use the police for their own purposes.   
Systematic patriarchy. The first one is related to the patriarchal nature of the 
society and how the patriarchal system pervades even the institutions that are supposed to 
protect and support women.  Because men and women cannot detach themselves from 
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their socialization, either directly or indirectly tend to reproduce the subordination of 
women so characteristic of patriarchal societies.  As violence against women is one of the 
most brutal expressions of patriarchy, violence is often condoned and seen as an 
expression of women’s transgression of gender roles or gender ideologies (Dobash and 
Dobash 1979).  Domestic violence is accepted as normal phenomenon among couples 
and often excused in  society, while sometimes females are socialized to endure violence 
and aceptar su cruz (Borjón López-Coterilla 2000; Glantz and Halperin 1996; Salcido 
and Adelman 2004; Torres-Falcón 2004).  Perhaps that is the reason why MPs often say 
to the woman, what did you do to your husband? 
The problem is so extended in Mexican society that many MPs are involved in 
partner violence in their private lives.  Therefore, cannot be detached from it.  “If they are 
violent in their homes, what type of service and treatment do you want these MPs to 
provide to women”, said the director of one UAVI in the Federal District.N7.26  Some of 
MPs realize about the problem when they take training in the issue of partner violence.  
The Coordinator of Assistance for Victims of Crime and Community Services in the 
Jalisco State Attorney’s Office said,  
I participated in the training of MPs in the issue of domestic violence and violence 
against women.  It is so obvious to me that many of them are involved in the 
problem.  Some of them have contacted me privately after the training sessions 
and requested help. Some others, I thought that they were even going to admit that 
they had been victims of abuse during their childhood or that they are violent 
toward their partners in front of their co-workers while in the training seminar.N7.27  
 
Dysfunction in the police departments. The second reason refers to the specific 
characteristics of the political system and functioning of the police bodies in Mexico.  
The status of those working in the police departments is low and they do not receive 
enough training in gender and family violence issues, nor is their work considered to be 
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prestigious.  MPs are often ignorant of the new laws, and “since the crime of family 
violence is new in Mexico, and before it was just an aggravating circumstance linked to 
another crime.  Most public authorities do not know about it, that’s the reason why 
women are treated bad”, said a male lawyer working at the DIF Jalisco.N7.28  Problems 
with the rule of law and impunity in Mexico only worsen the situation, because 
complaints against civil servants are often dismissed, and sanctions are rarely applied 
against them, explained to me a male judge in Guanajuato. 
The perceived use of the police by women against their partners. The third set of 
reasons is associated with the use that women make of the police and governmental 
public agencies that provide assistance to victims of partner violence.  In all the states 
where I conducted research all the people working in public agencies, the MP and in the 
judiciary system explained to me that there are many women who seek assistance 
because they want “that somebody with authority” pull on her husband's ears (dar un 
tiron de orejas).  In other words, some women just want somebody with authority (such 
as the MP) to let their husband know that his behavior is wrong, and that he has to respect 
his wife.  This situation coupled with the lack of personnel in police offices and the 
saturation of work, only worsens the situation of women that seek assistance in the MP.  
Some other women forgive their abusers for economic reasons.  As we saw in the 
previous chapter where the contents of the law were analyzed, those who engage in 
family violence have to pay fines or can be put into jail, which indeed increases the 
problems of poor families in which the male is the sole breadwinner.  Some of the 
respondents mentioned that many women do not want to end the relationship, and when 
they see the potential consequences for the abuser, they forgive him and ask MPs and 
judges to dismiss the case.  According to both judges, and people from the governmental 
agencies this has generated the lack of response of MPs and some of their attitudes, such 
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as “Madam, why don’t you go to your house and give your husband a second chance?”.  
A criminal judge in Morelos mentioned:   
It’s exasperating see that women arrive here [criminal court], or to the MP 
agencies with serious lesions as result of domestic violence. And then she 
forgives him. It is frustrating because all the machinery is already functioning.  
MPs do not believe women or do not take them seriously because they think that 
women will forgive the aggressor, so they [MP agents] do not want to start the 
procedure.N7.29    
 
7.3.c-  The Governor 
In all the states in which I conducted in-depth interviews except the Federal 
District, the Governor is perceived as a key figure in the development of public policies 
about partner violence and its later implementation.  The Governor is instrumental in 
promoting policies and in developing the institutions created by the family violence laws.  
However, the Governor’s personal life and their own experiences with the issue of 
domestic violence affect the role legally assigned to him regarding family violence.  A 
PAN female legislator from Guanajuato commented: 
Our law gives the executive the power of implementing [family violence] 
programs, and the governor is responsible for doing it.  In Guanajuato, we 
currently have a Governor [Juan Carlos Romero Hicks] who is very interested in 
the family. He has a beautiful family.  He married Frances Siekman, from the 
U.S., and has ten children.  He pays special attention to the family.  The Governor 
is a key figure in the development of family policies, and he is doing it.  Of 
course, previous governors also did it, Carlos Medina Plasencia, Vicente Fox 
Quesada, and Ramón Martín Huerta [all of them from the PAN].  All of these 
young governors had interest in family issues.  Perhaps that is what gave us a 
different family profile.N7.30 
 
In some states, such as Jalisco or Guanajuato, both people from the civil society 
and the executive consider that the Governor’s wife (as she is the one presiding over the 
DIF, the institution responsible for providing social assistance) plays a very important 
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role in promoting actions toward the integration of the family and preventing family 
violence.  In these two states, the Governor’s wife is perceived as being very concerned 
about the issue of family violence.  They are very well regarded for having promoted the 
creation of a shelter for victims of family violence, and supported specific actions on the 
issue.  The director of an agency in Guanajuato offering services to victims of domestic 
violence said: 
The Governor’s wife [Frances Siekman de Romero] has always been very 
concerned about people. If she supports the issue of domestic violence, it is 
because she thinks that it is important.  The problem is serious. The Governor’s 
wife is unpretentious, she worries about women.  She often comes here even 
though no pictures are taken for the press.N7.31  
 
The personal life or personal issues of the Governor also affects the 
implementation of policies about domestic violence.  There are unconfirmed rumors that 
the Governor of Morelos, Sergio Estrada Cajigal (PAN), and the former Governor of 
Chihuahua (Patricio Martinez Garcia, PRI) had been allegedly involved in incidents of 
domestic violence.  According to NGOs from Morelos, this is the reason why the 
CEPAVI (Consejo de Prevencion y Asistencia a la Violencia Intrafamiliar) was not 
summoned –in Morelos the Governor is the president of the CEPAVI and is responsible 
for summoning it.  One of my informants in Morelos told me,  
(…)  it was rumored that he had been involved in domestic violence, and perhaps 
summoning the Council would bring up personal memories to him. He is not 
interested and he blocks any type of action from governmental institutions and 
NGOs.  Moreover, he rejects the issue of family violence.  But perhaps it is also a 
party issue.  The PAN wants to keep the family together.  But I think that in the 
case of Morelos it is both, political party and individual factors. (…) We have 
tried to negotiate with several institutions, including the Morelos´ Women’s 
Institute because it is its responsibility to lead a program on violence against 
women.  But they receive little support; the current government does not allow 
them freedom of action. We look forward to have a more sensitive Governor and 
that things can move with the government change.N7.32  
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The public agencies in Morelos have quite a different story when questioned 
about the issue of the CEPAVI, because they blame the opposition of NGOs.  A member 
of the Morelos’ Women’s Institute said that the NGOs are just very negative and they 
complain about everything that the government does without making new proposals.  
NGOs in Morelos are very critical of the Governor, they compare him with the two 
previous governors, Jorge Carrillo Olea and Jorge Morales Barud, the interim governor, 
because during Estrada Cajigal’s period not only the Women’s Program was discontinued 
but also the CEPAVI was never summoned.  Members of the CEDH Morelos, Women’s 
Institute, DIF and NGOs have held several meetings trying to fulfill the role assigned to 
the CEPAVI.  Both the CEDH Morelos and the members of NGOs and women’s 
movements agree with what this key informant told me: 
The political circumstances surrounding of the governor have not allowed him to 
be involved in the issue of violence against women.  The gubernatorial politics 
have centered on infrastructure, but in this government there is not a real interest 
in human beings.N7.33 
 
The situation just described in Morelos is similar to the one of the former 
governor of Chihuahua.  It is surprising that although I only selected five states to 
conduct detailed research, in two of them either the Governor at the time or the former 
governor were rumored to have been involved in domestic violence incidents.  A 
psychologist who used to be very active in the Chihuahua’s women’s movement and is 
currently working in a private practice mentioned: 
Here in Chihuahua there was a Governor who apparently abused his wife. It is 
rumored that on one occasion the woman had to go to the U.S. for treatment. He 
cancelled almost all projects related to domestic violence, there were not UAVIs 
and he paralyzed the CEPAVI.  The new governor has paid definitely more 
attention to partner violence.N7.34 
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Regarding the role of the Governor, most respondents agree that it is not a matter 
of political ideology; they believe that it is a matter of the individual’s sensibility toward 
the issue.  For example, the PRD has publicly shown its concern about domestic violence, 
but that did not prevent one of the most prominent PRD politicians, Andrés Manuel 
Lopez Obrador, at that time the head of the Federal District Government, from proposing 
reducing funds for domestic violence programs and even floating the possibility of 
closing the only public funded domestic violence shelter in Mexico City, located in the 
Alvaro Obregón section.  The director of a domestic violence shelter in Mexico City said,  
I would not say that the interest in domestic violence is tied to a specific political 
party.  I think that some people are more interested in the issue of family violence 
than others.  When there is a government change, you wonder what is going to 
happen.  More than wondering which party will win the elections, you wonder if 
the new elected government be interested in family violence.N7.35 
 
7.4-  JUDICIARY POWER 
The judiciary power in Mexico has been subject to much adverse comment on 
account of its weakness relative to the executive and legislative branches of government. 
Pilar Domingo (2004), examining the judicial reforms of the 90s, notes that they 
significantly contributed to a re-accommodation of the judiciary in terms of its position 
with the Mexican political system”, which led to a growing “willingness by the courts to 
confront the executive, even on potentially sensitive issues in political and economic 
matters”.  At the same time, she notes that “little has been done in terms of addressing 
access to justice, efficiency, improving mechanisms of legal accountability, or 
introducing anti-corruption measures” (Domingo 2004). 
The judiciary is perhaps the branch of the Mexican State that is in less contact 
with the other two.  It is as well the branch that seems to harbor the deepest patriarchal 
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attitudes, as revealed by the following examples both at the federal and local level.  Since 
the reforms in the federal criminal and civil codes in the early 1990s, the law recognized 
the rape within the marriage as a crime.  However, in 1994 the Mexican Supreme Court, 
ruled against categorizing it as a crime.  Instead, rape within marriage was considered as 
an abusive exercise of conjugal debt.  The 1994 Supreme Court decision supported the 
idea the marriage had a procreation purpose.  It was not until November 15, 2005 that the 
Supreme Court overrode its former ruling and recognized that women’s right to sexual 
freedom, that is, of deciding when and with whom to have intercourse, is not lost in the 
institution of marriage.  
The role of the judiciary power is central since judges are responsible for applying 
the legislation concerning domestic violence.  As the family violence laws are 
administrative laws, the judges do not have any competency over them.  However, in 
some states the agreements reached by the victim and perpetrator of violence with 
assistance of a mediator or a counselor are ratified by the judge, in order to make sure 
that these will be observed.  However, there are judges who refuse to ratify these 
agreements.   
Judges often complain that the MPs –who are responsible for making the case– do 
not present the case according to the precepts laid down by the family violence legislation 
in the civil and criminal codes.  Similarly, there is also certain ignorance about the newly 
approved legislation regarding family violence among lawyers.  Two years prior to when 
I conducted this research, family violence was defined as a felony in the criminal code of 
Morelos.  However, a criminal judge explained to me that over the last two years since 
the change, he had only seen two cases in which “family violence” was charged, and one 
of them was related to the abuse of a minor.  He contended that there are many cases of 
domestic violence that could be charged as “family violence”, but given the lack of 
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competency of both MP and prosecutors, the family violence articles in the criminal code 
are not often used.  He argued, 
I know that some cases of domestic violence constitute felonies under the criminal 
code, but as a judge I cannot tell the prosecutor or the lawyer how they have to 
present the case.  Nor, can I tell MP to integrate a demand specifying that there 
was a family violence felony.N7.36  
 
Within the judiciary power, differences between male and female judges as with 
the MPs, don’t always correspond to gender differences.  Instead, differences can be 
traced back to individual values and personal sympathy with victims of partner violence.  
Regardless of the gender, there are judges who are more understanding of the problem of 
partner violence.  In my interviews with the judges in all states, the interviewees in the 
judiciary branch were mostly able to name at least a couple of colleagues that hold 
patriarchal attitudes, that is, that they tend not to believe the testimony of the woman, to 
believe that the family needs to stay together, or believe that a woman is physically 
abused generally “because she did something to upset her husband”.  Unfortunately, the 
attempts to contact these judges and obtain an interview were fruitless.  A woman 
responsible for coordinating the services to victims in the State Attorney’s Office of 
Guanajuato commented,  
Judges are more insensitive than they should be.  Some judges do not believe in 
psychological abuse.  They do not even believe in psychologists’ expert testimony 
(peritaje).  It is very frustrating.  We have made advances with the MP, they are 
more sensitized than they were before.  But even in those cases in which the 
response of the MP was correct, then we face the judges´ wall. Both men and 
women judges are very insensitive and have patriarchal attitudes.  So when we 
know that there is an insensitive judge presiding, we sometimes wait for the next 
judge on duty.N7.37 
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Trainers in domestic violence issues from public agencies, scholars and members 
of NGOs and the feminist movement all concur that some judges, regardless of their 
gender, will in some cases, regardless of the nature and severity of partner violence, 
attempt to impose  reconciliation on the couple.  In most states there is specific training 
for judges concerning gender and domestic violence issues.  However, as the head of a 
governmental agency also responsible for designing and teaching seminars to public 
employees and judges in the Federal District said, “Some judges do not want to receive 
training because they have the feeling that gender issues are not of their concern.”N7.38 
Most judges feel frustrated with the recent reforms in the state legislation 
concerning family violence.  For example, a female family judge in the state of Morelos 
argued that the administrative law regarding family violence is the result of a political fad 
which really gives  more importance and power to the executive through the promotion of 
the DIF.  But she claims that the executive power does not have a real interest in 
domestic violence issues, and therefore what they [judges] can do is rather limited.   
The law does not give us resources for bringing violence against women to an 
end.  We [judges] cannot sentence men to receive therapy.  The executive does 
not provide that type of services.  The only thing that we can do is to impose fines 
and remove the parental guardianship to those who perpetrate acts of family 
violence, but we cannot go any further.N7.39 
 
It is older and male judges who are most likely to have patriarchal attitudes 
toward women and be more dismissive of cases of domestic violence.  However, both 
men and women may hold this type of attitudes.  In sum, the application of laws intended 
to protect women depends greatly on the personal values of the person acting as a judge, 
and the values of the judge can’t be inferred from the gender of the judge; rather, they are 
related to specific socialization or special sensibility about the issue.   
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7.5-  DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIES  
As one might expect, given the weaknesses in the State system, the lack of 
resources, the lack of coordination within the different branches of the State, and even 
among agencies within the same branch, informal networks and individuals working on 
domestic violence issues have developed ‘work around’ strategies to be able to provide 
services to women, and protect them.  
 
7.5.a-  NGOs and MP:  Collaboration 
Given patriarchal attitudes among the police or MPs and the problems faced in the 
courtroom by abused women, many public agencies in all states where I did my research 
accompany the woman to the MP in order to make sure that they are treated “correctly”.  
In addition, specific individuals within the institutions of the State and those in NGOs 
providing services to abused women have developed a collaborative relationship.  These 
collaborative relationships are based in personal friendship between the people from the 
two agencies/institutions or in informal collaboration agreements developed by the two 
agencies/institutions as a result of the participation of the people responsible of these 
agencies in a certain event, conference, etc.  The director of one of the three domestic 
violence shelters in the Federal District in 2005 explained to me. 
We have a good relationship with authorities. Over here [in the shelter] women 
receive specialized services. When our women go to the [public] authorities, they 
know that they are not playing.  You know what we do?  We give them referral 
letters (cartas de canalizacion).  In that way the process not only is speeded up 
but also we make sure that they will receive good services.  Of course, there are 
women that went by themselves to the MP and were well treated.  But they were 




7.5.b-  Strategies Among Executive Power Agencies 
Given the previously described problems in the executive power agencies, they 
restore to the same strategies than NGOs.  The head of the CEPAVI at Jalisco mentioned 
that the institutions that have cooperated with the CEPAVI have forged some sort of 
solidarity.  Both the women that go to that particular agency for the first time, or those 
who are channeled by other institutions that also are coordinating with the CEPAVI, tend 
to receive good attention.  She mentioned that when she channels a woman she makes 
sure the woman is supplied with a letter to be given to the next agency.  “It is something 
simple, and perhaps something stupid, but it works”, said CEPAVI’s head.  Other 
common strategies are to accompany women victims of partner violence to the MP, to 
refer them to specialized MP agencies, or to send them to MP agencies well known for 
providing good attention to women.  This information is known through informal 
channels, by personal connections or friendship with people working in other public 
agencies.  
In other cases they follow the established channels, but they accompany the 
woman or they give her a letter.  There are informal agreements with the institutions. For 
example the Morelos’ Women’s Institute gives a letter to the woman before she goes to 
the MP or other agency, and then the MP or other agency sends an official letter back to 
let them know that they took care of the case.  
Other agencies, such as the State Commission of Human Rights, where citizens 
can denounce improper activities and behaviors of public employees, have also 
developed strategies to ensure that complaints of civil servants that have not provided 
good service to women or have treated them improperly are given a follow up.  For 
example, in the Morelos’ State Commission of Human Rights, informal protocol calls for 
the first official response to contact the chief of the agency or unit where the civil servant 
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is employed.  Otherwise no attention would be paid to the complaints.  Sergio Vallespín, 
president of the Morelos’ State Commission of Human Rights, explained it as follows,  
Women with complaints about acts or omissions of public servants arrive at the 
Morelos’ State Commission of Human Rights.  Above all, women victims of 
partner violence complain about MPs.  We give a call to the hierarchical superior 
of the civil servants.  After that, we follow up the case.  When, we give a call to 
other authorities, they provide us with an answer.  This is the fast track for settle 
cases, if we try to use other channels it does not work, because the complaint is 
filed without providing any answer to the complainant.  We make sure that those 
responsible of the units where the civil servants are employed get to know what 
their subordinates are doing.  In many cases, if it were not for us, they would not 
know.N7.41  
 
7.5.c-  MP and Judiciary Power:  Threats and Deadlines 
Sometimes the MPs also develop strategies for getting other branches of the State 
to work in favor of women’s interests.  This exhibits how conflict and tensions arise 
among the different branches of the State.  In the case of Mexico, given the lack of 
continuity of the high ranks of the administrative structure (as it changes with every 
election), there is a continuous negotiation among the branches of the State.  Given the 
lack of hierarchy between different branches of the State, when informal collaboration 
agreements based on friendship are not possible, or cannot be established, people in these 
branches “play with the time” and even resort to tricks for getting the law applied in 
victims of partner violence benefit.  For example, high officials in the Attorney’s General 
Office of Jalisco and Guanajuato mentioned that in critical cases of women severely 
beaten, when the abuser is under arrest, they have twenty-four hours to turn the detainee 
to the judge in duty.  Depending on the schedule of the judge on duty, and based on their 
previous experience with him or her, MPs play with the time frame of 24 hours in order 
to turn the detainee to a judge that is more likely to arrest the aggressor.   
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In other cases, when the individual in the State agency is highly sympathetic to 
victims of partner violence and holds a position of power in the organization, individuals 
within the ranks of the State might use threats to other individuals from the judiciary 
power in order to obtain protection to women.  One of this officials mentioned above 
admitted that he/she has even turned to threats for getting an apprehension order for the 
aggressor in cases where the life of the women is at risk: 
I have personally accompanied MPs to the court, or I have given a call to the 
judge in order to request the apprehension of the aggressor.  I have even told the 
judge ‘God grant that I send you a case of a beaten women and that the aggressor 
does not kill her, because if you do not sign an arrest order and something 
happens to the woman, I will make sure that everybody knows about that, and I 
will act against you’.N7.42 
 
7.6-  CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have demonstrated the pluralism of agendas and interests within 
the State, which helps us conceptualize it as a permanent arena of struggle between 
different forces.  By plural I mean that many battles take place within the State structure: 
battles between the civil society and social movements with the legislative and executive 
power, as well as battles between the different branches of the State.  The State is not 
unique and coordinated because actors within each branch might have different agendas, 
and different attitudes and perceptions toward the same issue.  I have also shown that 
patriarchy pervades the structure of the State, and that often these struggles must be 
understood relative to the gender of the individuals that occupy the positions within the 
State. 
By using the specific case of domestic violence and analyzing the responsibility 
of the different branches within the State toward the issue, I have demonstrated that 
gender battles also occur within the State.  The State has the power to transform the 
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societal structure through laws and the use of force.  However, gains in changing the 
social structure accomplished by one branch of the State might be undermined by another 
branch.  The gender of the individuals that compose the State matters in some branches 
and agencies of the State because it might affect the likelihood that the efforts from the 
State in changing the social structure will take place.   
I have also demonstrated how in Mexico the three branches of the State need to be 
studied independently because of the lack of coordination among them.  If we analyze 
progress in women’s rights by surveying legislation alone gives us a faulty and 
incomplete picture of the real situation.  Although any legislation that protects women 
might be considered an advance of women’s rights from one perspective, one must be 
cautious when in the case of Mexico given that the legislation has the double goal of 
protecting individuals within the family and the promotion of the family.  On an everyday 
level one has to know how the legislation is actually being implemented by the executive 
and enforced by the judiciary, and one has to look at whether or not resources are 
allocated for developing the public policies contemplated in the law. 
Also by using the theory of gendered organizations and the literature about gender 
styles, I have shown how in different branches of the State men and women are perceived 
to have different styles.  These different gender styles of specific individuals within the 
executive and legislative branches are not related to political ideology.  Instead, in those 
areas where men and women are perceived to have different gender styles (legislative, 
and police bodies within the executive), one actually finds individuals responding 
according to their socialization or idiosyncrasies that ensure greater or lesser interest in 
and understanding of partner violence.    
As post structuralists feminist perspectives of the State claim (see for example 
MacDowell Santos 2004; Molyneux 2000), the Mexican State is a ‘differentiated set of 
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institutions’ and a ‘site of struggle’ both representing and reconstructing gender relations.  
However, I have augmented this type of analysis by looking at the gender struggles 
occurring in the interior of the State at the micro level within each branch, and at the 
different gender styles among those with roles within the structure of the State in order to 
demonstrate that patriarchy might pervade the structures of the State.  Thus, descriptions 
of the State as a patriarchal institution are too broad, and one should look, instead, to two 
intertwined factors, the structural level of patriarchy and the prevalence of patriarchal 
ideology, in association with the actions of the individuals within the structures of the 
State to the degree in which they embody or dissent from these patriarchal norms.  
Although the State structures are effectively controlled by men, and tend to operate with 
certain bias toward heterosexual men’s interests (Connell 1990), this is a feature resulting 
from the embeddedness of individuals in a patriarchal system.  Nevertheless, I think that 
the different branches within the State and even different levels within branches might 
present particularities. 
By using the theory of gendered organizations I have also demonstrated the 
plurality among the three branches of the state in terms of different gender styles.  Acker 
(1990) argues that women have to present themselves in such a way that they eliminated 
gender coded behaviors, such as emotional expression, in order to succeed in male-
dominated organizations, doing work traditionally reserved to men, especially in the top 
of traditionally male predominant hierarchies.  This is not true throughout the State, as 
women in some branches have different styles than men.  In governmental agencies 
responsible for providing assistance to women, the employees providing direct assistance 
to victims of partner violence and the directors of such agencies as well are expected to 
be anything but gender neutral, displaying a certain sympathetic sensibility towards 
victims of abuse.  However, in more masculinized areas of the State such as in the 
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judiciary power and in the police in the executive power, perhaps due to the nature of the 
agencies and the pressure for conforming to organizational norms, these expectations 




CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS:  MAKING SENSE OF 
WOMEN, THE STATE AND VIOLENCE 
In this dissertation, I have been examining the confluence of effects that emerge 
when the State, implicated as it is in the patriarchal system, attempts to mitigate the 
individual women’s risk of partner violence by using its legislative, judicial and police 
powers.  I also have examined the influence of the patriarchal system on individual 
women’s risk of partner violence.  The approach adopted in this dissertation was based 
on the assumption that patriarchy is a social system that permeates institutions and that 
becomes internalized in the interpretive and motivational structure of individuals.  The 
framing questions with which I have approached my project relate to the influence of the 
patriarchal system on individual experiences of partner violence, as well as whether the 
Mexican State strengthens patriarchy and reaffirms women’s inequality in the family.  I 
also asked whether the Mexican State has in fact made any attempt to challenge 
patriarchy.  Finally, I looked at feminist and women’s movements and NGOs to 
determine whether they succeeded in influencing the State to adopt measures to guarantee 
women a life free of violence. I looked not only for their influence on the legislative 
level, but also surveyed the role they continue to play in implementing anti-violence 
laws.   
The 2003 ENDIREH revealed that more than 40 percent of women were victims 
of some sort of partner violence (physical, sexual, psychological/emotional or 
patrimonial/economic) during the year before the survey.  The phenomenon of partner 
violence is complex.  At the most micro-level there are individual, situational, and 
exosystem factors.  At the most macro level, the nature of Mexican society –which, like 
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Western societies in general, is patriarchal– contributes and inflects this phenomenon.  
Thus, the structure of my dissertation has been as follows: I’ve identified the multiple 
causal factors, starting individual and the cultural assumptions of patriarchy and going 
through political, economic and historic reasons which converge in the social 
phenomenon of domestic violence; I have sorted through the formation of resistance to 
domestic violence, starting with feminist consciousness raising groups in the seventies, 
and traced their subsequent influence on legislation; and, finally, I have followed the path 
from the legislative sanctions and mandates to the ordinary application of the law in a 
number of Mexican states, which involves the often conflicted coordination of state-level 
bureaucracies, the court system, and an array of non-public groups.    
How extensive is patriarchy in Mexico?  To answer this question, I constructed, in 
Chapter 2, an index for measuring the structural component of patriarchy, the Gender 
Equality Index in Mexican States (GEIMS).  By taking into consideration the level of 
gender inequality in the political, economic, educational and legal spheres, I concluded 
that Mexican women have attained an overall level of equality of 44 percent.  The 
homogeneity and size of the coefficients for each of the dimensions of gender equality 
reveal that almost all Mexican states but the Federal District, are still in the early stages 
of the trend to structural gender equality.  In essence, Mexican states all tend to rank 
relatively low in terms of structural gender equality. . 
The patriarchal ideology in Mexico that reproduces the inequality between men 
and women flourishes in the culture and language.  Pejorative sayings about women and 
misogynic characterizations are part of the ideology of patriarchy (Amorós 1990).  For 
women and dogs, a stick in one hand and bread in the other (a la mujer y al can, el palo 
en una mano y en la otra el pan);  Nothing will happen to a women who stays at home (a 
la mujer en casa, nada le pasa).  These sayings, and innumerable others, represent that 
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part of the folk psychology of Mexican culture which feeds into gender inequality and 
female subordination.  There are other sayings and attitudes that justify and normalize 
violence against women.  If I do not hit her, she will think I do not love her –si no la 
pego, pensara que no la quiero (Díaz-Olavarrieta and Sotelo 1996); All women secretly 
desire to be hit or raped –todas las mujeres desean en secreto ser golpeadas o violadas 
(Híjar-Medina, López, and Blanco 1997); He hits me because he loves me –me pega 
porque me quiere (Torres-Falcón 2001).  In other cases, popular sayings blame the victim 
and imply that women enjoy their own physical abuse: If she doesn’t like it [abuse] she 
would have left me –si no le gustara, ya se habría ido (Torres-Falcón 2001).  This 
patriarchal ideology tries to enroll not only men, but also women, in the task of 
subordinating women.  This is shown by the negative perception of men who desire to 
express their love to their family and make family decisions democratically, which is 
summed up in the term “mandilón”, that is, ‘a man with an apron’, without prestige for 
sharing prestige and authority (Guillé-Tamayo 2002). 
In Chapter 1, I presented the theoretical model governing my research, in which 
the social structure (level of patriarchy) is considered to have a direct effect on the 
behavior of individuals.  In the case of the experiences of partner violence, I confirmed 
this model in Chapter 3 by using a national representative sample of Mexican women.  In 
Mexico, in general, the context in which women live creates certain conditions that make 
them more vulnerable to certain types of partner violence.  That context of vulnerability, 
determined by the level of structural gender equality or the degree of structural 
patriarchy, influences the individual’s experiences of physical and psychological 
violence.  These findings are of relevance because until recently, quantitative sociological 
studies about partner violence have often ignored the context –social structure– in which 
individuals and social life is embedded.  Moreover, this finding empirically supports the 
 331
feminist liberal hypothesis: higher levels of structural gender equality do reflect erosion 
of patriarchy and are associated with lower levels of violence.  
Feminist and the women’s movement have, since the 1980s, emphasized the issue 
of violence against women, starting with the issue of sexual violence. They won over 
public opinion and pressured the State to take action, building alliances with female 
legislators and key members of the executive to introduce reforms in the criminal code 
regarding rape and creating specialized agencies for victims of sexual crimes.   
Responding to internal criticism that the feminist movement had not prioritized 
domestic violence as they had rape, the woman’s movement used the synergies created in 
the wake of the reform of sexual violence legislation to press for specific laws to protect 
women from domestic violence.  At least three other historically specific factors played a 
role in highlighting domestic violence issues.  First there was the recent participation of 
Mexico in the Fourth World Conference on Women organized by the United Nations in 
1995 in Beijing.  Second, Mexican government was put in a position where it had to 
defend itself from losing face, after endorsing the year of the American Convention on 
the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence –also known as Belem do Pará 
Convention– also in 1995.  And third, other countries in North, Central and South 
America had already enacted or were in the process of approving specific laws about 
violence against women (Puerto Rico in 1989; in 1994 in the United States, Argentina, 
Peru and Chile; in 1995 in Bolivia and Ecuador; in 1996 in Colombia, Costa Rica, El 
Salvador and Guatemala).  As we saw in Chapter 4, the first legislative initiative for 
protecting women from domestic violence was enacted in 1996 in the Federal District.  
The scope of the legislation was broad since it aimed not only to protect women against 
family violence, but also all members of the family.  Soon, other Mexican states 
approved similar types of legislation.  As we have shown, the dual objective of these laws 
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(promotion of the family and protection of individual’s within the family from family 
violence) created many ambiguities regarding its interpretation. 
 
8.1-  THE SEARCH FOR LEGITIMACY ON THE NAME OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS 
In Chapter 1, I proposed, following the theory of the State adumbrated by certain 
post-structuralist feminists that consider the democratic State to have a dual function, 
both as an arena in which tensions that originate in society are manifested and negotiated, 
and as an agent that has the potential for changing that same social structure, thereby 
altering gender relations through the use of force.  What led the State to approve the 
domestic violence legislation?  A detailed examination of the international, historical, 
political and economic circumstances surrounding the enactment of the administrative 
family violence legislation reveals the importance of the State’s search for legitimacy –
either for restoring lost legitimacy or obtaining it– in the process of approving the 
legislation.  The theoretical dimension of this was examined in Chapter 4 and the 
empirical dimension in Chapter 5. 
This search for legitimacy has to be understood in the political context of the 
political transition in Mexico, after seven decades of uninterrupted PRI governments.  In 
the Mexican case, as well as in other countries undergoing abnormal or intense political 
change, the State is more likely to grant and expand women’s rights as a transition looms, 
or during the political transition process (see Htun 2003, for an analysis of the case of 
Argentina, Chile and Brazil).  In its search for legitimacy, the Mexican State attempted to 
coopt minority groups traditionally excluded from the long-lasting corporatist political 
system, which in this case meant women’s and feminists groups (Camp 1999).  Taking 
into account the role played by women’s groups, NGOs and civil society in the process of 
writing and approving new laws concerning domestic violence, in Chapter 5 I identified 
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three different patterns that shaped the enactment of the bills.  One is the collaboration 
between the women’s movement and the State, as in the case of the Federal District.   
Another is the bottom-up model, which results from the efforts of the organized civil 
society, as in the case of Jalisco.  Finally, family violence law can be enacted as a result 
of a diffusion process promoted from above, as in the cases of Guanajuato and Morelos.  
Here, the women’s movement and NGOs were invited to participate later on, mostly to 
legitimize the legislation. 
That the laws were approved due to a different combination of pressures does not 
entail that that the laws were materially different, nor that they were open to significantly 
different interpretations.  In the past, some scholars argued that the enactment of 
legislation concerning women’s rights and especially legislation about violence against 
women was more in response to anxieties about legitimacy than to a real interest in 
women’s issues (Lamas, Martínez, Tarrés, and Tuñón 1995).  This argument was 
corroborated in Chapter 6.  In this chapter, the underlying question is whether or not the 
Mexican State is an enabling State in feminist terms?  The answer is not straightforward.  
Formally, yes, the Mexican State is enabling because it enacted legislation for the 
protection of women from family violence.  In these terms, the State was responsive to 
the demands of social and feminist groups (Weldon 2002).  But as to the question of 
efficacy, that is, are the actions of the Mexican State such as to satisfy its ostensible 
concern for women’s rights and guaranteeing women a live free of violence?  The answer 
to this question is a categorical no.   
The reason is in the double objective of the legislation that is implanted at the 
contents of the law, creating thus some sort of contradiction between protecting the 
family and protecting women, which are often treated as synonymous, thus highlighting 
the patriarchal assumptions pervading the State.  The way in which the states interpreted 
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and implemented family violence legislation highlights the inability and/or unwillingness 
of these states to protect women’s rights.    
 
8.2-  MUCH ADO ABOUT THE LAW, AND NOTHING... IN TERM OF 
IMMEDIATE CHANGES 
Given the hypothesis of the dual function of the democratic State presented in 
Chapter 1 –the State is both an arena in which tensions that originate in society are 
manifested and negotiated, and as an agent that has the potential for changing the same 
social structure–, the question presents itself:  Has the State been successful in 
challenging the existing patriarchal social structure both by giving a well publicized 
discursive space to the opposition to patriarchy, and by operating within society to 
challenge those patriarchal behaviors that make women vulnerable and unequal?  Yes, 
partially, but these changes have mostly occurred in the ideological sphere.  The Mexican 
State has been effective in promoting awareness about partner violence, and the diversity 
of acts that might constitute violence, since partner violence was previously associated 
almost exclusively with physical or sexual abuse.  In these terms, domestic violence has 
been condemned by the State, and the idea that violence against members of the family 
should not be tolerated has been extended in the society.   
On the other hand, although the Mexican State has been formally responsive to 
social demands, the interventionist function of the State has a less successful record. 
While the State has enacted domestic violence legislation, it has never seemed to back 
this legislation with resources allocated for implementing its provisions, suggesting to 
many that the State’s concern may be just a façade.  Therefore, although the State has 
done the preliminary work of instituting rules to change behaviors in the social structure, 
it hasn’t provided the resources in prevention and assistance programs, nor overseen the 
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enforcement of the legislation to lower the rate of domestic violence and nor achieved a 
measure of prevention by creating the expectation that acts of domestic violence will be 
taken seriously.  
The issue of approving legislation with the dual purpose of guarding the family 
and protecting individuals within the family from family violence brings us to two 
interlocking and long-lasting debates: a) women’s subordinate position both in society 
and in the family due to patriarchy; and b) protection of individual rights versus 
preserving the family. As Chapter 1 demonstrates, the State has traditionally fostered 
patriarchy within the family in an attempt to model hierarchies of obedience and 
hierarchy there that would be reproduced elsewhere in social life.  As we saw in Chapter 
6, there is an interaction between the provisions of the law, the patriarchal context, the 
long-lasting paternalism of the State, the embeddedness of patriarchy in the State and the 
strong familist tradition in Mexico that creates a schema in which the rights of women to 
protection from domestic violence is exchanged for the interests of the (dysfunctional) 
family. While the State has ostensively broken with this traditional exchange, there is a 
lag between the State’s rhetoric and the behavior of the officers of the State.  
Women resist the patriarchal system and the violence to which they are subject by 
seeking a number of kinds of help from State agencies.  The legislation offers women the 
possibility of promoting changes in the family.  The administrative family violence 
legislation is functional for women in terms of its second goal, the protection and 
promotion of the family.  In Chapter 6 I argue that many women want somebody with 
authority and power to tell her husband that it is wrong to use violence against them or 
other family members, a desire that surprised me when it came up in my field research. 
The State, here, operates as the embodiment not just of punitive power, but of moral 
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authority.  The State, in turn, does try to fulfill this role, indicating that the assumptions in 
play here are widespread enough in the community that the State is responding to them.   
In order for violence to end it is not enough to simply request that the violent 
partner stop his/her abusive behavior.  That is basically what the Mexican State does. As 
revealed by my research, the lack of resources makes often impossible to do anything 
else.  The legislation provides two different mechanisms for preventing the engagement 
of the couple in new episodes of violence.  First, the use of the force and the possibility of 
imposing fines and sanctions to perpetrators of violence. And, second, the possibility of 
ordering the aggressor to receive psychological therapy.  Both types of interventions have 
the possibility of changing the individual’s behavior (Gondolf 1997; Hamby 1998; 
Sherman and Berk 1984; Tolman and Weisz 1995; Ventura and Davis 2005).  The 
problem in Mexico is the lack of resources for implementing either of these options.  As a 
consequence, the abuser’s behavior is unlikely to change.  It is possible that violence 
might be temporarily discontinued in cases of common couple violence, but after a 
certain period of time violent incidents are likely to occur again.   
Why didn’t the feminist movement foresee the potential contradictions related to 
the protection of women and protection of the family inherent in the law, especially in 
those cases in which the legislation was approved in collaboration with the women’s 
movement?  My interviews with members of feminist NGOs suggest that many of them 
failed to anticipate the way the law would be interpreted and implemented.  In other 
cases, even foreseeing that the legislation would entail certain problems, the feminist 
organizations that participated either in the promotion or the legitimization process of the 
legislation preferred the existence of some kind of legislation over not having any 
legislation at all.  The women’s movement and members of feminist NGOs agree that the 
law did not fulfill their expectations.  Nevertheless, at present they have not prioritized 
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denouncing the current side effects of the legislation or demanding some kind of 
legislative or administrative changes.  This lack of action may be related to the fact that 
many feminists are coopted by the State, and feminist organizations receive a high 
percentage of their resources from the State, as well as accruing prestige from 
collaborating with the State, in effect making them hostages of the State’s policies and  
reducing their potential of acting independently.   
 
8.3-  AGENCY AND STRUCTURE WITHIN THE STATE 
In this research I adopted a post-structuralist perspective on the State, which 
meant that I regarded the State, from the beginning, as a dispersed and conflicted rather 
than unitary and monolithic entity.  From a post-structuralist perspective the State is 
conceived both an agent and an arena in which the battles for women’s rights take place.  
Bourque (1989:115) argues that State elites “are both potential sources of access as well 
as critical actors in the creation and maintenance of [gender] hierarchies.”  Therefore, 
their beliefs, values and attitudes must be taken into account in examining State’s role in 
promoting changes in the social structure and in maintaining the status quo in the 
relationship between men and women. 
Does this mean that all individuals or agencies act simply in accordance with the 
expectations that define their roles in the machinery of the State?  Or rather, do they have 
the potential to change both the law through its implementation and the social structure?  
The underlying debate is the overarching issue in Giddens’ structuration theory (1984) of 
the relationship between agency and structure.  This issue is complex as noted by Nancy 
Fraser (1992:16-17)  
The problem of agency has become a problem in recent feminist theory because 
of the cross-pull of two equally important imperatives.  On the one hand, feminist 
have sought to establish the seriousness of our struggle by establishing the 
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pervasiveness and systematicity of male dominance. Accordingly, we have often 
opted for theories that emphasize the constraining power of gender structures and 
norms, while downplaying the resisting capacities of individuals and groups. On 
the other hand, feminist have also sought to inspire women’s activism by 
recovering lost or socially invisible traditions of resistance in the past and present.  
Under the sway of this imperative, we have often supposed quasi-voluntarist 
models of change.  
 
The issue of agency and structure must be approached from both the micro-level 
(individuals within each agency, and individual women) and the macro level (agencies 
within the State).  This type of analytical strategy overcomes some of the problems 
highlighted by Fraser (1992), who points to the problems with structuralist feminist 
analysis insofar as it seems to either deny agency to women or interpret women’s agency 
so uncritically that the power of subordination evaporates.  Certain agents may choose to 
challenge the patriarchal social structure while retaining and using their positions in the 
institutional matrix of the State, and, as well, they retain some capacity to influence other 
branches of the State.  This is the case, for example, for State women’s institutes that 
have among their ostensive goals the improvement of women’s situation in society, and, 
by inference, the adoption of a gender perspective in State agencies.  The plurality of 
objectives among State agencies does, however, lead to conflicts between the goals and 
practices of different branches, so that, for instance, the goal of state women’s institutes, 
at least formally, differs from that of law enforcement agencies, which, in everyday 
practice, tend provide support for the status quo and reinforce patriarchal attitudes. 
While it is possible to view State agencies as social actors, it is important to also 
examine the beliefs and attitudes of the individuals within those agencies who are 
charged with the implementation of public policies.  The point is illustrated by the 
example of reconciliation policies: there is more enthusiasm on the part of some directors 
of DIFs than others for implementing the policy that reconciliation must be attempted 
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several times before more serious actions are taken, even up to the separation of the 
couple.  If a woman wants to pursue the dissolution of the marriage, the DIF’s legal 
services will not provide legal assistance unless the frequency and severity of the partner 
violence has escalated into a severe threat to the victim’s life.  The pro-family directors 
believe that the DIF is an institution for “integrating the family, not for its disintegration”.  
Therefore, they give more importance to the family than to individual women’s rights and 
well-being in cases of common couple violence.  
One must ask whether the party affiliation of important actors influences their 
personal views concerning the appropriate State role in order to get an accurate sense of 
the conditions that govern the differences between particular State’s positions vis-à-vis 
domestic violence.  The answer, as I show in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, is no: political 
party affiliation by itself is not a predictor of attitudes.  Rather attitudes appear to reflect 
an individual’s ideology, with gender being more of a determinant than party affiliation 
in many cases.  For example in the legislative power, women are more likely to challenge 
the social structure than men.  Again, this varies across branch and agency.  These 
variations demonstrate the degree to which State elites are critical actors in the creation, 
maintenance and change of gender hierarchies.  
In some cases individual women within State agencies also display their agency in 
the sense that they reinterpret the legislation to forward their objective of keeping the 
family together, just as the law proposed. Similarly, individual victims of partner 
violence exert their agency when they request the intervention of the State for stopping 
violence while aiming to keep the family together.  The question of agency should 
remind us that both the women who hold state offices, the women operating in women’s 
movement organizations, and the women who are the victims of domestic violence 
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should not be assumed to have the same interests or speak the same language because 
they are women.  As Chandra Talpade Mohanty has written: 
What binds women together is a sociological notion of the ‘sameness’ of their 
oppression.  It is at this point that an elision takes place between ‘women’ as a 
discursively constructed group and ‘women’ as material subject of their own 
history. Thus, the discursively consensual homogeneity of ‘woman’ as a group is 
mistaken for the historically specific material reality of groups of women. 
(Mohanti 2003:53) 
 
Thus, one cannot make assumptions about acting on behalf of all women in cases 
involving particular women.  Women are influenced by the patriarchal social structure in 
the sense that many factors might decide the victim of domestic violence, on the second, 
third or more occasion of abuse, to still give a chances to the male perpetrator for the sake 
of the family, or in response to their lower socioeconomic status, or their dependence on 
the male, or for reasons of familism, etc.  The problem arises with those who want to opt 
out of the situation entirely, or who would be inclined to, given help.  For some of these 
women it is hard to take this type of decision and to request help.  Especially if the State 
presses them to  go through a conciliation process –understood as reconciliation- for the 
‘sake of the family,’ encouraging them to interpret the violence not as an individual who 
has the right to prosecute assault, but as a female family member whose rights are 
lessened with relation to the rest of the family.    
Even in those cases in which women find the strength and decide to seek for help, 
their attempts are often dismissed by some agencies, for example law-enforcement 
institutions.  Therefore, women are revictimized by the State both directly and indirectly.  
Directly, because of the attitudes and behaviors of those State employees displaying their 
own patriarchal attitudes, and indirectly by rules forcing them to go through a 
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conciliation process that very often results in their return to a family situation in which 
new episodes of violence are very likely to be repeated.  
8.4-   POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
One of the objectives of this research is to offer insights into the multiplicity of 
factors that influence the phenomenon of partner violence in order to evaluate the 
potential actions that the State might take to address the problem.  The policy 
implications that I delineate are based on the assumption that the State has the capacity 
and responsibility to guarantee that individuals are able to enjoy a life free of violence.  
In response to international pressure the Mexican government has signed international 
treaties and passed national legislation to prevent violence and to address its negative 
individual and social effects.  At least in theory, the State is accountable for developing 
programs and engaging in actions to protect women and prevent violence. 
This research has shown that the liberal feminist theory that hypothesizes that as 
the level of gender equality in the social structure increases, the rate of violence decreases 
is true in the case of Mexico.  Lower levels of violence do correspond to higher levels of 
structural gender equality in the political, educational, legal and economic spheres.  This 
points to the underlying social context that the State needs to pro-actively address, and in 
particular, the issue of gender equality in the economic and educational spheres. The 
State should develop public policies that effectively address gender inequalities which 
might include governmental gender affirmative actions such as stimulus for guaranteeing 
access of women to managerial positions both in the public and private sectors, programs 
targeting the alleviation of poverty in female headed households, and increasing women’s 
access to higher levels of education.   
In the political realm, Mexico should continue implementing the gender quota 
system in elected positions, and promoting the access of women to the higher ranks of the 
 342
executive and judiciary power.  In the legal sphere, reforms should be made annulling or 
modifying those laws that perpetuate gender inequality and that fail to protect women’s 
basic right to security, while new legislation that further protects women’s rights should 
be enacted.  Some of the legal provisions that should be changed include sexual 
harassment laws, abortion legislation, the adjustment of punishments to reflect the 
severity of crimes (for instance, stealing livestock is punished more consistently and 
severely than rape perpetrated by strangers or rape within the marriage).  These types of 
measures will not only have a direct effect on women, but also they will create a climate 
of structural gender equality that in turn, might decrease the prevalence of partner 
violence. 
Nonetheless, I would like to draw attention to the potential short term 
consequences of such policies that could increase the prevalence of violence.  When the 
gender balance of a society is altered, violence is likely to occur due to males’ attempts of 
recovering their power by using violence (Yllo 1984; 1988; Yllo and Straus 1984).  This 
is known as backlash theory, which postulates that as women gain power in the political, 
educational, economic and legal spheres, violence against women might increase as a 
result of men’s attempts to control women and their achievements. 
The results of this research also show that women are often revictimized by the 
State.  Specific sensitivity training programs for civil servants should be implemented. 
These programs should be continuous, and attending to them should not be the result of a 
disciplinary action, which is the case, as I have shown, in some municipalities with law-
enforcement bodies.  Each time women are revictimized by civil servants, the moral and 
civil authority of the State fails; therefore disciplinary actions for those who incur in 
behaviors that contribute to the revictimization of women need to be established and 
effectively implemented.   
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One of the criticisms of members of the civil society and NGOs toward the State 
is the lack of continuity of the programs.  All political actors should reach a compromise 
that sustains the continuity of certain programs regarding family violence as a normal 
part of civic functioning.  Due to the lack of a tradition in which the civil service is 
connected to the party structure, with each election a high percentage of public 
employees are rotated, or move to other positions (Camp 1999), which means that the  
need for training is never-ending.  Due to the specialization of the services provided by 
public agencies with responsibility in assisting victims of partner violence, taking 
measures to minimize changes in these offices resulting from elections can help to 
provide better quality service.  
The biggest implication in terms of public policies addressing domestic violence 
in Mexico is indeed the need of developing them effectively.  The lack of public funding 
for developing programs and actions both for preventing and providing assistance to 
victims of partner violence is a generalized complaint.  The State needs to make sure that 
more funding is allocated for the type of provisions mandated by administrative family 
violence legislation.  Steady, certain funding commitments would affect every level of 
the State-domestic violence interface: in this way, the public shelters could be created, 
psychological therapy could be offered to perpetrators and victims, prevention programs 
could be extended and better quality of services by specialized personnel could be 
offered.   
In addition, my research has highlighted economic dependency as one of the 
major factors influencing women to decide to go back to their abusers.  Even in programs 
that aim at family reconciliation, a period of separation time in which the woman is 
separated from her assailant is crucial.  The number of public shelters is clearly 
insufficient for this all important task.  As of May 2004 the National Women’s Institute 
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(INMUJERES) reported the existence of only 32 shelters for battered women in Mexico.  
The resources offered to women are rather scarce and very often only address their short-
term survival needs.  The Mexican administrative legislation about family violence falls 
short in allocating funding for specific programs of partner violence.  For example, the 
U.S. Violence against Women Act of 1994 and its later reform in 2000 increased federal 
resources devoted to partner violence initiatives, and provided grants for educational and 
social programs aimed at the prevention of domestic violence.  It extended law 
enforcement initiatives related to domestic violence (see Orloff 2003; Tieffenthaler, 
Farmer, and Sambira 2005).  It also made possible for victims of partner violence to 
apply for post-trial relief aid (see review by Mirchandani 2005).  Reforms to the state 
administrative family laws to more effectively address partner violence should be 
promoted.  However, as I have shown, due to the lack of accountability in Mexico the 
enactment of legislation sometimes represents more a move toward legitimization than a 
real compromise.  Therefore, the changes in the law and its implementation could only be 
accomplished if there is a real compromise on behalf of the public powers.  
 
8.5-  SUGGESTED PATHS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The research agenda that derives from this study comprises four broad topics:  1) 
The conceptualization of the ideological component of the patriarchy as it was defined by 
Dobash and Dobash (1979), the social acceptance of the inequality between men and 
women; 2) The use of public agencies by women that have experienced some sort of 
partner violence; 3) The analysis of prevention programs and its effectiveness; 4)  
Monitoring the amount of violence against women over time, and probing any increases 
or stagnation.  
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For conceptualizing the ideological component of the patriarchy, first I will 
conduct some exploratory analysis of the areas in which the inequality between men and 
women is manifested.  Next, I will construct a questionnaire that it will allow me to 
measure the ideological inequality.  I will use focus groups for assessing the dimensions 
of gender inequality and questions to be included for measuring.  I will then develop a 
questionnaire that might include some of the questions found in the World Values 
Survey, or others such as:  Can females be as good as men as political leaders? Should 
men be paid more than women for the same job? Should families spend more time and 
money in the education of boys than girls? Should women quit their job to take care of 
the children? Should wives obey their husband? Is it a woman’s obligation to have sex 
even with her husband if she does not want to?  After pretesting the questionnaire, I will 
develop a final one that will be intended to be included in future surveys or small-scale 
projects.  The creation of such a measure might be of importance for analyzing not only 
the issue of partner violence, but also other social phenomena that because of their nature 
are expected to be influenced by the level of patriarchal ideology: fertility, abortion, or 
election of women in politics among others. 
The second research line that derives from this research relates to the use of 
public agencies by women that have experienced some type of partner violence.  I will 
use the recent collected ENDIREH 2006 that includes a battery of questions that allow 
the study of the use that victims of partner violence make of public agencies specifically 
created for their protection.  As result of the enactment of the administrative family 
violence legislation in Mexican states, a myriad of governmental agencies now provide 
assistance to women.  The evaluation of their use, and assessing what are the 
circumstances under which women use them, provides important data that should inform 
public policies.  I will use quantitative analysis to find the percentage of women that 
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experience violence and do use these agencies.  Then using logistic regression I will 
examine which are the sociodemographic, situational and structural correlates of 
individual use of the agencies.  I hypothesize that the use of these agencies is dependent 
on the type, frequency and severity of violence. 
The third research question that can be developed from this dissertation is the 
analysis of prevention programs and their effectiveness.  I will collect information about 
prevention programs at the state and federal level and I will assess where the efforts have 
been concentrated, and how much resources have been allocated to them.  Next, I will 
select some programs and I will analyze in detail their strength and weaknesses by using 
interviews with key informants.  The questions to be included in the interview protocol 
will derive from the quantitative analysis of the information, as well as from reviews of 
existing literature about prevention programs.  
Finally, the fourth issue in the research agenda deals with monitoring the quantity 
of partner violence over time.  I will establish a cross-sectional analysis of the ENDIREH 
2003 and ENDIREH 2006 for assessing first, whether or not the prevalence of violence is 
increasing or decreasing.  Then, I will examine if the individual, situational, exosystemic 
and structural correlates of experiencing violence have changed over time.  At last I will 
introduce state-level variables such as expending in programs related to domestic 
violence (prevention and assistance), state-level political variables as well as the level of 




APPENDIX 1:  INTERVIEW PROTOCOL AND CONTACT LETTER 
SENT TO KEY INFORMANTS 
 
PROTOCOL ITEMS FOR THE OPEN-ENDED INTERVIEWS WITH KEY 
INFORMANTS FROM PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS AND  
ORGANIZATIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
 
What is domestic violence?  How would you define it?  (Investigator will probe for other 
types of violence in addition to physical violence). 
 
What are the causes of domestic violence? (Investigator will probe for socio-economic 
and cultural causes). 
 
What are the characteristics of women that suffer partner violence? 
 
What is your organization/institutions’ role with regards to victims of partner violence? 
(Investigator will probe for cooperative actions with other institutions both form the 
government and civil society).  
 
How long have you been working with this organization? 
 
What is your specific role? Can you describe it?  
f 
How did you become involved in this organization? (Investigator will probe for 
willingness to do so, or if their involvement was the result of a promotion or the lack of 
work opportunities in other areas. Also probe for the personal involvement of the 
respondent with the organization). 
 
Is the most challenging part of your job? And the easiest?  (Investigator will prove for 
challenges resulting from the implementation of legislation, and cultural organizational 
practices of other institutions, and personal attitudes of the people working in their own 
institution and other institutions that he/she is involved as a result of his/her work).  
 
What can women do if they are physically abused? How do public institutions respond? 
(Investigator will prove for the knowledge of the procedure to follow in case of willing to 
report abusers, and also knowledge about resources that can be mobilized for somebody 
who has been victimized). 
 
Do you think that partner violence is a social problem in Mexico? (Investigator will 
probe for the comparison between domestic violence with other major problems in 
Mexico as corruption, or crime in general). 
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Do you think that this problem can be solved?  How?  (Investigator will probe for 
changes in legislation, changes in the enforcement procedures and organizational 
culture). 
 
Do you think that there are areas in which the incidence of domestic violence is higher 
than in others? If so, why do you think that is the reason for higher violence against 
women?  (Investigator will probe for differences within the state and across states, also 
will probe for cultural particularities in certain regions such as some areas being 
“machistas”, and also for institutional and societal responses in those areas). 
 
Is there anything else that I have not asked you and you consider that it would be 









17 de Junio de 2005 
Estimada  Sra.                          ,  
 
Soy Sonia M. Frías, española, investigadora y candidata a doctora en sociología por la University 
of Texas en Austin.  Estoy llevando a cabo una investigación sobre violencia intrafamiliar en 
México parcialmente financiada por la Fundación Mellon, y respaldada por el departamento de 
sociología de la Universidad de Texas.  
 
Usted, por su posición que ocupa en la organización u agencia de la cual es miembro, es un 
experto/a en el tema, y me gustaría tener la oportunidad de entrevistarle/a como tal.  Durante un 
periodo de siete meses voy a estar llevando a cabo entrevistas con expertos/as como usted en 
distintos lugares de la República Mexicana.  El próximo mes de julio iniciaré este trabajo 
cualitativo y dentro de unas semanas le contactaré para ver si usted me puede conceder una 
entrevista.  
 
Esta investigación analiza qué factores individuales y de la estructura social pueden ayudarnos a 
entender el fenómeno de la violencia intrafamiliar.  La primera parte de mi investigación se basa 
en el análisis de una encuesta de ámbito nacional y representativa de la población mexicana.  La 
segunda parte analiza como la estructura social, entendiendo por tal los tres poderes del Estado 
(legislativo, ejecutivo y judicial), y los diversos actores y organizaciones de la sociedad civil 
conceptualizan la violencia intrafamiliar y responden ante la misma.  En esta segunda parte se 
llevarán a cabo entrevistas con informadores claves y expertos en el tema en todas las áreas 
enumeradas con anterioridad.  
 
Por favor, si tiene alguna duda, comentario o sugerencia, o simplemente desea contactarme por 
favor no dude en hacerlo.  Asimismo si desea no participar en este estudio como experto/a en el 
tema, por favor hágamelo saber.  Mi información de contacto está a continuación.  El mejor modo 
de comunicarse conmigo es mediante correo electrónico ya que voy a estar viajando durante todo 
este tiempo. 
 






Sonia M. Frias, Doctora (c)  
University of Texas at Austin 
Department of Sociology 
1 University Station A1700 
Austin, TX  78712-1088 
Ph. (512) 475 8641  Fax. (512) 471-4886  (México: 55 36 8472 / 04455 1012 0824) 
e-mail: sfrias@mail.la.utexas.edu  
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DOCUMENTO CON INFORMACIÓN ACERCA DE LA PARTICIPACIÓN EN LA 
INVESTIGACIÓN  
The University of Texas at Austin 
 
Se le está pidiendo que usted participe en un estudio de investigación. Este 
documento le provee de toda la información que usted necesita saber acerca de este 
estudio.  El investigador principal (persona responsable de esta investigación) también le 
explicará todas las particularidades sobre este estudio y contestará cualquier duda o 
pregunta que usted tenga. Por favor, lea toda la información en este documento y siéntase 
libre de expresar todas aquellas dudas y preguntas que usted tenga antes de decidir tomar 
parte en el mismo. Su participación es totalmente voluntaria y usted puede negarse a 
participar. 
 
Título de la Investigación 
 
“Si No le Pego, Pensará que No la Quiero”: Explicaciones Individuales y Estructurales de 
la Violencia Doméstica en México.  
 
Investigador Principal y Supervisor Académico  
 
Investigador Principal:   Sonia M. Frias, Doctora (c) 
                            Department of Sociology 
      University of Texas at Austin 
   Phone:  (512) 475 8641  (USA)   Mexico (to be determined) 
                                       e-mail: sfrias@mail.la.utexas.edu 
 
Supervisor Académico:  Professor Ronald J. Angel, Doctor 
      Department of Sociology 
               University of Texas at Austin 
   Phone: (512) 232- 6315   
   e-mail: rangel@mail.la.utexas.edu 
 
¿Cuál es el objetivo de este estudio? 
Esta investigación analiza el fenómeno de la violencia doméstica en México. Por 
un lado, este proyecto examina una conocida encuesta representativa de la República 
Mexicana, de la cual quizás usted haya oído habla de ella, ENDIREH (Encuesta sobre la 
Dinámica en las Relaciones de los Hogares, Inegi 2003). Por otro lado, este estudio 
estudia la respuesta de las agencies públicas y organizaciones civiles al fenómeno de la 
violencia doméstica. Asimismo, también considera cómo sus respuestas institucionales 
afectan al objeto de estudio: violencia contra las mujeres en el entorno de la familia. 
Usted está siendo invitado a participar como un experto en esta segunda parte de la 
investigación.  Usted, junto con personas de agencies gubernamentales e instituciones y 
organizaciones no gubernamentales (ONGs) tales como representantes de la Comisión de 
Igualdad de Género del Congreso, profesores universitarios de distintas disciplinas, 
expertos en el área de violencia doméstica, directores de albergues para mujeres 
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maltratadas, jueces, síndicos, diseñadores de políticas públicas, jefes de policía, 
directores de programas de familia en el DIF, y diversos actores de la sociedad civil, tales 
como directores/as de ONGs y religiosos. Este grupo de expertos ha sido seleccionado de 
los diversos niveles del gobierno (local, estatal y federal) y su selección también obedece 
a una división rural/urbano.  
 
 
¿Qué va a suceder si participa en este estudio? 
Si usted acepta participar en este estudio usted será entrevistado y se le 
preguntarán cuestiones sobre violencia doméstica, las relaciones de género en los hogares 
y la respuesta de las instituciones, sus respuestas estarán basadas en la información 
privilegiada que usted tiene como experto.  Como miembro de una organización u 
agencia que trata directa o indirectamente el tema de la violencia intrafamiliar, se le 
realizarán preguntas sobre el rol de su agencia/organización, así como la concepción del 
fenómeno de violencia doméstica en la misma. Sus opiniones, declaraciones y 
contribuciones a esta investigación serán anónimas, a no ser que usted dé permiso al 
investigador principal a revelar su identidad. Bajo ninguna circunstancia la información 
que usted está proporcionado será facilitada a terceros. Se le preguntará si usted autoriza 
a que la entrevista sea registrada en cinta de audio, si usted prefiere que no sea así, o no 
se siente cómodo ante la perspectiva de que su conversación se grabe, usted puede 
negarse. La entrevista no durará más de una hora y quince minutes. Usted puede decidir 
no contestar cualquier pregunta. Se tomarán notas durante la entrevista. Éstas, y en el 
caso de que usted acceda a que se registre la entrevista, se mantendrán anónimas y serán 
de uso exclusivo para el investigador. No habrá ninguna información en estas notas, más 
allá de la afiliación institucional que le puedan identificar.  
 
¿Cuáles son los posibles riesgos y efectos secundarios? 
No se anticipa ningún riesgo serio, malestar o efecto secundario. No obstante, 
para algunas personas (dependiendo de cuales hayan sido sus experiencias personales, las 
cuales no son objeto de estudio en esta investigación) se puede producir algún leve 
malestar psicológico asociado con el proceso de entrevista y debido a la naturaleza del 
tema.  En el caso de que usted no se sienta cómodo o no quiera contestar alguna de las 
preguntas, usted es totalmente libre de decidir contestarlas o no, así como finalizar la 
entrevista en cualquier momento.  
 
¿Cuáles son los posibles beneficios que usted u otras personas pueden recibir? 
 Al participar en esta investigación usted tendrá la oportunidad de compartir sus 
opiniones y experiencias profesionales sobre el tema de la violencia intrafamiliar. La 
información que usted provea servirá para informar futuras investigaciones académicas, y 
tienen también la potencialidad de servir como base para avanzar en las investigaciones 
sobre políticas públicas. 
 
¿Hay algún riesgo de resultar dañado si participo en este estudio? 
 No hay ningún riesgo de daño físico asociado con la participación en este estudio.  
¿Hay algún coste o compensación asociada a la participación en este estudio? 
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 No. Es completamente voluntario decidir tomar parte en este estudio. No hay 
costes asociados, y usted no recibirá ninguna compensación por su participación en el 
mismo.  
 
¿Qué sucede si decido no participar en este estudio? 
La participación en esta investigación es completamente voluntaria. Usted puede 
decidir no participar en este estudio; esta decisión no influirá en el caso de que tenga o 
tuviera alguna relación con la University of Texas at Austin  
 
¿Cómo puedo hacer saber al investigador principal que deseo que la información 
proporcionada durante las entrevistas no sea incluida en el estudio?  ¿A quién puedo 
llamar? 
Usted puede decir no tomar parte del estudio en cualquier momento. Si usted 
desea que la información que proporcionó no sea incluida en el estudio, usted me puede 
contactar en el número de teléfono que está al inicio de esta documentación, o puede 
contactarme mediante correo electrónico en cualquier momento. Usted puede decidir no 
tomar parte del estudio sin que esto conlleve penalización alguna o pérdida de beneficios. 
A lo largo del tiempo en que se conduzca este estudio, el investigador le notificará de 
cualquier información disponible pudiera influir en su decisión de terminar el estudio.  
 Si usted tiene alguna duda sobre sus derechos como participante en la 
investigación, por favor contacte a Clarke A. Burnham, Ph.D., Chair, The University of 
Texas at Austin Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects, 
512/232-4383. 
 
¿Cómo se protegerá la privacidad y confidencialidad? 
Ninguna de la información que usted provea será hecha pública bajo su nombre. 
A no ser que usted dé su consentimiento expreso para ello. Ni su nombre ni otra 
información personal estarán en las notas tomadas durante la entrevista. Las notas de 
entrevista y las cintas de audio serán de uso exclusivo del investigador, y no se 
compartirán con nadie. Si después de realizar la entrevista, usted tiene alguna duda sobre 
la privacidad, usted puede contactarme en el número de teléfono o en la dirección de 
correo electrónico que se provee al inicio de este documento.   
Si los resultados de esta investigación se publican o se presentan en reuniones 
científicas, su identidad no será revelada en ningún momento. No obstante, personal 
autorizado de la University of Texas at Austin y el Comité Institucional de Revisión Ética 
tienen el derecho legal de revisar la información que usted provea (no obstante, usted no 
estará identificado), y este mismo Comité protegerá la confidencialidad de cualquier 
información dentro de los límites previstos por la legislación estadounidense.  De no ser 
que usted lo autorice, sólo una orden judicial puede hacer que el investigador dé a 
terceras personas la información que usted proporcionó.  
 
¿Se beneficiará el investigador de su participación en este estudio? 
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 El investigador no se beneficiará directamente de su participación en el estudio; 
no obstante su participación contribuirá a que el investigador principal pueda finalizar su 
tesis de doctorado, publicar su trabajo en conferencias especializadas, y presentar y 






APPENDIX 2:  NOTES IN SPANISH 
NOTES CHAPTER 4 
 
N4.1:  “La situación de las grandes feministas me da tristeza.  Están agotadas, no tienen 
ni recursos sociales ni económicos.  Su lucha era y continúa siendo muy agresiva.  Si no 
hubieran sido tan radicales no las hubieran dejado de lado.  Necesitamos incorporarlas a 
los nuevos movimientos.”   
 
N4.2:  “Yo lo tenía muy claro: Siempre pensé, que se debe luchar lo mismo fuera que 
dentro del sistema”, Mujeres Destacadas.  Esperanza Brito.  Instituto de las Mujeres del 
Distrito Federal.  Retrieved August 7, 2007 from 
http://www.inmujer.df.gob.mx/muj_destacadas/esperanzabrito.html 
 
N4.3:  “El papel que tuvieron las ONG fue fundamental.  Fueron ellas las que trabajaron 
para dar visibilidad al problema de la violencia contra las mujeres.  Ahora las ONGs 
también son muy importantes, pero al igual que los políticos hay gente que lo toma como 
moda, y se sube al barco para salir adelante.  (…) Pero creo que ahora el Estado tiene más 
influencia sobre el problema que las ONGs.  Las ONGs deben continuar su lucha.  Pero 
su rol no es tan importante como lo era antes, ya que se quejan de la falta de recursos y de 
que sus acciones tienen un alcance limitado.  El tema de la violencia contra las mujeres 
ya es un problema público, pero es importante que las ONGs continúen presionando al 
Estado.  (…)  Al inicio, las ONGs presionaban al Estado, ahora es el Estado quien las 
usa.  Ahora hay una doble dinámica: el Estado deja en manos de las ONGs 
responsabilidades que debería asumir, y algunas ONGs se constituyen como tales y 
trabajan en el tema de la violencia de pareja ya que eso les da recursos.” 
 
N4.4:  “Uno de los objetivos de APIS es promover la participación de las mujeres, y nos 
dimos cuenta de que las mujeres no pueden participar en nuestras actividades si tienen 
miedo de lo que su marido o pareja les vaya a hacer.” 
 
N4.5:  “Vamos casi a cumplir diez años desde la creación de la Casa de Apoyo a la 
mujer.  A partir de la junta de Beijing nos juntamos ocho mujeres que ven la necesidad de 
hacer algo para proteger a las mujeres que sufren violencia.  Al principio no sabíamos 
como hacerlo, todo era muy casero, incluso nosotras mismas poníamos de nuestro propio 
dinero para Casa de Apoyo.” 
 
N4.6:  “Cuando todavía era una estudiante de la carrera de comunicación produje dos 
programas de radio.  Era muy sorprendente escuchar las experiencias de las mujeres que 
sufrían violencia.  Ellas llamaban al programa de radio para contar sus historias.  Ellas 
tenían una gran necesidad de ser escuchadas.  Algunas amigas de la universidad y yo 
fundamos la revista Mujer Contemporánea ya que pensábamos que a partir de las 
palabras se podría cambiar todo, creíamos que el problema estaba en la mentalidad de las 
personas.  Entonces conocimos a Emilio Viano.  En México se había oído muy poco del 
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tema de la violencia domestica.  El [Emilio Viano] me ayudo a darme cuenta de que las 
mujeres que sufren violencia necesitan ayuda, y que necesitan que las instituciones 
publicas les ayuden a superar sus problemas”. 
 
N4.7:  “(…) algunas de las feministas que elaboran la propuesta [de 1984] colaboran en 
la parte inicial de la elaboración de la realizada por las parlamentarias del PRI, generando 
un puente indirecto de diálogo y colaboración que nunca se discute ni se aclara como 
estrategia política dentro del movimiento [feminista].  Es decir, el Movimiento genera 
una suerte de relación indirecta y vergonzante con los círculos oficiales, mediante un 
permiso implícito que se le otorga a algunas de sus participante autónomas, a condición 
de que se haga de manera extraoficial.” 
 
NOTES CHAPTER 5: 
 
N5.1: El gobierno mexicano sale al exterior y firma todos los convenios que encuentra, 
los habidos y por haber.  El gobierno mexicano es muy hábil en temas de derechos 
humanos, pero internamente, no pasa nada, y si hay leyes estas no sirven para nada.  No 
hay ningún tipo de interés, no hay ninguna intención.  Una cosa es lo que sucede en el 
exterior, la imagen que se da, pero aquí los convenios y tratados no se cumplen.  Es más, 
la realidad de México se maquilla en el exterior. 
 
N5.2: “Estuve compitiendo con otros 200 abogados para el trabajo.  Fui seleccionada, y 
acepté el trabajo por que el salario era bueno.  Ellos (los hombres en la Procuraduría de 
Justicia del Distrito Federal) no querían esta agencia.  Tuvimos que escribir el manual de 
procedimienos del CAVI.  La agencia fue finalmente creada, nos dieron el espacio pero 
tuvimos que empezar de cero… ya sabes, barriendo el suelo, limpiando las ventanas.  
Incluso tuvimos que colgar información en las paredes e ir a escuelas a dar información a 
mujeres (…).  Ellos no nos querían, no teníamos recursos, no recibíamos ningún tipo de 
apoyo, y nos consideraban aviadores”. 
 
N5.3: “(…) gran importancia del establecimiento de un Centro de Atención de Violencia 
Intrafamiliar para prevenir y sancionar las conductas antisociales (…).  Este Centro (...) 
proporcionará atención integral (…) a efecto de combatir y reducir los índices delictivos 
del Distrito Federal.  (…) La violencia intrafamiliar (…) favorece conductas antisociales, 
daña el desarrollo de las víctimas directas e indirectas, produce sufrimiento y propicia la 
aparición de delitos.”  (PGJDF, Acuerdo N.  A/026/90, en Lang 2003:79). 
 
N5.4:  “En este contexto, queda claro que la creación de los centros de atención para 
víctimas del delito en la Procuraduría correspondía a una estrategia populista.” 
 
N5.5  “[este proceso] fue complicado.  No éramos amigas, pero en ese momento había 
algo que nos unía.  En ese momento empezamos a trabajar (…).  La ley de violencia 
intrafamiliar familiar es el resultado de dos años intensos de reuniones y acuerdos entre 
mucha gente e instituciones.” 
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N5.6:  “Hubo mucha controversia porque algunas opinábamos que no teníamos por qué 
ir, que ni falta hacía tener su firma.  Pero otras decían: ´No.  Es que estamos en un 
sistema político en el que la figura del presidente, del Poder Ejecutivo, es muy fuerte´.  
Así es que reconociendo la situación como es, constitucionalmente el régimen es 
presidencialista, pero además (…) si nosotros lo queremos sacar adelante, si queremos 
tener un gran número de votos a favor, pensando en el PRI que eran 239 diputados, pues 
con la firma del Presidente garantizábamos esos 239.” 
 
N5.7:  “Un diputado PANista me dijo, ‘Ustedes creen que no le puedo dar una buena 
bofetada a mi hija cuando lo requiera?’.  Otros, PRDistas y PRIistas, no decían nada 
aunque lo pensaban.  Al menos los PANistas fueron más dignos y mostraron reacios a las 
reformas.” 
 
N5.8:  “Empezamos a trabajar sin que nadie dentro de la Asamblea nos hiciera mucho 
caso, ocupados como estaban en los ´grandes temas´ de la ciudad, entre los cuales, por 
supuesto, no se encontraban, ni se encuentran, los que nos atañen directamente a las 
mujeres” (Marta De La Lama, in Yllán and De la Lama 2003:VIII). 
 
N5.9:  “Aquí recibimos otras grandes sorpresas: algunos de ellos nos presentaron un 
proyecto de ley total y exclusivamente declarativo que no iba a servir para nada ni para 
nadie, urgiéndonos a suscribirlo, a lo cual por supuesto nos negamos.  Una persona de 
otro grupo, vital para nuestros fines, cuando estaba con nosotras nos ofrecía su apoyo in 
condicional y cuando nos dábamos la vuelta, daba contraorden a sus subordinados.  A tal 
grado llegó todo esto, que un caballero ordenó a una subalterna, parte de nuestro equipo, 
que saboteara el proyecto y tuvimos que simular una pelea con ella, delante de su jefe y 
varios funcionarios, reclamándole su actitud, para que su ‘superior’, en vista del 
escándalo, la dejara en paz” (en Yllán Rondero and De La Lama 2003:ix). 
 
N5.10:  “Patricia Elton empezó a sensibilizarse en cuestiones de género al entrar en 
contacto con el movimiento feminista de Morelos.  (…)  Un día llega con una propuesta 
de ley ya elaborada, y nos pregunta qué nos parece.  A ella [Patricia Elton] quería dejar 
esa propuesta, que era casi una copia de la del distrito Federal.  Pero nosotras, mujeres de 
distintas ONGs la revisamos e hicimos sugerencias sobre la propuesta para adaptarla a la 
realidad del Estado de Morelos.  Alguna gente piensa que era la propuesta de Patricia 
Elton, pero la realidad es que nosotras también estábamos tras la propuesta [de ley].” 
 
 
N5.11:  Hay un puñado de mujeres que pertenecen a varias ONGs.  De hecho, sólo hay 
tres o cuatro mujeres en Morelos que están preocupadas por el avance de las causas de las 
mujeres, pero no se puede decir que en Morelos exista un movimiento de mujeres”. 
 
N5.12:  “Ahora ya no le puedo pegar a mi vieja”; “Nos quieres poner a lavar trastes”; 
“No te vamos a aprobar la ley”. 
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N5.13:  “Hicimos un excelente trabajo de cabildeo a distintos niveles.  Ningún hombre 
votó en contra de la ley en el Congreso.  Sólo votó en contra una mujer.  Ella quería una 
ley punitiva.  Ella no entendió en ese momento que necesitábamos una ley consensuada.  
Se opuso no porque no creyera en la ley, o porque no la apoyara; se opuso porque creía 
que la ley tenía que ir más allá.” 
 
N5.14:  “Logramos un consenso, queríamos una ley, y no queríamos que el tema de la 
violencia en la familia continuara siendo invisible.  La ley tenía el objetivo de sensibilizar 
a la población.  La ley no era lo que queríamos, pero al menos conseguimos aprobar una 
ley.” 
 
N5.15:  “La ley (Ley de Prevención y Asistencia a la Violencia Intrafamiliar) es el 
resultado de un moda política.  Es sólo un a copia de la del Distrito Federal.  Muchas 
veces se aprueban aquí, ya que se aprueban allá.  No hubo tal cosa como un estudio de 
fondo de la situación social y características del lugar [Morelos] para ver si se podía 
aplicar.  (…)  En el Estado [Morelos] alguien [diputado estatal] oyó que había una ley de 
violencia en algún lugar, y la quisieron aprobar aquí, pero no se hicieron estudios 
específicos.” 
 
N5.16:  “Una diputada, Malú (María Lucía Micher Camarena, PRD) trae la iniciativa y  
la consensúa con algunas mujeres.  Tomó la ley del Distrito Federal como ejemplo.  Ella 
siguió el mismo procedimiento y modelo que en el Distrito Federal.” 
 
N5.17:  “Hay mujeres que trabajan por los derechos de las mujeres, pero aparte de Las 
Libres….  no, no hay un movimiento que las englobe.  Hay ocasiones que sí actúan, pero 
eso está en función del trabajo legislativo.  Sus acciones son intermitentes, y no existe un 
movimiento estructurado.  Sólo se reúnen por cuestiones coyunturales 
 
N5.18:  No existe un movimiento de mujeres, ya que es parte de la cultura.  A las mujeres 
les cuesta trabajo trabajar por las mujeres,  que le digan chismosa, tortillera, que el 
marido es un mandilón, etc… A mi no me afecta, pero a muchas mujeres les afecta 
mucho eso.” 
 
N5.19:  “El movimiento de mujeres en Guanajuato tiene su origen en el feminismo.  El 
PAN impulsa grupos de mujeres para que luchen en contra de la violencia intrafamiliar.  
Pero lo hacen desde una perspectiva gubernamentalista y asistencialista.  También hay 
alguna ONG de mujeres, pero muchas veces se trata de organizaciones fantasmas.  Sobre 
el tema de violencia, el tema está muy difundido, muchas dicen que atienden, pero en 
realidad hay pocas que lo hagan.” 
 
N5.20:  “[la ley] confundía violencia de género con violencia familiar, y el objetivo de 
esa ley es promover la conciliación.  Pero el problema es que frecuentemente la 
conciliación se confunde con (re)conciliación” 
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N5.21:  “La comisión de genero tiene mayoría PANista y no han entendido que es el 
genero.  La violencia es un tema en el que se meten, pero no tienen ningún tipo de 
formación en temas de género.  Nosotras habíamos dicho que era precisa una reforma de 
la ley, y que el DIF no tendría que tener tanta importancia en la ley.  (…) y sí… las 
legisladoras hablan de reformar la ley, pero hacen una reforma vinculada a la familia, 
confundiendo violencia de género y violencia familiar.  La ley anterior tenía como centro 
la inequidad de género y el poder.  (…) Se crearon unas mesas de trabajo para la ley, para 
consensuarla… pero el PAN mete su propuesta y no nos hacen caso.  Nos dijeron que 
dejáramos que la ley se aprobara, y que luego ya se harían cambios…  No…  Hubo un 
debate público, incluso en la televisión y nosotras sosteníamos que esa ley no servía, al 
igual que no servía la anterior.”  
 
N5.22:  “El PRI dijo que  no iba a apoyar la ley.  La ley de violencia se quedó un poco 
tiempo congelada en el congreso.  Pero entonces el PAN quería que la propuesta de ley 
estuviera consensuada.  Pero como el PAN tiene la mayoría en el Congreso…  La ley la 
aprueba la Comisión de Género y luego se envía a la Comisión de Justicia, donde se 
congela.   Pero todo este proceso coincide con la aprobación del presupuesto, y de 
repente el PRI ya no veía ningún tipo de problema en la ley.  La ley de violencia del 2005 
se aprobó con el apoyo de todos los partidos políticos menos el PRD.” 
 
N5.24:  [sobre el PRD] “es un partido de izquierda, y es lo que se supone que ha de hacer.  
Ninguno de sus diputados esta interesado en el tema [de la violencia intrafamiliar] pero 
las mujeres de otros partidos políticos están todavía menos interesadas en el tema.” 
 
N5.25:  “Hay una propuesta de reforma de ley del PRD, pero hay que verla con ojo 
clínico ya que el PRD tiene una visión populista.” 
 
N5.26:  “Milenio Feminista y las Libres están en desacuerdo con la ley.  Son muy 
radicales.” 
 
N5.27:  “Las libres no quieren llegar a ningún acuerdo, son muy radicales.  Yo creo que 
es una cuestión ideológica.  Ellas son socialistas, pero el gobierno es muy conservador.  
(…)  El problema es que las ONGs están vinculadas con los partidos políticos.” 
 
N5.28:  “Las personas del gobierno intentan dar una imagen de pluralidad.  Antes 
colaborábamos con el gobierno, incluso durante la aprobación de la ley de violencia 
intrafamiliar, cuando Vicente Fox era el gobernador de Guanajuato.  Pero ahora no.  
Tenemos nuestra posición bien definida.  No participamos, no porque no estemos 
interesadas, sino por que ya sabemos que esto es un juego, y que todo está ya cocinado.” 
 
N5.29:  “Es muy complicado trabajar con las mujeres del movimiento feminista.  Es un 
reto.  Yo creo que tendríamos que trabajar juntas, pero es muy complicado (…).  Hay 
pocas ONGs en Guanajuato y han hecho un buen trabajo al promover la creación del 
Instituto de las Mujeres, pero quizás de la forma en que lo hicieron no fue la correcta.  
[Las ONGs] tienen muy buenas cosas, y de alguna forma están vinculadas con el 
 359
gobierno, pero en la forma en que actúan no es la adecuada.  Algunas ONGs tienen 
mucha experiencia, y sería bueno encontrar un nuevo modo en que el gobierno y las 
ONGs pudieran interactuar.” 
 
N5.30: “Aquí en Jalisco, predomina el machismo.  El machismo ha impedido que se 
reconozca a la mujer como un ser humano igual.  Aunque la mujer tiene en teoría los 
mismos derechos que el hombre, a veces siente que sólo tiene derecho a migajitas.” 
 
N5.31:  “En Jalisco no hay tal cosa como un movimiento feminista.  Es más, hay una 
confrontación entre aquellas mujeres que se denominan feministas.  Hay una 
fragmentación entre ellas que no han podido superar, y no han logrado constituirse como 
un frente único con aspectos programáticos.  Pero sí existen organizaciones civiles que 
eventualmente han coincidido sobre algún tema.” 
 
N5.32:  “A diferencia de otros estados, en Jalisco no existen organizaciones civiles que 
trabajen el tema de la violencia doméstica.  Al crearse el movimiento [Voces Unidas] se 
buscaba que el gobierno resolviera el problema.  Nosotros somos co-responsables en 
hacer visible el problema, construir una demanda social y denunciar que no haya ley ni 
centros de atención para la violencia familiar.  (…)  Las víctimas de violencia familiar 
tenían pocos sitios donde ir.  Podían acudir a la Universidad de Guadalajara… pero 
ninguna organización era especialista con excepción de CIAM.  (…)…El tema de la 
violencia intrafamiliar no podría haber entrado [a la esfera pública] a partir del 
movimiento de mujeres, ya que el Jalisco y el Estado están vacunados en contra del 
feminismo.” 
 
N5.33:  ”(…) desde el principio la parte jurídica del proyecto quedó en manos del CIAM, 
representado pro la Licenciada Andrea Medina Rosas (…) sin embargo estaban claros los 
objetivos jurídicos para prevenir, evitar y, en su momento, sancionar la violencia 
intrafamiliar…  Finalmente, y ante la preocupación de Voces Unidas, el 23 de febrero de 
1998, el departamento de derecho a través de una comisión, analizó el trabajo legislativo 
y encontró que no reunía las aspiraciones que generaron el movimiento social que ya se 
encontraba en una etapa muy avanzada.  Trabajé [junto con ese grupo de abogados] para 
evitar que se diera cualquiera de los dos supuestos ambos negativos:  parar la iniciativa a 
unos cuantos días del compromiso público de presentación o que ésta tuviera un sentido 
distinto al que se publicitado hacia la sociedad y hacia la Iglesia misma, por ello se 
trabajó durante tres semanas, primero, para diferir el compromiso de presentarla el día 8 
de marzo (Día Internacional de la Mujer) y luego, trabajar con la responsable del 
proyecto para conservar todas la propuestas legítimas y tendientes a prevenir, disuadir y 
sancionar la conductas atentatorias en contra de la familia, quitarle lo represivo y algunas 
consideraciones de género que no tenían vinculación con el tema inicial del movimiento.”   
 
N5.34:  Ella [Andrea Medina] hizo cambios.  Esos cambios no habían sido discutidos por 
Voces Unidas y provocan una situación que impacta al Colectivo [Voces Unidas] y la 
posibilidad de que la ley se aprobara sin tanto peligro.  Es muy difícil llegar a un 
consenso.  Había una lucha entre intereses colectivo e individuales.” 
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N5.35:  “Hemos de reconocer que al momento de presentar al H. Congreso dicho 
documento, se le hicieron algunas modificaciones por la licenciada Medina Rosas que no 
estaban previstas, las cuales sin ser demasiado trascendentes, sí han metido un ruido 
innecesario a todo el proyecto.  (…)  ITESO participó en la Iniciativa, ahora bien, lo que 
nunca estuvo ni directa ni indirectamente involucrado en los objetivos fue atentar contra 
el concepto de familia, matrimonio ni otras cuestiones que pudieran interpretarse como 
de género.”   
 
NOTES CHAPTER 6 
 
N6.1: “Normalmente las mujeres tienden a sufrir más de un tipo de violencia.  En el caso 
de que sufran violencia psicológica o económica, las mujeres sienten que hay algo malo 
en su relación, pero no conceptualizan lo que les está ocurriendo como violencia.” 
 
N6.2:  “El problema es que el DIF y en general las instituciones del gobierno en 
Guanajuato no ven la violencia intrafamiliar como un delito.  La entienden como un 
conflicto.  Es por eso que el DIF entiende conciliación como reconciliación de la pareja.  
Todavía no hay conciencia de que la violencia intrafamiliar es un delito.  El robo de autos 
no lo concilias.  Entonces, ¿Por qué si concilias la violencia intrafamiliar?” 
 
N6.3: “(...) en la Procuraduría de Justicia del Distrito Federal existe una consigna de que 
si los casos de violencia intrafamiliar se resuelven mediante conciliación, entonces se 
consigue bajar el índice delictivo.” 
 
N6.4:  “Desde el Ministerio Público se promueve la reconciliación.  A veces se empuja a 
las personas continuar con la relación y se promueve la conciliación.  (…) Cuando la 
mujer otorga el perdón ya no se persigue la causa, aunque sea un delito que inicialmente 
se podría perseguir de oficio.” 
 
N6.5:  “Aquí, en Jalisco, no queremos que la relación se rompa, queremos que todas las 
posibilidades se agoten antes de que se produzca la disolución de la pareja.”  
 
N6.6:  “Se ve la violencia de pareja como un pleicitecito, y el Estado lo intenta resolver 
como si fueran niños.  (...)  El interés de las políticas públicas no es la mujer maltratada, 
es la familia.  Lo que les interesa no es el derecho individual, sino conservar la familia 
como institución social básica.  Clasifican a las familias en buenas y en malas, en 
funcionales y disfuncionales.  La esposa tiene que ser dulce, amorosa, tierna, tiene que 
atender al marido y apoyarlo, es decir...  la esposa tradicional.  (...)  Muchas de las 
instituciones que se encargan de implementar las leyes de violencia como es el caso del 
DIF, reproducen los patrones de género tradicionales, y en cierta forma lo que hacen es 
´como no podemos convencer al marido de que no sea violento, entonces hay que 
someter a la mujer, hay que confinar a la mujer a sus roles tradicionales´.” 
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N6.7:  “El Estado tiene entonces una función paternalista.  Por ejemplo en el DIF la idea 
es que los psicólogos tienen que hacer todo lo posible para que no se desintegre la 
familia.  Y por eso empujan a las mujeres al proceso de conciliación, para preservar la 
familia con independencia de cómo se sienta la mujer dentro de ella, o de que sufra 
violencia o no.  En Jalisco hay una visión muy conservadora sobre que es la familia.  La 
ley dice que no se deben permitir las conductas violentas, pero lo cierto es que las 
instituciones colaboran a que se perpetúe la violencia.” 
 
N6.8: “El empoderamiento a la Mexicana es cambiar para que todo siga igual.” 
 
N6.9: “La conciliación es un lavado de cerebro a las mujeres para que continúen en la 
relación.   En la conciliación la única que sale perdiendo es la mujer, y al hombre no le 
pasa nada (...) La conciliación ni es justa ni es equitativa.  Aunque haya terceras personas 
las mujeres son muy influenciables por el marido.  La conciliación no debería existir si el 
varón no recibe atención psicológica primero.” 
 
N6.10:  “Los especialistas dicen que no puede haber conciliación sin un trabajo previo y 
que no se puede negociar ya que la mujer y el hombre no están en igualdad de 
condiciones.  Sí que tiene sentido negociar cuando la mujer esta empoderada, pero no en 
otras condiciones.” 
 
N6.11:  “Las mujeres tienen miedo de hablar.  Nos damos cuenta del grado de violencia 
del hombre cuando amenaza a la mujer delante de nosotros y no la deja hablar.  A veces 
el hombre está hablando durante varias horas, se queja de que ella no está en casa, de que 
la comida no le gusta, de que la casa esta sucia.  (...)  A veces he llegado a temer por la 
vida de la mujer.  Algunos hombres llegan enojadísimos y exigiendo.  Cuando vemos esa 
situación pedimos a un policía que esté presente en el proceso de conciliación.  A veces 
me han intentado golpear y también a la señora que esta aquí.” 
 
N6.12:  [sobre la conciliación] “ si la lleva acabo una persona que sabe sobre violencia 
intrafamiliar es una maravilla, si no es una porquería.  El que no sabe le dice a las 
personas involucradas en la violencia que hablen ellos.  Eso es una plática, eso no es una 
conciliación.  El abogado en cambio da alternativas, y puede hacer propuestas, pero son 
las personas las que deciden.” 
 
N6.13:  [Entrega del citatorio para la conciliación].  “Antes de 2003 se le pedía apoyo a la 
policía preventiva para que ellos entregaran los oficios.  Ahora ella se lo da a la policía 
para que lo entregara al hombre.  Si la policía no lo puede entregar tras intentarlo en dos 
ocasiones, le dan respuesta a la institución, entonces le corresponde en teoría a la mujer.  
A veces, yo lo hago de forma personal, o hago que un familiar de ella o algún conocido le 
entregue la citación al hombre.  Normalmente ellas se salen de la casa, pero en algunas 
ocasiones todavía están allí cuando el hombre lo recibe.  Eso es peligroso.  Hay muchas 
mujeres que no se van ya que tienen miedo de que su pareja les acuse de abandono de 
hogar, lo cual es imposible ya que hay un motivo.  No marcharse en este contexto es muy 
peligroso para las mujeres.” 
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N6.14:  “El 90% de las mujeres no disuelve el matrimonio, y les otorgan el perdón al 
marido.  Las mujeres creen que deben otorgar el perdón, y que todo el proceso 
administrativo y penal es para que los hombres aprendan.” 
 
N6.15:  “Las mujeres la mayoría se echan para atrás, firman el convenio y deciden darle 
al tipo una segunda, tercera, o cuarta oportunidad.  También entra en juego el tema de la 
dependencia económica de la mujer.  Por lo que a veces las mujeres de clase social más 
alta es más probable que se queden en la relación por la dependencia económica y nadie 
quiere bajar de nivel.” 
 
N6.16:  “Las mujeres pobres toleran la violencia en parte por razones económicas.  Las 
mujeres pobres presentan muchas más denuncias que las mujeres de mejor clase social, 
pero también es menos probable que la denuncia prospere por los gastos que genera.  
Aunque tengan un abogado de oficio, iniciar un proceso por violencia intrafamiliar 
acarrea gastos y desembolsar dinero.  Y si no tienen dinero para comer, todavía tienen 
menos para pagar certificados copias y otro papeleo que requiere el proceso.  En algunos 
casos su autoestima es tan baja que piensan que no pueden sobrevivir sin ellos.  En 
muchas ocasiones este pensamiento es algo estúpido porque ellas los mantienen e incluso 
les dan dinero para sus vicios.” 
 
N6.17:  “He visto a muchos hombres prometer el cielo y las estrellas a las mujeres.  Las 
mujeres los han perdonado, y he visto como la misma mujer ha regresado a buscar 
ayuda.” 
 
N6.18: “Las mujeres acuden a la agencia pública.  Muchas veces ellas no saben lo que 
quieren, pero piden ayuda.  En el transcurso de unas horas, si tienen suerte, ya han pasado 
por el departamento de trabajo social, el departamento jurídico y el psicológico.  Después 
de contar su historia, esa institución cita la marido.  La policía, en aquellos estados donde 
si esta previsto lleva el citatorio, y si no es la propia mujer quien lleva al marido la 
citación.  Y, ¿Qué sucede?  Que el 50% de las mujeres ya no regresa a la agencia publica, 
otras muchas vuelven con el marido, y otras retiran la demanda.  Desisten.  (...)  Citan al 
hombre y a la mujer con media hora de diferencia.  El marido llega enojado, y la gente de 
la unidad, tanto los hombres de las mujeres que trabajan en la agencia lo intentan calmar 
y le dicen que buscarán soluciones.  El hombre pasa a terapia una media hora y luego lo 
citan para que firmen un convenio.  Eso si es que no lo hacen en ese mismo momento.  
En algunos casos se requiere que los hombres se sometan a terapia psicológica antes de 
proceder con el convenio.  El convenio se firma en la unidad y entonces en el convenio se 
pone la cláusula de respeto mutuo, y se llega a un compromiso.  En algunos casos 
[estados] también se puede incluir una cláusula por la cual tanto el agresor como la 
victima se comprometen a recibir terapia psicológica.” 
 
N6.19: “De acuerdo con mi experiencia, creo que el acuerdo de conciliación es inútil.  
Las mujeres continúan siendo violentadas, quizás, en algunos casos, en un nivel inferior, 
pero viven violentadas de cualquier modo.  No creo que así se ponga fin a la violencia, se 
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necesita trabajo psicológico de ambas partes.  Las personas con problemas psicológicos y 
emocionales no cambian.  Yo no creo en el proceso administrativo de conciliación.” 
 
N6.20:  “Con la ley nueva se firma el convenio, y la persona ha de ir ante el juez para 
ratificar el convenio y que adopte categoría de cosa juzgada, el problema es que muchas 
veces las mujeres no acuden ante el juez, y entonces ante cualquier tipo de violación del 
convenio no se puede hacer nada.  (...) En esos casos en los que se incumple el convenio 
se puede proceder por la vía civil o penal.  Pero entonces viene lo complicado, se ha de 
hacer mucho trabajo con la señora para que se inicien estos procesos alternativos”. 
 
N6.21:  “En general aquí en el DIF Jalisco intentamos que todos los convenios que se 
celebran entre las partes los ratifique el juez.  Pero hay algunos jueces que si los ratifican 
y otros no.  Los que no ratifican dicen que como es jurisdicción voluntaria...  no lo hacen.  
En Jalisco cuando se presenta una demanda, la computadora la asigna a un determinado 
juez, es por eso que dependiendo del juez se ratifica el convenio o no se hace.” 
 
N6.22:  “Si no se cumple el convenio en teoría hay multas, pero en realidad no se pagan.  
Estamos tratando con la secretaria de finanzas que se encargue de  recaudar y exigir las 
multas.  Entonces en realidad no establecemos ni las sanciones ni arrestos.  De momento 
la única alternativa que nos dejan, claro si la mujer quiere, es fundamentar la situación 
con documentos e ir delante del MP para presentar una demanda penal sobre la base de 
que ‘no hubo cambio por parte del hombre, por la violación del convenio y los nuevos 
actos de violencia eso constituyen violencia intrafamiliar.” 
 
N6.23:  “Si que hay resultados con la ley.  A los hombres que son detenidos los 
mandamos a terapia.  Creo que no hay reincidentes, ya sea por miedo o porque las 
terapias funcionan.  Las fianzas son de hasta 30.000 pesos.  (…)  El hombre se ha dado 
cuenta de que si golpean hay un castigo.  Pero antes era todo muy distinto.” 
 
NOTES CHAPTER 7 
 
N7.1:  “El tema de la violencia doméstica está de moda, es rentable políticamente y que 
vende mucho en el proceso electoral.  Cualquier candidato político, con independencia de 
la posición a la que se postule (local, estatal o federal) se ve muy bien si apoya el tema o 
ha participado en políticas [sobre violencia domestica].  Para los candidatos éste es un 
tema necesario.  Cincuenta y dos por ciento del padrón electoral está compuesto por 
mujeres, y un candidato que resulta atractivo para las mujeres es más probable que resulte 
elegido.  Este es el motivo por el cual llevan el tema de la violencia doméstica como 
bandera.”  
 
N7.2:  “De alguna forma los partidos de izquierda están más interesados en la 
problemática, tienen una visión más egalitaria del género que los partidos más 
conservadores, que tienen unas posturas que alimentan el sistema de desigualdad.” 
 
 364
N7.3:  “Hay diferencias entre partidos.  Por ejemplo la visión feminista del PRD es que la 
violencia doméstica se ha de reducir y erradicar para garantizar que las mujeres tengan 
una mejor calidad de vida.  Las legisladoras del PAN, por otro lado, creen que la 
violencia doméstica afecta a la familia, y que la violencia ha de desaparecer para 
mantener la familia intacta.  Es género versus familia.  Hay mucha gente con experiencia 
que quiere cambiar las cosas, pero dentro del mismo grupo político puedes encontrar 
facciones.  Estas facciones están incluso en mi propio partido.” 
 
N7.4:  “Durante la LVII legislatura se produjo un avance importante en los temas sobre 
mujeres.  Después, el ascenso del PAN trae personas con ideologías de derechas que 
tomaron el camino erróneo.  Tienen presiones de la Iglesia y de algunas organizaciones 
conservadoras.  Parece que hacen cosas para las mujeres, pero sólo es la fachada.  Por 
ejemplo, han fortalecido instituciones como el DIF y el Instituto de la Beneficencia 
Pública, que proveen asistencia a las mujeres.  El gobierno del presidente Fox pasará a la 
historia no sólo por ser el partido que sacó al PRI del gobierno, pero también por ser 
incapaz de promover la consolidación democrática.  En poco tiempo el PAN, con su 
perspectiva de familia, ha intentado promover cambios en las áreas donde se habían 
conseguido los mayores logros, como es el caso de la violencia doméstica o los derechos 
reproductivos.”   
 
N7.5:  “A las mujeres se les ha de dar sus golpes para controlarlas.” 
 
N7.6:  “(…) ellos nos decían que estábamos en contra de la familia, que éramos 
lesbianas, incluso algunas de las mujeres que apoyaban la legislación sobre violencia 
familiar les enviaron un chorizo.  Ya sabes...  como ellos pensaban que éramos lesbianas, 
era para comprobar si nos gustaba el chorizo.” 
 
N7.7:  “Las mujeres somos todavía las que se ocupan de otras mujeres.  La cultura 
machista y patriarcal está muy arraigada en México.  Nosotras, las mujeres, luchamos en 
contra de los hombres, incluso de nuestro propio partido.  Nosotras luchamos en contra 
del sarcasmo, en contra de sus actitudes machistas.  En los partidos políticos, al igual que 
en la sociedad hay machos, hay hombres autoritarios.  Pero hemos de luchar por la 
igualdad entre hombres y mujeres.  (...)  Hay hombres misóginos en todos los lados, y 
hombres con ideologías que son muy difíciles de cambiar.  Pero todavía las mujeres 
luchamos por otras mujeres.  Los hombres en la política pueden apoyar las propuestas de 
las mujeres, pero todavía es muy difícil que un hombre lidere una propuesta para las 
mujeres.” 
 
N7.8:  Nosotras [ONGs] le comunicamos a la diputada Victoria Chavira (PAN) que 
necesitábamos una ley [sobre violencia en contra de las mujeres].  Nos reunimos con la 
diputada Chavira y con varios de sus asesores y asesores del Congreso.  (...)  La diputada 
Chavira tiene mucho interés.  Pero es la única en el Congreso y en su partido que tiene 
interés.  Ella tiene  un interés personal para hacer algo, es muy responsable.  Es una cosa 
individual, a veces están en las reuniones otras diputadas de la Comisión de Género e 
 365
Igualdad, pero el verdadero interés lo tiene ella.  Ella ha sido la responsable que en el 
Congreso del Estado ahora haya mayor apertura sobre temas vinculados con la mujer.” 
 
N7.9:  Las diputadas de otros partidos políticos, e incluso del PAN, si no obstruyen mi 
trabajo, tampoco ayudan.  Pero creo que su momento todavía no ha llegado.  (…)  El 
sistema patriarcal es tan fuerte que hay pocas luces de liberalismo en el Congreso.  Yo 
propuse a las mujeres de todas las fracciones parlamentarias trabajar juntas en una ley 
sobre violencia en contra de las mujeres.  Empecé a trabajar, pero ellas no estaban muy 
interesadas.  Y lo que hice, fue invitar a miembros de ONGs para analizar y escribir una 
propuesta de ley.” 
 
N7.10:  “Todo acto del gobierno y promesa política que no se ve reflejada en un 
propuesto es populismo.  Cualquier iniciativa que quiera incorporar la transversalización 
de la perspectiva de género, como es el caso de la violencia de pareja, ha de pasar por 
modificar los presupuestos públicos.” 
 
N7.11:  “Hay cierta indolencia para denunciar.  Aunque hay CAVIS y agencias de delitos 
sexuales, tienen mucha carga de trabajo.  Se precisan más técnicos, y un equipo más 
especializado, servicios adecuados...  Las mujeres pasan por una ruta crítica.  Imagínate 
el caso de esta mujer.  Es un caso real.  Llego de Sinaloa.  La policía trae a la mujer al 
albergue ya que temían por la vida de la mujer debido a las conexiones de su marido con 
el narcotráfico.  Esta mujer llega al albergue en un estado crítico, con hematomas en todo 
el cuerpo, muchos golpes y violada con un objeto.  De hecho la mujer se salva ya que el 
marido la deja inconsciente, creo que el pensó que la había matado.   
Luego nos pide ayuda y la acompañamos a la agencia especial del Ministerio Público 
para certificar las lesiones.  Pero la agencia especial no abre los sábados y domingos, y 
nos vamos a una agencia normal del Ministerio Público.  No tuvieron ningún tipo de 
indolencia, mientras estábamos esperando se fueron a cenar...  Esperamos una hora y 
media.  Y la mujer esta ahí, toda golpeada.  Cuando ya nos atienden nos dicen que sólo le 
podían tomar declaración ya que el médico encargado de certificar lesiones no estaba allí, 
por lo que tenemos que ir al hospital.  Estábamos en una zona urbana, imagínate qué 
sucedería en una zona rural.  Finalmente llegamos al servicio de urgencias del hospital.  
Después de esperar más de una hora, y tras vernos, el medico nos dice que no puede 
hacer nada, ya que no llevábamos con nosotros el documento en el que estaba la orden 
del Ministerio Público.  Entonces nos regresamos a por el papel a la Procuraduría, 
conseguimos el papel y volvemos de regreso al hospital,  y luego nos dicen que volvamos 
al día siguiente.  Regresamos al día siguiente.  Esta mujer estaba acompañada por 
nosotras [trabajadoras del refugio].  ¿Te puedes imaginar a alguien que haya de pasar por 
todo este proceso sola?  Es muy improbable que acabe levantando una denuncia en contra 
de su agresor.” 
 
N7.12:  “La primera vez que llamamos, tardamos más de una hora para llegar al último 
teléfono, y cuando nos conectan a ese teléfono, resulta que era un fax.” 
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N7.13:  “Las personas  encargadas de los programas de violencia de familia no tienen 
ningún conocimiento sobre el tema y sólo dan una respuesta burocrática a los problemas.  
Desconocen el papel tan importante que tienen en la asistencia y prevención de la 
violencia familiar.  (...) Es complicado encontrar una agencia confiable, en la que esté 
claro el procedimiento a seguir en casos de violencia doméstica y que la mujer sea tratada 
con respeto.” 
 
N7.14:  “Los individuos responsables de esas agencias están preocupados por su propio 
protagonismo, en su búsqueda por ser el centro de atención, en lugar de preocuparse por 
aquellos para los cuales están diseñados los servicios gubernamentales.” 
 
N7.15:  “La actitud de los poderes públicos ha cambiado, pero no lo suficiente.  En cada 
renovación de gobierno se ha de cabildear.  El problema es que el tema de la violencia de 
género no está institucionalizado.  Los poderes públicos no están preparados.  Hay que 
incidir en sensibilizar.  Muchas veces con cada cambio de gobierno se pierde todo lo que 
se ha conseguido.  Pero poco a poco se ha logrado posicionar el tema en la opinión 
publica.” 
 
N7.16:  “A las mujeres las tratan muy mal en el DIF [Jalisco], las obligan a retomar su 
relación con los hombres que las violentan.  El DIF fuerza la reconciliación de la familia, 
y evita a cualquier precio el divorcio.” 
 
N7.17:  “Hay una ofensiva fuerte de la ultra derecha para promover un determinado 
modelo de familia, diciendo que el matrimonio no se puede disolver, sólo en casos en que 
haya peligro de muerte, pero que si sólo hay golpes el matrimonio debe seguir.” 
 
N7.18:  “El DIF mete mucho ruido, importan las mujeres como integrantes de la familia.  
El DIF ve a la familia como papá, mamá e hijo.  Con esta conceptualización no quieren 
que la gente se separe, si se separan o se divorcia, entonces ya no es familia.  Este es el 
motivo por el cual quieren mantener la familia unida con independencia de la situación de 
violencia de la mujer.” 
 
N7.19:  “Muchas de las mujeres que llegan a la CEDH Morelos cuando se van te dejan 
100 pesos, ya que en todas las instituciones a las que acuden le dan dinero.  La minoría de 
los casos lo hacen por agradecimiento, pero la mayoría lo hace por costumbre.  Nosotros 
les decimos que nuestros servicios y atención son gratuitos.  Lo que sucede es que están 
acostumbradas a que tienen que dar dinero por debajo de la manga a los servidores 
públicos si quieren que se agilice su asunto o trámite.  Por ejemplo, en el Ministerio 
Público si no tienes dinero no se agiliza la investigación o la tramitación de la queja.  
Incluso ha habido mujeres que me han dicho que como su esposo tiene recursos, éste ha 
pagado al Ministerio Público para que no dé continuidad al caso de violencia, o para que 
los dictámenes salgan a favor del tipo.  Casi el 50% de los casos que atendemos son 
quejas de los Ministerios Públicos, que actuaron de manera improcedente como 
consecuencia de haber aceptado el dinero del marido.” 
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N7.20:  “En el Estado [Chihuahua] no hay corrupción y los MPs tienen un salario 
aceptable.  No piden mordida.  La mayoría de quejas sobre los MP son por que tardan 
demasiado tiempo en tramitar la denuncia.  Pero aquí los MP no piden mordida.  Antes si 
que sucedía, pero no ahora.  En Chihuahua los MP están muy fiscalizados.  Sí que puede 
haber actitudes machistas, pero éstas se han ido reduciendo con el tiempo.  Pero aún y 
cuando los MP no estén capacitados en cuestiones de género, los comentarios machistas 
en contra de las mujeres que sufren violencia los pueden hacer tanto los hombres como 
las mujeres MP.” 
 
N7.21:  “El Procurador General, Leobardo Larios Guzmán, está muy comprometido con 
el tema de la violencia en contra de la mujer, y quiere que todos los ciudadanos reciban 
un buen servicio de la Procuraduría.  Casi 2000 personas en la Procuraduría ya han 
recibido capacitación en el tema de la violencia en contra de las mujeres.  Es un proceso 
difícil y lento ya por el tema del que se trata [violencia de pareja], pero creo que la 
capacitación está dando sus frutos.  Ya no hay tanto machismo como había antes en la 
Procuraduría.  Hay muchos mitos sobre los MPs y algunos de ellos ya están 
desapareciendo.  Al menos aquí, esos mitos son cosa del pasado.  Casi toda la plantilla de 
la Procuraduría cambió como resultado de un proceso que se inició en el año 2002.  La 
Procuraduría tuvo un proceso de control interno ya que algunos de nuestros efectivos 
estaban involucrados en cuestiones de violencia, y había casos de corrupción.  Lo 
limpiamos todo, y desde entonces, creo que la situación ha mejorado.  Creo que todo 
depende de la persona que esté al frente de la institución.” 
 
N7.22:  “Se tiene la imagen de que el Ministerio Público es de lo peor.  A veces las 
mujeres llegan aquí y quieren que les solucionemos la vida, y a veces no entienden que 
tenemos un procedimiento a seguir.  Nosotras hemos recibido mucha capacitación en 
temas de género y de violencia en contra de las mujeres.  Pero las mujeres que acuden 
aquí no entienden que tengamos que hacer un interrogatorio.  Sobre todo se enfadan 
mucho cuando nos damos cuenta que ellas denuncian cosas que son  falsas.  Entonces van 
por ahí diciendo que las tratamos mal.” 
 
N7.23:  “Las mujeres en el Ministerio Público o en otras agencias públicas no son 
distintas de los hombres.  Tener un cuerpo de mujer no es garantía de que ofrezcan un 
mejor trato a las víctimas de violencia de pareja.  Tanto los hombres como las mujeres 
están atrapados en una cultura patriarcal.  Si las mujeres no reciben capacitación, los 
hombres y las mujeres son igualmente insensibles.” 
 
N7.24:  “Las mujeres son completamente distintas.  Ellas tienen otras cualidades como la 
inteligencia emocional que les permiten atender a las mujeres victimas de violencia de 
otra forma.” 
 
N7.25:  “Con independencia de si es una situación de violencia doméstica o no, creo que 
las mujeres tratan de forma distinta a las víctimas de crímenes que los hombres.  Las 
mujeres tratan mejor a las víctimas, de una forma más humana.  Quizás es por una 
cuestión biológica.  Las mujeres son más sensibles, más comprensivas y tienen más 
 368
paciencia para entender el conflicto y sus causas.  Las mujeres son más hábiles en la 
resolución de conflictos.  Los hombres, por el contrario, son más prácticos y fríos con 
respecto a los problemas de familia.” 
 
N7.26:  “Si ellos [agentes del ministerio publico] son violentos en sus casas, ¿Qué tipo de 
asistencia y trato quieres que estos MPs le den a las mujeres?”. 
 
N7.27:  “He participado en seminarios y sesiones que tenían como objetivo la 
capacitación de MP en el tema de la violencia en contra de la mujer.  Es tan obvio que 
muchos de esos están involucrados en el problema.  Algunos de ellos me han contactado 
de forma privada después de las sesiones de capacitación y me han solicitado ayuda.  
Algunos otros, incluso llegué a pensar que iban a reconocer en frente de sus compañeros 
de salón que habían sido víctimas de violencia durante su infancia, o que ejercen 
violencia en contra de sus parejas“. 
 
N7.28:  “(...) el crimen de violencia intrafamiliar es nuevo en México.  Antes, no se 
consideraba como un crimen, era sólo una circunstancia agravante vinculada a otro 
crimen.  Muchas autoridades públicas no lo saben; ese el motivo por el cual se trata mal a 
las mujeres.” 
 
N7.29:  “Es desesperante ver como las mujeres que llegan aquí [juzgados penales], o a las 
agencias del MP con lesiones serias derivadas de la violencia domestica luego los 
perdonan.  Es frustrante, ya que toda la maquinaria para que después los perdonen.  Los 
MP no creen a las mujeres o no las toman en serio ya que creen que la mujer perdonará a 
su agresor, por lo tanto, [los MPs] no quieren iniciar todo el procedimiento.” 
 
N7.30:  “Nuestra ley prevé que el ejecutivo instrumente los programas [sobre violencia 
familiar], y el Gobernador tiene responsabilidad para hacerlo.  Ahora en Guanajuato hay 
un Gobernador [Juan Carlos Romero Hicks] con interés en la familia.  El tiene una 
familia muy bonita.  Se casó con Frances Siekman, estadounidense, y tiene diez hijos.  Él 
le presta una atención particular a la familia.  El Gobernador es una figura clave en el 
estado para el desarrollo de políticas de familia, y el lo está haciendo.  Claro, también lo 
hicieron los gobernadores anteriores, Carlos Medina Plasencia, Vicente Fox Quesada, y 
Ramón Martín Huerta [todos ellos del PAN].  Todos estos gobernadores jóvenes sí que 
han tenido interés en temas de familia.  Quizás eso ha sido lo que nos ha dado un 
esquema de familia diferente.” 
 
N7.31:  “La esposa del gobernador [Frances Siekman de Romero] ha estado siempre muy 
preocupada por la gente.  Y si ella le da apoyo al tema de la violencia doméstica es 
porque piensa que es importante.  El problema es grave.  La esposa del gobernador es una 
persona muy sencilla, que se preocupa por las mujeres.  Muchas veces se interesa en 
venir aquí aunque aquí no se tomen fotos.” 
 
N7.32:  “Se rumorea que el gobernador ha estado involucrado en cuestiones de violencia 
doméstica, quizás convocar el Consejo de Prevención y Asistencia de la Violencia 
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Intrafamiliar le traiga memorias personales.  El no está interesado en el tema y bloquea 
cualquier tipo de acción de las instituciones gubernamentales y ONGs.  Además, el 
rechaza el tema de la violencia intrafamiliar.  Pero quizás también es una cuestión de 
partido.  El PAN quiere mantener la familia unida.  Pero creo que en su caso son ambas 
cosas, una cuestión personal y una cuestión de partido.  (...)  Hemos intentado negociar 
con varias instituciones incluyendo el Instituto Morelense de las Mujeres, ya que le 
tocaba liderar un programa sobre violencia contra las mujeres.  Pero reciben poco apoyo, 
y el gobierno actual no les permite actuar libremente.  Esperemos que el próximo 
Gobernador sea más sensible y que se puedan mover las cosas con el cambio de 
gobierno.” 
 
N7.33:  “Las circunstancias políticas del Gobernador no ha permitido que se centren en el 
tema de la violencia hacia las mujeres.  La política del Gobernador en Morelos se ha 
centrado en las obras, pero no existe un verdadero interés del gobierno en el ser humano.” 
 
N7.34:  “Aquí en Chihuahua había un gobernador que ejercía violencia en contra de su 
mujer.  Se rumorea que en una de esas la señora tuvo que irse a EE.UU. para tratamiento.  
El canceló casi todos los proyectos sobre el tema de violencia doméstica, no había 
UAVIs y detuvo el CEPAVI.  Definitivamente el nuevo Gobernador ha prestado más 
atención al tema de la violencia de pareja.” 
 
N7.35:  “Yo no diría que el interés en violencia doméstica está vinculado con un partido 
político.  Creo que algunas personas tienen un mayor interés en el tema de la violencia 
familiar que otras.  Cuando hay un cambio de gobierno, te preguntas ¿Qué va a pasar?  
Más que preguntarte qué partido político va a ganar las elecciones a gobernador, te 
preguntas si el recién elegido gobierno estará interesado en la violencia familiar.” 
 
N7.36:  “Sé que algunos de los casos de violencia domestica que me llegan son punibles 
bajo las reformas aprobadas en el código penal, pero yo soy el juez y no le puedo decir al 
fiscal o al abogado como tienen que presentar su caso, ni al MP que levante un acta en la 
que se especifique que existe un delito de violencia familiar.” 
 
N7.37:  “Los jueces son más insensibles de lo que debieran.  Algunos jueces no creen en 
la violencia psicológica.  No creen en las pruebas periciales de los psicólogos.  Es muy 
frustrante.  Hemos avanzado en la sensibilización de los Ministerios Públicos, ahora están 
más sensibilizados que antes.  Pero incluso en aquellos casos en que la respuesta del MP 
es correcta, luego nos topamos con la pared del juez.  Los jueces, tanto hombres como 
mujeres, son muy insensibles, tienen actitudes patriarcales.  Es por eso que cuando 
sabemos que hay un juez insensible a veces esperamos al siguiente turno para que haya 
otro juez.” 
 
N7.38:  “Algunos jueces no quieren recibir capacitación porque piensan que los temas de 
genero no son de su incumbencia.”  
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N7.39: “La ley no nos da instrumentos para acabar con la violencia en contra de las 
mujeres.  Nosotros [jueces] no podemos sentenciar a los hombres a que reciban terapia.  
El poder ejecutivo no nos ofrece ese tipo de servicios.  La única cosa que podemos hacer 
es imponer sanciones y quitar la patria potestad a aquellos que incurran en actos de 
violencia de familia, pero no podemos ir más allá.” 
 
N7.40:  “Con las autoridades tenemos buena relación, las mujeres reciben un trato 
especializado aquí.  Cuando acuden nuestras mujeres a las autoridades, saben (las 
autoridades) que estas mujeres no están jugando.  Sabes? Les damos cartas de 
canalización, de esa forma se agiliza todo el proceso y nos aseguramos que las traten 
bien.  Claro, hay mujeres que han llegado por si solas al Ministerio Público y las han 
tratado bien, pero eso es una suerte.  Es suerte encontrarse con un ángel, con un agente 
sensibilizado.” 
 
N7.41:  “Aquí en la CEDH Morelos llegan mujeres que se quejan de actos u omisiones de 
un servidor público, sobre todo llegan quejas de los MPs.  Llamamos directamente al 
superior jerárquico del servidor público  Después no nos desentendemos, hacemos un 
seguimiento.  Claro, cuando llamamos directamente a otras autoridades sí que responden.  
Esta es la vía rápida de resolver las cosas, si lo hacemos de otra forma no funciona, se 
acaba radicando la queja.  Nosotros nos encargamos que los superiores jerárquicos se 
enteren de lo que hacen los de abajo.  En muchas ocasiones si no fuera por nosotros no se 
enterarían.” 
 
N7.42:  Yo he acompañado personalmente a los MP al juzgado, o he llamado 
directamente al juez para solicitar una que éste/a emita una orden de aprehensión para el 
agresor.  Incluso le he llegado a decir al juez, ´Pídele a Dios que yo te mande un caso de 
una mujer golpeada y que no la maten, porque si no firmas la orden de arresto y le sucede 
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